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Abstract
Gay men and heterosexual women may share some common interests in 
critiquing heteropatriarchy. However feminist ideologies and gay politics do not 
always coincide and the role of individual subjectivities in recognising 
oppressive discourses of normativity remains debated. To address the discursive 
construction of friendship between these identities, interviews were conducted 
with seven friendship dyads of heterosexual women and gay men.
Transcripts were subjected to discourse analysis, which show 
management of heterosexist friendship norms. The analysis highlighted 
ambiguity over the ‘male’ status of gay men, a concern with constructing the 
friendships as legitimately asexual, and the use of parody in the face of 
homophobia to disrupt normative assumptions. A second strand of analysis 
considered discourses of excess consumption (e.g. cocktails, clothing) in 
constructing the friendships as fun, but are also implicated in the performance of 
some visible gay identities. There was tension between construction of friendship 
in terms of fun and individualism, suggesting an interpersonal rather than 
political discourse of friendship.
Interviewees drew upon media representations of gay male / heterosexual 
female friendship. To examine these accounts, and discourses ‘missing’ from 
interviews, identifiable media representations were collected with the help of 
internet participants. This suggested the emergence of a relatively new discourse 
of friendship between heterosexual women and gay men. A discourse analysis, 
focused primarily on the sitcom Will & Grace, suggested common sexual interest 
in the same man potentially threatens friendship. While Will & Grace has 
received attention for its gay representation, it is seldom considered in feminist 
terms. Analysis showed instances where Will’s help was deeply patriarchal and 
ridiculed Grace in ways that are not easily accommodated within the construction 
of friendship. This indicates the potential for gay male sexism to be treated as a 
breech of friendship norms rather than as a matter of sexual politics.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Help! I’m a Gay Man Trapped in a Woman’s Body!
In 2003, the UK edition of Elle magazine featured an article warning 
women about the potential hazards of spending too much time with their gay male 
friends. Entitled ‘Help! I'm a Gay Man Trapped in a Woman’s Body!’, the 
headline parodies a discourse of transgender by juxtaposing a woman’s body 
against a supposedly gay male interior. The article problematises the amount of 
time some women spend with gay male friends, suggesting this causes them to 
become more like gay men and to consequently become unattractive to 
heterosexual men, thus diverting them from the normative path of heterosexuality. 
The article ends with a checklist of symptoms which, although tongue-in-cheek, 
expresses certain anxieties about the ways in which heterosexual femininity 
should be performed. Among the signs are:
‘Hearing Judy Garland sing iSbmew/zere over//ze itambow never 
ceases to make you burst into song, if not tears’ ; ‘You can re-enact 
the dance routines (and do it with pride in public) to every 
Bananarama song from the 80s’; ‘You flirt outrageously with every 
gay man you meet. But when it comes to straight men your bitchy 
one-liners are more fag hag than sex siren’; ‘Friends comment on 
your resemblance to Leader of the Fag Hags, Karen, from Will &
Gmce’; ‘You kid yourself that your penchant for feather boas, 
crimson lips and an over-abundance of sequins is endearingly 
flamboyant and eccentric. But that straight guy you're eyeing up is 
probably assuming you're an ageing stripper. Or, worse still, a drag 
queen’
(Finnigan & Hinc, 2003: 132)
Aside from the crude caricature of gay men, the advice seems to be that 
readers should be more interested in heterosexual men and keep flirting with them. 
Women should also avoid identifiably camp culture (e.g., Judy Garland and 
Bananarama) and eschew make-up that exaggerates femininity when this risks 
misidentification as a drag queen. The article is unusually overt in its expression of 
gender norms and regulation of women, femininity and adherence to compulsory 
heterosexuality (Rich, 1980). In the main article, a discourse of moderation
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permits women a limited amount of time spent with gay friends, but suggests that 
their influence/exposure should ultimately be sublimated to the more important 
goal of having a heterosexual relationship.
The Elle article draws upon a number of media constructions of friendship 
between heterosexual women and gay men, most obviously the television comedy 
Will & Grace (first screened in 1998). The last decade has seen the emergence of 
gay male and heterosexual female friendships as a ‘new’ public phenomenon; they 
were previously unrecognised by straight culture or dismissed with the ‘fag hag’ 
label (Quimby, 2005). Scholarship has charted the invention of homosexuality as 
an identity only in the late 19th Century, despite same-sex behaviours previously 
existing (D’Emilio, 1983; Foucault, 1978; Weeks, 1977). In similar terms this 
thesis suggests that although friendships between heterosexual women and gay 
men are not themselves ‘new’, this representation of ‘natural’ affinity between 
heterosexual women and gay men has emerged more recently.
1.2 Thesis Overview
In the following literature review it is argued that friendship is generally 
an under-researched interpersonal relationship that is constructed in specifically 
asexual terms. Social psychological literature tends to construct friendship 
predominantly in terms of shared interests and similarities, whereas literature on 
romantic or sexual relationships places a greater emphasis on complementarity. 
Furthermore friendship and romantic or sexual relations are sometimes presented 
dichotomously, with desire seen as troubling the category of friendship; thus 
friendship is constructed as normatively non-sexual. Consequently, while 
heterosexuality is presumed, female-male friendships are seen to be potentially 
'risky' in terms of the complicating 'threat' of sexual desire. Since male sexual 
desire is generally privileged over female, a gay man's assumed lack of interest in 
women as sexual objects apparently resolves this complicating issue. Whilst 
women may value cross-sex friendships where male sexual desire does not 
intrude, accounts of friendship between heterosexual women and gay men 
predicated on lack of hetero-male desire ignore female sexuality, constructing 
sexual desire as a masculine attribute.
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Politically, (heterosexual) women and gay men may share certain 
objectives in critiquing the dominance of heteropatriachy. However it seems far 
from clear that all gay men are invested in feminist politics. Whilst the 'inversion' 
model of homosexuality associates gay men with femininity, gay men are the 
beneficiaries of male privilege and frequently utilize sexist discourse and 
oppressive practices. Conversely, while women are associated with lower scores 
on homophobia scales, it cannot uniformly be assumed that they have any 
investment in gay politics. So whilst gay men and (heterosexual) women's 
oppressions may overlap, this does not unproblematically and inevitably lead to 
political solidarity.
In the following Method Chapter a detailed epistemological discussion 
considers the philosophy of language and how this came to be considered in 
psychology. It discusses two major discourse analytic approaches and how they 
vary with respect to claims of agency and relativism. The political as well as 
methodological implications of this are discussed and an integrated approach that 
grounds the analysis in a close textual focus while attending to ideologically 
informed readings.
The chapter goes on to discuss the first study where semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with pairs of heterosexual women and gay men (n=14) 
who considered themselves good friends. A pilot interview is discussed in terms 
of how it informed the interview schedule. Recruitment procedures are explained 
in detail and ethical concerns attended to. Some biographical information is 
included about participants, however the need to preserve anonymity required 
caution. The approach to transcription and analysis is described and justified with 
reference to the epistemological position in the first part of the chapter.
There follow three analysis chapters, major topics were identified, 
analysed and discussed: ‘discourses of normativity’; ‘commodification and 
identity’; and ‘liberal individualism’.
The first of these analyses considers participants' orientations towards 
being sexually normative in one dimension (i.e. male or heterosexual), whilst non- 
normative in another (i.e. female or gay). Interviewees frequently positioned 
themselves in terms of these differences and constructed. difference as providing 
useful exchanges of information about gender. Although accessing a 'male point 
of view' was presented favourably, there was some ambiguity about the 'male'
3
status of gay men (reflecting a wider conflation of gay identity with femininity). 
Participants worked to construct their friendships as legitimately asexual whilst 
articulating a requirement that they justify their mutual lack of desire. This 
imperative presented a dilemma, since passing as a heterosexual couple would 
reproduce heteronormativity, yet disclosure could risk negative responses and was 
constructed as implicitly accepting the normalcy of heterosexuality. Although 
presented as an almost inescapable problem, some of the interviewees discussed 
parody as a means of disrupting heteronormative assumptions. When considered 
through the lens of queer theory and Judith Butler's concept of performativity, it 
seems to offer some possibilities for escaping a problematic discourse. Yet 
questions are raised about whether parodies of heterosexuality are read 
parodically by onlookers or whether they risk being interpreted as the 
reproduction of norms.
The second of the analyses explores the issue of commodification, 
consumerism and pop culture, and their implications for identity. Consumption 
(and specifically shopping) is discussed in terms of its claims to liberationary 
potential, both in terms of women as dominant consumers and gay men's 
supposed ('pink pound') spending power. The emergence of gay identity through 
industrialisation and the marketplace is examined historically and, although it has 
brought visibility, questions are raised about whether it has challenged or colluded 
with the underlying heteropatriarchal structure. Interviewees provide consumerist 
accounts of friendship that frequently focus on narratives of mutual acquisition of 
symbolic objects (e.g. tickets for a Madonna concert) and excess consumption 
(e.g. colourful cocktails). Whilst this is constructed in pleasurable terms, it is an 
account of a gay man performing drag in a highly visible way that seems to offer 
the most obvious challenge to heteronormativity. Yet even this casts him as the 
dominant actor, raising questions about the difficulties of simultaneously 
attending to heteronormativity and sexism. Furthermore, while many of the 
interviewees’ accounts suggested considerable individual (or shared) pleasure, this 
is a problematic emancipatory discourse since it mainly privileges young and 
economically advantaged people.
The third analysis focuses on the means by which dyads construct their 
individualism in terms of an atomised self and generally reject associations 
between the personal and the political. By considering the emergence of
liberalism and its focus on the individual alongside psychology's construction of 
the person as an object, this chapter queries the dominant discourse of people as 
self-actualised units. For participants, one dilemma was how to construct their 
friendship in terms of similarities, shared experiences and 'attitudes', whilst also 
presenting the self as a unique individual. The conjunction of personal and 
political found in second wave feminism or the disruption of public/private 
boundaries in queer politics seemed largely absent from the interviewees’ 
accounts. Instead their friendship constructions were overtly personality-based, 
suggesting that not only is the process of friendship formation difficult to 
articulate retrospectively but that, unlike the political alliances proposed between 
(heterosexual) women and gay men,-these friendships were constructed in 
individualistic terms and resisted political interpretation.
Among the detailed friendship accounts was a persistent referencing of 
media representations of gay men and heterosexual women. The cultural currency 
of this account became increasingly obvious as prospective and actual 
participants, colleagues and interested third parties asked about or commented 
upon media representations. A second study is presented in which internet forums 
were used identify representations of heterosexual women and gay men in 
friendships. A broad range of representations were elicited suggesting widespread 
(and relatively recent) representation of these friendships. Pragmatic decisions 
were necessary to identify and sample potentially rich data with the television 
sitcom Will & Grace being used as the primary foci of analysis. Whilst continuing 
to apply the discourse analytic approach utilised in Study One, there is some 
exploration of the sitcom genre in order to understand its conventions and 
narrative form.
Preliminary analysis suggested many potential topics for further 
investigation but two areas of analysis were identified for further discussion. The 
first analysis concerns the tension between individual set piece scenes that parody 
and challenge heterosexist norms, whilst the overarching structure is more 
heteronormative, constantly positioning Grace and Will as pseudo-married.
In the chapter that follows a different concern is adopted and analysis 
focuses on instances of patriarchy and sexism. This was specifically chosen for 
analysis because it is a discourse that is ‘missing’ from the interview data. 
Furthermore, most scholarship on Will & Grace (other examples have received
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less attention) focuses principally on its gay politics without questioning it from a 
more feminist perspective. Specific instances of Will's patriarchal positioning of 
Grace are analysed but there is also broader consideration given to a formulaic 
narrative structure in which Grace is repeatedly 'rescued' by Will and where her 
boyfriends are required to meet with Will's approval. The lack of concern about 
this sexism from gay critics suggests a continued focus on gay politics at the 
expense of feminist concerns.
In conclusion, participants emphasised the mutual support and pleasure 
derived from their friendships (albeit in an interview situation requiring a co­
constructed mutually satisfying account). Positive framing of the absence of 
sexual desire suggested adherence to a discourse of asexual friendship whilst 
actively managing heteronormative expectations. There may be potential 
advantages of cross-sex friendship stripped of the ‘threat’ of hetero-male desire. 
However the existence of gender ambiguous constructions of gay male sexuality 
suggest dominant and oppressive discourses are difficult to shake off, even among 
people who are not obviously homophobic. In similar (and perhaps more 
problematic) terms, sexist discourse was deployed to confront homophobia yet 
itself went unchallenged. The scope of these friendships to resist heteropatriarchy 
is also challenged by the separation of interpersonal alliances from the broader 
domain of ‘public’ political action. By returning to the feminist idea that the 
personal is political, and challenging the view that romantic or sexual 
relationships should be organised hierarchically above (asexual) friendship, there 
may be ways of better understanding the sexual politics of friendship.
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In the following literature review sex differences are discussed in terms of 
how psychology constructs them both as a ‘natural’ object of analysis and within 
the social psychology of interpersonal relationships. Although the construction of 
friendship is non-sexual it is argued that it is still normatively heterosexual, with 
mixed-sex friendships having desire as a potentially ‘complicating’ factor. Since 
the male sex drive discourse positions men as the active sexual agents 
(marginalising female sexuality), friendships between heterosexual women and 
gay men are constructed as sexually uncomplicated by desire. Furthermore the 
emphasis on similarity in friendship constructs an implicit inversion account of 
gay men being ‘like’ women and thus having shared interests. Whether these 
interests extend to a joint critique of heterosexism is a matter of debate. 
Arguments suggesting a potentially powerful political alliance are considered, but 
there remain considerable questions about gay men’s commitment to feminist 
concerns and whether they have more invested in patriarchy.
2.2 Sex Differences
‘Throughout the history of Western culture, three beliefs about women 
and men have prevailed: that they have fundamentally different 
psychological and sexual natures, that men are inherently the 
dominant or superior sex, and that both male-female difference and 
male dominance are natural.’
(Bern, 1993:1)
Before reviewing the construction of sex differences in friendship, I think 
it is important to acknowledge the extent to which psychology has been (and 
continues to be) implicated in the construction and maintenance of patriarchy. As 
Naomi Weisstein (1968/1993: 207) pointed out, psychology constructed women 
as ‘emotionally unstable, lacking in a strong conscience or superego, weaker [...] 
“intuitive” rather than intelligent, and [...] suited to the home and to the family’; 
the implicit benchmark of normalcy is of course the male.
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Whilst such overt misogyny is rarer in contemporary psychology, 
improvements (such as they are) have often been attributed to improved science 
(in the value-free obj ective sense of the word) rather than because of the political 
efforts of feminists and their supporters. What this reveals is a schism between 
feminism (within psychology) as a political project and the positivist claim that 
greater equality is the result of improved science (Wilkinson, 1997). However, 
there can be no doubt that throughout the greater part of the history of psychology, 
the search for sex differences has been a routine aim for many positivist- 
empiricist (and for that matter feminist-empiricist) researchers. Furthermore, the 
rationale for seeking sex differences is sometimes assumed rather than justified in 
more explicit terms, thus raising serious questions about the motivation and 
politics of such work. This is perhaps best exemplified by the almost de facto 
inclusion of participants’ sex when reporting empirical findings. This is not to 
suggest that sex differences never exist, or that they are never meaningful, 
however the unquestioned assumption that sex differences are always worth 
searching for (even where there may be no clear rationale for such an 
examination) is both a product of, and simultaneously a contributor to, the 
construction of essentialist assumptions of sex differences.
Eagly (1995) argues that a long history of research into psychological sex 
differences has revealed differences with are both stable and replicable. Eagly 
further claimed that a broad (though temporary) consensus existed within feminist 
literature favouring either minimal or insignificant results sex differences. Hyde 
and Plant (1995) suggest the extent to which any unified position exists is 
dubious. They cite a range of sex differences which vary in size and different 
avenues of feminist theory as reasons to question whether there is consensus. 
Therefore the empirical basis for claims about sex differences is a highly 
contested area.
Kitzinger (1994) suggests that feminist researchers are indeed relatively 
split between the minimisers and the maximisers (those who represent the 
psychology of women as dramatically different from that of men). The point being 
that neither position is automatically more feminist: minimal sex differences 
provides a basis on which to challenge male dominance, yet it can also be 
criticised for basing equality on male terms. Being Tike’ men is certainly not an 
objective that radical feminists, deeply critical of masculinity, would cherish
(Jeffreys, 1990). Conversely maximising differences can be used to argue the 
distinctiveness of women and problematise the role of men. However, the 
discourse of fundamental sex differences forms part of public understanding of 
gender.
One of the best known popular accounts of essential sex differences is in 
John Gray’s ‘Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus’ (1992). In Gray’s 
paradigm the two cultures of male and female are learned from sex segregated 
play during childhood. Gray constructs a view of the world where men and 
women are so very different that their interactions will inevitably lead to conflict 
and misunderstanding (Hamson, 2003). Gray has come in for considerable 
criticism (see Crawford, 2004 for a review) about the empirical basis for his 
claims. However, the scientific discourse he adopts establishes differences not 
merely as ‘real’, but also as ‘inherent, inevitable and healthy’ (Crawford, p 64).
In other words Gray’s ideal of masculinity and femininity are, subject to 
following his rules and instructions, complimentary in the context of a 
heterosexual relationship.
Binary accounts of femininity and masculinity are difficult for many 
critics to accept because they are so rigid in terms of gender categorisation. The 
narrowness of the gender pigeonholes serves to exclude other identities (e.g., 
transgendered identities and alternative masculinities/femininities, Thomas, 2000). 
Furthermore, the possibility of relationships between two Venusians or Martians 
is not considered (Crawford, 2004). In Gray’s account same-sex relationships are 
an exception to the rule and thus they are implicitly marked as abnormal. In 
addition to this certain problems arise from within the notion of polarised gender. 
Constructing a high degree of gender incompatibility actually problematises 
Werosexuality, after all, if men and women are so fundamentally incompatible 
then why extol the virtues of heterosexuality? As Rochlin’s (1998: 472) 
‘Heterosexual Questionnaire’ puts it, ‘Just what do men and women do in bed 
together? How can they truly know how to please each other, being so 
anatomically different?’ This is a tactical reversal of questions posed to gay men 
and lesbians. Whilst it risks alienating some bisexuals, it queries how a 
maximising account of essential sex differences can automatically naturalise 
heterosexuality.
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Whilst it can be argued that Gray’s metaphor is merely an illustration of 
potential pitfalls in a (heterosexual) relationship, it actually highlights potential 
gender-political tensions. Heterosexuality is established as normative, yet 
simultaneously men and women are constructed in fundamentally different ways. 
It is against this background that the cultural phenomenon of gay men and 
heterosexual women as allies or potential best friends has arisen. Theorists like 
Richardson (1996) suggest that women and gay men may have shared political 
objectives (i.e., resisting heterosexism). So whilst we may consider friendships to 
be socially important, and even good for our mental and physical well-being, the 
construction of friendships between heterosexual women and gay men also 
provides an account of gender and sexuality.
2.3 Friendship
The study of interpersonal relations is one of the staple constituents of 
social psychology; consequently there is a considerable body of literature that 
separates personal relationships into three basic forms: 1) family relations; 2) 
romantic or sexual relationships and 3) friendship (Hogg & Vaughan, 2008). As 
with many seemingly clear distinctions, these categories are not inherently 
mutually exclusive (e.g. siblings might also be friends). However they are 
constructed in terms of social norms and culturally available discourses that 
privilege some categories of interpersonal relationship above others.
Despite evidence that friendships constitute ‘highly salient social bonds’ 
(Felmlee & Muraco: 318) and are associated with positive health implications 
such as longevity (Sabin, 1993), friendships are frequently overlooked and 
undervalued by psychologists. Rose (2000) argues that (heterosexual) romantic 
relationships are hierarchically privileged over friendship. Her contention is that 
research tends to focus on romantic or sexual inter-personal relationships. Miell 
and Croghan (1996) argue that the cultural script for (heterosexual) romantic love 
suggests that romance is key to personal fulfilment and consequently other forms 
of social support and friendships are undervalued or secondary.
Famously the film When Harry Met Sally (1989) explored the belief that 
‘Men and women can never be friends: the sex thing always gets in the way’. This 
suggests the likelihood of emerging sexual or romantic desire as a complicating
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factor in friendship. According to Werking (1997) 24% of cross-friendships ended 
on account of sexual or romantic interest becoming detrimental to the friendship. 
Whilst desire should not framed in universally negative terms, since some 
friendships become satisfying sexual or romantic relationships, Reeder (2000) 
suggested that qualitative distinctions between different types of relationships 
were extremely important to the cross-sex dyads she interviewed. This points to 
desire as a potentially destabilising aspect of friendship, especially where 
unanticipated or unreciprocated.
Duck (2007: 55) regards ‘cross-sex friendship as one of the hottest and 
understudied relationships’. For him the interest is that society increasingly 
permits platonic cross-sex relationships, yet simultaneously people have to 
manage the views of others who may interpret the friendship in other terms (i.e. 
romantic). So there seems to be a dual issue: firstly mutually satisfying 
management of possible sexual or romantic attraction; secondly a societal 
scepticism about legitimately asexual cross-sex friendships.
One of the difficulties with the separation of friend from romance is that 
this construction starts to break down under close analysis. Afifi and Faulkner 
(2000) reported 67% of college students claiming to have had sex with a friend. 
Whilst this does not necessarily equate with romance, it certainly troubles 
definitions of unambiguous non-sexual friendship. Sexual desire is commonly 
held to be the differentiating factor between friendship and romantic love (e.g. 
Duck, 2007). However alternative accounts of friendship construct sexual 
behaviour as the precursor to friendship (e.g. Nardi’s 1999 study of gay men) 
rather than a complicating factor. O’Meara (1989: 526) considered the role of 
attraction, albeit non-romantic, and specifically defined cross-sex friendship as:
Nonromantic, nonfamilial, personal relationship between a man and a 
woman. The relationship is nonromantic in the sense that its function is 
purposefully disassociated from courtship rites by the actors involved. 
Nonromantic does not mean, however, that sexuality and passion are 
necessarily absent from the relationship.
O’Meara’s version of cross-sex friendship defined itself against the norm 
of female-male romance, whilst simultaneously highlighting the potential for 
sexual desire. The definition seems to assume heterosexuality (O’Meara did not
11
see ‘sexuality and passion’ as potential aspects of same-sex friendship) but Reeder 
(2000) argues cross-sex friendships have a history of being treated as a sub-set of 
romantic relations rather than as friendships in their own right. This suggests a 
distinct limitation within the history of friendship research but it also troubles any 
absolute distinction between friendship and sexual or romantic relationships. 
However the persistence of the friend/lover dichotomy within public and social 
scientific discourse (Butt & Burr, 2004; Griffin, 2002) suggests a tenacious hold 
on the construction of our social world.
Rose (2000: 315) argues that although current models of friendship are not 
explicitly heterosexist they are ‘derived from cultural scripts that hold 
heterosexual relationships to be the norm’. The importance of gender and 
sexuality within friendship may riot be immediately obvious given that friendships 
are predominantly seen as non-sexual. However, they are heavily implicated in 
friendship since it has predominantly been constructed as being same, rather than 
cross-sex (Rose). The significance of this is that while heterosexuality is assumed 
(Rich, 1980) same-sex friendships are likely to be platonic.
Another major assumption of friendship literature is that men and women 
perform their friendships in different ways (Roy, Benenson & Lilly, 2000), thus 
casting friendships as predominantly same-sex serves to reinforce beliefs in 
essential sex differences, and their relevance to inter-personal relationships. So 
whilst heterosexual romance is ultimately constructed around difference (or rather 
complementarity, both biologically and psychologically) friendship is constructed 
around similarity (Rose, 2000). Note, for example, the broad consensus that 
women’s friendships are more intimate and men’s are constructed around shared 
activities (Duck, 2007; Duck & Wright, 1987). Roy, Benenson and Lilly argue 
that this is not the same as suggesting women have better quality friendship, but 
rather that they are performed in different (and possibly incompatible) ways.
Reeder (2000) regards apparently different styles of interaction as 
encouraged by same-sex interaction that begins in childhood. Gottman (1994) 
identified different styles of communication (e.g. boys interrupting, girls showing . 
more acknowledgement of each other) and suggested girls find boys annoying and 
boys think girls are dull. Although we might be sceptical of what seem like very 
deterministic gender norms, they are, as Reeder points out, strongly policed: 
cross-sex interaction is either seen as a ‘crush’ and the pursuit of friendship results
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in teasing. Minter (1999) went further, noting that DSM-FV lists a preference for 
cross-sex playmates among the criteria for Gender Identity Disorder in children. 
Thus, she argues, styles of play and choice of friends have been heavily studied by 
psychologists and used to identify ‘prehomosexual’ and ‘pretransexual’ children 
(p. 11). Although homosexuality is no longer pathologised by the DSM, the 
invention of Gender Identity Disorder sets out prescribed gender norms to which 
children are expected to adhere. Although the taxonomy of ‘symptoms’ 
emphasises modes of play, this is bound up not only with what a child does but 
also who they do it with - that is to say the sex of the playmate. If ‘playmates’ are 
considered analogous to friends then this lays the groundwork for the norming of 
same-sex friendship.
Cross-sex friendship becomes more common as children enter their 
teenage years and reach a peak in young adulthood, a point where many people 
are actively seeking opposite sex romantic or sexual partners (Rose, 2000). After 
marriage people have fewer cross-sex friendships, which Reeder (2000) takes to 
support the idea that the primary discourse of cross-sex interaction is through (or 
prior to) romantic or sexual interactions. The expectancy of this trend segregates 
friendships by gender and so a huge body of literature explores the supposed 
differences between male and female friendships.
One of the apparently more pervasive psychological sex differences in 
friendship concerns reported female preference for talking and male preference 
for activities (Duck, 2007). This dominant account is not exclusively the preserve 
of academics and is evident in popular psychology (e.g. Gray’s 1992 best-seller 
Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus). Therefore we might consider the 
possibility that self-reports and enactment of friendship are bound up with the 
performance of gender. In Butler’s (1990, 1993) terms we might consider that 
normative female friendship is not necessarily the expression of ‘real’ female 
psychology but a performance of norms that produce gender.
We might also consider the legitimacy of the talking versus activity 
dichotomy. Firstly, it is not consistent with the discourse analytic perspective of 
this thesis to partition off talking as a non-activity when talk has consistently been 
shown to accomplish things (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). There is a temptation to 
treat something like mountain biking as more of an activity than conversation - 
but this privileging of the ‘real’ over the linguistic is strongly resisted by the
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epistemological stance adopted in Chapter 3. Secondly, the separation of talk from 
activities is not only artificial but often nonsensical since under many 
circumstances they are not mutually exclusive. Conversation may occur whilst 
engaging in shared activities.
Despite these reservations it is acknowledged that the discourse of sex 
differences in friendship is deeply ingrained and naturalised. Given this context 
there are significant implications for cross-sex friendship beyond the expectation 
of sexual or romantic attraction. Rubin (1985) considers the potential for cross-sex 
friendship to permit women to engage in a more male-normative style of 
interaction. Meanwhile men expressed the benefits of emotional support (from 
women) in cross-sex friendship. Although sceptical of traditional norms and the 
limitations they can impose, it appears that within the framework of gendered 
friendship cross-sex interactions potentially afford a greater range of 
opportunities. Within this discourse there appear to be benefits to cross-sex 
friendships that may be lacking in same-sex friendships. However, it is unclear 
whether women and men are equal beneficiaries (e.g. how mutual is the emotional 
support in cross-sex friendship?). Furthermore, what are the effects of structuring 
women’s access to activity-based friendship through men? Does this further 
emphasise the gendering of friendship by constructing a cross-sex friend as the 
gate-keeper to a particular friendship style?
Rose (2000) argues that interpersonal relationships are organised 
hierarchically with (heterosexual) romantic relationships privileged over 
friendship. Consequently friendships are treated less seriously than romantic 
relationships both by the general public and social scientists. Psychological 
literature often focuses on friendships in the context of childhood (where they are 
seen to have developmental implications) or in adverse situations where the 
relevance are potential benefits to physical and mental health. Many social 
psychology textbooks do not specifically list friendship in the index, preferring 
instead terms like ‘interpersonal affiliation’, whereas sexual attraction and 
romantic love are frequently explored in considerable depth. An alien reader with 
no experience of humanity could be forgiven for thinking friendship was primarily 
a childhood phenomenon replaced by romantic partnership in adulthood. Miell 
and Croghan (1996) argue that the cultural script for (heterosexual) romantic love 
suggests that romance is key to personal fulfilment and consequently other forms
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of social support and friendships are undervalued. Reynolds and Wetherell (2003) 
argue that the construction of the category “single” (particularly when directed 
towards women) is pejorative and marks them as dysfunctional. The subject 
position of “being single” draws attention to Rich’s (1980) notion of compulsory 
heterosexuality where those adopting alternative paths and identities are 
repeatedly called to account for themselves.
One of the difficulties with the separation of friend from romance is that 
this construction starts to break down under close analysis. Afifi and Faulkner 
(2000) reports as many as 67% of college students claiming to have had sex with a 
friend. Whilst this does not necessarily equate with romance, sexual desire is 
commonly held to be the differentiating factor between friendship and romantic 
love. Nardi (1999) reported many gay men constructing sexual behaviour as the 
precursor to friendship in contrast with view that sexual desire threatens to 
complicate friendship. Reports such as these trouble any absolute distinction 
between friendship and sexual or romantic relationships.
2.4 Sex and Childhood
Despite some notable exceptions (e.g., Kitzinger & Perkins, 1993) the two 
main areas of friendship research are childhood/youth and the positive effects of 
friendship in terms of physical and/or mental well-being. In the latter instance the 
therapeutic benefits of friendship on everything from depression to coronary heart 
disease are noted (Duck 2007). However, the focus upon youth/childhood 
friendships may have more political effects. Furthermore are there ways in which 
this association between childhood and friendship bolsters the privileging of 
romantic relationships over friendship? Sharabany, Gershoni and Hofman (1981) 
describe the assumption that opposite-sex friendship must include an erotic 
element. Consequently children, who are presented as non-sexual (or perhaps pre- 
sexual) beings cannot relate across the gender divide since they (supposedly) lack 
this erotic element. A key implication of such claims is that romance becomes 
conflated with maturity at the expense of friendship.
The emphasis on youth/childhood friendships has been related to the 
influence of peer-relations. Here friendship is set up as a predictive factor in 
determining ‘traits’ which may be perceived as problematic later in life (e.g.,
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criminal tendencies or sexual orientation, see Bailey and Zucker, 1995). Bern’s 
(1996) ‘Exotic Becomes Erotic’ theory explicitly links childhood behaviour, play 
and friendship with sexual identity. Bern suggests that childhood temperament 
causes ‘sex-typical’ or ‘sex-atypical’ play and friendships. So a boy who preferred 
playing sex-atypical games with girls would view other (‘straight’) boys as 
different and exotic, this in time would lead to erotic desire. Conversely another 
boy might have mostly same-sex friends and consequently view girls as exotic 
leading towards heterosexuality.
Bern claims that one of the strengths of the theory is that it does not single 
out gay identities for scrutiny but rather accounts for all sexualities. However, 
Peplau, Garnets, Spalding, Conley and Veniegas (1998) argue that women’s 
experiences are not adequately represented. Furthermore, as an inversion model it 
emphasises the assumed similarities between gay men and heterosexual women. 
Indeed there has been a long tradition of conflating gay male identities with 
femininity within psychology (Terman & Miles, 1936). By representing gay men 
as like heterosexual women (as opposed to heterosexual women as like gay men) 
the gender benchmark is heterosexual and establishes heterosexual genders as 
ontologically prior to gay men and lesbians.
A similar assumption is associated Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in the
third and forth editions of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR). The diagnostic criteria for GID include
‘preference for playmates of the other sex’ (p. 581) suggesting that same-sex
friendship is institutionalised. The invention of GID constructs friendship between
*
a boy and a girl as potentially troubling his normative masculinity. Within this 
paradigm he is either likely to ‘become’ gay or not establish a satisfying 
masculine identity. In either instance the cautionary tale is about cross-sex 
friendship as disruptive to normative heterosexuality.
Walton, Weatherall and Jackson (2002) studied pre-adolescent girls’ 
friendships and found they formed relationships with boys that appeared to have 
some romantic components. However, Walton et al. suggest that when girls story 
the encounter, they narrate the relationship in such a way that its dissolution 
results in the re-forging of same-sex friendships. Thus the narrative closes with 
their decision that ‘boys are not worth it’ (p. 673) thus (re)affirming the 
importance of same-sex friendship. Whilst Walton et al. certainly acknowledge
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the heteronormativity of these girls social world, they perhaps do not make 
sufficiently explicit the sense in which (to quote Griffin, 2000:227) ‘young 
women (and men) must be “won” for the heterosexual patriarchal system’. 
Griffin’s conjecture is that friendship is political. Thus to ignore this, to treat 
claims of sex differences simply as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ science, would be insufficient.
An alternative (although not entirely incompatible) reading of the 
conflation of youth and friendship within psychological literature is what Rose 
(2000) calls the hierarchy of relationships. Principally the romantic relationship is 
afforded greater significance and desirability than the non-sexual friendship. Of 
course this assumes the two types of relationship to be non-overlapping and to 
have clearly defined boundaries. However it may be worth considering the legal 
and economic privileges afforded to romantic relations that are not afforded to 
friends (no matter how close or enduring their relationship might be).
2.5 Performing Gender
If we are to accept that there is a considerable history of seeking out sex 
differences in the role(s) of friendship, then we must also examine the gendered 
construction(s) o f ‘doing’ friendship in a performative1 sense. One mainstream 
approach to the production of social psychology is to assume that by observing 
the performance of significant social interactions (in this case friendship, but the 
same logic would apply to romantic relationships) insight may be gained into the 
differing ‘natures’ of men and women. So in other words the study of friendship 
can be set up as the window by which we may see what the sex differences 
‘really’ are.
Maccoby (1990) summarises what she considers to be the best-supported 
claims of sex differences within friendship: 1. Sex differences within friendships, 
and gender segregation as a whole, is a cross-cultural phenomenon; 2. Attempts to 
get children to make cross-sex friendships are often unsuccessful. Thus Maccoby 
suggests that this resistance to change may be seen as ‘proof of the essentialist 
sex-differences; 3. Same-sex friendships are favoured among children even where 
there is no adult pressure to do so. Maccoby uses the example of co-educational 
schools, suggesting that the drive for same-sex friendships comes from the 
children themselves rather than being structured by society; 4. Preferences for
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same-sex friends are found in very young children and certainly by the age of 
three.
So Maccoby sets up the preference for same-sex friends as ‘natural’ rather 
than a response to societal norms and expectations. This may appear to affirm the 
notion of essential sex differences (of which those within the domain of friendship 
would be but one aspect). However, Maccoby concedes that the tendency to prefer 
same-sex playmates does not correlate significantly with sex-typed behaviours or 
inventories of masculinity and/or femininity. Thus any such preferences cannot 
easily be attributed to boys and girls being so fundamentally different that they 
prefer friendship with their own kind. Moreover, when examining the notion of 
gendered play (e.g., dolls vs. toy bricks) insufficient consideration is given to 
gender-neutral play. Furthermore, the notion of any.type of play being inherently 
gendered must once again brought under scrutiny since there is nothing inherent 
about playing with bricks that is ‘masculine’. Maccoby seems to assume that sex- 
roles are fixed and that activities within friendship may be clearly assigned a 
position in a binary gender matrix. Of course there may be sex differences in types 
of play and this may have implications for same or cross-sex friendships, but 
critical psychologists reject the essentialism of gendered play and explore instead 
the social meanings.
The seemingly most frequently produced claim of sex differences is that of 
intimacy. The claim is that women of all ages (though a disproportionately large 
number of studies focus upon youth) are more intimate within their same-sex 
friendships than men are within their friendships (for discussion see Townsend, 
McCracken & Wilton, 1988). One response to this is to accept that women are 
more affectionate and emotional and that friendship is ah outlet for these 
‘qualities’. However, once again this is problematic in the sense that it 
essentialises sex differences. The social regulation of sex roles within hetero- 
patriarchal systems is made invisible as a series of political constructs and instead 
appears as ‘natural’ or pre-determined. This ‘naturalness’ makes it difficult to 
question the legitimacy of the perceived sex differences in friendships.
Griffin (2000) highlights the performance of friendship as political and a 
means by which normative cultural scripts may be enacted or resisted. Kitzinger 
and Perkins (1993) specifically challenge many of the assumptions of friendship
18
(most notably that platonic friendship is not a love relationship) thus contributing 
to a body of literature arguing against the romance-friendship hierarchy.
Research into sex differences in friendship shows no sign of abatement 
and critical thinkers are divided on whether sex differences research can ever be 
useful (Hyde, 1994 argues they may be useful, Hollway, 1994 cautions against 
such work). However, the issue is not so much whether differences exist or about 
their magnitude (statistically significant or otherwise) but rather how they are 
interpreted. Thus the dilemma of whether to seek and report sex differences is 
perhaps a diversion from the more important matter of how such findings produce 
(rather than merely reflect) social norms.
2.6 Normativity and Subjectivity
In this thesis, norms are examined less for their connotations of ‘the 
average’ but instead as ‘the ideal’. Consequently normativity is less an objective 
measure of frequency and more a commentary on the perceived desirability of 
social practices and identities. Simone de Beauvoir’s (1949) classic feminist text 
The Second Sex identified the ways that women were regarded as a sexual ‘other’ 
to normative masculinity and were defined principally in reference to men. 
However as Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1996) point out, otherness is not just an 
issue for women. There are many ‘others’ associated with a variety of power 
differences and oppressions. Torde (1984: 589) recognises that normativity is 
multifaceted and identifies what she calls ‘the mythical norm’. Although she 
specifically defines this as ‘thin, white, male, young, heterosexual, Christian and 
financially secure’, this is not an exhaustive list but one to which we could go on 
adding dimensions of normativity. This suggests the possibility of intersections 
between different axes of (non-) normality. Consequently this approach 
acknowledges that people can be subjected to multiple oppressions or 
simultaneously occupy both privileged and disadvantaged positions.
Normativity is subjectively experienced. People are often more aware of 
norms connected to their own oppression and less conscious of those norms that 
privilege them. Here Lorde (1984) sees the mythical norm as somewhere on the 
edge of consciousness. So although there may be some shared understanding of 
normativity, some aspects of it are more salient for certain people at particular
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times. Crucially this means we may fail to recognise some types of oppression 
adequately. For women and gay men there may be shared objectives in resisting 
heteropatriarchy (Richardson, 1996) but it cannot of course be assumed that all 
gay men have investments in feminist politics or that all women are interested in 
gay rights. Furthermore, even political allies may be inadvertently complicit in 
reproducing problematic discourses of normativity.
Although some forms of identity politics may share overlapping concerns, 
there remain obstacles to an unproblematic synthesis of feminism and gay 
liberation. Identity politics interpret all human oppression in terms of a dominant 
oppressive force which forms a template for all other oppressions. Gay men are, 
according to some feminist positions, complicit in the oppression of women and 
ultimately more invested in men than in women since they both are men and 
desire men (Jeffreys, 2003). Weeks (1977) also pointed out that gay men do not 
obviously desire femininity in the sense that gay men’s descriptions of effeminacy 
are generally pejorative and gay male fantasies tend to focus on symbols of 
masculinity (e.g. firemen). Jeffreys goes further and regards the dominance of gay 
men in the fashion industry as a prime example of a rather sadistic form of 
women-hatred. For Jeffreys gay men epitomise patriarchal values because of their 
allegiance to masculinity. Frye (1983) was similarly scathing of gay men and their 
treatment of women.
Jagose’s (1996) history of queer theory suggests relations between gay 
men and lesbians have been problematic, with societies formed to further both 
groups’ interests somehow always ending up benefiting gay men more. This 
forms part of Jeffreys’ (2003) critique of the supposedly all-encompassing 
adoption of queer theory. Although intended to do away with labels and reject the 
very basis of identity categories (Warner, 1994, 1999), Jeffreys sees (gay) male 
dominance and lesbian invisibility.
Jeffreys positions herself as a political lesbian and certainly not as a 
heterosexual woman. However, she makes an astute, if savage, critique of one of 
the founding ‘names’ associated with queer theory, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
(1950 -  2009). Jeffreys (2003) argued that Sedgwick was ‘in love with’ gay men 
(Sedgwick, 1999, p. 24) and even identified as a gay man (Sedgwick, 1993; 
Walters, 1996). Sedgwick’s attachment to gay men is problematic for some 
feminists; consequently any argument that her involvement in queer theory proves
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its feminist credentials is contestable. Furthermore, the term ‘fag hag’ to describe 
women (who associate with gay men) seems deeply unpleasant. It can be read as 
implying ownership and Moon (1995: 488) shows that some gay men connect it 
with ‘pathetic’ women. Some women have tried to reclaim the word and use it in 
a non-pejorative way, and Moon shows some men using it affectionately about 
their friends. Thompson (2004) argues that it is a post-identity politics term 
because it focuses not on what one identifies as but who is identified with. 
However, given oppressive power associated with words like ‘fag’ and ‘hag’ 
(together or separately) it is not a term used in this project. As Robertson (1996:8) 
puts it, ‘the fag hag stereotype often seems to presume a failed object choice on 
the part of the woman, the “hag” -  that is, the fag hag chooses gay men because 
she “can’t get a man’” . So whilst the term may theoretically have some radical 
potential, and people may have the right to reclaim it for themselves and position 
themselves within that discourse, it may be read differently by outsiders and 
reproduce rather than challenge oppressive norms. Although politically 
transformative to some queer theorists who challenge the very basis of identity 
categories, for many feminists the term ‘hag’ will never be acceptable given its 
associations with beauty and misogyny (Jeffreys, 2005) and the spinster discourse 
of women’s ‘single’ status (Sandfield & Percy, 2003).
It is worth taking Jeffreys’ (2003) critique of a male bias in queer theory 
very seriously and my previous research suggested some gay men are complicit in 
accomplishing sexism (Shepperd & Percy, 2002). Levy (2005:11) gives an 
account of the vice president of the Girls Gone Wild pornography franchise, a 
former academic and gay man who ‘talked about his boyfriend constantly’. The 
involvement of a gay man in the production of heterosexual pornography 
(especially the type that only features women) is framed as very surprising. 
Perhaps this suggests that pomographers are expected to be sexually interested in 
their products. However, it constructs a powerful account of gay men’s 
involvement in the objectification of women.
Frye (1983) theorises that many women regard gay men as less sexist 
because they are not sexually interested in women. (The implication is that desire 
brings out the worst in men.) Although some gay men have an ‘unusual 
identification with women’ (p. 138) generally gay men feel their ‘classification 
with women is based on a profound misunderstanding’ (i.e. the inversion
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discourse of gay identity). So for Frye the (erroneous) association between gay 
men and femininity encourages gay men to invest heavily in masculinity and 
identify against women (e.g. by telling jokes about women's bodies). So gay men 
claim sex is a form of male bonding and try to locate it as a completion of 
homoeroticism, thus as part of maleness and male privilege. Those men who are 
friends with women are disloyal to masculinity and have to reconstruct their own 
version. However, what seems unconvincing about this argument (and with 
Jeffreys’ claim that men are more invested in masculinity) is that there is not a. 
male fraternity that uniformly welcomes gay men. Heterosexual men tend to score 
more highly on scales measuring homophobia than heterosexual women (Kite & 
Whitley, 1996, 1998). (Davies (2004) suggests this is because hetero men have a 
greater investment in traditional gender roles.) So, if gay men are loyal to 
masculinity then the feelings do not seem to be reciprocated.
However the potential advantage gay men have over heterosexual men is 
that with normalcy goes unconsciousness (c.f. Lorde, 1984), whereas for gay men 
‘absence of privilege is a presence of knowledge’ (Frye, 1983: 147). This suggests 
that their non-normative positioning may result in a more critical approach to 
normative gender relations. Despite acknowledging some common interests in 
critiquing the heteropatriarchy, this thesis is sceptical of the supposedly ‘natural’ 
alliance between (all) women and gay men. Richardson (1996) sees an 
opportunity to resist heteropatriachy, and such an alliance could be politically 
powerful. Clearly there is scope for a great amount of variability ranging from 
men who specifically align themselves with feminism, to those who have been 
accused of misogyny and gynophobia.
2.7 Aims
Friendships between heterosexual women and gay men are not a new 
phenomenon but this thesis will argue that a new discourse constructing these two 
groups as ‘natural’ friends has emerged in relatively recent years. The aim will be 
to analyse discursive constructions of these friendships based on interview data 
and media representations (specifically the television comedy Will & Grace). This 
will permit analysis of constructions of gender and sexual identity to see how they 
work in the context of friendship (rather than a sexual or romantic relationship).
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What are the implications of these accounts for the psychological understanding 
of cross-sex friendship? Management of this friendship discourse may reveal 
some of the implicit norms associated with friendship. The analyses that follow 
will consider how constructions of gender and sexual identity are implicated in 
friendship and what this suggests about the cultural norms of friendship.
2.8 A Note on Terminology
Given the discourse analytic approach and epistemological position that 
language constructs (rather than merely reflects) subject positions (see Chapter 3), 
the choice of terminology is politically important. Throughout this thesis 
‘heterosexual’ is generally preferred over ‘straight’. Although seemingly 
■ analogous descriptions of sexual identity, some queer theory sets out a critique of 
normative (sexual) identities with which some heterosexuals align themselves 
(e.g. ‘Straight with a Twist’, Thomas, 2000). Consequently ‘straight’ can be read 
as an ideological position rather than simple description of ‘sexual orientation’, 
leading some heterosexuals to identify as ‘queer’ rather than ‘straight’. The 
logical analogue might be to use the term ‘homosexual’, however this is 
associated with pathology (Foucault, 1978) so its use is restricted to historical 
contexts. Recruitment materials deviate from this perspective by using the term 
‘straight women and gay men’ as a less formal mode of address.
The term ‘pro-feminist’ is used to describe men who subscribe to feminist 
ideology but have not themselves experienced being female. This is not intended 
to construct gender as immutable, or an attempt to deny trans-identities, but rather 
attempts to avoid colonisation of feminism by men (even by those asserting ‘good 
intentions’). Attempts have been made to deliberately alternate between ‘gay men 
and heterosexual women’ and ‘heterosexual women and gay men. Similarly the 
orders in which the interviewee’s pseudonyms, and the names of fictional 
characters, are presented are frequently swapped in order to avoid male first bias 
or privileging one identity over the other. It is acknowledged that this is 
sometimes linguistically awkward and leads to unfamiliar constructions (e.g. the 
television programme Will & Grace's main characters are sometimes referred to 
as Grace and Will). However, the apparent strangeness of these constructions 
reveals the implicit norms in language.
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1 ‘Performativity’ has a more specific meaning associated with Butler (1990). This is explored in 
detail in Chapter 4 and used as an analytic lens in the following analyses.
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Chapter 3
Epistemology and Method
3.1 Introduction
Questions about what constitutes ‘fact’ and the existence or accessibility 
of ‘truth’ are not merely intellectual exercises, removed from grittier ‘real-world’ 
applications; these concerns have a profound significance for the production of 
knowledge and power. Whilst epistemology is a branch of philosophy this does 
not mean that psychologists undertaking ‘real-world’ research (and aiming for 
‘real-world’ results) should be unconcerned with such matters. Indeed, it is 
impossible not to engage with epistemological assumptions whether in ‘everyday’ 
life or in the doing of science. Even the division of science from the ‘everyday’, 
the objective from the subjective, are epistemological commitments and as such 
open to critical scrutiny.
Social constructionists and others critical of taken-for-granted knowledge 
are particularly concerned by the need to deconstruct and make explicit the 
assumptions embedded in psychological research. By raising questions about truth 
claims in psychological research social constructionists have critiqued the belief 
that facts and values are separable. Thus claims that science is apolitical and that 
‘the facts speak for themselves’ are controversial. The division of objectivity from 
value is at the core of mainstream science, yet this does not make it 
unchallengeable. Indeed it is precisely because this notion is so dominant that 
social constructionists have critiqued it.
In this chapter an epistemological approach to discourse analysis will be 
developed, taking account of both political and methodological concerns.
Research methods do not exist in a theoretical vacuum and so it would be 
impossible to develop a methodological approach in the absence of theoretical 
underpinnings. Discourse analysis is of course not unique in this respect, but what 
it does demand is a critical reflectivity back towards itself. Discourse analytic 
work does not stand above its subjects; rather it must undergo to the same scrutiny 
that might be used to critique any other approach. Therefore it is important not to 
hide assumptions away or treat discourse analysis as a fixed and unchallengeable 
approach.
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This is not to suggest that a /-test, by contrast, is atheoretical or that 
empiricists never reflect upon their epistemologies. For example, many cognitivist 
social psychologists have been particularly concerned with the tension between 
controlled laboratory-based experimental work and ‘real world’ (or ‘natural’) 
observation (Eiser, 1980). However, the basic premise that there are social 
psychological facts that (given sufficiently sophisticated methods) are ultimately 
discoverable is the implicit cornerstone of positivism. This assumption is perhaps 
the most significant point of distinction between positivist empiricism and 
discourse analysis. The issue of whether work is qualitative or quantitative is in 
many senses less of a concern -  qualitative research is no guarantee of a critical 
approach, nor do the use of statistical tests necessarily preclude it.
The point is not that positivist empiricism lacks any sense of critical 
introspection but rather that singular and knowable truths are its ultimate goal.
The post-modern movement, with its roots in philosophy, art and literary 
criticism, and social sciences like sociology has had a powerful effect on social 
psychology since the 1970s (Burr, 1995). Increasingly science is seen as neither 
objective nor value-free, but as an ideological system with an important political 
role to play -  thus it is perhaps not surprising that so much social constructionist 
psychology has varying extents, and in different ways, been overtly political.
To begin to engage with the epistemologies of discourse analysis it is 
helpful to consider particular moves in philosophy and linguistics as part of a 
history of discourse analysis. As Burr (2003) points out, discourse analysis did not 
begin in psychology (although particular traditions of discourse analysis have 
emerged in British social psychology) and what is labelled social constructionism 
in psychology is rather more fundamental to sociology (Craib, 1997). However, it 
is important to consider these interdisciplinary contributions because they at once 
help to elucidate how discourse analysis differs from other forms of psychological 
research (even language-based research), and also because, as will become clear, 
history is of great relevance to many discourse analysts.
The contexts in which social constructionism and discourse analysis arose 
reflect both the ways language has been thought about and psychology’s changing 
relationship with science. The ‘turn to language’ was a philosophical movement 
that suggested new ways of thinking about what language actually was. This had 
implications for a range of academic disciplines and continues to have a
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contemporary significance within psychology. These debates and concerns will be 
discussed in terms of the ‘crisis in social psychology’ of the 1970s (onwards). 
Parker (1992) suggests that these events are interconnected, with discourse 
analysis emerging as one response to the crisis.
Discourse analysis offers a number of criticisms of the more mainstream 
cognitivist paradigm of social psychology. These theoretical underpinnings are 
pivotal to discourse analysis as a method and what it can and cannot offer 
researchers and readers. Lastly in this chapter, consideration will be given to the 
political dimensions of this approach and how best to go about forging an 
integrated approach to conducting critical discourse analytic research.
3.2 The Turn to Language
No single event marks ‘the turn to language’; rather it encompasses a shift, 
initially within the arts and social sciences, towards seeing language (in its own 
right) as worthy of study. Kress (2001) argues that most linguists studied general 
principles of language and the origins of particular words. During the nineteenth 
century researchers increasingly saw languages as related and looked for common 
roots. The predominant view was that language, by representing reality, allowed 
abstract thought to take place. From this followed the belief that a more perfect or 
complete language would solve many philosophical problems in much the same 
way that mathematics offers a language with which physicists can work to solve 
problems.
People were not seen as having to create their own languages in which to 
think or communicate because they are able to make use of those elements (e.g., 
vowels, syllables) that are pre-given by societies. Whilst in a sense this may seem 
obvious, it not only suggests that language is necessarily social but that language 
goes beyond individual control. A speaker may choose their words carefully, but 
their speech is formed from a relatively finite range of options.
Kress (2001) describes the major shift in the philosophy of language 
brought about by Saussure’s (1974) separation of signifier (i.e., the actual sound 
or the letters that make it.up) from meaning. Saussure’s assertion was that there 
was nothing inherent about the signifier that pertained to the signified (i.e., a 
word’s referent). In other words there is nothing intrinsically tree-like about the
27
word ‘tree’. Indeed across languages there are many words for tree that are not 
common in form, yet the meaning of ‘tree’ can be seen as consistent throughout.
Saussure also emphasised that focusing just on the meaning of a particular 
word was insufficient; it was also necessary to consider its value in terms of its 
opposition to other words (Kress, 2001). So, for example, if a person tells us they 
have planted a tree, this tells us that not only is ‘tree’ the object of their talk, but 
that they are not referring to a bush, a hedge or some roses. Saussure believed that 
societal conventions grouped collections of words in language and thus social 
forces are implicated in the speech of individuals.
Another significant contribution to contemporary studies of language was 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) conceptualisation of language not merely as a way of 
describing reality, or as a system of abstract reasoning, but as a series of games 
with associated rules and objectives (Potter, 2001). For example, Wittgenstein 
argued that giving orders, describing objects and guessing riddles were all kinds 
of games. Potter argues that this helped to shift the emphasis towards the 
functions of language. So rather than being tied to ‘real world’ objects, language 
is seen as potentially doing things (utterances like ‘No!’ and ‘Help!’ do not 
necessarily have material references, yet they still convey meaning).
A similar approach is found within Austin’s (1962) division of language as 
either constative (i.e., descriptive) or performative (Potter, 2001). Austin saw 
certain utterances as being actions in their own right, thus suggesting that words 
could at once be meaningful in their own right and yet also refer to things. 
Although Austin suggests people can do things with words, there are also certain 
constraints placed upon this. For example, Austin suggested that performatives 
could misfire -  ‘I name this ship... ’ misfires if a child is renaming a ship using 
lemonade rather than champagne. Perhaps more importantly what Austin’s 
approach suggests is that actions and language are not always mutually exclusive. 
For psychologists this suggests that there is not anything more inherently ‘real’ 
about studying behaviour as opposed to language. Austin calls into question the 
common-sense assumption that behaviour and language are invariably and 
‘naturally’ organised hierarchically. Indeed, from this standpoint, language could 
justifiably be considered to be behaviour.
Hall (2001) suggests that Foucault was similarly concerned with the 
performative aspects of language. However his interests were much more overtly
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political (e.g., social institutions like prisons and psychiatry, and latterly sexuality) 
and he saw discourse as implicated in power relations. For Foucault discourses 
were not just talk or words, but rather they made available ways of talking about 
particular objects. Individual speakers are seen as drawing upon a range of 
possible discourses when they talk and thus discourse is a system of social control 
and potentially oppressive.
One implication of Foucault’s approach is that the speaker is not in a 
position of absolute authorship; rather they use a collage of pre-existing 
discourses and speaking positions. The notion of authorship as both original and 
unitary has a liberal humanist resonance that Foucault rejects. Hall (2001)
Suggests that Foucault reverses the assumption that people’s speech reflects a 
‘true’ inner-self; rather it is the discourse that speaks us. That this reconfiguration 
of agency and authorship is so jarring perhaps indicates how radical the more 
extreme Foucauldian positions can be. However, this shifts the emphasis away 
from individuals, and their talk, to a far broader view of discourse being societal.
A seemingly inescapable consequence of this approach is that individuals 
are seen as relatively powerless. However, there are two issues that accompany 
notions of authorship and agency. Firstly, predicating authorship around 
originality (itself a problematic and ultimately unknowable term) ignores the 
possibility that stitching together discourses is itself a form of authorship. This is ' 
not to suggest that discourses are merely a selection box from which one might 
choose a resource at will -  there is a more complicated interrelationship and many 
positions are not available to speakers. However, Foucault requires us to rethink 
authorship and furthermore question the individualism that suggests social action 
is only achieved through people as individuals.
A person might adopt one set of discourses rather than another, or they 
might choose to resist a discourse, but the production of new discourses is not 
something individuals can readily accomplish nor is there any apparent exit to this 
world of discourse. Even the subject positions occupied by individuals are 
produced in discourse and personify particular forms of knowledge. Foucault 
seems to pose a significant challenge to the assumption that the individual is the 
most fundamental building block of society or the crucible in which change is 
initiated.
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Discourses are seen as specific to a particular culture or point in history 
rather than being in any sense universal. Foucault was particularly interested in 
tracing the history (or genealogy) of particular discourses (e.g., discourses of 
madness and homosexuality) and looking at where they appeared and 
disappeared. Discourses are not seen as ‘true’ in any absolute sense. Hall (2001) 
argues that Foucault was not especially concerned with ‘reality’ per se but rather 
with meaning. There are nevertheless certain discursive formulations that gain 
considerable credence. Discourses and power structures are seen as producing 
certain regimes o f truth, something Foucault saw as an instrument of power and 
even oppression.
Burr (1995) suggests that Foucault (among others such as Derrida) have 
influenced sociology for some decades, whereas the post-structuralist movement 
is still comparatively new to psychology. However, there are perhaps two 
particularly important elements to take from these linguistic and social theories. 
Firstly, language is performative. The upshot for psychologists is a need to treat 
language as a worthwhile topic in its own right rather than simply as a means of 
accessing something more real underneath. As such, Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
trace the historical roots of discourse analysis to the philosophy of language 
(particularly Wittgenstein and Austin’s sense of performativity in language). 
Secondly, Foucault’s interest in power has been particularly influential to those 
critical social psychologists who wish to challenge oppressive discourses and 
institutions (including social psychology itself, Parker, 1992).
3.3 The Crisis in Social Psychology
After the Second World War, social psychologists became increasingly 
concerned by both the topics and methodologies employed in experimental 
psychology. The use of psychological techniques in wartime propaganda and 
manipulation troubled liberal humanist psychologists and there was anxiety about 
whether the laboratory-based methods, adopted from the natural sciences, were 
appropriate for social psychologists in particular (Burr, 1995). The concern was 
not just a matter of whether methods were accurate in recording and predicting 
human behaviour. Increasingly, humanists like Rogers (1961) and Maslow (1954) 
argued that human experience was too rich and varied to be reduced to basic
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drives and cognitions. Rogers in particular felt that it was simply inappropriate to 
study humans scientifically. He argued that no one else could know what a person 
perceived as the greatest expert on the individual was the person(s) in question. 
This rather phenomenological approach was not entirely unwelcome. The view of 
the individual as positive and the emphasis upon self-actualisation had its obvious 
attractions, in contrast with Milgram’s (1963) ethically dubious (though massively 
influential) obedience experiments, and the dark psychoanalytic view of 
destructive unconscious forces.
Social psychology increasingly encountered apparently intractable 
methodological dilemmas. Harré and Secord (1972), as critics of the original 
laboratory-based research, argued that efforts to design out ‘confounding 
variables’ in experiments resulted in social and contextual effects being similarly 
excluded. Parker (1990) is especially critical of the pre-crisis paradigm of 
psychology seeing ‘entirely artificial schema[s] [...] designed by the researcher in 
which different variables could be predicted and controlled. [...] [These were] 
then bolted onto the ‘real’ world so that no unexpected meanings could intrude.’ 
(p. 19). Thus many social psychologists were left measuring and re-measuring 
what Parker (1990) calls ‘bizarre social situations] ’ (p. 44).
Parker (1990) sees a certain arrogance in labelling human behaviours as 
variables and regards the understanding of human experience entirely through the 
accumulation of measurements as a ‘delusion’ (p. 19). Although this echoes the 
humanists’ criticisms of experimental psychology, Parker rejects it on an anti- 
cognitivist basis and is critical of liberal humanism. The problems with 
cognitivism will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, but suffice to say 
that Parker criticises the notion of cognitive processes literally or figuratively 
existing within people’s heads. Furthermore, it is almost inevitable that any 
theoretical framework involved will be reified and talked about as if it actually 
existed. He further argues the liberal humanist movement, in defending the 
individual against the dehumanising effects of the experimenter, perpetuates the 
dichotomy of the social versus the individual.
Burr (1995) argues that social psychology was seen as being paid for by 
institutions (e.g., governments, military and industrial groups) that had an interest 
in preserving their positions of power and authority. Thus the voices of ‘ordinary’ 
people would largely be absent from this kind of work, whereas the interests of
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dominant groups would be asserted under the guise of objective science. Notions 
of ‘demand characteristics’ imply a significant power-relationship between 
experimenter and participant. This is of course the very subject of Milgram’s 
(in)famous study, yet the wider social meanings of the lab coat, and the power 
structures that should be implicated in Milgram’s shocking findings went 
untheorised.
Gergen (1973) argued that all knowledge is historically and culturally 
specific. Furthermore, he suggested that social psychology was too oriented 
towards the individual at the expense of theorising the social, political and 
economic spheres. Thus not only are attempts to generalise from specific 
instances or make universal claims are problematic, but social psychology may 
have overlooked some of the more interesting and fruitful approaches which take 
account of power relations. Clearly if there are ‘no once-and-for-all descriptions 
of people or society’ (Burr, 1995, p. 11) then this has serious implications for 
cognitivist notions of universal mechanisms like language acquisition devices, or 
the matching hypothesis (Walster, Aronson, Abrahams and Rottman, 1966) as a 
basis for attraction.
3.4 Cognitivism and its Discontents
Cognitivism is mechanistic and has drawn upon Boolean logic, stage 
models, flow charts and analogies with computers in order to suggest some of the 
mechanisms and machinery that might exist within the brain (Eiser, 1980). Since 
none of these operations can literally be observed, despite the advances in neuro­
imaging technologies, the actual cognitive processes are to some extent 
supposition derived from observations.
Whilst discourse analytic and social constructionist stances cannot 
specifically refute the existence of what Parker calls ‘imaginary mechanical 
apparatus’ (1992, p. 88) they can be deeply critical of many of the assumptions 
upon which cognitivism is predicated. The principle of falsification is itself 
empiricist because it depends upon hypothesis testing and the statistical 
probability of being ‘true’ (or in this case false). The notions of statistically 
significant differences or correlations do not form part of the discourse analytic 
landscape. It should be acknowledged that many cognitivists do study language,
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and many cognitivists also accept the importance of a given social, historical, 
economic, and political context (Eiser, 1980). However the cognitive paradigm 
assumes that measurable and observable behaviour maps onto some internal 
reality. Yet the turn to language in philosophy and many of the social sciences 
have brought into question the assumption that the utterances of an individual are 
indicative of their inner state.
Eiser (1980) emphasises that ‘social behaviour is the product of decisions’ 
(p. 8), conscious or otherwise, on the part of individuals. The corollary of this is 
that internal processes must govern behaviour. Even if the individual is unable to 
verbalise how and why they came to a decision, the cognitivist’s job is to theorise 
the mechanisms that might facilitate such a move (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). 
Similarly typically social psychological topics like attitudes, when treated in 
cognitive terms, are assumed to be the result of an underlying process common to 
all (or at least many) people. For Eiser (1980) attitudes are ‘certain feelings of like 
or dislike, approval or disapproval, attraction or repulsion, trust or distrust and so 
on’ (p. 17). Whatever they may consist of, Eiser locates them clearly within the 
individual and thus these pre-existing feelings are reflected in talk and behaviour.
Yet this approach, even were we to accept it, presents serious 
methodological and theoretical problems. As far back as 1928, Thurstone 
addressed concerns over whether attitudes were measurable. He acknowledged the 
complexity of the individual and accepted that a whole description was 
impossible. Thurstone’s answer was to measure key attributes of a person in much 
the same way that height, width and depth might be seen as broadly descriptive of 
the characteristics of a particular table. No single dimension was seen as any more 
immeasurable than a physical attribute such as weight.
Subsequently Eiser (1980) argues that many cognitivists shifted away 
from regarding numerical ratings as literally representing attitudes, and instead 
began to view them as a summary of the expression of an attitude. The concerns 
with reductionism were both methodological (there were questions over the 
validity of the measurements) and also a response to humanist disquiet about 
whether quantitative measures devalue(d) human subjectivity. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, neither of these tensions has been entirely resolved. Eiser 
acknowledges many of the difficulties in making inferences about cognitive 
mechanisms on the basis of behaviour, but his solution seems to take a step away
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from the subject and employ increasingly sophisticated research methods. In other 
words, these concerns are widely recognised among cognitivists, but they retain 
the core belief that objective knowledge of cognitive mechanisms is (at least 
theoretically) attainable. The problem (or rather dilemma) is framed in terms of 
methodological issues that are seen as ultimately solvable. For social 
constructionists it is the very assumption that observable behaviour provides a 
window on inner-processes that is rejected. Thus when discourse analysts study 
language the emphasis is very largely on what takes place in that realm (i.e., the 
‘textual’ domain) rather than as a means to theorising mental mechanisms.
Discourse analysts do not have a monopoly on the psychological study of 
language. Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest that Chomsky was responsible for 
popularising language as a topic for psychologists. However, Potter and Wetherell 
argue that his attention to idealised sentences is far removed from ‘everyday’ 
speech. The Chomskian approach to language analysis standardises pronunciation 
and regularises speech (removing hesitations and corrections) and is ultimately 
decontextualised. They argue that such a system cannot cope with ordinary talk, 
and yet mundane conversation is socially important and is the most pervasive 
form of interaction between people. Parker (1992) sees cognitivist experiments 
and studies of language as intentionally designing out real world investments.
Thus there are concerns about whether Chomsky’s vision of language as a 
representation of an ordered cognitive system was at the very least optimistic.
Potter and Wetherell (1987) propose that, rather than attempting to 
theorise competence (and so access cognitive structures), attention should be 
turned to the actual performance. They critique the cognitivist belief that language 
is a neutral medium by drawing upon Austin’s work on performative speech. 
Saussure’s belief in the arbitrariness of signifier (i.e., that concept is not linked to 
sound) and his further assertion that the signified is equally arbitrary suggests 
there are endless ways in which the world could be partitioned. Thus, Potter and 
Wetherell begin to trouble some of the base assumptions of cognitivist approaches 
and point towards a constructionist stance.
The view of language as active is common among discourse analysts and 
is one of the key ideas that distinguishes discourse analysis from cognitivist 
approaches (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Parker, 1992). Potter and Wetherell argue 
that locating ‘objects of thought on dimensions of judgement’ (McGuire, 1985, p.
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239) requires the transformation of participant responses. They question the basis 
for translating responses into attitudes and point towards the apparently 
incongruent claims made by participants in interviews. This appears to undermine 
the claim that attitudes are something enduring in people.
From a constructionist stance, the object of thought becomes in itself 
problematic since it cannot be assumed to have consistent meaning. There is a 
level upon which cognitivists have addressed this problem and it is to some extent 
the rationale for conducting research with many participants. However, this 
assumes there is some basic meaning to a category or object around which 
individual responses will be (ideally normally) distributed. As a solution to the 
problem of meaning it has no currency in discourse analytic circles. Parker (1992) 
suggests that the search for absolute truth should be abandoned and treated as a 
series of claims to truth. This is perhaps one of the core views of post-modernism, 
yet it is also one of the most difficult beliefs to accept and leaves post-modernists 
open to attack from positivist empiricists (and indeed anyone else with an interest 
in fixed reference points).
Potter and Wetherell (1987) discuss the construction of the self within 
psychology and highlight three models of self: trait, role and humanist (notably 
psychoanalysis is absent). Although there is much to separate them (indeed all 
three theories regard each other as mutually exclusive) they all construct the self 
as a unitary whole that is ultimately describable. Gergen (1985) suggests that 
social constructive approaches (seen by Burr, 1995, as broadly synonymous with 
social constructionism, although more individualistic rather than social by 
Danziger, 1997) do not directly compete with personality theories. Rather, he 
regards them as ways of sense-making that an individual might use to construct 
their personality. Social constructionism of course does compete with other ways 
of accounting for the self, especially where those models are more dominant in 
psychological textbooks. Yet, in another way, Gergen is right: the theories do not 
compete head on because the assumptions that underpin them are sufficiently 
opposed that there could be no agreement even upon the terms of the debate.
What discourse analysts can do is to engage critically with these theories 
of self as accounts without necessarily treating them as ‘true’ or ‘untrue’. Davies 
and Harré’s (1990) theory of positioning is a sophisticated social constructionist 
response to role theory. It has been widely adopted by discourse analysts because
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it suggests ways in which discourse generates subjectivity, yet avoids the 
essentialist trap of seemingly fixed roles. Similarly, Hollway (1984) made use of 
psychoanalysis to inform her discourse analysis. Although not without its 
problems, most obviously political, psychoanalysis need not be erased by 
discourse analysis. As a dominant mode of accounting for the self in Western talk, 
it might be, as Parker (1997) argues, dismissive to ignore it entirely. This raises 
some difficult questions about the basis upon which any account could be 
rejected, however apparently spurious, trivial or politically undesirable.
Ultimately this is a serious concern, especially for overtly political researchers.
Although Gergen suggests that the self is constructed and so has no true 
nature, Potter and Wetherell (1987) stress that successfully bringing off an 
account as persuasive may impose limitations upon how the self is constructed. In 
this sense, it seems important not to interpret the absence of objective truth as 
permitting a free-for-all. Furthermore the construction of self may have significant 
social and political effects. Potter and Wetherell advocate cross-cultural research 
to draw attention to that which is taken for granted and encourage the ‘suspension 
of belief (p. 104) in what is normally taken for granted.
Potter and Wetherell (1987) examine empirical evidence suggesting that 
categorisation accentuates difference. They argue that traditional approaches to 
categorisation (e.g., Tafel, 1981) draw upon perceptual theories and consequently 
are ‘glossed in evolutionary terms’ (p. 117). The invocation of an evolutionary 
cause tends to suggest that categorisation and consequently discrimination are 
‘natural’ processes. The inevitability of bias seems to suggest that people are 
passive victims of categorisation. This taken-for-granted knowledge that 
discrimination is natural stymies individual responsibility and precludes radical 
political change. Potter and Wetherell see this in individual terms, yet it may be 
useful to recognise a similar shift of responsibility at group and societal levels.
By critiquing the idea that categorisation or discrimination are natural 
processes, Potter and Wetherell would be able to deconstruct any claim that 
racism, for example, is natural and any subsequent disavowal of responsibility. It 
offers a means by which oppressive accounts can be taken apart and the potential 
for political change. This exciting prospect is reflected in the large number of 
discourse analytic works that are concerned with race, gender, sexualities and 
other political concerns. The construction of the ‘natural’ has an important role to
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play in privileging some sexual identities whilst marginalizing, pathologising and 
even criminalising others.
3.5 What is Discourse Analysis and What Can It Offer?
At this point in the chapter it is necessary to refer more explicitly than has 
previously been done to what might be considered the two major approaches in 
discourse analysis relevant to social psychology. Both approaches, whilst having a 
certain amount in common, come from different academic traditions and 
consequently adopt distinctive epistemological positions. There are many tensions 
and dilemmas that come under the broad label of social constructionism. Whilst 
Burr (2003) argues that the division between different approaches to discourse 
should not be painted too sharply, it is also useful to make the differences 
sufficiently clear for comparison to take place. So with the caveat that not all 
discourse analysts fit neatly into one of these two camps, the key distinctions and 
debates will be discussed. Towards the end of this section the merits of a more 
integrated approach will be considered.
Burr (1995) provides a particularly useful means of dividing research into 
that which operates either at the micro or at the macro level of discourse analysis. 
This basically translates as whether the focus is upon language and rhetorical 
devices manipulated by individuals in a specific setting (e.g., a particular 
conversation) or whether the emphasis is upon discourse in a much broader 
societal sense, related to the post-structuralist works of Foucault. So there are 
differences over the very topic of discourse: at the micro level discursive texts are 
typically transcripts of speech or written sources. In contrast, Foucauldians, to 
varying extents, regard discourses as external to the individual and consequently 
take a broad view of what might be considered textual. The implication is that 
anything which has meaning may be subjected to Foucauldian analysis.
At the micro level, Discursive Psychology (e.g., Potter and Wetherell,
1987, Edwards and Potter, 1992) does not merely challenge claims of naturalness 
and truth but is also radical in the way that it regards 6real-world’ objects. Potter 
and Wetherell point out that in the English language rivers and streams are 
distinguished on the basis of size, whereas in French the distinction is between a 
river that flows into the sea (fleuve) and one that does not (riviere). Their example
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shows that the partitioning of river and stream, fleuve and riviere, is a discursive 
move -  water does not come pre-labelled. They argue that cross-cultural studies 
can be useful because they serve as a constant reminder that things could be 
constructed differently.
When Discursive Psychologists speak of a constructed world, they refer to 
far more than just constructed political, ideological or social categories. In 
Discursive Psychology, materiality has no pre-given meaning until it is 
constructed (or to put it another way, all meaning comes abbut through discourse). 
There are many alternative ways in which to conceptualise the water that forms 
the basis of Potter and Wetherell’s example. The water is treated as a 
homogeneous whole, rather than chemically or sub-atomically. So there are no 
aspects of talk that are off-limits to the Discursive Psychologist suggesting that 
this form of analysis could be a powerful analytical approach. This strong anti- 
essentialism is a dominant feature of social constructionism and allows all truths, 
even ‘real-world’ claims, to be deconstructed. The relativism of discursive 
psychology strongly rejects that anything has an essential nature -  language does 
not reflect, it constructs. Although critical of taken-for-granted knowledge, 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysts are typically less extreme in their relativism and 
to varying degrees accept certain elements as ‘real’ (for example the material 
conditions required to (re)produce discourses). This epistemological tension is one 
of the major differentiating factors between discourse analytic approaches. To 
illustrate better how these concerns might inform discourse analytic research, it is 
perhaps useful to consider some examples firstly from Discursive Psychology 
before turning to the Foucauldian approach. In each case there are particular 
analytical concerns and objects of deconstruction that help to suggest where some 
of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach might lie.
Disavowal of ‘reality’ is an extremely anti-cognitivist manoeuvre (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987) yet it is not just a matter for epistemological debate.
Edwards and Potter (1992) demonstrate that discursive psychologists are able to 
conduct analysis and make comment where cognitivism would be unable to 
advance. To illustrate this assertion, Edwards and Potter refer to Neisser’s (1981) 
study of John Dean’s Watergate testimony. The study is seen as part of a shift in 
cognitivist research from lab-based experimental work towards a more 
‘ecologically valid’ style (i.e. this is a naturally-occurring event that Neisser has
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not manipulated). Both Dean’s testimony and the transcripts of the original 
conversations between Dean and Nixon were available. Neisser’s design used the 
transcript as a kind of experimental control against which Dean’s testimony can 
be checked. Edwards and Potter argue that this design requires ‘truth’ in the form 
of the transcript: without this Neisser could not have proceeded.
One of the major concerns of Discursive Psychology is the function(s) that 
certain utterances perform. Individuals are seen as highly active in the way that 
they use language to certain effects. Neisser (1981) does not attend to the 
functions of the text (i.e., Dean could be implicated in the scandal). Cognitivists 
certainly recognise that people might lie through self-interest but not only do they 
not study it, cognitivist experiments are typically designed to exclude it (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992). Dean’s construction of himself as honest, having a good 
memory and being awestruck by Nixon suggests that his testimony was not a 
window on his cognitive processes but instead part of an activity sequence. 
Therefore, Edwards and Potter propose, efforts to remember become 
indistinguishable from modes of accounting.
In another political scandal, Edwards and Potter (1992) describe Nigel 
Lawson’s (Chancellor of the Exchequer between June 1983 and October 1989) 
attempts to deny having briefed journalists off the record about a controversial 
new policy. Unlike Watergate, there are no tape recordings, only the journalists’ 
shorthand notes. These take on a variable status that is alternatively talked up and 
down as a source of ‘truth’. The press construct the consensus of journalists as 
strengthening their version of events. However, this account was undermined by 
Lawson who argued that the journalists colluded to produce a fictitious story 
(proved by their unanimity). The Chancellor manages his version of events in 
terms of the journalists’ stake (i.e., their need to file a good story), which lends 
credibility to his story. Edwards and Potter see this as a version of ‘they would say 
that, wouldn’t they?’ (attributed to Mandy Rice-Davies by Edwards and Potter,
1992, p. 117) which challenges a competing account on the grounds of its 
interests rather than its factuality.
Discursive psychology is very much grounded in the texts (either written 
or spoken) of individuals. The micro level analysis of the rhetorical moves and 
strategies employed seeks to understand how one individual tries to bring off their 
account of reality over competing accounts. Edwards and Potter (1992) in
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particular offer an extensive range of rhetorical devices that may be identified in 
texts. This carries with it the concept of speakers who are very actively engaged in 
producing their texts or utterances. Yet, at the same time, Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) and Edwards and Potter (1992) stress that discursive psychologists do not 
attribute intentionality to speakers. In other words they do not try to theorise 
whether the use of language is consciously strategic (or even whether its effects 
are anticipated) but just that it does have effects, intended or otherwise. In some 
respects, this does seem to shield analysts from speaker complaints (‘That wasn’t 
what I meant! ’) and avoids a seemingly irresolvable argument over who has 
access to what was ‘really’ meant. Yet, at the same time, it is difficult to read the 
re-analysis of Watergate without some implication of intentionality on the part of 
the John Dean. Madill and Doherty (1994) similarly feel that the view of speakers 
strategically using language does not sit easily with a blanket refusal to theorise 
intent.
The strongly post-structuralist Foucauldian Discourse Analytic approach 
operates well beyond the boundaries of individuals or specific conversations and 
instances. Not only is less emphasis placed upon the individual, but the individual 
versus society dichotomy (so central to social psychology and Western thought) is 
not itself above criticism. So rather than language use being strategic, for the 
advancement of individuals, Parker (1992) suggests language is structured to 
mirror existing power relations. In common with Discursive Psychology, 
discourses are not seen as merely descriptive, but as categorising the world and 
bringing into sight objects (even if they are not ‘real’). Indeed once something 
enters discourse it becomes difficult to refer to as anything but real, and herein is 
the problem of essentialism. An implication of this is that it becomes difficult to 
imagine or articulate alternative ways of being.
The apparent paradox is that discourse analytic research occurs ‘as you 
take your first step away from language’ (Parker, 1992, p. xi). It is difficult to 
imagine academic papers (and indeed normal life) without language, but what 
Parker suggests is that language be treated critically: just because we operate 
within it does not mean we cannot subject it to scrutiny. So Foucauldian 
approaches share with Discursive Psychology a similar scepticism of truth claims. 
Parker (1992), following Foucault, regards discourses as having history. Certain 
discourses fall into disuse and other new discourses emerge. Thus it is possible to
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trace these histories in a genealogical fashion. Although there are no means of 
predicting what discourses might surface in the future, some analysts in the 
Foucauldian tradition suggest ways in which discourses might become less 
oppressive (e.g. Willig 1998).
Foucauldian discourse analysis has been controversial partly because it 
can be seen as suggesting an inescapable system of power. If discourse controls 
the way objects are thought and spoken about, and our very subjectivity is the 
result of discourses, then there appears to be no exit from the ‘seamless web’ 
(Burman, 1983, p. 34). Parker (1992) argues that such an accusation is heavily 
loaded against discourse analysis and suggests a number of ways in which 
discourse analytic research can be useful and liberating. He suggests that a critical 
distance from discourse may be sufficient to set aside certain assumptions. From 
this point, any description of the discourse or attempt to educate or suggest 
alternative discourses is action research. Thus discourse analysis should not be 
seen as merely a post-modern intellectual pursuit, but as political research with 
the potential for ‘real world’ effects.
The Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis particularly avoids 
assuming individual culpability for social practices. Notions of intentionality and 
what might constitute an accidental slip or mistake are problematic for many 
discourse analysts (such terms imply an inner reality that is somehow more 
authentic than the speech act). However those subscribing to a macro view of 
discourses see individuals as sometimes producing utterances with connotations 
of which they were unaware. The person is not seen as exercising full control over 
the discourses they speak (or, to put it in more Foucauldian terms, the discourses 
that speak them) and thus has not necessarily failed to be a good person when they 
employ oppressive discourses. They may not even like the discourses they have 
employed (or, when they are spoken by discourses they may be positioned in 
ways they might often resist). This is useful in the sense that discourse analysis 
need not be heavily and oppressively judgemental. It also acknowledges that more 
desirable and liberating discourses are not always available. However, although 
discourses may have effects independent of a speaker’s intentions this does not 
mean that when theorising subjectivity intentionality must necessarily be ignored. 
Parker (1992) is clear that replacing what goes on in the head of a discourse user
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with a void or ‘black box’ is not particularly helpful and may invite cognitivism 
back into discourse analysis.
Burr (1995) argues that the positioning of ourselves and other people 
within any given conversation may be seen as having effects beyond that specific 
interaction. Power relations are played out within even the most trivial seeming 
conversations. As Burr points out, the belief that language does matter is also 
found in feminist research where (sexist) language is implicated in women’s 
oppression. This has a particular significance for any research into sexual or 
gender identities, not just in terms of using appropriate language for conducting 
research, but ,also in accounting for how satisfactory identities are constructed.
Walkerdine (1981) provides a useful example of macro level discourses at 
work where, due to their age, the speakers are probably not fully aware of the 
discourses they are drawing upon. This of course does conflate naivety and 
innocence with childhood. Although there is always the potential for this to be 
problematic, Walkerdine’s example is helpful in providing an account of the 
power of macro discourses without assuming the speakers to be skilled 
manipulators (consciously or otherwise).
A nursery teacher is admonishing two four-year-old boys when they start 
swearing. In the exchange, the boys briefly seize control of the situation by 
locating themselves and their teacher in a discourse of sexuality where she is 
rendered as a sex object. Walkerdine suggests that the teacher’s lack of resistance 
and ineffective response is the result of a pedagogical discourse in which, as 
teacher, free expression is something she must encourage. Neither the two boys 
nor the teacher are authors of the discourses in which they are positioned; rather 
their speech is a ‘tissue of quotations’ (Barthes, 1977, p. 146).
Burr (1995) argues that these discourses construct the two boys’ and the 
teacher’s subjectivity and how they experience themselves. As with discursive 
psychology there is an avoidance of cognitivist understandings of personality and 
fixed notions of traits and roles are rejected. Although they see the person as the 
basic unit of society, Harré and Van Langenhove (1991) argue that the concept of 
roles is too static and that positioning offers a more dynamic alternative. Their 
approach is broadly in line with post-structuralist theory as it seeks to avoid 
essentialising the self. Harré and Van Langenhove see positioning as largely 
taking place within what they regard as the most basic element of the social realm,
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the conversation. As such, it is not just the epistemology that makes positioning 
theory attractive to discourse analysts but also its topic. Furthermore, it is possible 
to regard positioning in both micro and macro terms.
Davies and Harré (1990) argue that positioning is a discursive practice that 
generates subjectivity, so rather than merely being a rhetorical move it also forms 
part of the psychology of the self. They suggest an interrelationship between 
positioning and illocutionary force, where the social meaning of an utterance 
depends upon the speaker’s position (which in itself is a product of social forces). 
Davies and Harré agree with the post-structuralist assertion that discourse is 
constitutive, but see this in terms of the provision of subject positions rather than 
being an entirely deterministic or what Danziger (1997) sees as ‘dark’ social 
constructionism. Whilst we might wish to avoid loaded terms like ‘dark’ and 
Tight’, and the assumption that individual agency equals desirable social change, 
Davies and Harré reject any heavily deterministic model and see agency in terms 
of the uptake of positions.
Although the individual is seen as neither passive nor fixed, once 
constituted they come to see the world from a particular position (with all the 
associated images, metaphors and stories). Positions are made available in the 
person’s own (and other speaker’s) discourse, and so an individual’s position may 
shift around during conversation. Harré and Van Langenhove see positioning as 
the ‘discursive construction of personal stories that make another person’s actions 
intelligible’ (p. 395) and so positioning at any given time has implications for how 
an utterance may be heard.
There is much to recommend both the Discursive and Foucauldian 
approaches to discourse analysis since they offer an anti-essentialist critique of 
cognitivist social psychology. Whereas cognitivists conceptualise language as a 
more or less transparent means of accessing underlying cognitions, discourse 
analysts see language as where the actual business of sense making and attribution 
take place (Edwards and Potter, 1992). So it is important to see discourse analysis 
as not just a turn to language (cognitivists can and do study language) but rather a 
radical refocusing of topic onto the functions of language and power systems 
embedded in it.
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3.6 Beyond Discourse: ‘Reality’ and Politics
The anti-essentialist positions found among all social constructionists, 
whilst challenging, do seem to offer a radical opportunity for change. Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) suggest there are endless ways in which the world could be 
constructed, echoing Saussure’s assertion that both signifier and signified are 
equally arbitrary (Kress, 2001). In this respect, there is nothing inherent within 
materiality that gives meaning or value. Thus relativism appears to offer the 
possibility of change.
The criticism most often made of Discursive Psychology is that it leads to 
a form of relativism where all accounts are equally valid. Willig (1998) makes the 
important point that it is very difficult to see a consistent theoretical basis for 
choosing one account over another, making relativism politically problematic. 
Parker (1998) regards this as a generalised problem where the same theoretical 
currents that deconstruct truth claims can also render the critiques of oppression 
relative. There are many instances where arguing for the relativity of oppression 
might be offensive. It could also be used to undermine any arguments for change 
and so offer no platform from which from which suggestions could be made.
Potter (1998) argues strongly that even extreme relativism does not mean 
that ‘anything goes’ (p. 34). For him, what ‘goes’ is the very thing that is argued 
about. Potter is right to suggest that politics and ideologies do not just appear, they 
are constructed and worked up through discourse, but this of course does not 
provide the theoretical basis that Willig seeks. A bigger concern is how relativists 
might go about giving voice to one marginalized group whilst denying a platform 
to, for example, the National Front (Burr, 1998). This seems to raise a problem for 
politically motivated researchers, which is perhaps to some extent reflected in the 
large amount of work on power relations and oppression that adopts a 
Foucauldian perspective. This is not to suggest that Discursive Psychology cannot 
be turned to politics but that relativism does not seem to provide a basis upon 
which to argue for one political structure rather than another (Willig, 1998) and 
treats accounts of oppression as social constructions.
The charge that relativism offers a free-for-all is clearly one that 
exasperates Potter (1998). Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest that successfully 
bringing off an account imposes some limitations on its construction. The style of
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micro-level analysis found in Discursive Psychology pays close attention to how 
arguments and accounts are constructed to be persuasive. Some versions of events 
would be very difficult (if not impossible) to credibly bring off, suggesting that 
relativism does not offer the free-for-all that its detractors claim.
In some respects it is difficult to imagine a once-and-for-all answer to the 
realist/relativist division. The terms of the argument mean different things to each 
side. Other facets of the debate are not clearly resolvable; after all, how would one 
go about proving that obj ective knowledge is always inaccessible? The very 
question violates the terms of relativism. Equally there are no arguments against 
relativism that cannot be deconstructed (c.f, Edwards, Ashmore and Potter,
1995). Therefore, discourse analysts are faced with an apparently intractable 
- problem. Yet the very notion that there must be a knowable and definitive answer 
is an empirical belief. Billig (1988) suggests that language and thought are 
dilemmatic and consequently bringing a tension to a resolution is neither 
necessary nor desirable. He sees dilemmas and arguments as productive and 
points to a long tradition of dilemmas in philosophy as a means of conceptualising 
human experience.
This does not mean that tensions, once raised, should be left forever 
dangling: such a move would be deeply unsatisfactory. Furthermore, as was 
argued at the start of this chapter, it would be difficult to proceed 
methodologically in the absence of an epistemological position. However, it may 
be useful to shift from a debate about which position is ‘true’ and which is ‘false’, 
towards a political argument based around what approaches can offer in terms of 
action-research.
Willig’s (1998, 2001) political concerns about relativism are the basis of 
her support for critical realism. The difficulty with this is how to avoid 
essentialism, truth claims and ultimately cognitivism. Reflections upon one’s own 
work may be useful in the sense that they can flag up certain assumptions and 
break down truth claims. This is arguably more ‘honest’ than perpetuating the 
myth of objectivity. However, it is difficult to make sense of competing and 
conflicting accounts of oppression, if they are all to be treated as real.
Parker (1992) proposes a different way of thinking about realism and 
relativism. He suggests there is division between ontological object status (so, the 
material conditions needed for thought and language) and epistemological status
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where an object enters discourse. Parker argues that ontological status is not in 
itself sufficient for an object to be knowable. However, material reality makes 
available potentialities, only some of which are realised in discourse. This 
separation of the realist/relativist debate into ontological and epistemological 
modes is useful because it avoids Nightingale and Cromby’s (1999) fear that 
discourse analysis can be seen as a blanket denial of any material reality (and thus 
seem very unconvincing). For Nightingale and Cromby, ‘discourse is always 
situated in a material world; it is always the product of embodied beings’ (p. 9, 
emphasis added).
Critical realists do not suggest that the textual world maps directly onto the 
‘natural’ one. However, they do suggest that materiality has some role in shaping 
discourse. Materiality may be seen as placing constraints upon social 
constructions in some respects whilst in others offering potentialities which may 
or may not be taken up. The goal however, unlike that of cognitivism, is not to 
discover a (theoretically) describable reality. Instead Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysts see discourse (and the knowledge/power couplet) as the topic and so 
focus less on individual or specific uses of interpretative repertoires.
Willig (1998) argues that deconstructing dominant and oppressive 
discourses does not guarantee political change. The idea of creating space for 
people to find new discourses sounds very appealing but Willig warns that, by 
abstaining from a political position, discourse analysts risk sustaining the status 
quo. Willig is keen not just to be critical of oppressive dominant discourses but 
also to offer alternatives. Discursive Psychology offers an approach that (at least 
theoretically) can veto any truth claim. However, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
attempts to offer a rationale (albeit imperfect) for promoting some discourses over 
others.
A Foucauldian approach seems to offer more potential for desirable 
political change and takes greater account of macro-level discourses and power. 
These aspects recommend it as a style of analysis for those who are politically 
motivated. The individual’s relationship with language is two-way: we speak it, it 
speaks us (Parker and the Bolton Discourse Network, 1999). Yet Wetherell (1998) 
regards post-structuralists as insufficiently concerned with the actual business of 
conversation. This is an important criticism because although from a political 
standpoint a Foucauldian position may be more epistemologically desirable,
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Wetherell rightly questions its methodological rigour. She is concerned that 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysts may be accused of making too many assumptions 
about interactions, language and social life without sufficient basis in the text. Of 
course there is thorough post-structuralist work (e.g., Hollway, 1984) and 
Wetherell’s note of caution should not be seen as a blanket criticism. However, it 
does seem that a specific use of close textual analysis that borrows from the 
technical conventions of Discursive Psychology could be productive.
Wetherell suggests that a purely technical (micro-level) analysis of text, 
although valuable, fails to answer why one utterance is used rather than another. 
Foucauldian approaches are broader both in their concepts of text (and so what 
may be subjected to analysis) allowing a greater freedom to conduct analysis 
within different domains. A television programme could be read as a text without 
reducing it only to transcript form, allowing the ‘language’ of the medium (e.g., 
conventions of framing and editing) to be analysed alongside the overtly textual 
spoken words. Another reason for retaining a broadly Foucauldian approach is 
that individuals do not necessarily occupy centre-stage. This can be used to 
challenge the assumption that individuals are the fundamental units of society in 
preference to power structures, institutions and discursive formations.
The aim is not to utilise the methodological tools of Discursive 
Psychology to scale-up the micro level talk-in-interaction and extrapolate from 
that a theory of ‘big’ discourse. Such a move would suggest that discourses could 
be generalised and were universal. What is required is an approach in which 
discourses are seen as both societal and present in the texts (of whatever form) 
people produce.
Wetherell (1998) draws upon the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1987) to see 
speakers as actively engaged in meaning making, yet at the same time not always 
being the author of their own articulations. This is a helpful idea because it fuses 
the agentic speaker (found in discursive psychology) with a more Foucauldian 
approach to discourses. The individual is active in the sense that they choose 
between the discourses available to them and so there is some hope that less 
oppressive discursive practices might be adopted. With the speaker choosing an 
available discourse from those potentialities, authorship is not theirs alone. 
Consequently the individual is not fully culpable where their discourse positions 
them, and others, in undesirable ways. The ambiguity of authorship, where the
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speaker is ‘both master and slave’ (Barthes, 1982, p. 460), is desirable from a 
methodological standpoint because it avoids the analytic process becoming 
judgemental. The focus in the analysis to follow is on discourses rather than 
people as individuals or groups. Thus it is the practice of oppressive discourse that 
will be attacked and not the individual discourse user.
It is also important to turn the discourse analytic process not just to 
participants’ texts and psychological literature, but also to cast critical gaze over 
this research work. Political and ideological positions inform aspects of the 
analysis since relativism on its own does not seem to offer the theoretical basis for 
radical political change (Willig, 1998, 2001). That said, the desirable 
characteristics one might argue for (e.g., liberation from oppressive power 
systems) are themselves part of a discourse of individualism and self- 
determination. It may be that it is ultimately not possible to escape cultural 
relativity. Furthermore even if a ‘better’ discourse could be agreed upon, would 
there be any guarantee that it did not have the potential to be oppressive in other 
unforeseen ways? Foucault (1978) certainly cautioned that discourse is neither 
inherently good nor bad. Oppressive discourses may be reversed, such as the 
invention of the pathological ‘homosexual’ that ultimately created a subject 
position from which people argued for gay rights. Conversely a seemingly 
liberationary discourse has the potential to be subverted to oppressive ends. 
However, in the studies that follow the subject positions made available within 
heterosexual women and gay men’s friendships are considered and some of the 
available discourses mapped out.
3.7 Method
This project is comprised of two studies, focusing on interview and media 
based accounts of friendship between heterosexual women and gay men. The aim 
is to better understand the complexities of how culturally available discourses of 
friendship, gender and sexuality construct subject positions, given the potential for 
both overlapping and oppositional political interests.
The data were subjected to discourse analysis, which allowed a focus on 
points of apparent contradiction and variability. The analysis drew upon aspects of 
the Foucauldian discourse analysis described above with a focus on discursive
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resources and their implications in terms of power and ideology (see Parker,
1992), while also attending to the more micro-level analyses favoured by 
discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992). This integrated approach has 
been best exemplified by Wetherell’s (1998) critical discursive psychology, which 
argues for a post-structural analysis that takes account of culturally available 
extra-textual systems of meaning, as well as more micro-interactional processes.
The methodological approach to the interview-based Study One is 
described below and the findings presented in the following three chapters. The 
media-based Study Two adopts a similar analytic perspective, but the details of 
data collection are described in Chapter 7 along with findings and further analysis 
in Chapter 8.
3.8 Study One
In order to investigate discourses of friendship between heterosexual 
women and gay men Study One used an interview based approach. Detailed semi­
structured interviews were conducted with pairs of interviewees who defined 
themselves a s ‘good friends’.
3.8.1 Pilot Interview
A pilot interview conducted with two friends (who did not meet the target 
criteria) was used to establish test the interview schedule. The friends in the pilot 
study were somewhat acquainted with the researcher and this produced difficulties 
in terms of maintaining topic focus (without being overly directive as an 
interviewer) and common points of reference went unarticulated. Whilst it was 
possible for the interviewer to ask for things to be made explicit, became 
progressively more awkward. It also required the interviewer to be consistently 
conscious of the need to unpack implicit details (even where they are objects of 
prior knowledge) and this was difficult to sustain. Whilst under no illusions of 
interviewer ‘neutrality’ it seemed quite likely that previously existing 
relationships between researcher and interviewee would be analytically 
problematic because extra-textual (outside the transcript) knowledge would be
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required to understand the accounts. So although it made recruitment more 
difficult, prior acquaintances were excluded from the final group of participants.
3.8.2 Recruitment
Participants were recruited through pre-existing social contacts (i.e. friends 
of friends) and via internet sites (specifically, gaydar.co.uk and 
outeverywhere.com). With five dyads the initial contact was through the male 
friend and in the other two cases via the female friend. A recruitment flyer (see 
Appendix 1) was only of limited use, but a sheet of ‘frequently asked questions’ 
(or to be more accurate, questions they might reasonably be anticipated to ask) 
was useful in making the link between researcher and prospective interviewees. 
Where friends of friends were approached this information sheet (see Appendix 2) 
was provided via the existing social contact. It addressed key issues like the focus 
of the research, the expectations upon them (e.g. in terms of time), issues of 
privacy and practical concerns such as where the interview could take place. The 
latter issue addressed the geographical areas I could practically cover, but also 
explained the need for a quiet environment (which specifically ruled out bars and 
cafes). This was necessary for the purposes of sound recording, aside from the 
ethical complication of interviewees drinking alcohol. However, this stipulation 
did deter some potential interviewees who perhaps were seeking a more informal 
space than an interview room, without necessarily wanting to invite me to their 
home.
3.8.3 Ethical Considerations
Although the topic of friendship was not in itself anticipated to be 
problematic or distressing (since the participants were recruited on the basis of 
their self categorisation as ‘good friends’) the decision to interview both parties 
together was taken for ethical reasons. It would have been possible to interview 
unconnected friends (and indeed a similar technique was employed in a previous 
study, Shepperd & Percy, 2002). However, interviewing pairs of friends offered 
the possibility of differing accounts of the same events. From a discourse analytic 
point of view such data would be very valuable, but raised an ethical concern. If
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one friend knew the other was being interviewed then they might (quite 
reasonably) want to know what was said about them thus posing a problem in 
terms of confidentiality. Even were it possible to sufficiently anonymise the data 
they might argue they had the moral right to see it. Even if it were possible to 
refuse such a request, might creating a situation where each friend has talked 
about the other (in confidence) with an interviewer damage their friendship? Since 
trust and self-disclosure are foundational aspects of friendship (Duck, 2007) 
interviews that disrupted those processes could easily be detrimental to the 
participants.
The solution was to interview both parties together so they could co­
construct an account of their friendship that would be acceptable to both of them. 
This also had the advantage of permitting more ‘naturally’ occurring speech 
between the friends.
Pseudonyms were given to participants and identifying details about 
precise location, place of work or other biographical details that would make them 
identifiable were not transcribed. Although most discussion focused on the 
participants’ friendship, where others were implicated they were also assigned 
false names and where necessary details obscured.
Despite the emphasis being on friendship some potential interviewees 
expressed concerns about the interview being designed to show they were 
unconsciously or secretly in love with their friend. No deception was involved and 
the interview schedule was not designed to explore sensitive topics of that kind, 
however where such concerns were articulated it was mutually agreed not to 
proceed.
Interviewees were able to choose the location of the interview (subject to it 
being sufficiently quiet for the recording). One dyad chose an interview room at 
the University of Surrey, but in all other cases participants opted to be interviewed 
at one of their homes. Consent forms were signed (see Appendix 3) and 
participants were made aware of their right to withdraw or skip over questions. 
They were also given the option of receiving a transcript on which they could 
comment or ask for deletions to be made.
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3.8.4 Participants
The 14 participants were aged 21-64. Using the British Census categories, 
they classified themselves as nine White British, one White Irish, one Iranian, one 
Mixed Caribbean, one British-Chinese and one Mixed-Other (Asian/Portuguese). 
The inclusion of participants with a variety of careers and educational 
backgrounds was deliberate. Whilst making no claims to a representative sample, 
there was an effort to specifically include individuals who are commonly under­
represented (e.g. older gay men). Participants included an artist, a makeup artist, a 
graphic designer, a retired builder, a student, an office worker, an account 
manager, a personal assistant, a public relations worker, two school teachers, a 
retired solicitor and two university lecturers. All the male participants identified as 
‘exclusively homosexual’. Only one female participant did not identify as 
‘exclusively heterosexual’ and opted for ‘mainly heterosexual with a small degree 
of homosexuality’. None of the pairs of friends were cohabiting. More specific 
demographics or biographical histories of particular participants are not reported 
in order to preserve anonymity.
3.8.5 Interview Schedule
Each pair of friends consented to an in-depth, semi-structured joint- 
interview with the researcher (in one instance Adrian Coyle acted as co­
interviewer). The interview schedule (Appendix 7) focused discussion on the 
history of their friendship and specific milestones during its development 
(Appendix 6). The pilot interview had suggested that people found it easier to 
discuss events and construct stories rather than talking about their friendship in a 
more abstract sense.
The interview was structured to follow a narrative course, from friendship 
formation, through any problems and ending with aspects of the friendship that 
they valued most. Interviewees were asked to talk about some of the milestones 
and challenges, as well as current aspects of their friendship. In practice, much of 
the content and structure of the interviews was determined by the participants’ 
negotiation of matters of importance within their friendship stories. Interviews
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typically lasted between 1.5 and 3 hours. This was longer than anticipated and 
meant breaks for refreshments became necessary. -
3.8.6 Transcription and Analysis
Transcription and analysis are deliberately discussed together since the 
processes overlap. Tapes were transcribed using a foot pedal controlled 
transcription machine in earlier cases. Later interviews were digitally recorded 
(for higher quality) and transcribed using Trans ana which allows simultaneous 
keyboard control of the audio playback (making it possible to jump backwards a 
few seconds) whilst transcribing.
A simplified version of Jefferson’s (2004) transcription system was used. 
Potter and Hepburn (2005: 8) argue that the full Jeffersonian system should be 
used (as opposed to ‘Jefferson Lite’) on the basis that decisions about what is 
important should follow rather than precede transcription. However, the 
discursive psychology associated with Potter operates at a more micro level, so 
like conversation analysis (Drew, 2003) makes more analytic capital of highly 
detailed linguistic features. Although highly detailed, the full Jeffersonian 
transcription remains an interpretation of the original data as spoken. It is a very 
earnest attempt to render naturalistic speech in textual form, but can be almost 
unreadable to the untrained eye and, as Griffin (2007) points out, even ‘Jefferson 
Lite’ requires a very considerable time investment.
Features like pauses and overlapping speech are noted. There is less 
attention given to intonation except where the emphasis is important for 
understanding the utterance (e.g. showing the stress placed on a particular word 
might make sense of the response that follows).
Transcripts were re-read many times during a lengthy coding process the 
resulted in 72 thematic areas. Many of these could be termed ‘discourses’ whilst 
others were more descriptive topics. Through an iterative process, moving 
between data and themes, coherent areas for analysis were formed and these form 
the basis of the following three analytic chapters.
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Chapter 4 
Mythical Norms1
4.1 Theoretical Background
This chapter analyses discourses of normativity and non-normativity in 
constructing accounts of friendship between heterosexual women and gay men. 
Sexual norms of gender and sexuality are evident in the speakers’ constructions of 
self, but other norms also emerge including cultural and ethnic differences. 
Furthermore, it seems that interviewees also attend to heteronormative constructions 
of mixed-sex friendship (i.e., the inevitability of sexual desire) by repeatedly 
accounting for their friendship as legitimately non-sexual. In this chapter I will show 
how speakers manage heteronormativity and explore the ways in which they both 
resist and engage with norms through the use of parody. The data will show that 
heterosexual women (not just the gay men) are subjected to heterosexist norms. 
Furthermore, although the pairs of interviewees did not share the same dimensions of 
non-normativity, evidence is presented to suggest that mutual non-normativity itself 
may be a basis for friendship and support.
Normativity is often understood as meaning statistically common, with non- 
normative groups being seen as unusual or minorities. However, there is not always a 
clear relationship between the size of a group and how it is perceived. For example 
women comprise a slim majority of the UK population, yet masculinity tends to be 
considered normative. Conversely there are many desirable and socially privileged 
positions that are statistically infrequent (e.g., being a genius). In this chapter 
normativity is regarded as a set of macro level discourses and part of an almost 
invisible system of social control. Therefore normativity is not regarded as politically 
neutral, rather it privileges certain groups at the expense of others.
In 1949 Simone de Beauvoir’s classic feminist text The Second Sex described 
the ways that women were regarded as a sexual ‘other’ to the normative masculinity. 
She argued that women were not simply treated as inferior, but were defined solely in 
reference to men. So maleness was (and still is) the benchmark of sexual normativity.
1A version o f this chapter is published as Shepperd, D., Coyle, A., & Hegarty, P. (2010). Discourses o f  
Friendship between Heterosexual Women and Gay Men: Mythical Norms and an Absence o f Desire. 
Feminism & Psychology, 20 (2) 205-224.
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This idea has been widely taken up and used by feminist psychologists. However as 
Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1996) point out, otherness is not just an issue for feminists. 
There are many ‘others’ associated with a variety of power differences and 
oppressions.
In a more intersectional account of normativity, Audre horde’s (1984) 
mythical norm, was described as as ‘thin, white, male, young, heterosexual, Christian 
and financially secure’ (p. 589). This is not an exhaustive list, but one to which we 
could go on adding norms. Lorde regards the mythical norm as somewhere on the 
edge of consciousness. So although there may be some shared understanding of 
normativity, some aspects of it are more salient for certain people at particular times. 
Lorde suggests that people are more aware of norms connected to their own 
oppression, and less conscious of those norms which privilege them. This is in many 
ways a very persuasive theory, but it carries with it a warning: we may fail to 
recognise some types of oppression adequately. Although Richardson (1996) argues 
that women and gay men may have many shared objectives in resisting 
heteropatriarchy, even political allies may be inadvertently complicit in reproducing 
problematic discourses of normativity. horde’s theory seems to suggest that gay men 
and heterosexual women might be conscious, and unaware, of different modes of 
oppression.
Lorde (1984) was similarly concerned that many political movements (e.g., 
feminism, gay liberation and Marxism) tended to view all human oppression in terms 
of one dominant oppressive force. Rubin (1984) made an analogous critique of 
lesbian feminists, who viewed patriarchy as the model for all forms of oppression. 
She suggests that feminism lacks the necessary analytical tools and theories to 
account for the oppression sexual minorities face. Rubin notes not just a hetero / 
homo binary, but a far more nuanced hierarchy has marital reproductive sex at the 
top, stable and long term gay relationships in the middle and fetishists, sex workers 
and sadomasochists o n ‘the outer limits’ (p. 281).
However the structure Rubin describes is complicated by what Warner (1999) 
regards as ‘false norms’. In particular, he argues that marriage is a false norm because 
society takes little notice of the sexual practices within it (regardless of where they 
fall in Rubin’s hierarchy). Thus the push towards same-sex marriage rights, whilst 
leaving the basic power structures unchanged, will privilege some gay men and
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lesbians whilst excluding those who are unmarried. Warner’s argument is that 
individual civil rights do not on their own change sexual norms.
However power structures like sexual norms are very enduring and coded 
into many areas of society. These norms are continually reproduced in everyday 
speech acts. Hollway (1984) suggested that the dominance of patriarchal discourse is 
evidenced by the terms ‘man’, ‘mankind’ and ‘he/him’ as universal descriptors of all 
humanity (regardless of gender). Warner (1993) suggests that most theories of human 
relations are based upon an implicit model of heterosexuality. She argues that the 
dominance of this norm is all too often ignored or even hidden from view. Sedgwick 
(1990: 1) claims ‘an understanding of virtually any aspect of modem western culture 
must be, not merely incomplete, but damaged in its central substance to the degree 
that it does not incorporate a critical analysis of modem homo/heterosexual 
definition’. Furthermore, as Warner (p. xxi) puts it, heterosexual culture ‘interprets 
itself as society’. What these different theorists tell us is that not only do sexual 
norms touch most areas of society, but heterosexuality will always be assumed and it 
need never account for itself. Valentine (1993) identifies certain public spaces (like 
hotels) as projections of heterosexuality. She explains that many lesbian couples 
booking a hotel rooms face a dilemma whether to ask for twin beds or a double. Her 
contention is that heteronormativity produces a situation where non-normative 
sexualities are faced with a situation that might not seem obvious to heterosexuals.
Jeffreys (1991) argues that the heterosexual norms of western societies 
‘would seem as little worth comment as the fact rain falls from the skies’ (p. 287). 
This is an apposite remark because it captures the sense of inevitability and 
naturalness coded into norms of gender and sexuality. However it also indicates that 
some norms are so foundational that to call attention to them seems banal. As 
Hollway (1984: 231) says of the male sex drive discourse, ‘This needs little 
introduction because it is so familiar -  so hegemonic, or dominant -  in the 
production of meanings concerning sexuality’. Hollway could just as easily have 
made the same comment of heterosexuality. Sexual norms are so familiar that they 
draw little attention to themselves as political rather than neutral. Furthermore 
heterosexuality operates in an almost invisible way, seldom calling attention to itself 
yet requiring others to continually explain themselves.
Foucault’s (1978) The History o f  Sexuality argues that social regulation
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operates not (just) through laws and rules with punishments, but instead by 
subjecting individuals to constant surveillance. This disciplinary power operates in 
part through a process of normalisation where individuals are judged according to a 
dominant norm. Foucault suggests that norms are practised and leamt by ordinary 
people rather than imposed by one dominant group upon another weaker group. So in 
this sense no one is exempt from normalisation, both in terms of being subjected to 
it, but often implicated in its production.
Butler (1990), following Foucault (1978), argues that it is impossible to 
escape the hegemony of heterosexuality as any alternative account (e.g., a gay or 
lesbian identity) will always be constructed within heterosexual norms. So it seems 
that it is impossible to stand entirely outside normative discourse. Yet Butler also 
claims that heterosexuality is locked into a process of continually reconstructing 
itself. Therefore there is no original, natural expression of heterosexuality. The 
corollary of this is that with no original heterosexuality, homosexuality cannot be an 
‘inferior’ copy.
However the claim of heterosexual naturalness is a very powerful and readily 
accepted discourse. Not only are men and women expected to be sexually involved 
with one another, but non-sexual relationships may have difficultly justifying 
themselves. Kitzinger and Perkins (1993: 115- 116) emphasise the excessive 
importance of sexual discourses, ‘It is a measure of the extraordinary burden placed 
upon sexuality these days that the word “relationship” has come to mean “sexual 
relationship”, as though only sex makes a relationship real, worth commenting on.’. 
Rose (2000) also finds that friendships are treated less seriously than romantic 
relationships both by the general public and social scientists. These priorities are 
reflected in a PsycINFO keyword search showing five times more matches for 
‘romance’ than ‘friendship’. In additional friends (even those who cohabit) have few 
legal privileges to compare with those in legally recognised sexual relationships.
Within each pair of friends interviewed, speakers are positioned in non- 
normative discourses (albeit in different ways). Furthermore the relationship between 
them is non-normative because it does not conform to the heterosexual norm.
In the analysis ahead I will examine the role of non-normative sexuality in 
excluding gay men from normative masculinity. I will also discuss the implications 
of heteronormativity not just for gay men, but also for heterosexual women and the
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friendship. Management of other people’s perceptions of the interviewees’ friendship 
will also be considered with particular references to the use of parody and other 
means of disrupting normativity. Lastly I will consider whether difference from the 
mythical norm can itself be a basis for friendship, even where the non-normativities 
do not overlap.
4.2 Analysis
In these analyses the role of non-normative sexuality in excluding gay men 
from normative masculinity is examined. I also discuss the implications of 
heteronormativity for gay men, heterosexual women, and for friendships between 
them. Management of other people’s perceptions of the interviewees’ friendship will 
be considered with particular references to the use of parody and other means of 
disrupting normativity. Lastly I consider whether difference from Lorde’s (1984) 
‘mythical norm’ can itself become a basis for friendship, such that non-normativity 
can be a form of affinity.
4.3 Normativity and Gay Men
Many of the participants (mostly women) drew upon accounts of 
psychological sex differences to explain the importance of their friendship. In this 
extract, Emily explained that her friend Mike gave her a male perspective that (by 
implication) her female friends could not provide (T  denotes the speaking turns of 
the interviewer).
Extract 1
I find that I do tend to ask Mike lots of questions 
to hear like the man's point of view of things cos 
r don't really like asking male friends about that 
kind of thing. Even though it you know 
What do you mean like =
= Straight male friends 
Straight male?
Sorry ( (laughs)) but erm yeah. But even cos then I'd 
ask Mike from a male point of view (.) for a male point 
of view and then I'll ask like Jenny for example 
for a female point of view so it's kinda like separate
1040 E:
1041
1042
1043
1044 I:
1045 E:
1046 I:
1047 E:
1048
1049
1050
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Here, ‘difference’ needs to be understood and Emily suggested that she was 
curious about the alternative (male) viewpoint. This spoke to a binary gender 
discourse where masculinity is a communicable and unified experience that Mike 
was apparently able to articulate on behalf of all men. Indeed later Emily reported 
asking Mike about the male gaze: T was getting a bit jealous of my boyfriend staring 
at other women and stuff and I was like saying to Mike is that quite normal for you 
know men to do?’ (lines 1243-6).
Masculinity and femininity were constructed as essentially separate, with 
Emily able to ask Mike and Jenny for their gendered (and, from Emily’s perspective, 
‘objective’) opinions. Yet in voicing her difficulties in talking to men, Emily 
excluded Mike from the category of ‘male friends’ (line 1042), shifting between 
accounts of ‘men’ that included and excluded gay men. When the interviewer started 
to query this account, she quickly repaired the construction and apologised with a 
laugh. The repair suggests that Emily became aware that she was hearable as having 
constructed Mike as ‘not male’. The slippage between ‘male’ and ‘straight male’ 
exemplifies one form of heteronormativity that Braun (2000) sees as heterosexism by 
commission (an articulation of heterosexist assumptions). The interviewer’s 
inteijection disrupted her construction and she immediately identified the norm she 
has drawn upon. Emily modified what she was seeking to ‘straight male’, yet rather 
paradoxically Mike was then re-positioned as able to offer her this vantage point 
despite being gay.
Like the media discourse of Will & Grace, Emily seemed to be suggesting 
that Mike’s gay identity permitted her to speak to him in ways she could not with 
heterosexual men (apparently including her heterosexual boyfriend). This publicly 
available account is something that Emily drew upon as she constructed the value of 
their friendship. Emily later raised the potential for a special kind of friendship 
between heterosexual women and gay men, which she constructed in terms of the 
problems of mixed-sex friendships. Yet, as Extract 2 shows, Mike was wary of the 
idea that gay men should be inherently preferable friends for straight women:
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Extract 2
I: To finish up with I just wondered what your reaction
is to [media representation of gay male/straight female 
friendships] but also if there anything you would like 
people to know about it?
M: Definitely I think definitely I think this whole media
portrayal is (.) I think in a way the thing going across 
is always that women feel like blah blah blah about 
straight men so they hang out with gay men. Erm but it 
kind of makes gay men seem oh so nice and most of them 
are bitchy bastards at the end of the day. It's the same 
with straight men and gay men they are the same most of 
them are bastards really.
Mike can be seen to reject a positive representation of gay men as sensitive 
and 4oh so nice’ (line 1508). He resisted the discourse of allegiance between gay men 
and heterosexual women, then introduced a bottom-line argument that ‘most of them 
are bitchy bastards at the end of the day’ (lines 1508-9). Mike qualified this with the 
word ‘most’ (lines 1508 and 1510) but nevertheless appealed to a sense of 
universality amongst ‘most’ men and suggested that they are essentially all the 
‘same’ (line 1510). There was, however, some variability in how he treated gender. 
Firstly gender was prioritised: unlike Emily’s earlier construction, gay men were first 
and foremost men. However the construction of ‘bitchy bastards’ coupled two 
oppositely gendered insults. This speaks to a discourse of gay men which associated 
them with effeminacy, yet also claimed masculinity. It also resonated because the 
lexicon of sex role slang is wider for gay men (accounting for 35% of terms) than for 
heterosexuals (7%) showing gay men’s marginal status compared with hegemonic 
heterosexuality (Peel, 2005). In embracing a construction of gay men as potentially 
not so ‘nice’ without providing any stable, easily categorised alternative, Mike 
implicitly resisted Emily’s construction of interactive possibilities that are not 
available in exchanges with straight men.
The first extract presented a construction, albeit perhaps unintentional, of gay 
men as sufficiently non-normative that they are (temporarily) excluded from the 
category of men. Conversely gay men are positioned as able to represent a generic 
male perspective and, in the second extract, Mike’s condemnation of gay men is 
partly based on their similarity (albeit bitchy) with straight men. The normativity of, 
gay men seems variable and perhaps, if we return to horde’s (1984) mythical norm, 
mediated by the speaker’s identity.
1500
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
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4.4 Disrupting Norms
If positioning gay men as nice non-normative men results in the self­
interpolation that gay men are ‘bitchy bastards’, what else can people do apropos of 
normativities? In this next extract, the participants interrogated normative sexuality. 
Querying Butler’s (1990) notion of parody, I examine an account which exemplifies 
some of the ambiguities around passing and parody. Butler is suspicious of attempts 
to normalise identities into the categories of oppressive structures. Instead, like many 
other queer theorists, she argues that the underlying structures must be challenged. 
Butler’s well-known emphasis on performativity1 shifts the weight from what one is 
to what one does. Butler (1993) advocates disrupting and denaturalising normative 
genders through the use of parody and drag. She also argues that it is possible for 
women to appropriate the phallus; the penis is not the definitive phallus and so does 
not belong uniquely to men. By using a dildo as a lesbian phallus, Butler suggests it 
is possible to disrupt the link between male bodies and power. Richardson (1996: 8) 
raises concerns about the workability of these tactics. She questions how ‘the lesbian 
cock’ is supposed to challenge heterosexuality as an institution, given that it is likely 
to be interpreted as an imitation penis. Lamos (1994: 95) wryly remarks ‘the dildo- 
bedecked lesbian may be disappointed that her parody of the phallus is interpreted 
differently by others’.
Cerys and Rob co-constructed a narrative around a holiday they spent 
together some years previously where a shared bedroom produced the potential to 
‘out’ Rob.
Extract 3
1301 I : Were you ever tempted to wind people up by taking
1302 it further?
1303 C: Erm (.) I think we had a bit of fun with the
1304 bloke at the bed and breakfast. ((laughs))
1305 R: Yes (.) but I don't think we've ever really =
1306 C: = not deliberately =
1307 R: = gone out of our way to (.) we just
1308 C: We've just not made things clear.
1309 R: Yeah (.) w h y 'should we bother to have to -
1310 C: = Exactly yeah.
1311 R: go to the (trouble) of making it clear.
1312 C: He was wondering -
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1313 I: -- good point
1314 C: He was clearly trying to figure things out. We
1315 could have put him out of his misery and we chose
1316 not t o .
1317 (•)
1318 I: But then again it might not have been that easy
1319 to have (.) I don't know (.) would it have been
1320 easy to put him out of his misery?
1321 C: I dunno (.. ) could have just said "we're friends
1322 (.) he's gay you (.) why would he want to sleep
1323 with me? (.) why would I want to sleep with him?
1324 I have a nice big bed to myself" you know. I
1325 dunno (.) he might turn out to be completely
1326 homophobic.
1327 R: Well yes. Exactly (.) yes
1328 C: Poison your breakfast mushrooms.
1329 R: Best just to leave it as it was.
In their account, while staying in ‘bed and breakfast’ style accommodation, 
they shared a room with multiple beds. The puzzled owner was reportedly unable to 
reconcile Cerys and Rob sleeping in different beds with them not having fallen out or 
argued. They superficially had the raw ingredients for heterosexuality and so Cerys 
voiced a perceived expectation that they should be sexually involved.
Like Valentine’s (1993) observation of the heterosexism experienced by 
lesbians checking into hotels, gay men and heterosexual women on holiday together 
are also read in heteronormative terms. This requirement to explain themselves and 
their non-normativity was not lost on Rob and he questioned ‘why should we bother 
to have to [...] go to the (trouble) of making it clear’ (lines 1309-11). This shifted the 
responsibility away from them as actors; it was not necessarily their role to correct 
every misreading of their relationship.
Rob queried the assumption that they should have to explain their friendship 
and this resonates with queer theorists’ (e.g., Butler, 1990) rejection of normative 
categories (instead of engaging in a liberal-humanist struggle for acceptance). Yet the 
assumption produces a ‘double bind’ where silently passing as heterosexual confirms 
the taken-for-grantedness of heterosexuality, but coming out is not only risky but also 
acknowledges the hegemony of heterosexuality.
The interviewer asked Cerys and Rob about their role in permitting this 
(mis)reading of their relationship to be perpetuated and the notion of ‘winding up’ 
(line 1301) introduced the possibility that they were actively misleading the hotelier; 
producing a scene to be gazed upon. Cerys’ idea that this performance was a ‘bit of 
fun’ (line 1303) disclaimed the significance of their actions, heading off an
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alternative interpretation that they were trying to embarrass the hotelier. They 
deflected claims that they have done something dishonest, which makes it hard to 
then claim they have made a political statement. Yet their account reclaimed as fun a 
situation where sexual normativity had the potential to disrupt their holiday.
Cerys offered a hypothetical example of how she could explain their 
relationship to the hotelier. She gave a number of reasons, not for why they are 
friends but for why they are not in a romantic relationship. ‘He’s gay you (.)’ (line 
1322) raised the questioner’s knowledge (through the assumed but unspoken ‘know’ 
after the momentary pause) into the discourse as well as Rob’s sexuality. Suddenly 
the hotelier appeared to be someone who should ‘know’ not to presume 
heterosexuality. Firstly Cerys treated it as an easy speech act to make before 
orienting to homophobic consequences. In the next part of Cerys’justification of 
their friendship, she said ‘Why would he want to sleep with me? (.) why would I 
want to sleep with him?’ (lines 1322-3). The balancing of this couplet emphasizes 
their mutual lack of sexual desire and headed off any suggestion that she might 
(secretly) desire him. It spoke to a discourse o f ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ (Rich,
1980) and their need to justify not sleeping together. His gay identity was used to 
explain the non-normative absence of sexual interest.
Up to this point, neither Rob nor Cerys attended to the reaction they might 
encounter in such a situation. The interviewer’s question about how they would raise 
the matter hinted at the possibility of difficulties but Cerys was the first to explicitly 
mention a hostile response, saying ‘I dunno (.) he might turn out to be completely 
homophobic’ (lines 1324-6). At this point Rob took up the conversation saying, ‘Well 
yes. Exactly (.) yes’ (line 1327). Rob’s gay identity gave him the entitlement to speak 
with expert knowledge and confirmed her speculation as a real possibility.
In reading this extract, we become aware of how each speaker has different 
stakes in the matrix of sexual norms. In the interview Cerys was able to parody 
homophobia with an ironic reference to ‘Poison your breakfast mushrooms’ (line 
1328) -  hardly a typical homophobic attack. Meanwhile Rob’s reaction may suggest 
a connection between his identity as a gay man and his more sober articulation of the 
threat.
The way this account is interpreted greatly depends upon our own theoretical 
positions: some queer theorists might see this as parody in a Butlerian sense with
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some subversive potential, whereas some feminists might see passing, closeting and 
recapitulation. This example seems to fall between the theoretical categories of 
parody and performance and refuses to be classed in any sustained way, suggesting 
that feminist and queer theories may be harder to tease apart when considering ‘real’ 
social interactions.
In the next extract, two interviewees talked about their engagement in a more 
overt parody of heterosexuality by kissing, and appeared to use this to combat 
homophobia. A widespread theme in many interviews was the problem of friendship 
and desire coexisting. Given the cultural currency of this discourse (c.f. Werking, 
1997) it is not surprising that the pairs of interviewees invested considerable 
discursive resources in asserting the absence of sexual tension. The normalcy of 
heterosexual desire between ‘men’ and ‘women’ is such that participants’ accounts 
drew heavily upon gay sexuality to explain the absence of attraction. In discourse, 
gay sexuality operated as an effective blockade against the possibility of desire, to 
the point where heterosexual behaviour was openly practiced between gay male and 
straight female friends without constituting evidence of inner psychological desires.
Extract 4
232 D = there were twats in the bar weren't there?
233 K I know I had to pretend to be Dave's girlfriend
234 D Homophobic twats in the bar =
235 K = yeah so I had to snog him in the bar
236 D ( ) and we thought w e 'd wind 'em up (.) so
237 went for a good fucking snog didn't we?
238 K Yeah .
239 D Like (.) tonsil tennis =
240 K = Exactly.(.) just to prove a point =
241 D = Yeah it was [ (quite a laugh)
242 K [ Trying to prove [( )
243 D [ I t  was hilarious
This story explained how they aimed to ‘wind up’ the (presumably 
heterosexual) ‘homophobic twats’ (line 234). It suggested considerable pleasure at 
making available a potential misreading of their relationship and thus confusing the 
‘homophobic twats” initial assumption. Its humour is also based around a parody of 
heterosexuality that excluded the ‘homophobic twats’ by winding them up. 
Considerable discursive work was involved in heading off alternative readings that 
the ‘snog’ represented sexual desire: having set the scene and outlined a socio-
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political motive for the ‘snog’, Katie explained it was ‘just to prove a point’ (line
240) thus denying other motivations and Dave added that it was ‘quite a laugh’ (line
241) which he upgraded t o ‘was hilarious’ (line 243).
Their account of the ‘snog’ is rendered more possible by the social 
circumstances in which it took place; the catalyst of the homophobic abuse and the 
public context. A ‘good fucking snog’ (line 237) in private or in other public settings 
would mean something different. The presence of the ‘homophobic twats’ (line 234) 
purged the act of desire, allowing the event construction as a parody of 
heterosexuality, where they did something normative in a queer or non-normative 
way. However, as noted earlier, parody may be interpreted as ‘reality’ (Richardson,
1996), and so has the potential to be politically counter-revolutionary. This raises 
questions about the extent to which Dave and Katie’s performance troubled the 
heteronormativity of the ‘homophobic twats’ in the bar. Yet, unlike in the previous 
extract, we see that Katie and Dave were constructing a powerful political 
manoeuvre in a specific environment, thus giving us a much stronger sense of 
parody. We can not know how it was read by the ‘homophobic twats’; in the 
narrative, it appeared to have empowered Dave and Katie at a moment of oppression. 
But, if it did so, was this achieved by only obscuring Dave’s gay identity? Perhaps 
individuals have greater difficulty bringing off performances as parody than the more 
theatrical queer collective actions (e.g., ‘kiss-ins’) that Butler advocated.
What seems more troubling within this account of parody is Dave’s sexist use 
of the word ‘twats’ and ‘homophobic twats ’ (lines 232, 234). Possibly he was 
parodying homophobia but used a gendered insult to do so, parodying along one 
dimension, whilst invoking problematic norms along the other. Yet unlike Emily’s 
slip in the first extract (where she excluded Mike from the category of men), this 
utterance went unchallenged by thé gay male interviewer. Furthermore it took the 
authors longer at the analysis stage to notice this misogynistic construction than the 
previous heteronormative one. This suggests that, for authors and interviewees alike, 
certain kinds of situated knowledge are more readily available (and easier to 
comment upon) than others.
In both these extracts the interviewees discussed instances of ‘real’ or inferred 
heterosexism and talked about performing heterosexuality in ways that might 
confuse or disrupt onlookers’ assumptions. In one instance the friendship, and its
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non-sexual/romantic status, seemed to require explanation and in the other the threat 
appeared to be directed more specifically at Dave’s gay identity. In both cases they 
articulated strategies that involved elements of parody, yet they are also readable as 
recapitulation. Although it may not be possible for to gauge the (potential) effects of 
these performances, they indicate that parody may be more contradictory than queer 
theorists might suggest.
4.5 Lust and Desire
So far all these constructions have assumed that gay men do not desire women. It has 
been intimated (by Cerys) that gay men are not objects of desire for heterosexual 
women. However, in the next extract Cerys and Rob discuss the attractiveness of 
various men, including the large number of gay men present at Rob’s birthday party.
Extract 5
1025 R: [...] there were just three straight men at that
102 6 party (.) and one of them being Nick who you
1027 brought with you. And the other two being two
1028 brothers I know quite well.
1029 D: Mhm
1030 R: One of whom was there with his wife and the
1031 other with his fiancée. So all the straight men
1032 were (.) .
1033 D : attached = -
1034 R: = spoken for. So you only had the gay men to
1035 lust after didn't you?
1036 (.)
1037 C : Yeah but they were actually nicer than the
1038 straight men ( (laughs)) .
1039 D : In what way? •
1040 C: No just purely (.) ahem (.) lust (.) lust looking
1041 without even knowing (.) he's got some very
1042 good looking friends. And they are nice as well
1043 (.pit's like shit (.) you know (.) it's a bit of
1044 a waste. ((laughs)) Well you have (.) you've got some '
1045 nice friends. (.) And you fancied my husband.
1046 R: Yeah (.) yeah. He was very nice.
1047 C: And my friend Julian who came around the other day.
1048 R: Oh yeah (.) yeah.
1049
1050 [A detailed discussion of Julian's current occupation is
1051 removed for brevity.]
1052
1053 C: But he's not gay.
1054 R: Waste of emotional effort.
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It is established that at the party heterosexual men were a minority group and 
are all ‘spoken for’ (line 1034) -  thus they are apparently not available to Cerys. This 
short anecdote has the party context as exposition, the lack of available straight men 
as the complication and the gay men being ‘nicer than the straight men’ (lines 1037- 
8) as the (ironic) resolution. This is humorous, not in the sense that she does not like 
gay men, but insofar as desiring them is unlikely to result in sexual fulfilment. 
However, the hearing of ‘nicer’ as ironic is in itself problematic because gay-straight 
comparisons that favour gay men are necessarily ironic and are not taken seriously. 
Conversely Rob’s desire for the heterosexual Julian is apparently not heard as 
humorous. So it appears that women desiring gay men have more comedic value than 
gay men desiring straight men. This may also be tied to the normative exclusion of 
women from the male sex drive discourse, and thus female desire (wheresoever 
directed) is taken less seriously than male desire.
This account partially fits with the culturally available idea that gay men pay 
more attention to appearance than heterosexual men. This seems to construct gay 
men in opposition to normative masculinities. Although the tone is complimentary it 
speaks only to a very culturally specific discourse of gay men which excludes less 
visible versions of gay sexuality. Yet there is also a certain tension here as twice 
Cerys moves from ‘lust’ to ‘nice’ and so takes the sexual heat out of the account. This 
is all partly humorous and we should assume nothing one way or the other about 
whether any lusting was really going on. However, whilst constructing gay men as 
desirable this exchange also sees Cerys moving away from being a desiring subject 
and so again positions her somewhere outside the male sex drive discourse (c.f , 
Hollway, 1984).
Cerys describes how she looks at the men. She has taken up the word ‘lust’ 
and suggests ‘looking without even knowing’. This continues the visual theme where 
she gazes at them and can construct them as sexual objects yet does not necessarily 
know anything about them in terms of what we might call personality. This 
seemingly reverses the dominant position of women being subjected to male gaze. 
When Cerys adds ‘they are nice as well’ (line 1042) this not only ups the stakes of 
her story, but responds to a perceived need to see the whole person. It is also 
important to see how this comment heads off any accusation or claim that she is
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being superficial by constituting the men only through her gaze. Here we see. sexual 
norms at work; as it seems much more problematic for a woman to occupy a desiring 
position than for a man. Any charge of superficiality is more dangerous for Cerys 
than a man who could claim the normativity of male gaze as part of the male sex 
drive discourse.
A more ambiguous moment occurs when Cerys says of Rob’s attractive gay 
friends ‘it’s a bit of a waste’ (lines 1043-4). In her terms, she may be flattering them 
as individuals - they are worthy of her wanting them to be heterosexual. So this is 
perhaps an indirect way of saying she would have liked the opportunity to have sex 
with them. Yet this poses a problem because the same utterance is simultaneously 
hearable as suggesting that their good looks and nice personalities are wasted on 
other gay men. This can be read as a flippant comment and it is important not to start 
reading in prejudice on Cerys’ part. However the discourse within which she is 
positioned reads as privileging heterosexuality over gay male identities. Unlike her 
comments about gay men being nicer, this is not obviously hearable as ironic, 
perhaps because it is heteronormative. It also leads to a paradox whereby gay men 
are wasted on gay men.
Rob replies after their conversation about the heterosexual Julian that he is a 
‘waste of emotional effort’ (line 1054). This picks up on the same theme of attractive 
people being constructed as having the ‘wrong’ sexuality. Rob is here reversing 
Cerys’ earlier comments about his gay friends. It is not possible to make any 
inference about whether this is a conscious move, but it nevertheless deploys the idea 
of ‘waste’ in a slightly different way. The waste here is of ‘emotional effort’ rather 
than of Julian on heterosexual women. So although Cerys’ and Rob’s ‘waste’ 
comments appear to mirror each other, they operate in quite different ways. 
Furthermore, Rob is able to articulate quite a calculating sexuality in a way which 
Cerys, as a woman, was not. Here the male sex drive discourse privileges his desires 
as normative, and they are easy to articulate.
Gay men have here been constructed as people that can be lusted over, yet at 
other times their sexuality may be invoked to preclude the possibility of desire 
existing between friends. This produces a seemingly convincing discourse of a 
legitimately non-sexual friendship. The desiring position is normatively occupied by 
men and so on the rare occasions where women take it up, desire seems difficult to
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express. However, issues of normativity are rarely referred to explicitly by 
participants. Under analysis the processes of normativity are clearer, but the speakers 
themselves do not often raise the issue or reflect upon its importance for their 
friendship. One notable exception concerns Amitis and her friend Paul. She directly 
draws upon their shared sense of non-normativity (in her case as âfï Iranian woman) 
to construct them as ethnic and sexual others.
4.6 Solidarity in Difference
Issues of normativity were rarely referred to explicitly by participants. Under 
analysis, the processes of normativity became salient to us but the speakers 
themselves did not often overtly raise the issue or reflect upon its importance for 
their friendship. One notable exception concerns Amitis’ Iranian ethnicity and her 
white British friend Paul. She directly drew upon their shared sense of non- 
normativity to construct them as ethnic and sexual Others.
Extract 6
1223 A: It was not easy
1224 because your language, the way you talk, you use your
1225 hand and da da da is very different (.) and back then
1226 I was a lot more different (.) because it's at least
1227 fifteen years gone. So it's nice because gay men are
1228 minority (.) in a sense for me the people who I met who
1229 I became very close to because they are a minority
1230 within their own society. Some form of difference and
1231 being different and actually needing to talk about it
1232 (.) and that was a very very very (important) (.) I
1233 know for that reason I end up being closer to gay (.)
1234 to white gay men in college than than other people. So
1235 for me it was and still is that difference. It doesn't
1236 matter how much I live here (.) I'm a minority (.)
1237 visually and culturally in a way. '
1238, I: So why do you think people want (.) or need to talk
1239 about difference?
1240 A: Need to? Erm (.) wow (.)
1241 I: I don't disagree with you.
1242 [Paul's boyfriend enters and there is a brief interruption]
1243 A: I think it's partly for your sanity =
By evoking gay men as a ‘minority within their own society’ (lines 1229-30), 
Amitis did not treat society as entirely monolithic or conflate it with heterosexuality 
(cf., Warner, 1993). Nevertheless she constructed herself as outside the social group
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that gay men are ‘within’ (line 1230), despite their marginalised position. Amitis 
invoked the idea of intersections between multiple axes of (non)normality that 
potentially compete or work in conjunction with each other. She accounted for her 
many friendships with gay men in terms of ‘needing to talk about’ (line 1231) 
difference and their mutual non-normativity. This speaks to horde’s (1984: 589) 
mythical norm of the ‘thin, white, male, young, heterosexual, Christian and 
financially secure’. She seemed to focus on the multifaceted dimensions of 
normativity and constructed an account of shared experience between different non- 
normative identities.
Amitis spoke of her time at college where she met many of her gay friends 
(though not Paul): T end up being closer to gay (.) to white gay men in college than 
than other people’ (lines 1233-4). Amitis started constructing an argument that links 
specific identities through their shared sense of being Other. Her experience of 
difference seemed to be a process of co-discovery and mutual exploration of what 
normativity means (lines 1225-7; 1235-7). Among our interviewees Amitis was the 
most explicit about having political friendships. Her account suggested solidarity or 
affinity through difference; that being in some way ‘Other’ to the normative can be a 
basis for friendship.
The interviewer’s question (lines 1238-9) about why people might wish to 
discuss difference was met with a surprised response. The interviewer clearly 
oriented towards this, saying T don’t disagree with you’ (line 1241). Amitis’ 
exclamation, ‘wow’ (line 1240), indicates some amazement that the interviewer even 
had to ask; perhaps she regarded this as surprisingly naïve coming from someone 
who should know about difference. From her response, ‘partly for your sanity’ (line 
1243), we get a sense that exploring normativity might have positive effects for well­
being rather than simply about making inter-group comparisons. She also suggests a 
need to interrogate difference rather than treating it as necessarily pejorative. This 
raises questions about the ways in which others’ experience of being non-normative 
may inform people’s subjectivities in ways that they were previously unaware of.
However is there any evidence to suggest heterosexual women and gay men 
orient towards shared interests in resisting heteropatriarchy? Participants tended not 
to construct their friendships in overtly political terms, preferring instead discourses 
of personality. However, there were occasions in which they used the intersection of
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gender and sexual identities to account for valued aspects of their friendships.
Later in the interview, Paul provided one explanation for why he enjoyed 
female company saying, ‘I just feel more comfortable. There is also no way that we 
are gonna get drunk and end up in bed together (.) there’s not gonna be any of that 
awkward sexual tension and anything’ (lines 1261-3). In one sense, this draws upon a 
model of fixed sexual desire where people only have sex because their ‘on-the- 
record’ sexual orientations match up. Since he did not desire Amitis (or presumably 
any other female friends), there was little likelihood of them having sex. There was 
nothing to indicate that Amitis was sexually attracted to Paul but nevertheless his 
construction revolved around male as normatively desirous. It assumes that people 
only engage in consensual sexual behaviour when both (or all) parties desire each 
other.
The possibility of having some sort of sex occurring was constructed as most 
conceivable when it involved alcohol. Drinking here seemed to serve as an 
explanation for what follows or perhaps even a way of not explaining. Drunkenness 
opened up a possibility space in which they were able to construct a ‘what if’ 
scenario. Notably Paul did not sketch out a situation where he actually desired Amitis 
or where they decided that sex might be enjoyable regardless of the lack of desire. 
These would also be potentially problematic possibilities to articulate no matter how 
hypothetically framed. The very utterance of such possibilities would require 
considerable rhetorical work to neutralise. Desire between men and women is so 
normative that any disruption of Paul’s gay identity (as perhaps bisexual instead) 
would make mutual desire possible. We see in this that gay sexuality is constructed 
in these interview contexts as an absolute. The presence (or absence) of sexual 
behaviour seems to have the power to fundamentally alter the friendship (Werking,
1997). The rhetorical work needed to avoid treating seriously the possibility of desire 
speaks to what Jackson and Scott (2004) see as the immense weight placed on sex 
and how it inexorably (re)defines relationships.
Amitis’ explicitly political discourse of friendship attended to the benefits of 
forging alliances with other non-normative identities. Despite the differences 
between being ethnically non-normative and sexually non-normative, she oriented to 
a common exclusion from horde’s (1984) mythical norm as being an important basis 
for friendship. Paul meanwhile attended to the expectation of sexual tension between
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women and men. He highlighted the non-normative absence of sexual desire as a 
valued feature of their relationship which seems to speak to the primacy of sexual or 
romantic relationships over mere friendship (Werking, 1997).
4.7 Discussion
In these interactions, no one speaker had the monopoly on discourses of 
normativity or non-normativity: in their accounts, members of each dyad were 
marginalised in some domains whilst being normative in others. The data presented 
show examples of a heterosexual woman’s exclusion of gay men from normative 
masculinity and a gay man’s unchallenged use of sexist language suggesting that 
friends may uncritically draw upon normative discourses. Yet I also discussed co­
operation between heterosexual women and gay men and the means by which they 
might use strategies like parody to challenge normative assumptions. Lastly I 
considered the account of a participant who articulated a desire to coalesce around 
shared understandings of normativity and her friend who found the freedom from 
sexual expectations liberating.
horde’s (1984) suggestion that people are more able to speak about the ways 
in which they stand outside the mythical norm was borne out by speakers who 
oriented towards their own marginality and left their privilege(s) more often 
unspoken. Emily’s brief positioning of Mike outside masculinity shows how the 
interviewer’s challenge drew attention to the norm and she made a rapid repair. This 
demonstrated the seemingly unintended use of heteronormative gender categories by 
a speaker who was positioned as ‘gay-friendly’ by the data analysts (and who 
undoubtedly positioned herself thus in pre-interview interactions). We might wish to 
consider this as an example of the discourse speaking the subject rather than as some 
reflection of Emily’s ‘true’ inner-state. Instead of the speaker being in a position of 
absolute authorship, we see them using a collage of pre-existing discourse which 
produces a moment of heterosexism by commission, spoken by a ‘liberal’ person 
(Braun, 2000).
The pro-gay discourses taken up by Emily met with some resistance from 
Mike who queried the account of gay men as somehow preferable (to straight). 
Similarly Cerys broadly supported disclosing Rob’s sexual identity but he questioned
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the imperative to come out. Whilst not worked up as an explicitly queer critique, they • 
do nevertheless point to tensions between gay-affirmation and outright rejection of 
normative categories. Nevertheless discourses of co-operation did emerge. Dave and 
Katie’s ‘parody kiss’ was certainly presented as disrupting the ‘homophobic twats” 
positioning of Dave, yet we cannot know whether it was interpreted as 
‘straightening’ Dave or queering heterosexual behaviour. Although this is partly an 
epistemological concern, it also suggests difficulties with authoring queer 
performances in heterosexual spaces. The public performances Butler (1990) 
advocates involve collective action rather than individual gestures. Lloyd (1999: 197) 
points to a shift that occurs between Gender Trouble (Butler, 1990) and Bodies That 
Matter (Butler, 1993), highlighting Butler’s disavowal of the subject as an 
‘autonomous agent’ and an emphasis upon reiteration to produce the subject. This 
means individual parodies may be limited in their transgressive effects, because they 
are more easily subsumed as imitations of heterosexuality. Diamond’s (2005: 104) 
analysis of media representations of female same-sex sexuality suggests that 
performances of ‘heteroflexibility’ are seldom seen as challenging heterosexuality.
We also know nothing of the physical performance of the kiss and whether aspects of 
embodiment invite a queer reading to on-lookers. It is, however, possible that their 
effects lie more in the way they disrupt normative assumptions of friendship than in 
changing perceptions of Dave’s sexual identity.
Unlike the hypothetical lesbian phallus (Butler, 1993), these actual cases are 
rather fuzzy in their politics. Thus we might identify parodie potential in a public 
‘snog’ but also see elements of recapitulation and heteronormativity. Dave’s use of 
sexist language, to describe anti-gay people, is an instantiation of norming in a 
relationship that is frequently positioned as non-normative (or even radical). The 
inevitable reproduction of norms in friendship is something we might have 
anticipated at a theoretical or implicit level, but here I have empirically supported 
something feminist scholars (e.g. Frye, 1983; Jeffreys, 2003) have long suspected.
The politics of parody are not easily resolved: ordinary events (e.g., playing a 
joke on holiday) are much more nuanced than in the imaginations of theorists, and so 
frustrate the categories of analysts. Whilst some scholars treat parody as an 
irreconcilable difference between queer theory and feminism (Jeffreys, 2003), these 
data suggest that people living out these friendships move between inhabiting pre-
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existing discourse and parodying or troubling those same discourses when 
collaboratively producing narratives.
Amitis was explicit about the way she embraced difference as shared 
Otherness. Non-normativity was to be experienced and explored rather than annexed. 
This suggests that although Otherness tends to be a source of oppression and non- 
normativities can manifest specific sets of identity politics (Jeffreys, 2003), there are 
also ways that people may coalesce around a shared critique of normative values 
which we might recognise as an objective of queer theorists (Jagose, 1996). In the 
case of Amitis and Paul, it became clear that she constructed non-normativities as 
roughly equivalent, not in the sense that they are identical, but as all being a basis for 
political affinity. This suggests the need to consider friendships not just in terms of 
commonalities, but also in the sense of affording forms of political solidarity 
between identities based on shared non-normativity.
Sexual norms manifest themselves not just in sexual relationships (Kitzinger 
and Perkins, 1993) but, as we see here, in explicitly non-sexual friendships. The 
expectation that emotionally close men and women should be romantically and/or 
sexually involved (Werking, 1997) is at odds with the normative form of friendship 
as non-sexual (Rose, 2000). This produces a culturally available discourse which 
reads friendships between men and women as potentially problematic because of 
sexual tension (Nardi, 1999). The accounts that these speakers produce emphasise 
the absence of sexual tension, suggesting these friendships are important because 
they are sexually uncomplicated. Whilst this seems to offer valuable opportunities for 
mixed-sex friendship and a source of emotional and political solidarity, the emphasis 
placed on the absence of sexual desire risks implicitly sanctioning the norm of desire 
in mixed-sex heterosexual friendship.
Before reaching our concluding comments I want to consider how research 
design and practice may have impacted upon the results. Recruitment of dyads 
occurred predominantly through the gay men, with the heterosexual women brought 
in subsequently. Ideologically, this was undesirable because it reproduced the 
primacy of men, but it also created situations where gay participants had a number of 
heterosexual women friends, any one of whom was potentially a suitable 
interviewee. Of course not all social networks collapse easily into pairs of friends, 
and many might be better examined by inviting a greater range of people into the
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interview. Although it is arguable this might lead to equally arbitrary cut off points 
being applied, it might nevertheless situate the participants’ discourses within a more 
systemic context giving a better sense of the group processes involved.
This study specifically recruited gay men as opposed to bisexual men. Whilst 
a few male participants had some previous experience of heterosexual relationships 
and sexual behaviour, this was invariably constructed as occurring prior to their 
‘coming out’ and adopting an exclusively gay identity. Thus it was strictly separated 
from their current identity and appeared to have no direct implications for their 
friendship.
4.7.1 Conclusion
Some queer theorists have challenged sex as a defining element in the 
hierarchy of relationships. While this distinction remains, it is difficult to elevate 
friendship to equivalence with sexual relationships. Furthermore mixed-sex friends 
find themselves expected to explain the asexuality of their friendship as if romance 
were always preferable to friendship. Gay men’s sexual identity may be a discursive 
resource for heterosexual women and gay men to partly legitimise their lack of 
desire, but this produces disclosure dilemmas and leaves unaddressed the imperative 
than under ‘normal’ circumstances emotionally close men and women should be 
romantically or sexually involved.
Consistent with Braun (2000), I found instances of sexist and 
heteronormative discourse spoken by ‘liberal’ people that may trouble the 
assumption that heterosexual women and gay men are ‘natural’ allies. Using horde’s 
(1984) idea of the mythical norm, I have considered the difficulties in articulating 
forms of oppression that do not directly impinge upon the speaker’s identity. 
Although this may be an inevitable difficulty for people speaking about different 
identities (including us as analysts), I found examples where friends who occupied 
different (non)normativities explored ways of challenging norms through the use of 
parody. I recognise that what looks like disruption of norms to queer theorists may be 
read as recapitulation by some feminist scholars. However, in the discourses 
presented parody seems to overlap with periodic inhabitation of norms, suggesting 
that queering and recapitulation may be less distinct than some theorists propose.
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1 Butler (1991: 18) uses the word ‘play’ to describe this notion o f performance. This is in some 
respects confusing because it suggests a role which may easily be exchanged for another. Yet she is 
very clear that play is very deep-seated and not something which is easily changed. This is quite an 
appealing way o f approaching identity, because it takes seriously sexual identity, but by avoiding 
biological or social determinism does not get dragged into treating identity as real. Butler sees the play 
as producing the ‘being’ element of identity. So in Butler’s autobiographic reference, she plays at 
being lesbian which establishes her as being d. lesbian. However it is this repetition that also 
establishes instability -  the category is constituted through repetition; it does not exist on its own. So 
it is not a single act or performance that constitutes a lesbian or gay identity, but rather a series of  
(varying) performances that constitute the self.
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Chapter 5
Consumption and Commodified Identities
5.1 Theoretical Background
A dominant topic in interviews was the consumption of goods, clothing and 
alcohol. Although not particularly unusual in a Western capitalist country, 
interviewees used discourses of excess, constructing their friendships as fun and 
performing versions of gender and sexual identity through accounts of excess, 
popular culture and gossip.
Consumer culture focuses less on the material qualities of objects and instead 
emphasises their meanings in symbolic or political terms (Lury, 1996). As this 
chapter will show, consumption is seldom a once-and-for-all activity that destroys 
the object of consumption, but is more often involved with processes of production 
and construction. Modern consumer culture is differentiated from a more historical 
approach to consumption based on the biological needs necessary to maintain life. 
Bauman (2001) argues that the emergence of elaborate social standards of ‘decency, 
property [and the] good life’ (p. 12) have decoupled consumption from its material or 
bodily limits, whereas pre-modem needs were relatively fixed and more concerned 
with sustaining life. Once biological needs were met there was little need or 
opportunity to consume more (thus imposing an upper limit). Bauman suggests that 
pre-modem families were largely responsible for the production of their own food 
and other needs. Consequently there was little scope for consumption beyond a 
relatively limited range of material goods such as shoes, certain raw materials and 
other prerequisites for work. Although this was partly the result of poverty, dominant 
religious discourses condemned ‘pleasures of the flesh, gluttony and intemperance’ 
(p. 12) so public discourse was one of frugality rather than aspirational consumption.
There is no singular point at which consumerism suddenly emerges but 
certain events and discontinuities can be treated as milestones in the appearance of 
consumerism. Williams (1999) specifically identifies advertising as part of what he 
calls a ‘magical’ (p. 410) system whereby capitalism transforms commodities into 
glamorous and desirable signifiers (e.g. a car is not transport but a symbol of 
masculinity). In the UK and US this process began with the growth of newspapers at
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the end of the 17th century and advertisements for new luxuries and pseudo-medical 
cures. What many of these advertisements had in common was that they promoted 
previously unknown products to customers who would otherwise have been unable 
to purchase them. In contrast ordinary domestic goods (e.g. soap) were not advertised 
until the mid 19th century because people already knew where to purchase them. 
Furthermore advertised products were viewed suspiciously as inferior goods. 
However advertising began to create new markets and new consumers. Factories had 
not previously experienced difficulties in selling their products before the growth in 
advertising, but following the collapse of the Vienna Stock Exchange, the Long 
Depression of 1873 - 1896 caused a shortage of available money (e.g. loans) to 
facilitate trade. The US and many European governments abandoned free trade in 
favour of nationalist protectionism while businesses reacted with a greater desire to 
control the market. Larger companies offered branded food (e.g. Hovis, Cadbury and 
Kellogg), thus adding value to goods which were previously unbranded. D’Emilo 
(1983) gives the example of bread as something which many people would formerly 
have produced from raw ingredients but in the interests of capitalist expansion can be 
produced for consumers. Furthermore new inventions (e.g. sewing machines, 
cameras and bicycles) which were being widely advertised so by the end of the 19th 
century there were whole new markets for goods which had not formerly existed.
During the 19th century philosophers and economists attempted to address the 
question of how the value of goods was established. One particular problem was the 
variability of exchange-value when the materiality of the item was unchanged. For 
example a log in a forest has little value yet in the market context (as firewood, or 
even just as a raw material for a carpenter) gains value. In Das Capital Karl Marx 
(1867) examined the disjunction between the use-value of goods and their exchange- 
value. For example gold has a higher exchange-value than a blanket, yet unlike the 
blanket it has very little use-value. In Marxist terms labour-power (a commodity) is 
traded for money (a special commodity) that is used to claim various other 
commodities. Marx calls the attachment of extra value to goods object fetishism1 to 
explain why labour-value is not necessarily the determining factor in establishing 
exchange-value. The new business of advertising began to attach other values and 
even human powers or qualities to products, so Marx argued that under capitalism 
people organised their lives in terms of commodities.
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Featherstone (1991) argues that as markets developed, capitalists found new 
ways of attaching values like ‘romance, exotica, desire, beauty, fulfilment, 
communality, scientific progress and the good life to mundane consumer goods [...]■ 
and alcoholic drinks’ (p. 14). The Marxist analysis of the disparity between use and 
exchange-values has been taken up in semiology and consumption has been theorised 
as involving the active manipulation of signs. Most obviously Baudrillard (1970) 
argues that signifiers float freely from the signified and so provides a structuralist 
understanding of how commodities come to be imbued with cultural meaning.
Until the 1880s shops specialised in selling advertising space on behalf of 
newspapers. However they started buying up space themselves in order to act as 
agents rather than as brokers. Consequently the agents began to work for the 
advertisers rather than for the newspapers. Out of this emerged a new field of 
expertise: the psychology of advertising -  part art, part science. This new knowledge 
was seen by Williams (1999) as important to the belief that the market’s job was not 
merely to supply, but to create demand.
In contrast with its formerly tawdry image, advertising began to drive parts of 
the market, offering solutions for newly invented ‘problems’ (e.g. body odour and 
listlessness). However critics of advertising, and the new field of ‘public relations’, 
were attacked as ‘enemies of free enterprise’ (Williams, 1999: 418 - 9). (This attack 
came to have greater resonance during the Cold War as capitalism came to symbolise 
freedom.) Following the Great Depression of the late 1920s Keynes (1936) argued 
that market growth should be driven through consumer demand since this would 
inevitably lead to increased productivity and greater prosperity. Consumption and the 
growth of new markets became important not just to business but also to the 
economies of westernised nations. However this came at a time when consumption 
was operating more independently from material need than had previously been the 
case. Without an upper limit to constrain consumption, the possibility of theoretically 
limitless market expansion and gravity defying macro-economic systems opened up.
Mort (1996) argues that the post-war golden years of the 1950s and 60s 
showed a massive expansion in productive capacity and technology. He argues that 
these 'fruits of consumer abundance' (p. 7) changed people's perceptions of self and 
their relationships with each other. Whereas consumption had chiefly been a material 
and economic issue it started to impact on consumers’ subjectivities in new and
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previously unimagined ways. Mort urges caution about seeing the self shaped in an 
entirely consumerist way - our experience is not just triggered by market forces and 
mechanisms. However there was an at times idealistic view of the market as 
something which could level out interpersonal differences. Hierarchies of status and 
class would become meaningless once everyone was a consumer in a kind of cultural 
democracy. The idea of the market as socially transformative was evident in 
Chancellor Nigel Lawson's 1988 budget which aimed to deliver 'prosperity to the 
many' (Mort, p 1). Broadly welcomed by the press, praise was also given to those 
who were constructed as shaping the new consumerism (e.g. Maurice Saatchi, Sir 
Ralph Halperin from the Burton group, and George Davies from Next).
Williams (1999) argues that critiques of ‘materialism’ are misdirected since 
materialist ideology should really suggest an emphasis upon the physical properties 
of the product rather than its social meaning. Consequently a ‘true’ materialist would 
be virtually immune to advertising. Epistemologically we might also be sceptical of 
whether pure and direct access to an object is possible. However Williams reveals 
that it is not the desire for objects per se that fuels consumerism but what Bauman 
(2001) calls ‘the consuming desire of consuming’ (p. 13 -  original emphasis). There 
is a kind of paradox in that it is acquisition that is satisfying rather than ownership.
The hallmark of consumer culture (and arguably modernism) has been not so 
much consumption per se, but consumption that is no longer restricted to need, and is 
instead free from the functional limitations. Bauman (2001) argues that needs are no 
longer states of tension which may be satiated; instead demand is boundless.
Whereas once delayed gratification was virtuous, gratification is now impossible. 
Furthermore consumption now exists as its own justification, seldom requiring 
explanation and claiming for itself the discourses of freedom and choice.
It is important to reemphasise that consumer culture is not about consumption 
in the sense of eating, drinking or in some other way 'using up' (p. 1). Williams 
(1983) suggests an anxiety over consumption expressed in notions of being 
consumed with greed, envy, desire. Consumption is also bound up with production, 
construction with destruction and so on. So the historic view of the housewife is that 
she consumes goods (raw ingredients for cooking) from a supermarket which are 
then used up in the production of the family dinner. This is a significant shift from 
the time when family units would act almost entirely as producers, consuming only a
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few goods (e.g. shoes). So between the pre-modem and the modem we have a shift 
towards producing for ourselves and those around us, to one of producing for the 
market. Although Lury (1996) points out this probably underemphasises the role of 
economics in pre-modem societies Marx (1867) viewed the (then) diminishing 
emphasis on production for people as detrimental to society, because people 
produced for the market rather than for each other.
Postmodern theories of consumerism focus on the reversed roles of producer 
and consumer: whereas once one might have been a baker -  the act of producing 
giving identity and even name -  it is now the act of consumption which constructs 
identities (Sturrock and Pioch, 1998). Geertz (1973) regards people as in a sense 
incomplete and so consumption has become a process through which we can 
culturally finish ourselves. Yet Scafidi (2005) argues that commodification of 
identity has become so pervasive that the market is implicated in areas like gender 
that do not obviously have fiscal value. However Bauman (2001 ) sees a connection 
between the authenticity of ‘being oneself (p. 12) and acquisition (especially 
consumption of leisure activities). Consequently it seems that commodification is 
inextricably linked to modem performances of gender and (as we shall see) sexuality.
5.2 Commodified Identities
‘It is a postmodern truth, universally acknowledged, that a single 
consumer in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a life. ’
(Quoted in Kacen, 2000: 345)
‘Like so many Americans, she was trying to construct a life that made 
sense from things she found in gift shops.’
(Vonnegut, 1969: 39)
From the early 20th century onwards the category of ‘woman’ was produced 
as the ideal consumer since they were largely responsible for household shopping 
(McRobbie, 1997). Consumption by women has traditionally been bound up with 
processes of production, for example purchasing cooking ingredients that are 
transformed into the family meal and consumed. Whilst examples pertaining to food 
always suggest a very realist understanding of ‘consumption’, similar processes have 
also been at work in other forms of domestic labour such as the 
consumption/production of furnishings and clothing. It is on this basis we can see
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that consumption has often been the precursor to (female) domestic labour 
(McRobbie, 1997). Women are still involved in more than 80% of consumption 
decisions (both purchasing and consuming) (Lury, 1996). The consumer research 
agency Experian regards young women as especially important targets in marketing 
campaigns because despite receiving less remuneration than men, they are expected 
to go on and make purchasing decisions on behalf of a family later in life. 
Consequently brand loyalties and preferences of consumption established early in 
life are assumed to continue into later adulthood (Hill & Asthana, 2005). Whilst the 
retailers involved are ostensibly attending to women’s desires, this nevertheless 
constructs a view of women that values them in terms of their prospective 
heterosexual relations.
One defence of women’s consumerism, attributed to Naomi Wolf (2003) by 
The Exile (a Moscow-based alternative and sometimes satirical newspaper2) 
constructs attacks on women’s consumerism as ad mulierem on women themselves. 
In an explicit link to the ‘fat [...] is a feminist issue’ debate it argues ‘anti­
consumerism equals anti-woman’ because shopping is one of the only ‘women- 
centric rituals’. But as Klein (2000) points out, the products currently consumed by 
middle-class women are more often than not produced in very poor working 
conditions by young women in Asia. She details the indignities they suffer in order to 
produce goods for the western market. Therefore it seems difficult to accept 
consumerism as an unproblematic feminist project because emancipation is limited 
to an already privileged group of middle-class women.
Against this McRobbie (1997: 75) argues that ‘cultural feminists’ place less 
emphasis on material conditions seeing them as crudely economic and ignoring the 
role of female desire for consumption. They are critical of the political left for simply 
understanding consumption in terms of supporting capitalism: the market is one of 
many tools in the oppression of women but it is not necessarily seen as the root 
cause. Some businesses like The Body Shop originally organised themselves in terms 
of less exploitative ethical and environmental practices. Moves away from animal 
testing have been applauded, as have commitments to the defence of human rights 
and who would argue with the claim that ‘every woman has the right to feel 
fabulous’ (The Body Shop, 2006a: [^5)7 Feeling fabulous may be well and good, but 
fabulous seems to be commodified into ‘natural ingredients [...] innovative products,
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honestly marketed (sic), and priced so that everyone can afford them’. This is in 
many senses an attractive offer, but we need to read it against their statement of 
values in which they identify ‘self-esteem’ amidst calls to ‘support community trade’ 
and ‘protect our planet’.
‘Throughout the ages, women’s bodies have been manipulated to fit 
the latest fad. We’ve been trussed up, pumped out, corseted and 
bandaged. Waists have been pinched, skin bleached, ribs removed.
The fat sucked out, the silicone injected in. Wouldn’t you rather be 
measured by your individuality, thinking and lust for life? Stand up 
for who you really are stand up for self esteem.’
(The Body Shop, 2006b: %2)
. This passage opens with an identifiably feminist message about both 
commodification and objectification of women’s bodies. Images of artificiality, pain, 
and restriction (perhaps even with the suggestion of bondage) construct the demands 
upon women’s appearance as unnatural and inauthentic. So when The Body Shop’s 
alternative vision of femininity emerges in the last two sentences, readers are well 
prepared for the seemingly positive messages o f ‘individuality’, ‘who you really are’ 
and ‘self esteem’. This more positive construction of femininity is something The 
Body Shop apparently feels well placed to sell to women customers. Of course not 
all retailers or marketeers are so overt about feminist politics, but in a broader sense 
the discourse of self-actualisation (specifically with respect to gender) is something 
we might see quite commonly.
At an epistemological level there are serious questions to be asked about the 
validity of a ‘true’ self. Furthermore there is something rather paradoxical about 
selling to people, or commodifying, something that they apparently possessed all 
along. This echoes Butler’s (1990) consideration of the peculiarity of regarding 
gender as accomplished when it is simultaneously held to be fundamental.
For some feminists it is a source of frustration that decades after the original 
challenge to the commodification of women, the gains of feminism in the 1970s and 
80s have been squandered on female consumerism. Jeffreys (2003) identifies 
hostility among many women to the feminism that (partially) liberated them in the 
first place. Levy (2006) finds a growing acquiescence to raunch culture and an 
acceptance among young women that their commodification now draws on a pom-
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aesthetic. A discourse of sexual availability as personal choice and empowerment has 
emerged amidst what looks very much like the continued objectification of women. 
Yet for the women Levy spoke to, wearing skimpy T shirts with ‘pomstar’ printed 
upon them was constructed as an authentic expression of their liberation.
Whilst trailing the makers of the hugely successful ‘Girls Gone Wild’ films3, 
Levy finds college age women willingly exposing their breasts (ironically in 
exchange for clothing) with little vocalised coercion from the male crew (led by a 
gay man). Levy is of course dealing with an extreme case, but within it we see the 
collision of what most feminists would regard as exploitation, constructed within a 
discourse of fun and sexual freedom. Despite Levy’s understandable suspicion of the 
gender politics involved, we do not actually know what women ‘really’ thought 
about posing for ‘Girls Gone Wild’. So we cannot utterly discount that this may be 
viewed as sexually liberating for some individuals, it seems more like false 
consciousness and Levy juxtaposes proud participation against those who later regret 
their involvement. More telling are her descriptions of crowds of men who demand 
and bay for female flesh -  suggesting that the sexual liberation claimed by some 
women may have been interpreted differently by many men.
Levy problematised the role of one gay man in relation to the 
commodification of women and Jeffreys (2003) extends this to gay men actively 
involved in the fashion industry which requires women to shape their bodies in 
uncomfortable and even dangerous ways. Jeffreys sees little scope for political 
solidarity between feminists and gay men, because she argues gay men are first and 
foremost attracted to masculinity not femininity. I think this may overlook the 
different kinds of masculinities that many gay men play with or are attracted to. 
Consequently I am not convinced that gender is always a zero-sum game where 
attraction to and performance of masculinity is necessarily an exercise in woman- 
hatred. Certainly there are tensions which need to be explored but first we need to 
consider the emergence of a gay market, the commodification of gay identities, and 1 
the possibilities and limitations these impose.
While commodification of women has undoubtedly shaped discourses of 
femininity, the marketplace has in some senses created the modern gay man. 
D’Emilo (1983) regards the idea of a trans-historieal gay identity as a myth and 
instead focuses on it as a product of modem capitalism and consumer culture. In
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1970s there was an assumption that gay men had always existed but were not able to 
‘come out’. D’Emilio sees the myth of the eternal gay identity as politically useful, 
but nevertheless a backward projection of gay liberationists’ own personal histories 
into the past. Norton (2006) describes an identifiable 18th century gay subculture 
centred on the famous Mother Clapp's Molly House in London. However, 
historically most gay venues have been hidden from view because of their precarious 
legal status and the threat of police raids (Weeks, 1985). Mort (1996) links the 
(limited) décriminalisation of gay sex in 1967 with the emergence of conspicuous 
consumption among gay men. Although predated by the work of many unrecognised 
individuals and organisations (Weeks, 1995), the modem gay era is often dated back 
to the Stonewall Protest which began in a New York gay bar. However it is an 
example of the marketplace as an area in which political resistance may be made 
possible. Penaloza (1996) cites ‘lunch counters, bus and retail service, in hotel 
accommodations, and in socially acceptable standards of dress’ (p. 16) as areas 
where oppressed groups struggle(d) for recognition and legitimacy. So it is no 
coincidence that totemic events (or what Weeks calls ‘myths’) like the Stonewall 
Protest took place within market settings.
In the last few decades the gay market has undergone revolution as gay men 
have been embraced as a distinct consumer group. Moreover the myth of the ‘pink 
pound’ or ‘Dorothy dollar’ has suggested that gay men have more disposable income 
because a) they tend not to have dependent children and b) they have better than 
average educational standards and so have greater earning power than heterosexuals 
(Schofield & Schmidt, 2005). Yet it remains entirely unclear why gay men should 
have greater earning power. The 2007 Equalities Review in the UK suggests that 
homophobia in schools does not create an environment conducive to learning and 
may even cause young people to drop out of the educational system. Furthermore 
what Schneider (1986: 464) claims the need to ‘manage a disreputable sexual 
identity in the workplace’ imposes limitations for some gay men over the 
occupations they pursue. Although equal opportunities in the workplace are generally 
supported among heterosexuals (Badgett and King, 1997), there is nevertheless 
considerable ambivalence about whether gay men should be publicly ‘out’ at work.
So in some senses the problem is less one of being gay and employed but rather more 
one of being visibly ‘out’ and employed.
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Penaloza (1996) argues that the gay market was ‘discovered’ (p. 19) in the 
1990s. By this point same-sex behaviours were in most cases legalised and the 
mental illness model had (mostly) been abandoned. Although gay venues had existed 
for a long time, the wider acknowledgement of the gay market lagged significantly 
behind legal and civil rights gains. Penaloza suggests that the relatively slow 
response to the gay consumer was not simply a matter of prejudice, but also in part 
due to a lack of meaningful statistics about the market potential. Marketeers were 
unclear about the size and spending power of the gay population. However 
Penaloza’s analysis only briefly considers those gay men who are not always visible 
as gay, such as closeted gay men who may discreetly use gay services (e.g. telephone 
chatlines and, more recently, internet services). Furthermore, even among ‘out’ gay 
men ‘coming out’ is not a once and for all experience, rather a continual process of 
coming out (Sedgwick, 1991). Therefore although the gay community may be 
relatively visible, gay consumers in a broader sense may have been (and continue to 
be) unaccounted for.
Reliance on self-identification posed marketeers with a problem, since they 
were unable to directly access and identify parts of the gay market. However, in 
recent years solutions have emerged from different sources: Gluckman and Reed
(1997) see a hunger for visibility and acknowledgement amongst many sexual 
minorities. In this sense it is not just businesses creating a market, but a political 
demand to be validated by the market. Furthermore the ‘gay community’ has been 
sold to business by gay organisations that emphasise gay spending power. Manning 
(1996) sees gay media, business and many gay organisations as forming a monolithic 
post-gay liberation culture. However this is largely an assimilationist doctrine where 
gay men’s normativity is emphasised through societal structures like consumption.
So within capitalism gay men can be good consumers too. Manning also argues that 
gay culture seeks to manage its own image by emphasising positive aspects to gay 
culture, like the supposed spending power of gay men.
Although there are questions about whether gay men really have the spending 
power so often attributed to them, many businesses and marketeers see ‘a dream 
market’ (Wall Street Journal, 1991; cited in Badgett, 1997: 65) in selling a 
commodified gay lifestyle. Rudd (1996) adds that there are differences in aesthetic 
preferences between gay and straight men. So businesses have emerged to target
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areas of gay life beyond the bar or nightclub and there is now a full service market 
offering holidays, legal, medical and financial services. So Haslop, Hill and Schmidt
(1998) interpret Wilkinson and Kitzinger’s (1994) claims about the dominance of 
mainstream heterosexual culture as meaning that gay people have to do more work to 
bring off a satisfactory gay identity. They regard consumption as the means by which 
identities are produced. Consequently gay men may engage in more practices of 
consumption as part of the process of constructing and asserting their identities.
Some feminists have argues that the gay community has been replaced with a 
gay consumer market. Case (1997) is concerned that this builds new hierarchies, not 
just in terms of those excluded, but also in the sense that owners of gay businesses 
may become very privileged. She accuses gay men (including queer theorists) of 
developing a movement which celebrates shopping: ‘queer has been commoditised 
so that it is constituted by such things as body piercings, leather and spike haircuts’ 
(p. 213). Schulman (1994) points to a variety of problematic economic practices that 
target gay consumers (gay organisations profiting from HIV-positive buyers, 
viatical4 companies which purchase life-insurance policies from people with AIDS) 
and Case laments the transformation of Queer Nation into the Queer Shopping 
Network of New York. Manning (1996) sees shared gay identity as the consumption 
of ‘dance music, female comediennes, muscular bodies, designer clothes, Calvin 
Klein underwear, cappuccino, bottled beers and Ikea furniture’ (p. 107).
Consumption of these items is seen to constitute gay identity, raising questions about 
the extent to which gay identities may be performed without recourse to consumerist 
practices.
In addition to excluding those who do not confirm their normativity by 
consuming, the emphasis on the pink pound and gay spending power may be a 
dangerous discourse that can be taken up by the political right and used in 
unintended ways. Gluckman and Reed (1997) suggest that gay consumption can be 
portrayed as hedonistic and confirms the right-wing claim that gay men are a 
privileged minority who need no further help or protection from the state.
Scafidi (2005: 6) argues that ‘one of the most significant differences between 
recognisable and invisible cultural groups [...] is the degree to which a particular 
group has been commodified’. Through consumption of culturally or ethnically 
aligned products, people are seen to sample other cultures and afford limited group
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recognition on that basis. So the availability of products determines public interest in 
groups of cultures. Although an entire culture cannot be read from one item or a meal 
in a restaurant she nevertheless regards this as a useful starting point as it affords 
some recognition and contact between groups.
Although an apparently generalisable model, some groups are more easily 
associated with particular products than others. Whilst there might be plenty of 
marketing theories of what gay men will buy, it is perhaps less clear what 
heterosexuals should purchase if they want to sample gay culture. We might list 
some humorous or crude stereotypes, but what constitutes gay food? Even the 
products of gay culture (e.g. fashion) are not necessarily read as gay by their 
heterosexual consumers. So some cultures seem easier to consciously sample than 
others (indeed some actively present themselves as consumable).
Meanwhile Chasin (2000) sees the relationship between gay commodification 
and social acceptance as more closely connected to consumption rather than 
production for the mass-market. She identifies a discourse which connects 
consumption with patriotism in America and suggests that advertising implicitly 
holds out the promise of inclusion as a full citizen to all good consumers. As has 
already been stated, this dates back to the Cold War with shopping being constructed 
as a patriotic duty during ‘peace no less than war’ (p. 104). This discourse was 
resurrected by Tony Blair, George W. Bush and Rudolf Giuliani with their call to 
keep shopping after the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 (O’Farrell, 2001; 
Vardy & Wattie, 2001). Chasin’s approach is in many ways quite different from the 
UK where patriotism is formulated in other and often less explicit ways. However 
the idea of citizenship or some kind of earned membership of a normative category 
may be a useful way to understand gay assimilation through commodification.
Economists and marketeers suggested that consumption was a great leveller 
of people which leads to the ultimate destruction of difference, leaving everyone 
merely customers in the marketplace. Whilst this might sound dehumanising, it was 
intended to be an optimistic vision of a future where immigrants could easily 
assimilate into society where ethnic difference would cease to matter. However 
Chasin (2000) argues that American foreign-language publications should have 
become extinct by the 1960s if assimilation were the only outcome of consumption. 
So it is not entirely clear whether advertising promotes or retards assimilation.
Instead it seems to permit a variety of positions which are partially assimilated, yet 
also distinct (or ‘nationalistic’ to use Chasin’s term).
There seems to be a degree of tension between wanting to be seen as distinct 
(through commodified signs and codes) and the fear of being branded different in a 
more pejorative sense. In the marketplace difference can be manipulated as non­
threatening and so assimilation is very appealing to many gay men and lesbians, for 
whom distinctiveness becomes about style choice rather than politics.
Politics themselves are not beyond reach of commodification. Chasin (2000) 
identifies a connection between distinctiveness and the early gay pride movement. 
However distinctiveness has largely come to mean commodified appearance (e.g. 
clothes, haircuts); thus pride itself is commodified. Chasin charts the transformation 
of political symbols into logos and the takeover of pride marches by companies 
(albeit often run by gay men and lesbians) suggesting a steady creep in the ways in 
which sexual identities are commodified.
D’Emilio (1983) argues that because capitalism requires growth, it must 
expand by moving into new areas both geographically but also through new markets. 
Commodified identities have delivered visibility but gay emancipation is incomplete. 
Chasin (2000) sees the violation of consumer norms as the basis for hostility between 
identities (T’d like them better if they didn’t wear such queer clothes’, 108). There is 
perhaps a purposeful ambiguity about whether Chasin is still using ‘ethnic’ in the 
sense of gay ethnicity/nationalism, or if she is returning to immigrant communities 
and using ‘queer’ in the sense of strange or unfamiliar. In either case it seems that 
although shopping can be an exercise in conformity, consumer norms are something 
that can be subverted (albeit at the risk of hostility). Consequently some consumer 
practices and modes of commodification have the potential to challenge market 
norms and destabilise seemingly fixed identities.
5.3 Subversion of Commodified Identities
The theory of performativity advanced by Butler (1990) not only provides a 
means of understanding commodified gender in terms of practices, but may also 
suggest means by which oppressive gender formations may be resisted. She argues 
that ‘the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status
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apart from the various acts which constitute its reality’ (p. 173). This suggests that 
external gender performance creates the illusion of an authentic internal gender. If 
gender is seen as internally located this masks the extent to which political practices 
and regulations are implicated in gender construction. The consequence of this is that 
no gender can be true, original, natural or ontologically prior to any other. Self- 
conscious performances of gender, like drag, disrupt the distinction between internal 
and external genders. By suggesting that appearance is illusionary, drag can be about 
feminine appearance by someone with a male internal gender whilst also symbolising 
the conflicting role of appearing masculine whilst being inwardly feminine. So this 
suggests alternative means of playing with commodified gender through objects like 
clothes and makeup.
Given that biological sex is decoupled from gender, Garber (1992: 354) asks 
what differentiates ‘female impersonators’ from women? Although it might seem 
bizarre and wilfully naïve to ask this question, if all gender is performance then how 
does the performance of drag differ ontologically from the performance of woman? 
Can women have ownership of femininity without making essentialist claims? 
Jeffreys (1991) sees drag as one of the divisive aspects of 1970s gay liberation. Gay 
men wanted to be gender-free and shake off the privilege of masculinity so rejected 
butch gay identities. This was partly embodied through rejection of masculine modes 
of dress (e.g. jeans and jackets), in favour of frocks and makeup. However Jeffreys 
argues that most gay men, however radical, simply do not appreciate that the return 
to a feminine performance so consciously rejected by radical lesbians is politically 
problematic. She argues that male interest in transvestism and drag (in her terms the 
former is heterosexual and the latter gay) is actually a fixation on symbols of 
oppression rather than the materiality of women’s clothes. In support of this she 
points out that many women wear jeans and shirts, yet these are not the focus of male 
interest in wearing female clothing.
For queer theorists drag is a parody of gender as a concept rather than a 
caricature of women. It takes inspiration from some of the more extreme (or limiting) 
gender practices, so tends to emphasise totemic aspects o f ‘female’ clothing, rather 
than acknowledging less gendered attire like jeans and shirts (as Jeffreys, 1991 
suggests). Furthermore drag is not solely focused on femininity since drag kings 
perform a parodie version of masculinity (Garber, 1992).
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Jeffreys fundamentally differs from queer theorists like Butler in the sense 
that she wants to erase gender rather than transgress or play with it. However I think 
Butler gives us a clearer sense of how subversion might work amidst the 
commodification of gender. After all consumption seems to be tied to recognition, so 
a refusal to partake in the market might be easily ignored. However questions remain 
about the extent to which the marketplace will accommodate radical politics. Much 
of the recognition and rights afforded women and gay men come as a result of their 
participation as consumers. Would non-consumers, or those who strongly resisted 
their commodified identities, be ignored by the marketplace and lose their current 
freedoms?
Some of these questions may for now be unanswerable; however we can 
examine the interplay of gay male and heterosexual female consumers and perhaps in 
doing so tease out some of the tensions between feminism and queer theory in the 
unavoidable matter of consumption. The commodification of participants’ identities 
in a series of market environments may give us some sense of the range of options 
made available to them. Furthermore as we look at how they are positioned within 
their accounts of consumption it may be possible to understand what limitations are 
imposed upon them. Jeffreys (2003) regards gay male and female interests as 
fundamentally opposed, whereas Butler (1990) suggests the potential for a more 
flexible cross-gender relationship. Therefore it is important to look at how 
participants are positioned differently within consumer discourse since modes of • 
commodification which empower one speaker may be oppressive for their friend.
In the following interview extracts a series of different forms of consumption 
are considered in terms of how the participants explore commodification and 
identity.
5.4 Alcohol Consumption and Bar Environments
The theme of consumption is at its most overt with the participants’ 
discussion of the literal (and liberal) consumption of alcohol. In this section I discuss 
the way that alcohol is variously positioned as friendship enhancing, superficial or 
(in great excess) dangerous. Firstly the symbolism of particular drinks and the 
implications for the performance of identity are also considered.
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One style of drinks that is repeatedly invoked by participants is cocktails. The 
repetition of this discourse suggests there may be some cultural meaning to them 
which is important to participants’ identities. Cocktails involve a considerable 
amount of ritual (both in drink preparation and consumption) and specific ingredients 
and equipment. Although the precise etymology of the word is not clear it is most 
often associated with cocks’ tail feathers - the often colourful plumage associated 
with avian displays of male sexuality. The mixed colours in the tail feathers 
(especially in the case of peacocks) mirror both the mixing of cocktail ingredients 
and the colourfulness of the drinks themselves. Yet of course the peacock’s tail 
feathers are often invoked by evolutionists as an example of flamboyant mating 
rituals (e.g. Turner, 1996). Regardless of participant intent, the discussion of 
cocktails inevitably speaks to a discourse of sexual attraction and hints at a 
flamboyant aspect to the drinks.
In this short extract taken from the start of an interview John invokes the 
discourse of cocktails as exotic drinks.
Extract 1
23 I
24 J
25 S
26 D
27 J
I've got a supply of bottles of mineral water.
Ah 1
Ah
In case you get thirsty.
I'd like a pina colada if you've got one of those
At this opening moment in an interview we have just discussed the idea of 
taking a break part way through the interview and I mention the availability of 
mineral water. John and (a fraction of a second later) Sarah respond ‘Ah’ (24-5), 
before John immediately parodies the offer of a simple drink with an extreme case 
formulation - the request for ‘a pina colada’ (27). This references the construction of 
the cocktail (and perhaps pina coladas in particular) as exotic. It plays with the 
material impossibility of an interviewer (albeit a gay one who might know what a 
pina colada was) being able to produce the cocktail in the interview setting. The joke 
seems to work because it suggests cocktails have a normative environment (e.g. a bar 
or party) and the incongruence is the basis of the humour.
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In this next extract exotic drinks are located in a more typical venue: Dave 
and Katie discuss their consumption of the colourful liqueur blue curaçao (‘Blue 
Bols’) on Katie’s ‘first (.) gay clubbing experience’ (290).
Extract 2
305 D = And we drank Blue Bols all night didn't we?
306 K Blue (.) Blue Bols (.) blue curaçao
307 I I know the stuff = :
308 K = All night (.) for some reason we decided we were
309 gonna drink it when we first got there =
310 D = and I had blue poo (.) you do you actually get blue
311 wee and blue poo.
312 I You're the only other people I know who drink that 
stuff.
313 D Gorgeous.
314 K I very very rarely drink it now but that night we
315 literally cleared them out (.) they ran out =
316 D = They ran out because the Guild, the Guild don't =
317 K They actually did run out (.) so we had to pick on
318 something else. •
319 D We were in (.) we were in (.) we were upstairs in it
320 wasn't Fingles by then it was [ ( )
321 K [ Yeah
322 D And erm (.) they don't (.) not many places stock it
323 I Mm
324 D So when they do stock it it's like "Oh my god they've
325. got blue curaçao" [ so we've drunk it (in lots of
326 places together)
327 K: [ Yeah yeah (.) we do like our blue
328 curaçao (.)
Their shared experience, flagged up with the liberal use of the word ‘we’ (e.g. 
305, 308, 309) forms an anecdote about excessive consumption. Note that they drank 
‘all night’ (305) until the bar ran out of blue curaçao. Epistemologically we do not 
know the materiality of this claim, but the image of drinking the bar dry builds up the 
sense of excess which becomes a leitmotif of their friendship.
It is also important not to overlook the choice of drink in the story. Although 
flavoured with bitter orange, blue curaçao (as the name suggests) is a vivid blue 
colour. So the drink itself comes with an inner tension between orange and blue -  the 
visual appearance gives no clue to its taste, so could we regard the drink as cross­
coloured and subversive of expectations in an almost Butlerian sense? So there is 
something rather playful, flamboyant and ever-so-slightly queer about the invocation 
of this colourful liqueur, since blue is so seldom associated with food or drink. This 
also speaks to a societal discourse that associates female and (particularly) gay
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identities with fun and superficiality. So through this account of drinking we can read 
the performance of gender and sexual identity.
There is a child-like playfulness in Dave’s talk of the ‘blue wee’ (310-1) and 
‘blue poo’ (311) -  the exotic now manifested through bodily functions. Note also my 
contributions to this exchange: firstly that (as a gay man) I know what blue curaçao 
is, and secondly my exclamation that they are ‘the only other people I know who 
drink that stuff (312). In saying this I respond to the idea that the drink is 
comparatively unusual. Although I implicate myself in the consumption of the 
liqueur, the choice of the word ‘stuff (312) seems to carry with it a guarded 
evaluation of blue curaçao. Dave responds with ‘Gorgeous’ (313) a strongly positive 
appraisal of the drink, but Katie seems to make a different kind of response. Possibly 
her ‘I very very rarely drink it now’ (314) acts as a contrast to the consumption 
described elsewhere in this text. It helps to build a sense of excess and constructs this 
extremity as noteworthy. There seems also to be some distancing work taking place, 
perhaps from Dave’s more scatological construction (310-1) of the implications of 
excess consumption. It carries with it a sense of present maturity in contrast with past 
immature superficiality.
Later in the exchange Dave says that ‘not many places stock’ (322) blue 
curaçao. In their account it was in a Birmingham gay bar where they first drank it 
together, whereas, as Dave starts to explain, it was not available at ‘the Guild’ (the 
equivalent of a students’ union) (316). Despite Katie’s suggestion that the blue 
curaçao drinking is now an element of the past, Dave constructs the consumption as 
prone to repetition (‘so we’ve drunk it (in lots of places together)’, 325-6). However 
this is predicated around the issue of availability and he describes his excitement on 
seeing the drink available, “‘Oh my god they’ve got blue curaçao’” (324-5). They 
talk up the scarcity of the liqueur both on this one specific occasion, and in a more 
general sense, which makes it seem more specific to their friendship. The power of 
this becomes clear if the reader substitutes a more ordinary drink like tap water. So 
an apparently exotic commodity is seen here as a discursive device employed to tell 
not just the history of their friendship, but also to hint at a shared sense of 
exclusivity.
Other interviewees also depicted aspects of their friendship by drawing upon 
cocktails and bar environments. Participants were asked to discuss a hypothetical
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photograph which might ‘represent’ their friendship. In some instances interviewees 
spoke of an actual (i.e. existent) picture. However in other cases it was possible to 
persuade them to draw an impression of how such a photograph might look. Like 
many other participants, Emily and Mike locate the (hypothetical) scene representing 
their friendship in a bar. In this next extract they negotiate the subject of their 
picture:
Extract 3
1358 M Can you draw?
1359 E No I'm really (.) shit.
1360 M Can we do stick people?
1361 I You can do stick people. ,
1362 M I don't know how to draw ((laughs)) Where would
1363 we draw it though where would it be located?
1364 E I'm for me thinking it would be like in a bar
1365 somewhere
1366 M Okay cool
1367 E Or like yeah in a bar with us talking and
1368 cocktails. Having a drink and stuff in a trendy
1369 bar ((laughs)). That would be us listening to
1370 nice music or dancing.
1371 M Yeah dancing.
Having been persuaded to draw a picture, they begin to negotiate firstly who 
will do the drawing, and secondly the subject of the ‘photograph’. Mike questions 
Emily’s drawing ability (1358) in such a way as to imply she could act as artist. She 
closes down this option immediately by answering ‘No’ (1359), justified by her self­
appraised lack of skill. Mike reacts by refocusing the task in two ways. Firstly the 
word ‘we’ (1360) suggests this is something to be attempted by both of them and not 
just her. Secondly he scales down the difficulty of the task by asking me if ‘stick 
people’ are acceptable. Mike uses the less common, but gender-neutral formation of 
stick people rather than men and so attends to their gender identities.
Mike switches away not only from the issue of drawing, but also of drawing 
people to the content of the picture and the location or background (1362-3). Emily 
suggests a bar (1364) and Mike immediately agrees. Although she goes on to discuss 
a number of characteristics of the bar and what they might be doing (1367-70), the 
bar itself is non-specific. By avoiding naming the bar, this generic bar comes to stand 
for all ‘trendy bar[s]’ (1368-9) rather than any specific venue or occasion. In this
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sense they achieve something in their hypothetical picture that would be impossible 
in a real photograph: they transcend the materiality of any one instance, instead 
presenting their own co-construction of friendship performed in a kind of meta-bar.
Figure 1. Emily and Mike's drawing o f an image to ‘represent’ their friendship.
Mike and Emily were drawn as stereotypically male and female stick figures. 
Her gender is connoted by long hair (it did not obviously resemble her hair as I 
observed it in the interview; instead it appears to be a signifier of generic femininity). 
The only clothing drawn is her trapezium skirt which again suggests symbolic 
femininity rather than any literal depiction of her wardrobe. The unusual shape seems 
to suggest broad (‘child-bearing’) hips in contrast with his narrow form. The image 
of Mike is less obviously gendered, with only a hint of short hair on his head 
suggesting a more typically male haircut.
Mike is depicted without clothes: that is not to say nude in the sense of being 
undressed, but rather that clothes are less pertinent to the construction of his gender. 
Furthermore it is Emily’s skirt which is shown. This clearly conveys the gender of 
the stick figure in a way that more unisex clothing would not. It also associates 
Emily with the wearing of clothes and suggests that when dealing simply with the 
male/female binary, female gender identities are more heavily commodified. His 
male gender appears to require less unpacking and demonstrating than her 
femaleness. This image roughly correlated with his real hair. However we should not
■A ' .
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assume any intent towards a naturalistic depiction since the picture is meaningful at a 
symbolic level.
They stand together with him on the left (and so in left-right reading cultures, 
first). They hold hands; his spare arm is outstretched whereas hers is turned inwards 
as if she were going to place her hand on her hip. There are large loudspeakers either 
side giving the drawing a nearly symmetrical appearance. Whether this is read as 
sameness between Mike and Emily, or whether it is seen as reflectedness (implying 
complementarity) between them is open to debate. However it undoubtedly connects 
them systemically as well as through the literal hand-holding.
Their discussion introduced the idea of music and dance in a ‘trendy bar’. 
Here the loudspeakers depict the idea of music and turn their hand-holding into what 
is probably dancing (although no motion is actually implied in the drawing). 
Although not drawn in the picture Emily has mentioned the recurrent theme of 
cocktails (1368) as one of the things they might enjoy at a bar, constructing a sense 
of fun and sharedness.
Although drinks and cocktails have been examined in terms of their bright 
colours and for their fun, interviewees also point to alcohol (in a broader sense) as 
serving more serious social functions. The same speakers later treat alcohol as 
producing a set of circumstances in which different types of discussion may take 
place. Here Sarah and John discuss a time they had a meal and wine with two gay 
friends who begin to question Sarah:
Extract 4
517 S : We had quite a lot of red wine, they were
518 psychoanalysing me, cos I'd split up with my
519 long-term relationship.
[.••I
548 S : So after picking on me for hours at this curry,
549 (and) we'd had quite a lot of red wine, then I (.)
550 wanted to ask (.) John was (.) was instigating it.
551 So I asked "How about you then?". He was a little
552 bit drunk. Are we running out of time?
553 I : No, no
554 J: Plenty of time to spend on this subject.
555 5 : And (.) he (.) so I tried to turn the tables and ask
556 John, cos I thought this might be my routine with two
557 gay men who we now trust. And (.) he made (.) little
558 like inroads further than he ever had before. And he
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(.) didn't want me to ask him. And he was (.) fending 
it off and the two guys were going "No, no, you've had 
your turn asking Sarah, it's only fair". And then he 
said, "Yes, I'm gay".
Sarah is initially the subject of discussion and there are some suggestions that 
the sustained focus of discussion was eventually unwelcome (‘psychoanalysing me’, 
518; ‘picking on me’, 548). However the consumption of alcohol is repeated 
verbatim (‘quite a lot of red wine’, 517, 549). This seems to serve to explain two 
moments of apparently unusual self-exploration, firstly of Sarah’s previous 
relationship and secondly of John’s sexuality.
We cannot know if these discussions would have taken place in the absence 
of alcohol, and if so how they might have been differently formed. However, in her 
account the consumption of red wine appears important both in the sense of scene- 
setting and in terms of explaining how the conversation came to be. Furthermore, if 
alcohol is implicated in the emergence of ‘truth’ then does this legitimately explain 
why it was at this moment (and not before) that John finally came out? Perhaps this 
suggests that aside from the psychological effects of alcohol (and the potential for 
unintended disclosures), it is a culturally understood means of explaining how a 
potentially difficult discussion took place. Alcohol seems to explain an unusually 
probing conversation and apparently causes John to out himself as gay. This is not a 
comment on the tongue-loosening properties of alcohol, but rather its discursive 
currency as a rationalisation for unusual or difficult speech acts. Consequently this 
discourse of consumption can mitigate or explain behaviour without recourse to other 
more psychologically involved accounts.
In this instance the consumption is constructed in broadly positive terms 
because it brings about John’s declaration. Whether or not alcohol enables certain 
discursively difficult conversations, it certainly seems to explain how they took 
place. However in the next extract with Amitis and Paul, Amitis queries the role of 
intoxication (alcohol and/or drug induced) in friendship. Regardless of whether it is 
pleasurable, she expressed concerns over the longevity and significance of 
friendships based around nightclubs and in particular the consumption of drugs.
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Extract 5
220 P : I read in like Boyz magazine or something that there was
221 gonna be a party or something happening called "Just
222 Coping" which some friends of mine from New York were
223 gonna be performing at. So I (.) went along to that and
224 (.) got kicked out of the party for reasons I won't go
225 into and (.) ((laughs)) ended up back at the girl who 
had
226 organised the party's house which was just round the 
corner
227 and (.) she'd gone to college with Amitis and Amitis had
228 been at the party and (.) we met that night
' [ • • . ]
242 A: What I'd like to say here is that the friendship is
243 like still really really close it has got nothing to do
244 with (.) club friendship. That night that we met
245 although we were taking coke and we were off our heads
246 was an event night it was not a clubby night as such 
where
247 like you were all twatted and that.
[ • • • ]
280 A: But you see I myself I don't have any club friends
281 because I have so much attitude about friendship about
282 principles and so on and so forth so I don't have club
283 friends but I know a lot of people who do have clubby
284 friends and for me anyway it (.) I'd say it's fake, it's
285 club ridden, it's drug ridden (.) the common interest
286 between people is the fact that they get twatted in
287 clubs. Not more than that. So when one party decided to
288 stop doing that then the whole thing collapses because
289 there is nothing in common.
This exchange takes place as Amitis and Paul explain how they came to be 
friends. Unlike many of the other interviewees their friendship was constructed very 
much as part of a larger group -  although Amitis does state that a large number of 
her friends are gay men (see the ‘Normativity’ chapter). However Paul is seemingly 
the stranger here, not just new to the group, but new to London. He explains that the 
party was advertised in the gay press and he discovered that he knew some of the 
performers. Also note that, although this is an event open to the general public, 
advertised in the gay press and, as we later discover, is held in a nightclub with 
security staff, Paul repeatedly refers to it as a ‘party’ (221, 224, 228) rather than a 
performance, gig or nightclub. This seems to suggest a greater sense of inclusiveness, 
or membership rather than simply being a member of the paying public.
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Tension arises because ‘club friends’, as Amitis puts it, are ‘fake’ (284). The 
association is constructed in terms of a common interest in intoxication (‘get[ting] 
twatted’, 286). However the unifying qualities of this pursuit are seen as transient 
and so ‘fake’. There is also a sense in which going out and getting ‘twatted’ is 
necessarily associated with youth and consequently not the basis for an on-going 
friendship. Yet at the same time this assumes that getting ‘twatted’ is inherently 
meaningless, hedonistic and transitionary. Amitis also suggests that discontinuing 
that mode of pleasure is disruptive to friendship. Hence friendships forged in one 
part of the marketplace (albeit in part illegal) appear not to be transferable to other 
areas.
Among the same pair of interviewees, the triviality o f ‘club friends’ (280) is 
contested. After all Paul joined the group of friends (of which Amitis is a part) by 
going to a nightclub, taking drugs and being thrown out (224). Whilst neither of them 
suggests their friendship is based upon the repetition of such events, this nevertheless 
suggests that despite having met at a nightclub they did indeed become close friends. 
Thus drugs and nightclubs seem not to automatically exclude other perhaps more 
meaningful (or as Amitis would put it, principled) aspects of friendship.
5.5 Vanity and Fashion
Despite Amitis’ concern over the superficiality of associations constructed 
around hedonistic modes of commodification, other participants invoke discourses of 
vanity and fashion as part of their friendship constructions. Many of the participants 
discuss their own appearance and what that means to them. Emily and Mike talk 
about an occasion where Mike stayed in Emily’s home and in doing so colonised her 
room with his toiletries and clothes.
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Extract 6
855 E : I remember when you came round you slept in my room
856 and you brought like loads of stuff.
857 : m : All my toiletries
858 E : Everything like all your outfits that you're gonna
859 wear and stuff, ((laughs)) When I came into my room I
860 couldn't open the door because of like all your stuff
861 everywhere
862 ' M : ((laughs))
863 E : So I thought this is what it's like to live with Mike
864 ((laughs))
Whereas -  as we shall see later - Katie emphasised the detailed features of 
Dave’s glamorous drag performance, Emily here emphasises the sheer quantity of 
things Mike has brought with him. This is built up in stages with firstly a reference to 
Toads of stuff (856). Mike adds to the construction of the account the more specific 
reference to ‘all my toiletries’ (857). The completeness of the word ‘all’ (implying 
very little has been left behind) is picked up as Emily emphasises ‘Everything’ (858). 
This discourse of excess is rendered in the materiality of the door being obstructed 
(859-60) by his ‘stuff (859-60). Although it is worth emphasising that we have no 
means of knowing the ‘reality’ of this situation, the issue of the door suggests a vivid 
image of Mike having filled up the room. There is also a comedic quality to Mike 
literally taking over Emily’s room. The excessive ownership of toiletries speaks to a 
culturally understood discourse of gay identity. This also serves to reinforce his 
gayness within the context of her bedroom, thus reasserting the lack of (hetero)sexual 
significance to his staying in her bedroom.
Emily’s construction of Mike’s clothes is of them as ‘outfits’ (858) that 
specifically connotes a sense of coordination -  outfits being sets of clothes intended 
to be worn together. So here the emphasis moves from the excess of Mike having 
brought everything with him to far more structured, premeditated choices of clothing. 
Thus it appears that she is constructing Mike as someone who plans his appearance 
in advance and is in some senses involved in an apparently conscious attempt to 
construct a visible identity.
Meanwhile Emily’s ownership of clothes, outfits and toiletries goes 
unmentioned. In this context it may be that her material possessions are better housed 
in the room and consequently are more discreet. However we are nevertheless left 
with the impression that it is his material excesses which are noteworthy. She seems
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to be occupying a more normative albeit less conspicuous position within the story. 
We might think back to Haslop, Hill and Schmidt’s (1998) suggestion that for many 
gay men excessive and repeated consumption attends to the difficulties of 
establishing and maintaining a satisfactory gay identity. The most extreme example 
of material excess came from an interview with Katie and Dave. Katie has been 
telling the story of a visit to a restaurant with her friend Dave and her boyfriend. 
Dave equips them all with fur coats to create a gangster rapper look (in the style of 
Sean Combs formerly known as Puff Daddy, now as P. Diddy):
Extract 7
We all went in fur coats =
= I've got twenty-six coats.
It was [ hilarious
[ I've got a wardrobe just of coats. So Darren
on my (.) black and white animal =
= yeah
(It's) like shagpile. And I put on my (.) full length
tiger print fur coat.
So funny.
And we went together as gangsters and put sunglasses on 
our heads.
5 previous extract there is a discourse of excess which weaves its way 
through this account. As Katie starts telling the restaurant story Dave interrupts with 
the details of his coat collection (in contrast with Mike’s excesses which were 
narrated by Emily). Firstly we are told he has ‘twenty-six coats’ (1327) and then that 
he has ‘a wardrobe just of coats’ (1329). This latter detail functions in a very similar 
way to the obstruction of Emily’s bedroom door creating a sense of fullness and 
extravagance. This interaction reads almost like a satire and one could imagine the 
wardrobe of coats featuring in a television comedy like Will & Grace. However if we 
examine the transcript there is no indication that Katie or I read the wardrobe 
comically, so it appears that Dave is able to bring off ownership of twenty-six coats 
as extravagant, but credible for a gay man.
In the next phase of the account Dave becomes engaged in detailing the coats 
themselves. Katie’s boyfriend wears ‘my (.) black and white animal’ (1330) which 
might be a pet name for a specific coat and Dave continues the wild animal theme 
referring to ‘tiger print’ (1333). The luxurious wildness of the fur is contrasted
1326 K
1327 D
1328 K
1329 D
put
1330
1331 K
1332 D
( . )
1333
1334 K
1335 D
1336
Like
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against the domesticity o f ‘shagpile’ (1332) building the sense of excess not only of 
quantity (note also the opulence of the ‘full length’ coat, 1332). Despite lending out 
his coats Dave is quite possessive of his ownership using phrases like ‘I’ve got’ 
(1327, 1329) and ‘my’ (1330, 1332). Perhaps we can read this not just as signifying 
his material ownership, but also ownership of a certain identity. Despite their 
adoption by some male rappers, fur coats have a history as female status symbols and 
association with 1940s Hollywood (e.g. Joan Crawford in ‘Mildred Pierce’). Calefato 
(2004) notes the popularity of fur coats with women in 1960s Italy, despite being 
entirely impractical for the climate. Furthermore she explains fur coats were the 
source of financial tension between husbands and wives. So we might interpret 
Dave’s possessive utterances as establishing not only his fiscal investment in the 
coats, but also ownership of any undercurrents of cross-dressing.
There is no indication what kind o f fur coat Katie has borrowed to wear, only 
that they appear to be coordinated in the sense of wearing animal print fur. Moreover 
Dave describes them as having dressed collectively as ‘gangsters’ and they are all 
portrayed as having the same props with them, namely sunglasses on their heads 
(1335-6). This speaks to the fashion market and the so called ‘gay consumer’ and 
its production/consumption of ‘looks’ or coordinated clothing. Dave seems to 
orchestrate the attire. This appears to be a collective effort in which heterosexual 
men and women can also dress playfully in non-normative ways. There is a related 
discourse of the gay consumer as more fashion literate than most heterosexuals. This 
body of knowledge is something that Emily refers to in the next extract as Mike is 
able to advise her and a friend about clothes.
Extract 8
we have like really different tastes in- clothes.
Yeah ((laughs)) I kinda like made suggestions.
And I was like "No" and then I make suggestions and 
you're like "That's too boring".
((laughter) )
I remember like with Amanda while ago she came 
shopping to Guildford and I surprised myself with my 
shopping advice. We went to the centre ((laughs)) and 
I managed to say "Oh that looks quite good (.) nice 
black underwear" and she got it and quite impressed 
Tom apparently, ((laughs))
1616 E:
1617 M:
1618 E:
1619
1620
1621 M:
1622
1623
1624
1625
1626
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What is initially constructed as ‘different tastes’ (1616) is quickly clarified 
into her more conservative tastes (which he is reported to say are ‘too boring’, 1619) 
compared with his ideas. As far as Emily is concerned we do not know how many of 
Mike’s suggestions are taken up and translated into purchases, but it seems there is 
some degree of resistance from Emily who claims she said ‘no’ (1618). Equally she 
voices Mike’s rejection of her advice on styles of clothing. Although they appear not 
to take each other’s advice, Mike is constructed in accordance with a discourse of 
gay fashion being more adventurous and leading other fashions, so perhaps this 
resonates with the earlier themes of wildness and excess. However these accounts do 
not reflect consumers’ inner aesthetic preferences. Rather what we see is apparently 
an attempt to construct versions of the self through clothing, or in this case 
discourses of clothing.
In some senses this account starts out as a story about their differences in 
terms of choice of clothing. However Mike starts to describe another female friend, 
Amanda, whom he explains he advised with apparently more success. This surprises 
him (1622), presumably because the clothing is women’s black underwear and as a 
gay man he might be expected to know relatively little about that type of clothing. 
Within Mike’s account there is also evidence of some difficulty in voicing his 
approval of the black underwear (T managed to say “Oh that looks quite good’” , 
1624). The word ‘managed’ does imply a certain difficulty which is perhaps best 
understood in comparison with the heterosexual boyfriend Tom’s reported reaction. 
Whereas Tom is apparently ‘quite impressed’ with the underwear, it is in a sense 
being constructed as for his eye, for him to gaze at. Mike takes on a role almost like a 
gay fashion designer who feels able to dress women who are then appraised by other 
men. Furthermore, like a mute model, Amanda has no right of reply here when Mike 
speaks on her behalf.
There is a tension between on the one hand Mike as advisor and commentator 
on women’s clothing and his ability to compliment a friend on her underwear. This 
perhaps reveals more about the symbolism of underwear and its sexual connotations 
rather than Mike’s fashion knowledge per se. Yet in this account it appears that he is 
engaged in the process of helping Amanda choose her underwear and the shopping 
trip is deemed successful (because it meets with Tom’s approval). This raises 
questions about who actually benefits from sexy underwear, and why it is apparently
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appropriate for a gay man to comment despite presumably having little or no 
experience of women’s underwear. Despite their arguably greater knowledge it is 
hard to imagine Amanda seeking a heterosexual man’s advice on underwear. This 
may suggest that access to fashion knowledge is not necessarily the only (or even 
main) thing at stake but rather that gay sexual identity has produced a context where 
it is possible to positively appraise Amanda’s underwear without positioning her as 
the object of sexual desire.
Having considered the commodification of gay identity in terms of cocktails 
and clothing and the positioning of women dressing up for male gaze I turn now to 
an example of a different kind of consumption. One of the dominant publicly 
available discourses of gay identity is an association with popular culture and music. 
This is something that Emily and Mike reflect upon as an aspect of their friendship:
Extract 9
1113 M: Yeah we talk a lot about music yeah.
1114 E : (We talk loads about pop) yeah
1115 M: (What's) the latest gossip as well yeah. We love like
1116 celebrity gossip as well don't we?
1117 E: That's the thing though because I know like nothing
1118 about celebrities or whatever. I didn't know who certain
1119 famous people were before I you know talk about them
1120 quite (often).
1121 M: yeah ((laughs))
1122 E: It's just a bit of fun really.
1123 Mr We talk about music though as well because (.) ah
Madonna
1124 E: Ah
1125 M: I just spent a load of money on Friday. I bought two
1126 Madonna tickets
1127 D: Ooh
1128 E: I'm going as well
1129 M: and Emily is going to come with me. ((laughs)) It cost
1130 a fortune I was like kinda having heart palpitations at
1131 the time spending that amount of money but also that I
1132 got the tickets. I was like "Oh my god I'm going to see
1133 her" . My favourite as well I've got loads of her albums
1134 as well. We talk about Madonna quite a lot
1135 E: We can do a lot like yeah.
They start by constructing a love of talking about pop music and celebrity 
gossip (1113-6). To an extent we might regard this as an extension of the kind of 
information sharing and gossip which is common to many interpersonal 
relationships. Bosson, Johnson, Niederhoffer and Swann (2006) find that sharing
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attributions (especially negative ones) about third-parties promotes bonding between 
people. In this instance it may be that Emily and Mike are doing something rather 
similar except that the third-party celebrity is not actually known to them. However 
celebrity gossip is a historically specific occurrence. Publications like Heat and the 
proliferation of gossip based websites (e.g. popbitch.com) claim to be ‘democratising 
gossip’ (Wright quoted by Aitkenhead, 2006: % 4) in the sense that stories about 
celebrities (true or otherwise) are accessible to a mass audience. We should also 
acknowledge the extent to which gossip is gendered: ‘While gossip among women is 
universally ridiculed as low and trivial, gossip among men, especially if it is about 
women, is called theory, or idea, or fact.’ (Dworkin, 1983, p. 13). Perhaps by 
constructing his talk as ‘celebrity gossip’ Mike has partially positioned himself 
within a discourse of femininity. It seems as though consumption of this kind of 
knowledge constructs his identity in ways that refuse binary gender performances.
However the gossip appears to be somewhat asymmetric insofar as Emily 
professes to ‘know like nothing about celebrities’ (1117-8) and then attributes the 
knowledge she does have to Mike (1118-20). Perhaps it is the triviality of celebrity 
gossip as much as her access to source materials, but she does not seem a particularly 
active participant in the consumption of gossip. Mike seems to accept his implication 
in the celebrity gossip (1121) and Emily quickly dismisses it as ‘a bit of fun’ (1122)
-  a phrase which seems to head off any interpretations about any deeper significance 
or indeed that their gossip is in any way unpleasant or mean-spirited.
Mike switches tack to attend to the music element rather than the gossip and 
suddenly appears to remember (‘Ah’, 1123) the tickets he has purchased for a 
Madonna concert. The rarity of these he talks up by emphasising the financial 
commitment (‘spent a load of money’, 1125; ‘It cost a fortune I was like kinda 
having heart palpitations at the time spending that amount of money’, 1129-31).
Mike also claims to have Toads of her albums’ (1133) so this suggests a sustained 
interest over the time of their release. He also evokes a more physical response to 
Madonna in terms of his ‘heart palpitations’ (1130) and the idea that he is ‘going to 
see her’ (1132-3). The use of the word ‘her’ seems particularly notable in terms of 
the reverence it seems to display to being in her presence.
In contrast with Mike’s effusive enthusiasm Emily is more restrained, saying 
only that she is ‘going as well’ (1128) and confirming, perhaps rather wryly, that
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they do talk about Madonna lots (1135), despite him doing almost all the speaking. 
Without wishing to comment on their relative enthusiasm for her music, it does seem 
that Mike is more invested in talking about Madonna. Furthermore in a tiny utterance 
(‘Ooh’, 1127) I signal my shared enthusiasm for Madonna and perhaps can be read 
as reinforcing the idea that gay men should breathlessly consume Madonna.
My utterance also shows an orientation towards the interview as performative 
for me as another gay man. Mike seems to be much more engaged in constructing a 
satisfactory gay identity for himself, both in these extracts and elsewhere.
Specifically this connotes a moment in the interview where gay identity has suddenly 
become normative. Meanwhile Emily is at times marginalised by these constructions 
and so occupies a supporting role where she merely confirms and adds the occasional 
detail to Mike’s account. In some ways this raises concerns about the limits of 
interviewing (as a gendered interviewer) and the potential for tiny utterances to 
convey not only approval but a kind of allegiance with a participant. One additional 
consideration is whether gay men have more rhetorical resources available to them 
with respect to consumption. Although in theoretical terms women have been 
considered the prototypical consumers, to what extent have gay men taken over this 
role? Or perhaps of more relevance is the question of whether the acts of 
consumption involved in being a modem gay man are necessarily more extravagant 
and exotic, thus are more memorable and more suitable for retelling. Could it be that 
her silence does not signify less consumption or fewer forms of commodification, but 
rather that gay men are engaged in a discourse of excess which makes other 
(potential) female accounts appear mundane by contrast? As a heterosexual it is 
possible Emily has less need to continually reassert her identity through 
consumption, which may further account for her minor role? However we need to be 
open to the possibility that the discussion of commodified gay identity is in some 
way silencing or limiting her options to speak of her own identity.
In the remaining few transcript extracts I will turn to an overt imitation of the 
structure of gender. Drag is a subversive performance that uses cross-dressing to play 
with the idea of gender. As such it often satirises the commodification of gender. 
Katie and Dave produced an unheralded co-construction of drag in which they 
describe Dave’s appearance in relation to Katie who has also dressed up. We see that 
although Katie produces a large proportion of the accounts, she is (like Emily)
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positioned in a supporting role raising questions about whether queer performances 
tend to favour gay men over heterosexual women. Katie and Dave describe going to 
a 1970s themed nightclub. They both dressed up for the occasion but for the first 
time Dave decided to go in drag rather than just 1970s fancy dress.
Extract 10
1155 D : It was my first outing ever in drag.
1156 K: Yeah (.) and I was like "Why not? (.) I'll get dressed
up
1157 as well". Well my dressing up looked (.) you know like
day 1158 wear compared to him.
1159 D: ( (laughs))
1160 K: He turns up on the doorstep. I've got like blue
eyelashes
1161 (.) you know all kinda shiny.
1162 D: You did.
1163 K: All massive blue (.) electric blue (.) they were
fantastic.
1164 D: They were brilliant.
1165 K: They were really good fun. (.) Dave turns up at the
door. 1166 He's six foot four (.) he is wearing (.) six inch
heeled
1167 (•) black PVC thigh high stiletto pointy boots. (.) A 
PVC
1168 black skirt (.) that was (.) talk about butt skimming 
( • )
1169 my god a size eight dress from New Look.
1170 D : I had to strap it up (.) cos otherwise I was hanging
1171 out underneath.
1172 K: Literally this skirt was (.) was only about (.) eight
1173 inches long.
1174 D: Very tight pants. Very tight pants I had to wear.
1175 K: With a matching (.) equally small black PVC boob tube
( • )
117 6 and then a floor length purple PVC coat (.) with a
feather
1177 boa like trimming. A black wig that looked like 
something
1178 Cruella de Vil would have worn
117 9 D: ( (laughs))
1180 K: you know (.) really severe fringe.
That this is Dave’s ‘first outing ever in drag’ (1155) constructs this 
experience as novel and implicitly emphasises that this is a (relatively) unusual 
activity for him. However the use of the word ‘outing’ echoes both Dave’s position 
as an ‘out’ gay man but also suggests a sense in which drag operates publicly rather 
than privately (and indeed it is not clear whether this is the first time Dave has worn 
these clothes). Katie’s own reported speech constructs a more casual response and
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she joins him in ‘get[ting] dressed up as well’ (1156-7). So although this is 
constructed as a shared experience, and indeed has emerged at a point in the 
interview where they are discussing shared activities, we are left in no doubt that this 
is a story focused around Dave in drag, rather than a more balanced story about 
dressing up. This of course has the effect of privileging male drag as more comment­
worthy than other forms of dressing up that do not destabilise gender.
Katie turns first to Dave’s appearance at her doorstep (1160) yet nevertheless 
ends up describing her own ‘dressed up’ appearance for a few lines (1160-5). We 
might read this as an attempt on her part to construct her own glamorous appearance 
as well as her investment in the dressing up and shared experience of going out 
together. Yet of course the story has already been set up as his first outing in drag, so 
the momentum is against her and she returns to the main subject matter. So the 
details of her part in the account are really only expositionary which inevitably 
establishes her as thematically peripheral (although perhaps not materially 
peripheral, since they agreed to go together).
There is some dramatic variability in the way that she alternately talks up 
Dave’s appearance by making her own sound mundane (‘my dressing up looked [...] 
like day wear compared to him’, 1157-8) and the description of her ‘shiny’ (1161), 
‘massive [...] electric blue’ (1163) ‘eyelashes’ (1160). This raises the stakes, since 
she has already established how fabulous her eyelashes were and got Dave’s 
agreement that they ‘were brilliant’ (1164). Although Katie’s self-description helps 
provide a background for Dave’s first outing in drag (1155), it also anticipates a 
response from Dave (1164) and establishes her role in the story.
The first part of her account (1165-9) is punctuated with pauses as she 
apparently tries to find the words to illustrate the flamboyance of Dave in drag. This 
fragmented list unfolds with a sense of drama and vivid detail which accentuate the 
extremity of Dave’s performance. Certain dimensions are sharply contrasted: Dave’s 
towering height is worked up by first invoking his bodily height (‘six foot four’) and 
then his ‘six inch [...] stiletto pointy boots’ (1166-7), whereas the ‘eight inches’ of 
skirt is short. She also constructs Dave’s body in contrasting terms: he is ‘six foot 
four’ (1166) but wearing‘a size eight dress’ (1169).
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The description of Dave’s drag performance manages to encapsulate many 
elements of Jeffreys’ (1991) critique of female clothing as distorting and 
exaggerating bodily characteristics:
‘Such clothing includes high-heeled shoes, low cleavages, corsets, 
frilly underwear, tights and stockings, and the sort of dresses or skirts 
which restrict movement. Such clothes make it difficult for women to 
relax and sprawl their limbs as men do, and make women constantly 
careful lest men observe their thighs or genitals’
(Jeffreys, 1991: 169-170)
Katie’s description echoes some of these characteristics, whilst 
simultaneously appraising the situation in an altogether more positive and admiring 
way. Of course Katie has not positioned herself as radical feminist so it is not 
surprising that she evaluates the situation differently to Jeffreys. However their 
account does serve to highlight the practical difficulties and absurdity of wearing 
certain clothes: somehow their clothing the male body reveals the artifice. Jeffreys 
would argue that Dave was performing women’s commodified subjugation (thus to 
her making it politically problematic). However I think the way they construct the 
performance allows them to talk about the ways in which women’s clothes are both 
restrictive and revealing.
While Katie emphasises finished appearance, perhaps reflecting her self- 
construction as observer, Dave focuses more on the process of ‘strapping] it up’
(1170) and wearing ‘very tight pants’ (1174). Here he explains the potential 
anatomical problems of disguising his penis whilst wearing what has already been 
constructed as a very revealing dress. The process he describes is of having ‘to strap 
it up’ (1170) and wearing ‘very tight [under]pants’ (1174) because ‘I was hanging 
out underneath’ (1170-1). The slip between referring to his penis as ‘i f  and T  
(1170) suggests a strong identification with his penis as the signifier of his male 
body. This also seems to suggest that Dave has layered his performance of gender in 
such a way that he remains underneath it all fundamentally a man. This is at once 
essentialist in that it claims an unchanged masculinity, but is mischievous in the way 
that it undermines all Katie’s rhetorical work in constructing a much more
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(ef)feminised account. There is also a tradition of drag performers drawing attention 
to their genitals in ways that disrupt performances of femininity.
Garber (1992) makes a distinction between drag and trans people who regard 
themselves, and wish to be thought of, as ‘real’ women. So the dichotomy is not so 
much ‘real’ versus ‘fake’, as ‘real’ versus ‘masquerade’. However intentionality 
presents us with both methodological and theoretical concerns. Firstly discourse 
analysis is relatively ill-equipped (and outside the more psychodynamic forms does 
not attempt) to theorise intentionality because the ‘mind’ is considered inaccessible. 
Furthermore Dave gives us no clue as to his intention within the story. However we 
can examine the functions of the text where he invokes his penis as a counterpoint to 
Katie’s description of his drag appearance. Secondly womanliness can be seen as 
‘masquerade’ (Riviere, 1929: 39). Since femininity is constructed by culture it must 
be an impersonation and we are left with a Butlerian (1990) idea of performativity. 
However, I think it is more useful to see performativity as a comment about the 
ontology of gender (i.e. that there is not an original or natural form). Butler (1993) 
explains that an unintended side-effect of the word performance and her interest in 
drag is that it suggests gender may easily be cast aside, whereas for most people it is 
deep-rooted and relatively stable.
Dave’s performance is not a representation of femininity per se and Katie 
likens the ‘severe’ (1180) hair to the vampish ‘Cruella de Vil’ (1178) from One 
Hundred and One Dalmatians (the name being a play on ‘Cruel Devil’). Identity is 
performed in a very stylised way with specific props and commodities (e.g. the 
‘feather boa’ trimming, 1176-7) which point towards drag rather than femininity. 
However, we should recall that Katie herself is wearing false eyelashes, yet this is 
not something we might obviously recognise as drag because Katie is positioned as a 
woman. However there is no way we can accept ‘massive’ ‘electric blue’ lashes as 
enhancing or exaggerating ‘naturality’. This suggests that, although wearing makeup 
is culturally ‘normal’ for women, this obscures the falsehood of original gender and 
reveals it as performance. Since Katie’s performance falls within the ‘normal’ range 
of female commodification it does not call attention to itself. Her relative invisibility 
suggests that this formulation of drag offers fewer positions for women to occupy 
than men.
I l l
The construction of ‘day wear’ (Katie, 1157-8) suggests that clothing may be 
located temporally and so associates drag with night time. This may be linked to a 
sense of fun and flamboyance that are more easily located in the 1970s themed 
nightclub than a mundane setting like an office or a supermarket. In the final extract 
they co-construct an account of an occasion where Dave performed drag outside a 
fancy dress setting. They describe how Dave (on a separate occasion) decided to 
walk home from a student bar through a busy suburban area of Birmingham. From 
this we get a hint of the potential dangers involved as well as the role of visibility as 
a factor in drag.
Extract 11
we went to The Guild for a drink (.) and there were
virtually asking for his autograph you know. It was 
hilarious. And then he walked back through Belly Oak.
all these feathers =
= all the cars were hooting their horns. It was
(.) Cos I was a little bit tipsy.
Just a bit.
I was like "I'm gonna walk home". And they were like 
"What?". And I was like "I have to be seen". (.) Such an 
exhibitionist.
Although related to the earlier story of Dave wearing drag, this situates them 
in a different consumer setting, and then outside on the street. Katie continues to 
construct Dave in extraordinary terms; or rather she constructs people’s reaction 
towards him as extraordinary which imbues the account with a sense of drama. Katie 
at first constructs him as almost having taken on celebrity status with ‘people 
virtually asking for his autograph’ (1211-12) (although the word ‘virtually’ suggests 
that Dave may not actually have been asked for autographs, despite the attention he 
apparently received). Then as they walk through the streets of Birmingham strangers 
hooted their car horns (1215). However the whole account is one of excess with the 
word ‘all’ applied to both feathers (1214) and cars (1215) constructing a sense of 
absolutes and extremes. The motif seems to be one of overstatement until Dave 
raises the issue of alcohol saying he was ‘a little bit tipsy’ (1216). There is an implied 
understatement here which Katie picks up when she adds ‘just a bit’ (1217).
1211 K: 
people
1212
1213 
With
1214
1215 D: 
hilarious.
1216
1217 K:
1218 D:
1219
1220
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Amongst their accounts of their (mainly his) appearance and the reaction
from strangers, they did not attend to any negative reactions or dangers until Dave
articulated his desire to walk home (1218) against the apparent surprise (‘they were
like “What?”’, 1218) voiced by unnamed (and perhaps unknown) associates. Maybe
this can be read as referencing an unspoken danger but clearly references an
awareness that walking the streets in drag is potentially problematic. Although the
Guild could be expected to be a relatively safe space for gay or queer identities, there
does not seem to be any expectation that outside will be safe. Consequently Dave has
to capacity to shock people twice: firstly with his appearance, and secondly where he
'
is prepared to wear it. Chasin (2000) identified the violation of consumer norms and 
failure to follow normative modes of dress as a source of hostility between groups. 
However Dave is engaged in a challenge to something more foundational than mere 
aesthetics. He is not just being aesthetically distinct (although if Katie’s construction 
of his appearance has any basis in ‘reality’ then this is certainly a factor), but rather 
he is disrupting many of the things taken for granted about identity and gender, 
consequently opening himself up to heterosexist attack.
Dave’s reported response to the concerns of others is to say “‘I have to be 
seen’” (1219). Of course we do not know what he said at the time, and he may well 
be engaged in sense-making after the event but this is not really of any great concern. 
His refusal to take things seriously and instead emphasise the playful is a pivotal 
concept in Sontag’s (1964) understanding of camp. However his self-deprecating 
comment ‘such an exhibitionist’ (1219-20) suggests a knowing consciousness of how 
the need to be seen may be regarded. Here Dave is privileging the theatricality and 
the experience of being seen or viewed in an aesthetic sense, over the practical or 
social problems he may encounter walking home. Furthermore, his existence is being 
confirmed through the public gaze. Drag is being constructed very publicly as 
something that needs to be observed. In this sense there are echoes of other forms of 
conspicuous commodification like performances of masculinity and femininity, and 
some aspects of gay identities asserting their rights to a place within the market.
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5.6 Conclusion
The story of Dave’s drag has been read for the customs in which 
commodified gender is subverted and drag performed in ways that echo Butler. Yet 
Dave is not a queer theorist and he does not even outline an explicit political agenda. 
However regardless of his or Katie’s intentions they seem to raise themes which 
suggest he is playing with the commodification of gender and they collectively 
derive considerable pleasure from it. Their construction of these activities as fun 
should not fool us into overlooking the politics being enacted.
Problems arise about those who are excluded from these accounts. These 
analyses have focused on the younger participants who drew upon discourses of 
consumption and commodification to a far greater degree. This is actually something 
that other participants attended to, showing an awareness of a connection between . 
commodification and youth. John describes how as you get older 6 You can (.) be 
easier on yourself (1178), and although only in his thirties, he oriented to my 
position as a younger gay man (‘when you are your age... you are probably very 
aware of how you look’, 1172-4). So although it only comes across in glimpses, there 
is a sense in which commodification constructs individual identities, in a similar way 
to how D’Emilio (1983) saw consumerism creating the modem gay man. Yet the 
relative lack of different kinds of identity produced by commodification and also the 
emphasis on appearance suggest occasions where gay men may be objectified in 
ways which would feel very familiar to feminists as diverse as Jeffreys (1991) and 
Levy (2006). Richardson (1996) expresses concerns that commodification of gay 
identities leaves relatively little room for individuality and for gay men who do not 
fit within a relatively narrowly defined image.
Participants like Emily and Katie are seldom the primary agents in these 
narratives and, if we are to take seriously friendships between gay men and 
heterosexual women as a position of resistance to heterosexism, then discourses that 
position women in a consistently secondary position are extremely problematic. 
Although there are methodological reasons why speakers have oriented more 
strongly to gay identity rather than female identity we are nevertheless left with 
accounts of commodification which leave women (even relatively privileged middle- 
class, heterosexual and in Katie’s case, white women) with relatively few positions
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to take up. Furthermore, unless Katie adopted an equivalently cross-dressed form of 
drag (e.g. as a drag king) or other distinctly non-normative mode of 
commodification, it is difficult to see her matching Dave’s level of visibility.
1 Although object fetishism suggests a Freudian connection, this was originally unrelated to 
psychoanalysis. However they have subsequently been connected (Scafidi, 2005). The word may have 
been deliberated provocative in that it satirises the apparently rational basis o f capitalism.
2 The Exile is an English language alternative newspaper published in Moscow. Although 
notable for ‘serious’ investigative journalism it also publishes dry satire (the closest British equivalent 
might be Private Eye).
3 The ‘Girls Gone Wild’ franchise depends on camera crews touring parties and beaches 
where they persuade predominantly White young women to ‘flash’ or expose themselves to the 
camera. The genre emphasises their role as amateurs rather than as professionals.
4 Owners of life insurance policies can sell the policy to a viatical company which will pay a
percentage of the face value in advance. Normally a viatical company will only purchase the policy if  
the holder has a life expectancy o f less than two years. Schulman (1994) argues that gay men with 
AIDS are less likely to have beneficiaries of their life insurance and so many opt for an immediate 
cash settlement, even if  it only constitutes a fraction of the policy’s value.
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Chapter 6
Liberal Individualism: When the Personal is(n't) Political
6.1 Theoretical Background
Of all the themes identified in this study, the issue of liberal individualism is 
the most nebulous. There are two identifiable elements to this: Firstly it is woven into 
the fabric of participants’ discourse in familiar linguistic formations that do not 
immediately present themselves as noteworthy. Talking about the self, especially to a 
psychologist, is neither uncommon nor unexpected. Liberal individualism is by no 
means unique to heterosexual women and gay men. However by examining the 
emergence of liberal discourse, and what might be considered a rise in individualism, 
I want to carefully examine the taken-for-granted version of liberal individualism and 
its implications for gay identity, friendship and feminism.
This leads to the second reason why this theme may appear intangible: liberal 
individualism is a common cultural reference point in the UK but suffers from a lack 
of definition in lay circles and many competing definitions in academia and politics. 
Thus it is very difficult to know what ‘liberalism’ refers to since it suffers ‘a serious 
case of intellectual incoherence’ (Schultz, 1972: viii). Liberalism may connote 
freedom, but this raises more questions than it answers. Freedom for whoml 
Freedom from what? As Billig (1996: 177) notes ‘everyone champions the value of 
freedom, but the democrat’s freedom is the fascist’s ‘anarchic degeneracy’, whilst 
the fascist's idea of ‘freedom’, for anti-fascists, constitutes the essence of freedom's 
negation’.
Although participants in the study did not disagree so vociferously about 
liberalism, because it was seldom invoked so explicitly it is difficult to pin down in a 
consistent and cohesive fashion. Likewise individuality is all too often a taken-for- 
granted facet of society and psychology. However this atomisation is riot something 
explicitly reflected upon by speakers so it is necessary to do considerable scholarship 
. around these issues. By providing a historical context, looking at disjunctions and 
examples of how liberal individualism might be other than what it is that I hope to 
shed light on the significance of these constructions.
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Lastly we must consider the political importance of the context of liberal 
individualism. It has facilitated the (partial) emancipation of women and gay men 
and so is not without value. The granting of certain rights such as the right to vote, 
the right to civil union and anti-discrimination legislation are the products of liberal 
ideologies. However this chapter will consider interviewees' construction of 
friendship as a purely personal matter focused on individuals and thus the means by 
which it is excluded from the public/political domain.
'Political theorists base their inquiries on the assumption that their subject 
lies in the public world of the economy and state and that the private 
realm of the domestic, familial and sexual relations lies outside their 
proper concerns.'
(Pateman, 1989: 3)
6.2 Whose Liberalism?
One of the great dilemmas in liberalism comes when freedom of speech 
conflicts with tolerance. It seems to produce intractable problems where people are 
asked to choose between the type of liberalism that permits freedom of expression, 
accepting that this may at times be unpalatable, and the kind of liberalism that seeks 
to protect people (e.g. recognised minority groups) from vilification. The former 
Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, although known for his longstanding support of 
women and gay rights, found himself criticised for sharing a platform with Muslims 
who condemned homosexuality (Tatchell, 2007). Conversely Peter Tatchell's 
sustained attack on Livingstone brought accusations of Islamaphobia against the 
former (Tatchell, 2005). What this reveals is the breadth of interpretations of 
liberalism and suggests that even people who share a commitment to women's 
equality and gay rights may disagree about how liberalism should be performed.
Instead of seeing this dilemma as a choice between the rights of one minority 
group versus another it can be regarded as between, on the one hand, the plurality 
and coexistence of different ways of life and, on the other, the search for a universal 
and rational consensus (Gray, 2000). Thus liberalism can be cast as a project that 
celebrates difference, or tries to uncover/establish essential commonalities. This 
rational viewpoint is one that will be examined later in the form of liberal humanist 
science and its impact on psychology.
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Arguably heterosexual women and gay men have vested interests in 
liberalism. It appears to permit the public expression of gay identity and facilitate the 
emancipation of women. Particular milestones such as universal suffrage in 1928 or 
partial décriminalisation of homosexuality in 1967 might be seen as liberal 
successes. However, different versions of liberalism coexist to the extent where 
producing a single history or even a universal definition becomes highly problematic. 
For example, liberalism in the USA is seen as a far more socialist project than in the 
UK. Versions of liberalism cross the political spectrum to such an extent that 
political discourse is saturated with competing claims about liberalism. Amidst this 
noise participants repeatedly invoke liberal ideas whilst disclaiming their political 
intentions. Whilst liberal discourses may be quite pervasive in many areas of talk 
they have particular significance when uttered by people whose identities are bound 
up with liberalism.
There is a long-standing dichotomy in liberal philosophy between what Isaiah 
Berlin (1958) called ‘negative’ and ‘positive liberties’. Negative liberties focus on 
'the area within which the subject — a person or group of persons — is or should be 
left to do or be what he (sic) is able to do or be, without interference by other 
persons' (p. 55). In other words it is the freedom not to be stopped from doing things. 
Conversely positive liberty is the ability to achieve certain ends and can be seen as 
focusing on material equality. Berlin associated this with the potential (or even 
inevitable) abuse of power. Although the goal might be a better society, in his eyes it 
justified the curtailment of other (negative) liberties for people's own good. Berlin, 
writing during the Cold War, associated this with the repression of the Soviet Union 
and was suspicious of restricting of individual liberties (like shopping and recreation) 
in favour of a grand and ideologically driven goal. Furthermore it has been seen as a 
misapplication of liberalism: whether someone can run a four-minute-mile is not an 
issue of personal liberty, but rather a fact of their physiology (Kelley, 1998).
This debate was ultimately about the scope, or rather focus, of liberalism. 
Whilst liberalism connoted a commitment to the freedom from 'political impediments 
to voluntary activity' (Koemer, 1985: 11) the argument was increasingly about 
whether this freedom should extend to the ‘absence of social and economic 
hindrances to individual self-determination’. Following Adam Smith, this idea has
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been extended to free-market laissez faire economic liberalism. Thus liberalism has 
different connotations for sexual liberationists than it would for economists.
6.3 The Historical Construction of Liberal Individualism
Finding a beginning for such a wide-ranging history is problematic because 
the starting point will always be somewhat artificial. (Perhaps this should more 
accurately be titled‘The Construction of Historical Liberal Individualism’.) 
Furthermore the ramifications of liberalism are still unclear. It is not obvious whether 
one ‘version’ will ultimately become dominant or whether different varieties can co­
exist (Gray, 2000). However it is perhaps useful to consider how some of the ideas 
and debates in liberalism came to be. Nothing about liberalism was inevitable as it 
did not drop from the sky fully formed (Rorty, 1979).
The second element to this history is the construction of the agentic 
individual and the implications not just for women and gay men, but also for notions 
of the public/political and the personal/private. The modem focus on the individual is 
made possible by the emergence of liberalism. John Stuart Mill (1869) saw liberty as 
fundamentally about describing the relationship between state and individual. For 
Mill, two kinds of limits to a ruler's power were established. Firstly ‘political 
liberties or rights’ (p. 2) which any ruler breaching could expect a justifiable 
uprising. Secondly constitutional checks which would, by various means, ensure that 
governing power represented community interests. The idea was simply that if the 
will of the ruler and the people were in agreement then the people could not, by 
definition, be tyrannised.
Mill noted that this analysis ignored an important detail: the will of the people 
is applied to individuals who are not part of this majority. So the populace could 
decide to oppress a particular group of people and this raised a question mark about 
democracy since the will of the people is not unfailingly liberal. For Mill the problem 
with democracy is that just because many people share a preference does not 
necessarily mean it is right. Furthermore he saw people expressing those preferences 
based on subjective opinions rather than reason and logic. His argument was that 
without some kind of rationale the will of the populace might simply be the 
expression of many people's personal preferences (or prejudices). Consequently he
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felt there should be safeguards about how far the state should intervene in people’s 
lives - no matter how well intentioned they might be, some areas should be the 
domain of the individual.
Mill's concern with protecting unpopular minorities from the will of the 
people may in some senses seem quite a modem issue that resonates with some 
contemporary forms of sexual oppression. He wrote extensively about women’s 
liberation (as an MP he advocated women’s suffrage) and liberty over one's own 
body - which we might read now as broadly analogous to the ‘consenting adults’ 
liberal discourse of sex. This takes us into the area of individualism and the 
emergence of the self as an autonomous being with implications for friendship.
6.4 Liberal Individualism and Psychology
It is in some ways quite shocking to find that what might seem the irreducible 
building block of society, the individual, is historically quite a recent invention. This 
may be partly due to the same changes in material circumstances, discussed in the 
previous chapter, which gave rise to the modem gay identity. However Jansz (2004) 
identifies a number of historical ‘stages’ of individualism. These are perhaps useful 
for illustrating the emergence of individualism, but are presented with the caveat that 
we shouldn't necessarily accept the linear process they imply.
Early western individuality has its roots in Greek antiquity however Jansz 
identifies the Renaissance as a starting point commonly used by historians. People 
had been largely defined by their jobs but this only worked locally, if you moved to 
another town you risked leaving your identity behind. However mobility began to 
increase and a new kind of identity was more attached to the individual. The rise of 
Protestantism and Luther and Calvin's critique of Roman Catholicism led to a more 
individualised idea of the person. People could read the Bible themselves and have a 
more direct relationship with God. Sins were confessed in private, leaving the 
individual to judge for themselves the seriousness of their transgressions rather than 
relying on a priest. Jansz argues this produced a situation where examining one’s 
own conscience was increasingly common.
In more domestic domains of life people became increasingly individualised. 
Wealthier people started eating from their own plate rather than a communal dish.
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They sat at chairs, not benches. Etiquette increasingly emphasised the individual. For 
example communal eating continued in the form of service à la français until the 
nineteenth century and indeed lives on in tapas and meze. However, the shift to 
service à la russe, popularised in the UK by Escoffier (1846-1935) and characterised 
by individual dishes presented as courses, is the dominant mode of eating today 
(Montagne, 2001).
Another major stage in the history of liberal individualism was ushered in by 
an increasingly scientific approach. During the Enlightenment (1700 to 1800) Galileo 
and Newton published material that suggested an increasingly mechanistic world 
governed by laws and reason that humans could hope to understand. Around the 
same time came another movement which at first glance might seem the antithesis of 
the enlightenment, but it also worked to emphasise the individual. Out of France 
came Romanticism and people were urged to express their feelings (Jansz, 2004).
Around this time Wollstonecraft published her rationalist ‘Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman’ (1792). This argued that women were not naturally inferior, if 
they appeared that way it was an educational issue. The call for more women’s 
education was liberal, but it was also a solution that focused on the betterment of 
individuals. Historically psychology constructed women as psychologically inferior 
to men in terms of mental illness (e.g. hysteria) and individual personality traits (e.g. 
neuroticism) (Miller, 1986). There is an analogous history to the study of 
homosexuality. Freud was arguably more sympathetic than other psychoanalysts1, but 
nevertheless homosexuality came into being as something that could be diagnosed, 
measured and (possibly) ‘treated’ (Foucault, 1978). Sexuality emerged not only as a 
label but also produced categories of person.
6.5 Friendships and Politics
Westerners often see friendship as part of the private sphere of life and 
academic interest in friendship tends to be more connected with issues of emotional 
well-being than friendship as public/political. O'Connor (1992: 1) notes: ‘The study 
of friendship can... be viewed as a rather trivial exercise’. As personal relationships 
go it superficially lacks the obvious pizzazz of sexual/romantic relationships. Rose 
(1996) certainly argues that on the hierarchy of relationships, friendship comes quite
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low. The upsurge in phenomenological methods and the emergence of feminist and 
LGBT psychology have all contributed to a greater emphasis on relationships. 
However, as Kitzinger and Perkins (1997) point out relationship tends to me 
romantic/sexual rather than friendship. So although psychology is frequently 
concerned with peering into ‘private’ areas of human experience, it appears that it 
does so selectively.
Contarello and Volpato (1991) see modem friendship as facilitated by 
modem social conditions and argue that only 20th century literature shows a clear 
division between sexual love and friendship. Commenting on the (socially 
constructed) division between being friends and lovers, Butt and Burr (2004: 19) 
note that in the West ‘love is big business’. The distinction between love and 
friendship, knowing when one is ‘really’ in love, is a relatively modem obsession.
Friendship in the non-sexual sense seems harder to tie to politics or social 
concerns. Yet O'Connor points out instances where class differences are important, 
noting that friendship takes different forms in working rather than middle class. 
However the common view of friendship in the west is that it lacks social form and 
this makes it hard to view politically or academically. However this also makes it 
quite malleable so it can be shaped to particular situations. In a sense this less 
defined version of friendship is a more individualised.
Derrida (1994) asks whether friendship is simply an attempt to gloss over the 
reality of our separation from others. Yet this seems to suggest that our very 
relationships with others imply our isolation. Out of this paradox Derrida comes to 
question the public/private, political/apolitical model of friendship. What he sees as 
fraternal friendship does not fit easily into the public domain. But conversely Derrida 
associates friendship with virtue and political morality. Thus it is difficult to entirely 
separate friendship from politics, yet equally it does not readily occupy a place in the 
political sphere. (We might consider the relative lack of formalised occasions and 
rituals marking friendship as evidence of the latter. After all to be a best-man or 
bridesmaid is principally to be implicated in the celebration of romance.) Derrida 
suggests that this complex positioning of friendship emphasises the inherent rather 
than public/political value of friendship.
Another dimension to the intersection between friendship and politics is not 
merely the freedom to make friends, but also to accept in a friend the enemy they
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nmay become (Derrida, 1994). From this perspective Derrida argues that tyrants and 
slaves are essentially unable to experience friendship because they are neither 
sufficiently free nor equal. If respect and freedom are cornerstones of friendship then 
liberalism is heavily implicated in contemporary friendship.
Yet the form of liberalism mostly commonly considered in the friendship 
context is that of liberal individualism rather what Scorza (2004: 87) calls ‘civic 
liberalism’:
‘liberal individualists tend to relegate the practice of friendship (and its 
norms) to the private sphere, where citizens as private persons are free to 
establish amicable relations with whomever they choose... They do not... 
propose that friendship serve as a normative model for the practice of 
citizenship, as Aristotle['s]... contemporary admirers do’
Scorza (2004:86)
Following Aristotle, Scorza’s argument is that all friendship is at least partly 
altruistic since people are concerned for their friends’ welfare for their sake, not 
simply their own. However Aristotle's notion of friendship also encompassed an idea 
of civic, as opposed to personal, friendship. Like modem personal friendships, civic 
relationships may grow deeper when invested in and fail when citizens make 
excessive demands.
Scorza outlines some objections to this analogy which, whilst they do not 
refute the comparison, should make us sceptical of simplistically mapping ancient 
Aristotelian civic friendship onto the modem personal variety. Firstly personal 
friendships are consensual whereas (in most cases) citizenship is predetermined. 
Secondly most fellow citizens will never meet let alone become attached to each 
other. Yet, as Scorza suggests, friends do not initially meet at the high point of their 
friendship, rather they grow with time.
In reviewing the history of liberal individualism and how that coincides with 
modem friendship I hope to have articulated the idea that liberalism and friendship 
may not be overtly positioned as political. Indeed the latter is all too easily subsumed 
as a private aspect of the former. Yet they are also inseparable from the history that 
precedes them and the politics that make them possible. So the following extracts 
will consider the personal/political conjunction.
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6.6 Analysis
Unlike second wave feminists, participants do not often orient to more 
political readings of their friendships (see Chapter 4). When prompted by the 
interviewer to talk about the political significance we see a number of examples 
where discourses of personality are used to explain their friendship (in ways that 
deny political implications). This mirrors the dominant psychological accounts of 
friendship/affiliation which have quite an individualistic focus.
6.7 Self Identification
Participant accounts seem to depend on them having similar or 
complimentary 'traits'. So in this section I will demonstrate the variability between 
similar and complimentary (which echoes the heteronormative social psychological 
account of romance vs. friendship). There is an example of participants emphasising 
the uniqueness of their friend, but also saying how similar there are to each other. 
This seems contradictory, but speaks to a dilemma between individuality and 
commonality.
Extract 1
430 S: I feel (we are as) similar as we are different "=
431 J: = Yeah, we are very [ different.
432 S: [ but we are also very similar.
433 ((laughs))
434 J: Yes, yes (.) that's true.
Here, Sarah and John co-construct an unheralded account of their similarities 
and differences to address the issue of why they are friends. One of the striking 
things about this extract is the balance between ‘similar’ and ‘different’ in line 430 
where they are constructed in equivalent terms: as if same and different could be 
weighed against one another and balanced.
John overlaps to pick up on their differences (line 431). He initially implies 
agreement with a 'Yeah' before not simply re-stating one side of Sarah's balanced 
equation but adding the word 'very'. The question then is whether this signifies a 
greater extremity of both similarities and differences, or whether in specifically 
attending to one aspect John has added weight to their differences. I am inclined
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toward the latter explanation because it requires fewer inferences about what John 
might have left unstated. More importantly Sarah appears to orient to his emphasis 
on difference with a reassertion of similarity, only this time with ‘very’ (line 432) to 
mirror John's own utterance. Perhaps her laughter suggests awareness that although 
she has not flatly contradicted him she has incorporated his statement of difference 
(line 431) into a reiteration of balanced difference and similarity .
At this point Sarah has restored the construction of their similarities and 
differences back to equilibrium. John could potentially resist her co-option of his 
words and assert their differences. Indeed were he to disagree with her about the 
similarity/difference balance this would potentially support his claim, since failure to 
agree an account of their friendship would surely be seen by the interviewer as proof 
positive that they were indeed 6very different’. Instead he acquiesces in line 433 and 
affirms the truth of the similarity/difference equilibrium.
Whilst remaining relatively agnostic about the ‘reality’ of their differences 
and similarities this might nevertheless suggest something about the presentation of 
self and individuality as rendered through the medium of friendship. The balancing 
act that Sarah seems engaged in may not be a literal representation of how she views 
their personalities. Rather it seems to attend to the twin concerns of being in aiclose 
friendship, which must imply some commonalities, whilst trying to maintain ‘ 
sufficient individualism not to appear beholden to John.
Where commonality does fleetingly emerge it is to dismiss the political 
significance of friendship and emphasise gay men as like heterosexual women:
Extract 2
1077 K: you don't'have the complications that you would have if
1078 you were a straight bloke=
1079 D: =and you see parts of your own personality reflected in
each other.
1080 K: Yeah (.) to me its no (.) it's no different to any of
the
1081 friendships I have with my straight girlfriends.
1082 D: And I have very few friendships with gay men anyway. I
1083 can't stand being surrounded by gay men. Ha
1084 I : So who are most of your friends?
1085 D: Straight. (.) And probably women.
In addressing the special meanings or qualities of their friendship Katie raises 
the issue of simplicity and draws a comparison with ‘straight bloke[s]’ (line 1078)
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thus making the issue of sexuality clear whilst leaving it unspoken. The assumed 
absence of desire is something I have dealt with elsewhere in more detail, but here it 
also seems to lay the groundwork for them to emphasise their commonalities.
The idea that personality is reflected (Dave, line 1079) raises several 
possibilities. What is the nature of the reflection? Do they see similarities or do they 
see differences (reflections are, after all, inverted)? But what seems to be taken for 
granted is that each has an individual personality. They are not absolute mirrors 
(either same or inverted) since they mirror only 'parts' and not the whole. This 
suggests that personalities are not only things that may be seen but also reflect. There 
seems to be some degree of self-knowledge associated with viewing oneself reflected 
in another.
Katie not only compares but claims ‘no differences]' (line 1080) to her 
‘friendships [...] with [...] straight girlfriends’ (lines 1080-1). Dave does not contest 
this directly but sets up an alternative account where he has ‘very few friendships 
with gay men anyway’ (line 1082) and ‘can’t stand being surrounded by gay men’ 
(lines 1082-3). On one level he is almost putting himself in the same position as her 
by suggesting gay men are not that important: ‘no different to... straight girlfriends’ 
and ‘very few friendships with gay men anyway’ have a certain casual equivalence. 
Yet he has made a strong statement about his preferred quantity of gay men in his 
life, an expression of preference quite different to Katie’s. So there is no agreement 
in their account about the similarity or difference between gay men and heterosexual 
women as categories.
Liberalism is rather divided between celebrating individuality and 
differences, or instead trying to emphasise the commonalities. The issue of 
difference, similarity and reflection also arose with Paul:
Extract 3
P: rather than saying "I am this" you can say "I am
not that". I am not this type of person (.) I am 
not this type of person. (.) so therefore by a 
process of elimination you come to a rough 
approximation of what you are as well and it's an 
easier way to do it by a process of elimination I 
think rather than (.) constructing a personality 
you can kind of reflect it from other people. (.)
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
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Paul seems to draw upon a negative form of self identification by seeing 
things saying recognising 'I am not that' (line 1774-5). By ‘negative’ I am not 
suggesting it is destructive or unhelpful, but rather that it seems to operate on a 
principle akin to falsification. Indeed Paul states that he considers this ‘easier’ than 
‘constructing a personality’ (line 1779-80) with its implications of starting from 
scratch.
When considering the idea of a personality ‘reflected]... from other people’ 
(line 1781) and comparing it to ‘constructing a personality’ one must be careful not 
to assume that one personality is inherently more original than other. Furthermore, 
recognising a reflection is emphatically not copying - rather a reflection implies 
something already there albeit previously unseen. This imbues the personality with a 
kind of ontological ‘reality’ that can be articulated once reflected and recognised in a 
friend. Thus in this account we may read Paul as claiming some essential essence to 
personality.
Katie and Dave resist the idea of a declarative knowledge (to borrow a 
cognitive term) about their friendship. They claim no intellectual engagement with 
their friendship, choosing instead to see friendship as natural:
Extract 4
791 K: It's not something we think about (.) or have to work
792 at. It's just part of our friendship I guess. So yeah.
793 I : So i t 's not a big deal?
794 D: I don't think it's a big deal (.) it's also because we
795 are closer than we actually think we are. And we don't
796 analyse it. That's what comes of a very good friendship
797 With a good relationship you don't analyse it or. think .
798 about things.
799 K: It's just very natural.
800 D: It naturally happens.. .
Part of this construction focuses on not ‘thinkpng] about’ (line 791) and not 
trying to ‘analyse’ (lines 796 & 797) their friendship. This inevitably constructs the 
interview as a strange situation and implies that their co-construction of friendship is 
novel and being performed for the first time. This of course provides a get-out clause 
should their construction be deficient in some way, after all they do not normally 
analyse it and by implication it is their first attempt.
Dave suggests that ‘we are closer than we actually think we are’ (lines 794-
5). Seemingly oxymoronic, it suggests they can have multiple kinds of knowledge
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about their friendship. We might interpret this as suggesting a more everyday 
knowledge that does not analyse their friendship, but should they ever do so, then 
they can claim there is a close friendship underneath.
The thread running through this extract, and indeed many other interviews, is 
that friendship is ‘natural’ (line 799) and thus need not be intellectualised. By 
constructing it as somehow extra-discursive, or ontologically prior to discourses of 
friendship, it is afforded a higher status than the talk surrounding it. Indeed Dave 
constructs not talking about it as 6com[ing] of a very good friendship’. This idea that 
they don't have to ‘work at’ (line 791-2) their friendship contrasts with the maxim 
that relationships require work and the generally held social psychological approach 
to relationship maintenance. However by constructing their relationship as effortless 
and natural, they not only fend off some of the interviewer's probing questions (note, 
in line 793,1 collude with their construction) but also elevate the significance of 
friendship. To articulate the mundane day-to-day mechanics of building and 
maintaining a friendship is, in some respects, to detract from its significance. The 
‘just’ in Katie’s ‘just very natural’ (line 799) obscures much of the detail. However, 
the difficulty or resistance to articulating the friendship more fully inevitably 
positions it as a more personal, rather than public/political, project.
Another element to the problem of articulating friendship comes in the form 
of a discourse about personalities. This also brings us back to the original question 
about whether ‘the personal’ stands in opposition to ‘the political’. After all, it is 
liberalism that respects and makes possible the domain of ‘the personal’. Liberalism 
makes possible the gay man and the woman who can have male friends. Yet by 
making the business of friendship a personal matter are people rather limited in how 
they can articulate it?
Werking (1997) It is difficult to study the interconnections among friends 
because our ‘vocabulary [is] rich in individualistic terms and poor in terms of 
describing relationship, complexity and process.’ (p.5) So we note that most 
interviewees could provide an account of how they first met in terms of the 
circumstances (e.g. the particular night out) but were less able to articulate the 
process by which they became friends:
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Extract 5
139 I: Can you think about the first time you actually
140 thought about each other as friends?
141 M: I'm not the type of person that
142 E: No
143 M: you know like the type of person that you know
144 like if two people are in a relationship and they
14 5 get together and everything and they remember the
146 . dates and I'd never do that I'm not that sort of
147 person. I don't remember specific incidents-like
148 that. ...
149 E: I don't think like that with friendships. You
150 don't think of a certain point
151 M: . It just happens.
152 I : Yeah. That point doesn't occur retrospectively? (
153 Or is it hard to say?
154 E: I can't really.
Mike struggles with the question which requires them to identify a specific 
point at which they identified as friends. In explaining he does not ‘remember 
specific incidents like that’ (lines 147-8) he twice invokes the idea of being a 
particular ‘type of person’ (lines 141 & 143). Interviews are littered with small 
instances such as these where participants articulate their self knowledge in a 
discourse of personality type. This functions to explain behaviour or ‘attitudes’ 
because it assumes a relatively fixed pattern the speaker will follow. Thus the 
description of personality serves as its own explanation and invites no further 
questions.
In Extract 4 I briefly commented on Dave’s rather deterministic sense of 
friendship formation. In this instance Mike claims that friendship ‘just happens’ (line 
151) and this is a common discourse among many interviewees. Behind the word 
‘just’ must lurk many details, processes and meanings. Yet the simplistic inevitability 
of friendship emerging is presented and as the interviewer I offer some limited 
agreement (line 152). Even my attempt to encourage them to retrospectively identify 
the start of their friendship fails.
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6.8 Threats to Individualism
Sophie (60) and Bob (64) from the south coast discuss heterosexual men and 
Sophie provides an individualised account (note some lines are not quoted because 
they reveal more specific information about her ex-husband and potentially make the 
pair of friends identifiable):
Extract 6 ,
B: Do you feel a (.) our friendship is. different to you
is different to the friendship you would expect from 
a straight man (.) or a straight couple?
S: Well (.) I do know I'm not very good with straight
men. I had (.) a very bad experience (.) with a 
husband marriage wise.
[ • • • ]
But (.) I do find (.) I do find straight men quite 
difficult and I'm sorta (.) I'm a bit (.) wary of 
them. But (.) I probably get on better with men than
I get on with women (.) and I've always had male
friends for as long as I can remember (.) even from 
school I've had.gay male friends. So I think maybe 
I've always been a bit that way (.) anti straight 
m e n .
Could you put your finger on what it is about 
straight men?
Could I (.) I find them very threatening. Which 
sounds totally stupid=
=No it doesn't (.) not at all [ I know exactly
[ N o  (.) I find 
them threatening in a sexual sense, I find them 
threatening in a power sense, I find them 
threatening in (.) my financial independence sense 
I find them threatening in what colour I can paint 
my walls (.) you know (.) how I do my kitchen (.) 
in all sorts of ways.
Some time prior to this extract I had asked ‘what if you were a straight man’ 
(line 1013) and it takes a few turns before Bob (rather helpfully) reintroduces the 
question (line 1022-4), but obviously this time it is directed to Sophie rather than 
interpretable as a more general question about the relevance of sexual identity.
Sophie makes a shift from T’m not very good with straight men’ (lines 1025- 
6) with an attribution that this has something to do with her, to being ‘a bit (.) wary’
(1044). She switches back into emphasising how well she gets on ‘better with men 
than I get on with women’ (lines 1045-6) constructing this is a long standing attribute
1043 S:
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051 D:
1052
1053 S:
1054
1055 B:
1056 S:
1057
1058
1059
1060 
1061 
1062
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026 
1027
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(‘as long as I can remember’, line 1047) before specifying ‘gay male friends’ (line 
1048) and saying ‘anti straight men’ (lines 1049-50).
My request for clarification, about what seems to be an increasingly strong 
account that has shifted from a discourse about her abilities (to deal with straight 
men), to an explicitly ‘anti’ stance, gets a more hesitant response. Firstly she begins 
repeating the question ‘Could I (.)’ (line 1053) before articulating a sense of threat 
(line 1053) followed by an inoculation ‘Which sounds totally stupid=’ (lines 1053-4). 
Bob jumps in to collude with this account, denying twice that she sounds stupid 
‘=No it doesn’t (.) not at all’ (line 1055). He starts articulating what sounds like the 
start of a personal account (‘I know exactly ’ line 1055) before being cut off by 
Sophie.
The following account (lines 1056-62) is highly individualised and she 
accounts for her friendship with gay men not in terms of some general propensity for 
heterosexual women to like gay men but in terms of herself. She provides a six-part 
list (or two three-part lists, to be more conventional) of her objections:
1) ‘I find them threatening in a sexual sense’ (lines 1056-7)
2) ‘I find them threatening in a power sense’ (line 1057-8)
3) ‘I find them threatening in (.) my financial independence sense’ (line
1058-9)
4) ‘I find them threatening in what colour I can paint my walls’ (line 1060-1)
5 ) ‘how I do my kitchen’ (line 1061)
6) ‘all sorts of ways’ (line 1062)
All but the final utterance makes direct reference to herself in the first person. 
The first four follow a standard ‘I find them threatening in ...’ formation. Statements 
3-5 introduce the ‘my’ factor (finance, walls, kitchen). The account vividly 
constructs straight men (to use their term) threatening her individual autonomy.
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6.9 Discussion
These extracts are in some ways representative of a difficulty, or resistance, 
many participants showed to articulating elements of their friendships. It suggests 
discursive difficulties with bringing into the more public sphere (to the extent 
interviews are ‘public’) elements which are considered to be ‘personal’. Haley 
(1963) argued that psychologists also lack the terminology to talk about 
relationships. Psychologists are good at ‘roles’, ‘attitudes’, ‘traits’ and ‘cognitions’ 
which Haley saw as ‘inside skin’ concepts. Gottman (1982) felt that (for western 
traditions) the language has focused on the individual for over two thousand years 
thus it inadequately describes relationships.
6.10 The End of Ideology?
‘The “end of ideology” was in some ways actually a by-product of the 
acceptance -  one might almost say the institutionalization -  of liberal 
democracy in the West.’
Koemer (1985: 1)
Fukuyama (1989) argued that Western liberal democracy had effectively 
‘won’ the cold war and thus emerged as the only significant mode of governance. His 
notion of ‘the end of history’ described the ‘unabashed victory of economic and 
political liberalism’ and the ‘total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives’ (p. 1). 
In the light of recent economic events unfettered liberalism in the free-market sense 
is being revisited. But what of the depoliticisation of identities and relationships? A 
shift to the ‘personal’ seems to be denial of the political. After all liberalism and 
individualism are ideologies, that the present themselves as natural and inevitable 
does not mean they are for all time, or that liberalism will inherently led to more 
progressive politics and improved civil rights.
To the extent that more nations operate as liberal democracies we might 
regard the project (if we can afford it that sense of intentionality) as successful. 
Moreover Derrida (1994: 85) questioned the value of this liberal hegemony: ‘at a 
time when... the ideal of a liberal democracy... has finally realized itself as the ideal 
of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine and thus 
economic oppression affected as many human beings... in absolute figures, never
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have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated 
on the earth.’ Critical of triumphalism, Derrida undercut the apparent success of 
liberal democracy by pointing to these and other failings (e.g. the dilemma of free 
markets versus protectionism). Derrida's solution is to call upon spectres de Marx, 
not as communism or Marxism as a political entity, but rather as an analytic or 
critical tool. We might view it as an agenda of re-politicising politics. "
By identifying some of the problems and contradictions of liberalism Derrida 
challenges us to view it more sceptically. Fukuyama’s approach seems to regard the 
rise of liberalism as both inevitable and, excepting temporary setbacks, unstoppable. 
Yet the history previously discussed suggests a process of continual construction 
with points of major divergence. Can this really be the emergence of something 
inevitable? Like ‘good science’ is liberalism the ‘naturally’ occurring outcome of 
logic and reason? Fukuyama seems to hint at an end point, or conclusion, where all 
other alternatives fall away. Yet given the range of liberalisms available can we 
afford to simply accept it as a forgone conclusion? In his discussion of science Rorty 
(1979: 344) suggests it is like the journey ‘up the mountain on whose (possibly false) 
summit we stand’. Could Fukuyama’s sense of liberal democracy be a similar false 
summit?
The potential problem with viewing the current state of liberalism (if such a 
thing can be defined) as inevitable and nearing its summit is, as Derrida noted, that it 
does not invite criticism. It fosters a turn away from liberalism as political. By 
casting it as taken-for-granted or the ‘natural’ outcome of knowledge and reason its 
ideological underpinnings are obscured.
This lack of diversity in politics (with a big ‘P’) seems to mirror a move away 
from explicit allegiance to feminist or gay politics. In the decade since Time 
magazine postulated the death of feminism (Bellafonte, 1998) critics have argued 
that those quick to mark the passing of feminism have overlooked the anti-sweatshop 
culture of US universities and ignored online feminists publications and forums (e.g. 
feminist.com and feminista!) (Jervis, 2004). Meanwhile critics of gay culture have, 
as noted in the previous chapter, attacked it for being more motivated by 
consumerism than politics (Penaloza, 1996; Simpson, 1999). Have the successes of 
liberalism in terms of improved equal rights made identity politics seem less 
relevant?
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6.11 Conclusion
Participants also became bound up in the dilemma of uniqueness versus 
commonality. This is one of the most widespread examples of variability, friends 
account for their relationship on the basis of being the same underneath, different in a 
complimentary fashion (see Chapter 4) and as unique. It seems mean spirited to 
critique positive appraisals of people and I do not question the legitimacy of these 
friendships, but what these accounts show is the paucity of discourses about why 
people value each other outside of romantic relationships. Although contradictory, 
uniqueness and commonality are (when unspecified) quite banal terms. From this 
standpoint everyone is simultaneously similar and unique, so it does not address the 
question of why this particular person and not another equally unique human. The 
answer, if any, seems to come from shared histories and experiences.
The other issue we can draw from the data is that participants often resist 
political positioning of their friendships. At various points this chapter has suggested 
that people might be discursively limited when it comes to politics and friendship 
coinciding. Is it perhaps problematic to construct friendship on the basis of politics 
rather than inter-personal factors? At other points (see Chapters 4 and 5) 
interviewees constructed accounts of sexual (non)normativity, yet when explicitly 
attending to the matter of friendship in the abstract sense (rather than shared 
experiences) politics appear more difficult to articulate.
6.12 Study One - Conclusions
Through the previous three chapters participants have co-constructed 
accounts of friendship in overwhelmingly positive terms. The absence of sexual 
complications is accounted for as something that simplifies and clarifies the 
discourse of friendship as authentically asexual. In this context gay identity neatly 
explains the lack of desire (albeit focused on male rather than female sexuality). It 
also responds to societal norms and expectations about cross-sex friendship. If there 
were no discourses of heteronormativity, then their accounts of friendship would not 
need to disclaim such possibilities within each dyad.
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The benefits of friendship appear to be more easily articulated (and provider 
richer data for analysis) when story-telling shared experiences. This may be a more 
familiar speech act than answering more abstract questions about friendship. Thus 
one implication may be that future interview (or focus group) based studies of 
friendship may find that permitting space for participants to construct stories of 
friendship is more fruitful than a more hypothetical focus where answers may 
constitute more difficult and unfamiliar speech acts.
Under most circumstances we might expect friends to spend time together 
and thus a body of shared experience conforms to a normative expectation of 
friendship. It is extensively built into their accounts of friendship in a way that 
appears to ‘evidence’ their claim to legitimate friendship. Across the three analytic 
chapters there are pervasive discourses of fun (e.g. the possibilities of playing with 
third-party understandings of their friendship), consumption of celebrity culture and 
more hedonistic accounts (e.g. excessive alcohol). Some interviewees focused 
extensively on more flamboyant accounts of coordinated dressing up (e.g. Dave in 
drag) which is presented as a positive shared experience (albeit with Katie in a more 
peripheral role). It is not surprising that friendship would be constructed in terms of 
fun or pleasure. However some of the examples appeared specific to the particular 
combination of heterosexual women and gay men. Shared activities like shopping fit 
within the construction of gay identity.
Although Amitis overtly connects her non-normative ethnicity with Paul’s 
non-normative sexual identity, this is a rare instance of political norms being drawn 
into a friendship discourse. As this third analytic chapters shows, the dominant 
discourse of friendship is based on the personal rather than the political. Personal 
characteristics or qualities are the backbone of a highly individualistic friendship 
discourse. However throughout these analyses I have consistently pointed to the - 
sexual politics at work and the discursive management necessary to make some 
interpretations work whilst heading off others (e.g. the issue of romantic or sexual 
desire). Herein lies the central issue to emerge from across the interviews - 
discourses of friendship not only have to manage a legitimately platonic account, but 
seem to operate in personal rather than political terms. Philosophically I am sceptical 
of political vacuums or claims of neutrality especially when participants are so 
obviously juggling with social norms. If there were no sexual politics at work then it
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would not be necessary to discursively manage gendered expectations. Whilst 
participants broadly resisted political readings of their friendships, it was an issue 
that resolutely refused to go away.
Having started out with certain understandings of how friendship might be 
constructed (e.g. platonic) it appears that these friendship are articulated in terms of 
the (interpersonal that resist political meanings. This may be a definitional issue 
between broad and narrow approaches to what constitutes the political. However 
there may be a more specific issue in the context of friendship. If the culturally 
available discourse of friendship emphasises (inter)personal relations in a relatively 
private sphere, then a more political account may appear incompatible authentic 
friendship. In other words a version of friendship based on sexual identities may not 
sufficiently value the individuals involved and thus fail to convincingly work as an 
account of good friendship. There are also potential difficulties in speaking of 
identity groups (e.g. gay men) as if they were a homogeneous whole. Friendship 
seems to be constructed at a very individual level; however this imposes limitations 
on its political dimensions. Although issues of sexual politics and discourses of 
normativity are evident interviewees seldom oriented to wider political concerns. 
Furthermore the instances where they seem closest to troubling norms (e.g. through 
drag or potentially misrepresenting their relationship) are primarily couched in terms 
of fun. So whilst pleasure and humour comfortably fit within the construct of 
friendship, a more worked up version of political implications could present a 
challenging speech act given the need to maintain the individual value of the 
friendship.
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1 Gilman (1983) ‘Homosexuality was, for Freud, a fixation at an earlier stage of 
sexual development... each stage of development is also paralleled by a difference in 
the love object. Initially it is the self, then the mother, then the father, and finally 
someone of the opposite sex. Homosexuality is therefore a universal experience 
through which all individuals pass.’ (p. 135) ‘Homosexuality was in no way to be 
seen as an illness... Freud's views concerning the meaning of homosexuality altered 
over time. He came to understand that the homosexual could be completely “healthy” 
in his or her sexual orientation.’ (p. 136) According to Gilman, Freud wrote a letter 
in 1935 saying homosexuality had ‘no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of, 
no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it a 
variation of sexual function.’ (quoted by Gilman, p. 136). However, Harris (1999 
sees contradictions since ‘Freud both perpetuates and breaks with the conventional 
patriarchal thinking on homosexuality and femininity’ (p. 158). The problem is that 
despite what Freud wrote, when he treated people (e.g. ‘Case of Homosexuality in a 
Woman’) he implicitly sided with the father who wanted his daughter ‘cured’.
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Chapter 7
Media (Re)presentations of Heterosexual Women and Gay Men
7.1 Participant Accounts of Will & Grace
Qualitative psychological research increasingly uses pre-existing texts such 
as media sources alongside elicited data (e.g. focus groups and interviews). 
Methodologically these can be combined into one study, for example using a film 
clip as a stimulus for a focus group (Willig, 2001). There is considerable scholarship 
within psychology about how media texts are understood by people. Often this takes 
the existence of a media phenomenon as a logical starting point and then explores 
how participants understand or talk about the subject matter (e.g. Giles & Maltby, 
2004). Media analysis followed by interview data suggests a focusing from the broad 
to the specific, and thus implies a rigorous focus. The design of this project has been 
somewhat atypical in that study one comprised of interview based data, now 
followed by a media analysis. Moving from specific discourses uttered by ‘real’ 
people, to a media analysis is not so much an attempt to broaden the analysis, but 
rather to interrogate a different discursive arena. Throughout the process of recruiting 
interviewees it became increasingly apparent^that Will & Grace was a specific lens 
through which many participants articulated aspects of their friendship. It became the 
framework in which some interviewees were recruited - awareness of the media 
phenomenon apparently legitimising the subject matter. As the principle media 
representation of these friendships, the sitcom became shorthand for the 
phenomenon. Although much of this occurred during the recruitment process, and 
thus outside of the data collection process, there are nevertheless examples of 
participants referring to Will & Grace.
Part way through the interview with John and Sarah we began discussing 
their role as participants. As a dyad they were recruited through a third party who 
John knew (the exact details of the connection are unspecified to ensure participant 
anonymity).
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Extract 1
972 J: You know (.) I thought (.) and I don't know (.) the
973 subject matter I thought,(.) was quite interesting.
974 S: John mentioned it a couple of weeks ago (.)
975 J: Mm . •
976 S: and urn (.j probably over Will and Grace (.).and said
977 "Shall we do it?"
In this account John articulates an interest in the ‘subject matter’ (line 973) of 
the interview. In turn Sarah explains her knowledge of the study came from John 
(line 974). After a brief interjection (apparently of agreement, line 975) it emerges 
that the conversation about participation occurred in the context of Will & Grace.
The phrase ‘probably over Will and Grace’ (line 976) is slightly ambiguous as to 
whether it refers specifically to watching the programme or talking about it (the 
former seems more likely in this context). However the specifics are less significant 
than the account of participation being discussed ‘over’ Will & Grace. ■
A cognitive approach might focus on a literal reading of this account and 
whether the sitcom triggered the discussion. From a discursive perspective I am less 
concerned with how it ‘really’ happened and more interested in the implicit 
connection between Will & Grace and this particular dyad. The account of deciding 
to participate refers to ‘subject matter’ (line 973), which in the interview context 
goes unarticulated, but is evaluated by John as ‘quite interesting’ (line 973). This 
constructs a topic or field of knowledge that has been communicated to Sarah. Her 
narration of John’s suggestion that they participate in the interview, ‘Shall we do it?’ 
(line 977), implicates them within the object of knowledge (i.e. heterosexual women 
and gay men who are friends). That this appears to occur in the context of Will & 
Grace could be interpreted as including the programme as part of the ‘subject matter’ 
since it apparently constitutes a meaningful or appropriate setting for the discussion. 
How deeply this can be read is a moot point, but at the very least it constructs their 
familiarity with the media representation.
Much later in the interview John and Sarah reflected back on Will & Grace 
but this time made an explicit connection with their friendship:
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Extract 2
2619 S: = It's a bit of a shame Will and Grace has happened
2620 because. (.) [ we
2621 J: [ It's quite interesting.
2622 S: (.) we were like them before they came on the telly
2623 (.) in the sense of our humour and stuff (. ) but
2624 then [ the norm is Will and Grace =
2625 A: [ Hmm
2626 D: [ (.) Mmm
2627 J: = Exactly. . .
This account is unusual in that it makes a direct comparison between the 
participants and the media representation but claims similarity and originality. Will 
& Grace is constructed as a phenomenon that ‘happened’ (line 2619) suggesting it as 
a defining event located at a particular point in time. Whereas John refers to it as 
‘quite interesting’ (line 2621) in an echo of his earlier verdict on the ‘quite 
interesting’ ‘subject matter’ (both line 973), Sarah calls it ‘a bit of a shame’ (2619) 
and starts to construct their friendship as similar but prior to Will & Grace (‘we were 
like them before they came on the telly’ (line 2622). This claim to originality may 
work to emphasise the authenticity of their friendship.
The claimed likeness in ‘humour and stuff (line 2623) is offset against an 
apparent concession that ‘but then the norm is Will and Grace’ (lines 2623-2624). 
This seems to unambiguously articulate the programme’s status as the prime example 
or representation. However, what is less clear is whether Sarah’s ‘but then’ (lines 
2623-2624) signifies causality in their sameness. If they are like Will & Grace, and 
those characters are normative, is the implication that the sitcom reflects a ‘real’ 
variety of friendship that Sarah and John exemplify? We might see this as compatible 
with the claim of originality, that their friendship and presumably others like it were 
effectively the template for the sitcom.
Other interviewees also showed knowledge of Will & Grace but were far 
more reticent about claiming a likeness. Emily and Mike discussed an apparently 
former friend of Mike’s whose motivation for friendship is constructed in terms of a 
media (or ‘fashion’, line 1592) discourse.
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Extract 3
She just likes the idea of having a gay friend (.) 
and at the time it seemed cool that I could =
= It somehow was a bit of fashion thing.
Yeah (.) I think yeah =
= Fashionable.
Where do you think the whole fashion thing came from? 
From things like Will and Grace ((laughs)) I don't 
know (.)
I don't know (.)
The media? ■
Yeah (.) but I don't think our friendship is like that. 
No
I think we are just kinda friends really that its not 
like a fashion thing "Oh Mike's cool he's gay"
((laughs)) no it's nothing like that. I don't think I'd 
want =
= It shouldn't be like that.
Friendship is about deeper things than just saying "oh 
that sounds cool".
Principally this is a negative account of friendship based on ‘fashion’ (1592) 
and what is ‘cool’ (lines 1603 and 1608). The extract opens at the end of a rather 
critical appraisal of someone Mike was friends with. ‘Having a gay friend’ (line 
1590) is constructed as a past tense fashion and when questioned (line 1595) Emily 
attributes it to ‘things like Will and Grace’ (1596) and ‘the media’ (line 1599). This 
seems to be a slightly broader account of representation but, like Sarah before, Will 
& Grace is the principle example (in this instance because the programme is named). 
Although slightly unsure of precisely where the fashion for women having gay 
friends came from, they co-construct it as a distinct phenomenon (e.g. line 1592) ‘at 
the time’ (line 1591). The sense of transience fits the discourse of fashion suggesting 
its cultural resonance was located in a specific time period.
Having framed the phenomenon in terms of fashion Mike particularly emphasises 
that their friendship is ‘not like a fashion thing’ (lines 1602-1603). In the midst of co- 
constructing a mutually satisfying account of their friendship any implication that it 
was motivated by fashion could threaten their legitimacy.
1590 M:
1591
1592 E:
1593 M:
1594 E:
1595 D:
1596 E:
1597
1598 M:
1599 E:
1600 M:
1601 E:
1602 M:
1603
1604
1605
1606 E:
1607 M:
1608
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Interviewees commonly referenced Will & Grace suggesting shared 
knowledge of the programme. In common with the above examples comparisons 
between participants’ friendships and media representations were accompanied by 
caveats that emphasised the legitimacy of their friendships. Any suggestion of 
imitation or following a fashion was disclaimed - an account permitting such 
interpretations could devalue the friendship.
Will & Grace appeared to be the primary cultural reference point for interviewees. 
When comparing (or differentiating) themselves with Will & Grace it was often 
unclear whether they specifically meant those two characters or the programme as a 
whole.
There is a tension between Will & Grace as an interesting representation that 
crystallises this specific type of friendship as a known phenomenon, or whether direct 
comparison with a media construct potentially devalues ‘real’ friendship. Whilst 
direct equivalence with ‘fictional’ characters is something interviewees avoided, the 
prevalence of this media representation suggests that it occupies a significant 
position in the discursive landscape. Constructing an account of authentic friendship 
apparently limits the usefulness of Will & Grace as a reference point. As we have 
seen it is utilised as a known example and then differentiated (e.g. as subsequent to 
‘real’ friendship). Yet there appear to be aspects of the representation that are 
claimed (e.g. humour) and its cultural currency is acknowledged (Sarah calls it ‘the 
norm’, line 2624). Interview data suggested an extensive engagement with media 
representation of these friendships, with Will & Grace being the foremost example.
7.2 Introduction to Study Two
‘Tom, who has just taken, unflatteringly, to calling himself a hag-fag, 
has been sweetly supportive about the Daniel crisis. Tom has a theory 
about homosexuals and single women in their thirties having a natural 
bonding: both being accustomed to disappointing their parents and 
being treated as freaks by society.’
Bridget Jones’s Diary (Fielding, 1996: 27)
This is the first of two chapters critically analysing publicly available media 
discourses of gay men and heterosexual women. Although continuing the discourse 
analytic approach adopted for study one, the media form poses particular
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methodological issues (e.g. for sampling and data collection). It also diverges from 
the first study insofar as it focuses on explicitly ‘fictional’ characters and media 
constructs set within specific genres with their own conventions. Whilst this requires 
some attention, it does not necessarily represent a paradigmatic leap from one 
domain (interviews) to another (media and fiction). Certainly there are ‘rules’ and 
conventions to be understood within genres like sitcom, but then Conversation 
Analysts (Edwards, 1995) would equally point to the highly structured features of 
speech. Furthermore, the ‘fictitiousness’ of characters is not seen in opposition to the 
‘realness’ of the interviewees. Indeed the first study attempted to be relatively 
agnostic about the ‘reality’ of interviewees’ accounts. These were co-constructions, 
that perform friendship using a palette of available discourses. Seen in this way the 
approaches are not regarded as fundamentally incompatible. Indeed discourses made 
available through the media make up a certain amount of ‘naturally’ occurring or 
interview discourse. If as Barthes suggests, speech is a ‘tissue of quotations’ (1977: 
146) then media texts are in some sense quotable, whilst themselves being iterations 
of other discourses. In other words, the relationship between media text and spoken 
discourse is seen as two-directional and dynamic, both shaping and reflecting 
discourse.
Whilst this and the following chapter will consider how media discourses 
have changed (for example the representation of women and gay men has changed 
dramatically), it is not the aim to uncover some ‘original’ version. In the same way 
Butler’s notion of performativity (1993) rejects an original or ‘authentic’ gender (of 
which other performances are copies), the aim here is not to find the ‘original’ 
friendship between gay men and heterosexual women (such a thing would precede 
the category of ‘gay’ or the historical invention of ‘homosexuals’ as a type of person, 
Foucault, 1977). However, it is notable that at a particular point in time (around the 
late 1990s) a number of films and television programmes began representing 
friendship between heterosexual women and gay men -  or, in the case of Will & 
Grace using it as the central theme.
The increased representation of women on television (Dyer, 1987; Gauntlett, 
2008), combined with a shift away from pathological portrayal of ‘homosexuality’ 
towards more liberal and widespread representation (Pullen, 2009), provide the 
necessary preconditions for these friendships to be constructed in the media. The
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production of Will & Grace (1998 -  2006) by NBC, and subsequent broadcast on 
Channel 4 (and later Living TV) seemed to precipitate a flurry of articles in 
newspapers and women’s magazines about (presumably heterosexual) women and 
their friendships with gay men. (Indeed the UK version of Elle magazine asked me to
. ' f
comment on the phenomenon (Polyviou, 2003); the published article is the subject of 
analysis in Shepperd, Coyle & Hegarty, 2010).
Interviewees drew upon media representations of (heterosexual) women’s 
friendship with gay men using Will & Grace as a commonly understood reference 
point (e.g. Sarah, line 978; Mike, line 1323). One interviewee, Emily, gave an 
account in which having a gay friend could be seen 4 as a fashion thing’ (line 1603). 
She carefully distanced herself from such views, not unreasonably given that her gay 
friend Mike might have resented the position of a 4 fashion’ accessory (connoting 
something more temporary or transient than the account of enduring friendship they 
constructed).
The discourses of friendship between gay men and heterosexual women thus 
far analysed have come from interviews with participants engaged in these 
friendships. One limitation of this approach is that it could ignore alternative 
accounts and narratives produced for public consumption. Given the extent to which 
some interviewees drew upon popular culture it is perhaps not surprising that their 
accounts would be constructed using this high profile representation of their 
friendship (even if they articulated differences between media representations and 
their account of friendship). Mentions of Will & Grace might suggest that certain 
media accounts form part of the cultural and discursive resources available for 
participants to explain their friendships. Yet it may be that some of the media 
constructions are more useful (or salient) in an interview context than others. This 
begs the question, what discourses do the media present that are not manifested in the 
interviews? To get a better sense of the accounts available, a larger group of people 
were asked to name examples of media representation of this type of friendship.
7.3 Identifying Representations
The discourses of friendship between gay men and heterosexual women thus 
far analysed have come from interviews with participants engaged in these
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friendships. One limitation of this approach is that it could ignore alternative - 
accounts and narratives produced for public consumption. To further investigate 
cultural knowledge of friendship between heterosexual women and gay men 
members of internet forums were asked about where in the media they recognised 
these friendships being represented. Forums were chosen on the basis of their users’ 
potential interest in the subject rather than according to any presumed stake in ‘real 
life’ versions of the friendship.
Access to the websites proved surprisingly difficult. For example Famous
(fmforums.co.uk) is a very large website that originated as a place to discuss 
male celebrities, and post pictures, but spanned into much wider areas of discussion 
about the media and politics. Its focus on sexual interest in male celebrities suggested 
a mixture of heterosexual women and gay men (insofar as user names could be read 
as indicating gender). However, they were deeply suspicious of being used for 
research purposes and refused to permit a discussion to take place (or even discuss 
the matter).
Another problem was that some forums have lists of banned words that are 
automatically removed by the software. To my astonishment ‘gay’ was regarded as 
sufficiently pejorative that it was included it in the banned words list. Due to the 
software in use, and forum administrator’s lack of technical expertise, this was an 
insurmountable problem for one forum despite expressing a willingness to facilitate 
the discussion. (They were sufficiently embarrassed that they asked not to be 
named.) I considered alternative spellings o f ‘gay’ (e.g. ‘gey’, ‘gai’, ‘ghay’), various 
forms of censorship (e.g. ‘g*y) and other terminology (e.g. ‘homosexual’, although 
that is problematic due to its historically pathological connotations). All options 
seemed to reinforce exactly the heterosexist politics I wanted to question and it 
would be very distracting from the main question about media representations. 
Besides, even if /managed to circumvent the word ‘gay’, many respondents would 
not. So it seemed that initiating a discussion where one of the key terms of reference 
was off limits was not a tenable position.
In the USA NBC Television had a forum with sub-sections dedicated to 
individual programmes. As the makers of Will & Grace I presumed they might have 
some fans with knowledge of other representations of these friendships. Despite the 
rather convoluted business of getting NBC’s cooperation, the question received no
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replies at all (and was later purged from their website). This may initially have been 
because it fell between US airings of the show, causing the Will & Grace forum to be 
less prominent. Perhaps my emergence as a (foreign) stranger, engaged in 
psychological study, was potentially off-putting.
Having learnt some lessons about framing the question, I identified Digital 
Spy (digitalspy.co.uk) as a forum that discusses all forms of media and has a very 
high number of users. Having gained their permission I started a discussion and 
posed a question about where people saw these friendships being represented (see 
Appendix 9). This time I positioned myself as a PhD student asking for help rather 
than as a ‘psychologist’ . Nevertheless I was still challenged about trying to get other 
people to do my work for me. So explained I already had my own ideas, but wanted 
to know what they thought and this seemed to be acceptable to the group who 
provided 59 replies (see Appendix 9).
The issue of having a pre-existing relationship with the forum seemed 
important to assuage some people’s concerns, so I enlisted the help of one supervisor 
(Adrian Coyle) to start a thread on an LGBT forum, Out Everywhere 
(outeverywhere.com), where he had some prior connections. This gained a further 24 
responses (see Appendix 10), many of them listing multiple representations.
7.4 Public Knowledge of Representations
Each discussion resulted in a certain amount of conversation about the subject 
generally and a few comments about personal experiences. The first reply on Out 
Everywhere noted a gay friend whose association (specifically dancing) with 
heterosexual women was apparently confusing until ‘a TV program ... (sic) that 
explained it all’. This seemed to construct the idea of a specific phenomenon that 
could, or should, be explained via the media.
The second reply was the first to start giving specific examples:
Extract 1
rupert everett and Madonna 
• jack and karen from will and grace
they are the most obvious ones that spring to mind
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Note that characters from Will & Grace were constructed as ‘obvious’ in the 
second reply and not mentioned again in any of the twenty-two following replies (the 
lack of repetition will be discussed further in this chapter). Also worth noting is the 
way different people add more detail to previous replies. Following a knowing 
comment about the Big Brother genre -  ‘doesn’t Big Brother usually have a gay man 
and a straight woman who are best friends after 24 hours?’ -  the next reply supplies 
two names that fit that mould -  ‘Brian Dowling and Naurinda [sic] Kaur!’. 
Consequently responses were highly occasioned by the context, repetition apparently 
diminished but other people supplying extra information to form a co-constructed 
and diverse list of accounts.
Replies from the media commentary site Digital Spy and gay social 
networking site Out Everywhere were collated (see table 1). Aggregating ‘fictional’ 
representations was relatively simple although, in long-running series, explicitly 
cited different sets of friends in non-overlapping narrative strands were kept separate. 
More complex was the coding of celebrity (or ‘real life’) groups of friends. Certain 
names were raised repeatedly (e.g. Cilia Black) but not necessarily with the same 
male friends. Indeed, one respondent on Out Everywhere remarked ‘Cilia Black and 
-  well how long have you got’ indicating a potentially lengthy list. This was coded 
with someone who named Cilia Black and gave precisely such a list.
Within the ‘fictional’ and ‘ celebrity’ sections of the table examples are 
presented alphabetically. As far as possible, the order in which names are presented 
reflects the respondents’ replies. In other words I have tried to indicate whether male 
names came first or female. The order is quite mixed suggesting no consistent ‘male 
first’ bias.
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Table 1: Examples of perceived friendships between heterosexual women and gay men in the 
media.
‘Fictional’ Out Digital Total
Everywhere Spy
A Taste of Honey (UK Stage Play and Film, 1958/61) 1 1
As Good As It Gets (US Film, 1997) 2 2
Bob & Rose (UK Drama, 2001) 1 1
Bridget Jones’ Diary (UK Book, 1996) 1 2 2
Coronation Street (Sean & Violet) (UK Soap opera, 2004 - 
8) 1 2 3
Dawson's Creek (Jack & Jen) (US Teen drama, 1998 - 
2002) 1 1
Eastenders (Pauline Fowler & Derek) (UK Soap Opera, 
2001 -5) 1 1
Get Real (UK Film, 1998) I 1
Gimme Gimme Gimme (UK Sitcom, 1999-2001) 1 2 3
Hollyoaks in the City (UK Soap Opera, 2006) 1
My Best Friend's Wedding (US Film, 1997) 1 1 2
Pretty In Pink (US Film, 1986) 1 1
Queer as Folk (Nathan & Donna) (UK TV Drama, 1999) 1 1 2
Roseanne (Leon) (US Sitcom, 1991 -97) 1 1
Sex and the City (Carrie Bradshaw & Stanford) (US i
Drama, 1998 - 2004) 1 1 2
Sex and the City (Charlotte York & Anthony) (US Drama, i 
1998-2004) I 1 1 2
Shameless (Ian Gallagher & Mandy Maguire) (UK |
Drama, 2004 -9) I 1 1
The Archers (Adam & Ian with Lillian) (UK Radio Soap I
Opera, circa 1996) I 1 1
The Next Best Thing (US Film, 2000) 1 1
The Object of My Affection (US Film, 1998) I 1 1
Will & Grace (US Sitcom, 1998 - 2006) | 1 2 3
'Celebrity1
Big Brother (generally) 1 1
Big Brother: Brian and Narinder 1 1
Big Brother: Dan and Nadia i 1
Big Brother: Richard and Nikki 1 1
Cilia Black + Dale Winton, Christopher Biggins, Paul 
O'Grady 2 2 4
David Gest* and Liza Minnelli 1 1
Elton John + Elizabeth Hurley, Geri Halliwell, Cilia Black 
or Princess Dianna 1 1 2
George Michael and Geri Halliwell 1 1 2
Joan Collins and Christopher Biggins 1 1
Kylie Minogue and Jake Shears 1 1
Madonna (generally) 1 1
Paul Burrell* and Princess Diana 1 1
Posh Spice and Elton John 1 1 2
Princess Margaret and various "walkers" 1 1
Rupert Everett and Madonna 1 1
N.B Dates refer to year of initial distribution, broadcast or printing. Where specific characters from 
long running series are named, dates refer to that particular story.
148
Figure 1: Number of reported 'fictional' representations of friendship by year.
go
IOf
4
^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  
Year
N.B. Dates refer to years o f original publication, performance or broadcast, although some films and 
programmes (e.g. Will & Grace) continue to be broadcast (as repeats) or are available for sale on 
DVD. Other programmes like Shameless continued production past 2006.
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The responses seemed to fit two categories: fiction and celebrity (also 
covering reality television). This is not an indication that one set of responses is seen 
to correspond more strongly with ‘reality’. None of the respondents claimed to know 
the celebrities personally so responses are presumably (reconstructions of media 
accounts (e.g. celebrity gossip magazines, websites, or televised coverage of Big 
Brother). From a discursive perspective this does not present a problem; rather it 
indicates the prevalence of the heterosexual woman / gay man discourse across a 
range of public figures.
In some instances (noted **’) men who identify themselves as heterosexual 
have been connected with Liza Minnelli and Princess Dianna (thus implicitly 
suggesting a gay identity). This perhaps speaks to the interest in celebrity gossip (see 
Chapter 5) and the respondents frame their replies as slightly mischievous, e.g. ‘Paul 
Burrell and Diana.. .oops no, he’s married isn’t he?’ (from Out Everywhere). It 
seems to indicate that marriage is not always constructed as guaranteeing 
heterosexuality and as Pullen (2009) discusses, there is a long history of gay male 
celebrities marrying women to obscure their sexuality (with varying degrees of 
success). In the case of Minnelli, a ‘gay icon’ herself (maybe doubly so for being 
Judy Garland’s daughter), there is perhaps a question about whether the identity of 
one party can be read as saying something about the sexual identity of another. There 
is perhaps an analogue with the courtesy stigma that heterosexual men with gay 
friends suffer (Sigelman et ah, 1991). Whereas heterosexual men who associate with 
gay men have their sexual identity brought into question, it seems here that there is a 
similar occurrence v/ith men who associate with (or in Gest’s case married) gay 
icons.
The ‘fictional’ category offered more possibilities for textual analysis since 
the majority of the examples were accessible in some form, thus permitting a 
discourse analysis of those representations. By contrast the majority of ‘celebrity’ 
examples were not so readily available in an analysable form. Firstly, they were not 
attached to a particular source and a trawl of celebrity gossip magazines (e.g. Heat) 
had little correspondence with the examples given and posed some difficulties in 
terms of back issue access. Internet gossip websites and email newsletters (e.g. 
Popbitch) offered an array of potentially defamatory claims about ‘closeted’ 
celebrities. However, what these sources lacked was a representation of friendship:
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linking two names is not the same as an account or story that can be subjected to 
discourse analysis. So whilst the list of celebrity examples indicated people could be 
positioned within this particular friendship discourse, the ‘fictional’ category 
appeared a richer vein for analysis.
The results suggested a strong preference for film and television sitcom with 
relatively few mentions of books or radio. This might be accounted for in terms of 
the relative memorability of a print article compared with a Hollywood film or 
television series, although audience size may be relevant, as may the tendency to 
repeat popular television programmes and their continued availability in DVD box 
sets, whereas newspapers and magazines may be discarded. Lastly, it may say 
something about what ‘media’ is understood to be. Hart (1991) emphasises the 
transmission of messages to large numbers of people as the defining feature, but 
some forms (i.e. those with moving pictures) may be more salient than others.
Notable exceptions to the dominance of film and television are Bridget 
Jones’s Diary by Helen Fielding, although this was adapted from a book into a film. 
Another less usual representation was A Taste o f Honey, a 1958 play by Shelagh 
Delaney (and film adaptation in 1961). Obviously this comes from a different point 
historically, and this is significant when you consider the Sexual Offences Act only 
partially decriminalised ‘homosexual acts’ in 1967. It is also quite different in tone to 
the other ‘fictional’ examples and fits in with the social realist movement in 
representing‘real’ working class people (Wickham, 2003).
Initially it was surprising that Will & Grace was not mentioned more 
frequently. The programme’s significance has been noted by scholars who 
acknowledge its critical and commercial success (e.g. Battles & Hilton-Morrow, 
2002; Cooper, 2003). Avoidance of repetition may be a factor as each discussion 
unfolded with participants adding new ideas and reflecting on their own experiences, 
so in this context simple repetition might be seen as inappropriate. This is a potential 
disadvantage of using a thread where previous responses are visible, rather than 
people answering an online questionnaire. We also lacked demographic information, 
although Out Everywhere indicates gender (25% of the respondents claimed to be 
female). Gender might be inferred from the Digital Spy online names but that 
requires some big assumptions about gender normative naming and ignores the 
possibility of people playing with identity online where gender swapping is not
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uncommon (Suler, 2004). It was also apparent from some user names that they were 
joint accounts (e.g. ‘Phil and John’) so it is hard to make assumptions about whether 
one person was answering or if their reply was collective.
Were we interested in measuring the relative prominence of these 
representations then these issues would be more problematic. However, the 
discussion format had considerable advantages as people collaborated in constructing 
a list with some ideas triggering others.
Another important consideration is that not all media examples carry the 
same weight. Some were minor sub-plots that existed briefly in long running series, 
whereas others were focused on heterosexual women and gay men in a sustained 
way. The usefulness of the data is not in the frequency with which representations 
were mentioned but the suggestion of a broad spread of culturally available 
representations. This suggested that knowledge of these friendships was quite 
widespread among users of both mixed and explicitly LGBT orientated websites. We 
might note that the respondents on the forums articulated no difficulty in 
understanding the representation we were seeking. Furthermore, no replies were 
contested as ‘wrong’ by other respondents, implying the discourse of gay men and 
heterosexual women’s friendships was commonly understood.
7.5 Sampling Media Representations
Given the potentially vast spread of media representations, a pragmatic 
decision had to be made about sampling. Although some representations were not 
available to us, or only partially accessible, there was still a considerable body of 
potential data. For example, a single mention of Roseanne corresponds with 222 
episodes. Even if we randomly sampled a few it would be possible to entirely miss . 
the representation since the gay friend was not a principle character, so a more 
purposeful sampling strategy was devised. Prominence of the friendship within the 
media form was considered as indicating potentially richer data. On this basis Will & 
Grace and Gimme, Gimme, Gimme were prioritised because their principal 
characters are pairs of heterosexual women and gay men. This still represented a 
very large body of data (194 episodes of Will & Grace constitute nearly 72 hours of 
coverage) so episode guides were used to help identify particular narratives focusing
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explicitly on friendship and these episodes were identified for analysis. To help 
ensure this selection process did not unintentionally exclude other themes, a further 
six episodes were randomly sampled and transcriptions produced.
7.6 The Sitcom Genre
Although, a primary focus on two sitcoms excludes other representations, it 
also permitted an analysis that focuses on a more homogeneous body of data. 
Television comedy suffers from being overlooked in comparison with its cinematic 
equivalent, frequently being written off as ‘only sitcom’ (Mills, 2005: 3). Perhaps it 
is the relatively cheap production or the large number of episodes that implies a lack 
of quality (especially in the US where one series may contain over twenty episodes, 
compared with typically six in the UK). Whatever the reason, it is often assumed 
sitcoms have little to say about culture and society because their main purpose is to 
be funny. Yet sitcoms are always engaged in representation and generally rely on 
representations that are easily understood by large groups of people (Mills). 
Consequently sitcoms are heavily reliant on normalised social conventions. These 
have sometimes been controversial when those representations legitimise 
problematic or oppressive discourses (Spangler, 2003).
Sitcom can overlap with other genres such as comedy drama and the sketch 
show. However key elements are recurrent characters within the same premise (i.e. 
the ‘situation’) and the normally audible presence of a live audience (Mintz, 1985). 
Unlike soap operas, sitcoms tend to operate with few concurrent plot-lines and, 
rather than continually deferring narrative resolution, episodes are generally self- 
contained. Consequently an isolated episode of Will & Grace is arguably more 
comprehensible than a single episode of Eastenders.
Although the genre owes much to theatre, it first emerged in its modem form 
on the radio. Like the soap operas the transition from radio to television took place 
during the 1950s. Unlike soaps which almost universally had domestic settings,. 
sitcoms were more frequently located in work environments (e.g. The Phil Silvers 
Show was set in a US Army post) (Mills, 2005). Although the characters and settings 
of sitcoms are diverse, the basic structure of the plot is familiar:
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‘Domestic harmony is threatened when a character develops a desire 
that runs counter to the group’s welfare, or misunderstands a situation 
because of poor communication, or contacts a disruptive outside 
element. The voice of the group [...] tries to restore harmony but fails.
The dissenter grabs at an easy, often unilateral solution. The solution 
fails, and the dissenter must surrender to the group for rescue. The 
problem turns out to be not very serious after all, once everyone 
remembers to communicate and surrender his or her selfish goals [...] 
Everyone, including the dissenter, is happier than at the outset.’
Jones (1992: 3-4)
This very simple narrative structure is open to almost endless reinterpretation. 
Unlike some forms of storytelling, the sitcom plot is not necessarily the most 
important aspect of each episode. Jokes and set piece, comedic exchanges (e.g. the 
witty banter between Will & Grace) could stand alone (Mills, 2005). Conversely the 
story, when stripped back to the bare narrative need not be that compelling.
Therefore it can be understood as a framework which allows the rest (e.g. jokes) to 
take place. Furthermore the emphasis on jokes means that the narrative as a whole 
and the individual comic elements are not necessarily congruent. Mills argues that in 
The Simpsons many jokes focus on Homer’s selfishness and lack of concern for his 
wife Marge, yet the storylines frequently show him caring for his wife. One might 
attribute this variability to the large number of episodes and teams of writers used for 
long-running American programmes. However the apparent inconsistency is best 
explored by reading the jokes and the narrative in a multifaceted way, rather than 
attempting to prioritise one over the other in order to determine a ‘true’ meaning. 
Similar seeming contradictions are present in many sitcoms and so it is necessary to 
attend to alternative readings where appropriate to the data.
7.7 Media Discourses and Representation
'
The issue of variability in sitcoms (described above) shares some 
commonalities with the discourse analysis of interview data in preceding chapters. In 
both cases there is no expectation that objective ‘truth’ be directly accessible. 
Therefore rather than regarding conflicting discourses as contradictory they can 
sometimes help identify ideological dilemmas and processes of resistance (Willig, 
1999).
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It might be tempting to regard the interview data as somehow more real and 
less artificially constructed (certainly not by a team of writers and script editors). 
However this fails to recognise the ways in which interviewees were engaged in co­
construction and furthermore mistakes the analytic focus as being on the person(s) 
rather than discourse(s). While it may be contended that, unlike the interviewees, 
characters like Will and Grace are not ‘real’ it is the discourse that speaks them 
which forms the object of analysis. Consequently analysis of sitcoms or other media 
formats need not mean an epistemological shift.
Discourse analysis is most commonly applied to speech and written text; 
however ‘discourse may be studied wherever there is meaning’ (Parker, 1999: 1). In 
the case of television and film, the decision was made to focus on transcriptions of 
the spoken word and minimal stage directions (enough to make sense of spoken 
words, but not generally descriptive). Although scholars in disciplines like media 
studies would doubtless interpret much of the visual material on screen, the emphasis 
here is on discourse as spoken utterances.
One major difference between media discourse and that which occurs in 
interviews is the extent to which the former is considered public and in some way 
influential. One of the most important theories of the relationship between media and 
audience was the so-called hypodermic syringe model (sometimes attributed to 
Packard, 1957) which described the influence of film and television on society. This 
model conceptualised the viewer as the entirely passive recipient of media ideology. 
In the 1960s the idea that television and film might be socially harmful strongly 
influenced religious groups like Mary Whitehouse’s National Viewers’ and 
Listeners’ Association and some anti-pornography feminists (Dyer, 1987).
It is perhaps significant that although the story of representation tends to 
suggest blanket invisibility of minorities there have been notable exceptions. The 
first US family sitcom was The Rise o f the Goldbergs (starting on the radio in 1929 
and moving to television in 1949) which centred on the character of Molly, a Jewish 
mother (Antler, 2007). Despite the anti-Semitism rife during that period, Molly 
Goldberg was a significant success indicating that occasionally a popular programme 
can represent identities that would otherwise be ignored or disliked.
More recently the theoretical relationship between audience and media has 
been reconceptualised. No longer was the media seen as injecting its values into a
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compliant audience but instead there was seen to be a bidirectional relationship 
between media and society with them (re)presenting each other (Gauntlett, 1999). 
There is some evidence of this going on with the interviewees who talked about Will 
& Grace, if only to reject elements of the representation. However television reflects 
society selectively rather than in totality (Russell, 1999). Even where minority groups 
are represented, questions must be asked about who it is that represents a particular 
population and whether they in turn conceal other identities. Despite television being 
increasingly diverse in whom it includes, those representations can reflect a society 
as we might like it to be rather than as it is experienced.
7 .8 ‘Will & Grace’
Given the frequency with which Will & Grace is cited by interviewees, 
internet respondents and in scholarship on gay representation, it has been taken to be 
the prime media representation of gay men and heterosexual women. This may be 
because the gay/straight alliance is pivotal to the programme whereas other media 
forms approach the issue tangentially or as part of a larger mix of characters (e.g. the 
soap operas). The timing of the programme may also add to its memorability since it 
began on NBC in 1998 and continued production until 2006. In the UK it was 
initially shown by Channel 4 with frequent repeats on both this channel and Living : 
TV. Furthermore the programme was subject to considerable media analysis and 
debate when it debuted, further raising its profile.
The series spans eight seasons, totalling 194 episodes. It has received Emmy 
Awards for Outstanding Comedy Series, Outstanding Supporting Actress and 
Outstanding Supporting Actor. (Arguably this reveals the sense in which the 
supporting characters, Karen and Jack, eclipse the title characters.) The series 
occupied a comedy slot (both in the US and the UK) associated with shows like 
Friends and Frasier and has arguably been one of the most popular gay-themed 
television shows of all time (Cooper, 2003). This was particularly notable in America 
where many liberal commentators were surprised that a show treating homosexuality 
and heterosexuality as morally equivalent (Kaveny, 2002) was not criticised by right- 
wing Christian groups or boycotted by advertisers (Cooper).
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Will & Grace is set in New York featuring Will Truman, a white gay lawyer, 
and Grace Adler, a heterosexual white Jewish interior designer. Much of the 
programme takes place within an apartment they share on the affluent Upper West 
Side of Manhattan. The sitcom reveals some of their prior history, most notably that 
they dated (and were engaged to be married) prior to Will ‘coming out’. After a year 
they were reconciled and became best friends. Mirroring this relationship is the 
friendship between gay (generally out of work) actor/performer Jack McFarland and 
rich heterosexual Karen Walker who ostensibly works for Grace. Although 
notionally supporting characters, Jack and Karen are more comedic and positioned as 
more excessive and flamboyant. While Grace and Will are shown to agonise over 
moral dilemmas, Karen and Jack completely disregard such issues and the format 
allows them to act insensitively with apparent impunity.
Cooper (2003) reports a study indicating that heterosexual viewers found 
Jack the funniest character (49.2%), closely followed by Karen (30%), and another 
8.5% seeing ihom  collectively as the funniest character. In contrast only Will (6.9%) 
and Grace (5.4%) were seldom rated as the funniest characters. This indicates an 
asymmetry in where the comedic value is perceived; but despite finding Jack the 
most amusing, viewers regarded him as the ‘frequent butt of humor (sic)’ (p. 525) 
and when asked who they would prefer to be friends with, Will (70%) was preferred 
over Jack (26%).
The apparent success of Will & Grace came in marked contrast to the 
originally successful Ellen which declined in ratings after the title character ‘came 
out’ as lesbian (Mills, 2005). Commentary focused on whether Will & Grace had 
finally broken into the mainstream and made gay characters acceptable. ‘How on 
earth did Will and Grace, a sitcom with such overtly gay characters, manage to win 
over middle America?’ asked Smith (2003: 18). More critical voices noted that a 
particular version of gay identity was at work and hinted that this was implicated in 
the show’s apparent acceptability:
'Will and Grace are friend and flatmates, and Will is gay. That's gay as
in sensitive, caring, in touch with his emotions, not as in KY1.'
(Watson, 2001:1|6)
This ‘neutered’ (Smith, 2003:18) version of the gay man arguably led to Will 
& Grace’s mass appeal. Mills (2005) suggests the show is visually very conventional
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and that this provides a level of assurance. Unlike other ‘modem’ sitcoms like Scrubs 
it is clearly set in a television studio in front of an audience. The brilliantly lit scenes 
eschew wobbly vérité handheld cameras for smooth conventional framing and 
continuity editing. Consequently Will & Grace is not a naturalistic depiction of 
friendship but a stylised account that falls firmly within the conventions of the sitcom 
genre.
Despite criticism for being so conventional, Will & Grace occasionally 
landed a political punch. During the second series Will and Jack protested about a 
TV station not showing a same-sex kiss on screen, thus referencing their own 
constricted status on NBC. Furthermore the show attracted many guest stars (e.g. 
Cher, Joan Collins, Sandra Bernhard, Madonna, Matt Damon and Ellen DeGeneres) 
that lend the programme status through their association and play to a gay audience. 
Consequently it can convincingly be argued either that Will & Grace sanitises gay 
identity stripping it of its sexuality, or that by first winning over a mainstream 
audience it ultimately brought gay issues into the open. In this respect it echoes some 
of the debates between liberal politics (wishing to be accommodated within the status 
quo) and a more radical critique of gender politics that rejects the legitimacy of the 
mainstream (See Chapter 2).
7.9 Analysis
Analysis of the sampled media sources produced many themes that 
potentially merited further analysis. For example, Will & Grace and Gimme, Gimme, 
Gimme were rich in examples of materialism, references to aesthetics, fashion and 
popular (gay) culture. Sharing of gossip and articulation of gay vs. heterosexual 
norms were also identifiable threads in the data set. Connections between thematic 
areas were in some cases discernible, e.g. one of the ways normative gay identity was 
constructed was through discourse about fashion, clothing and appearance. This 
seemed to echo elements of the interview based research and its prevalence indicated 
a fruitful area for further analysis. Whilst wishing to connect the media 
representations with interviewees’ constructions, an important aim of this second 
study was to consider where discourses might diverge and whether certain culturally 
available ways of constructing these friendships were missing from the interviews. In
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the latter case there were more potentially heterosexist and explicitly sexist discourse 
within the media analysed than was evidenced in the interview data.
It might be tempting simply to construct the interviewees as politically more 
progressive. Another possibility (whilst noting that discourse analysis attempts to be 
agnostic about intentionality, Edwards & Potter, 1992) is the demand characteristics 
of interviews, where the implicit goal is a coherent and agreed account of friendship. 
By contrast, media forms like sitcoms require conflict to produce drama and comedy 
(Mills, 2005). However, even were we to accept these propositions a more useful and 
theoretically engaging analysis might look at the positions made available by the 
media and consider the political implications for heterosexual women and gay men. 
The following analysis will focus on the production of gay subjectivity using an 
episode where Will and Grace attempt to discern the sexual identity of a man they 
are mutually sexually interested in. This narrative structure produced a series of 
accounts that will be subjected to analysis.
In Yours, Mine or Ours both Will and Grace independently meet an attractive 
but sexually ambiguous man (Peter) who is moving into their apartment building. In 
separate encounters Peter invites each of them to his apartment for what appears to 
be a dinner date. Thus in the sitcom tradition (Mills, 2005), this narrative set up 
allows a series of misunderstandings or ambiguities to follow. Firstly, in an instance 
of dramatic irony (Abrams, 1985) neither Grace nor Will know their ‘dates’ are to be 
with the same person:
Extract 2
WILL :
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
No time to talk (.) there's something I have to 
do. What was it again? Oh yeah (.) a date (.) I 
have a date.
Oh my God (.) you have a date? I'm so excited 
I want to hear all about him (.) but not now 
because (.) I have a date too.
No -
Yes
No
Yes
We have a date.
Will has just entered and pre-emptively dismisses anything Grace might say 
(‘no time to talk’). The vagueness of having ‘something’ to do (‘what was it again?’)
might be read as playful because it implies the date is temporarily forgettable. He 
toys with Grace by momentarily withholding the information and his casual 
construction is juxtaposed against the date as a dramatic event (note the emphasis on 
the word ‘date’ and repetition, ‘I have a date’). Grace takes this up as an exciting 
event (‘Oh my God’) and goes on to articulate her enthusiasm (‘I’m so excited’). 
Despite asking to ‘hear all about him [Will’s date]’ she mirrors his earlier manoeuvre 
and pre-emptively cuts off any description in order to announce ‘I have a date too.’ 
This is a rather fateful conversation because were they to talk more then it might 
emerge their ‘dates’ were both with Peter. However they continue articulating 
surprise and excitement in a repeated no/yes exchange. Will then summarises by 
saying ‘We have a date’ after which they dance in apparent celebration. However, 
Will’s slightly unusual articulation, pairing the first person plural ‘we’ against the 
singular ‘a date’ is funny because he unwittingly describes the events to follow; they 
have ‘a date’ not plural dates. Again, this is part of the dramatic irony, where an 
audience would have knowledge (from previous scenes) that the characters have yet 
to piece together. However, ‘we have a date’ also connotes their connectedness 
which is further reinforced as they rapidly prepare for their date, swap advice on 
clothing and mirror each other’s speech patterns.
Extract 3
t ■ .
Ok. (.) I'm taking the Merlot Jack stole 
from the restaurant after they fired him 
for stealing the Cabernet.
Grab me one.
Grab my shoe.
How do we look?
I 'd sit with u s .
Me too.
After agreeing on how to dress Grace deems it socially appropriate to take a 
bottle of wine to her date and Will asks her to ‘grab me one’ meaning that at this 
point they both have identical bottles of wine (‘Merlot’) to give to their date. 
Although the scene shows hasty preparation and Will’s use of the word ‘grab’ 
implies urgency the matching bottles of wine can be seen as again constructing their 
similarity.
GRACE:
WILL : 
GRACE: 
WILL: 
GRACE:
WILL:
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One issue that perhaps should not be overlooked is Grace’s account of the 
wine’s provenance, i.e. stolen by Jack from a restaurant ‘after they fired him for 
stealing the Cabernet’. Whilst this provides a plausible account of why they have 
multiple bottles of apparently good wine readily accessible in the apartment, it is also 
a small but not insignificant moment where Jack is positioned as unprofessional or 
lacking morals. Furthermore he is constructed as incapable or unwilling to learn, 
change or develop since he repeats the crime by stealing more wine. Perhaps the 
character could rationalise the decision as revenge for being dismissed or as having 
nothing to lose, but it is one of many examples where Jack is infantilised or 
constructed as a childish character. This is not treated problematically within the 
programme and neither Grace nor Will articulate any moral qualms about taking the 
stolen wine.
The scene continues to emphasise their similarity with a return to the first 
person plural in ‘How do we look?’ This in isolation might be read as concern rather 
than a more self-interested ‘How do /  look?’ Yet there are many alternative 
articulations that would achieve this effect, for example ‘How do we both look?’ 
accomplishes concern for the other whilst keeping their identities separate. 
Furthermore, Grace’s tautological response T d  sit with us’ and Will’s agreement 
further underscores their similarity and potentially coupled positioning.
The initial misunderstanding is uncovered when they leave for their ‘date’ 
and almost immediately end up outside the same apartment door. This is immediately 
read by both of them as meaning they are now in competition for the same man (the 
possibility of more than one occupant does not arise). As they Peter welcomes them 
in they present the wine:
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Extract 4
PETER: Ohî Oh (.) a "1985 Merlot" always an
excellent choice (.) and a (.) uh (.)
"1985 Merlot" still an excellent choice. 
Come on in. So (.) clearly y o u .two know 
each other?
WILL: Sort of (.) we're uh (.) we live together.
GRACE : As roommates.
WILL: In a two bedroom.
GRACE : In two beds (.) in separate rooms.
PETER: It's ok (.) I get it. You're married. (.)
Just kidding.
((They laugh))
WILL : Yeah (.) married.
In this exchange the first Merlot is received and pronounced to be ‘an 
excellent choice’. Having commented on one bottle, failure to similarly note and 
praise the other bottle might be a perceived snub. The hesitation before Peter reads 
the (presumably identical) label seems to indicate the potential difficulty this poses in 
receiving two identical gifts. He points to its obvious parity by declaring it ‘still an 
excellent choice’. There is some humour in the word ‘still’ (as in unchanging) in the 
context of vintage wine (probably about fourteen years old, if we are to assume the 
world of Will & Grace is contemporaneous to its point of original transmission) since 
the wine has presumably not further matured or deteriorated in the few seconds since. 
he received the first bottle.
Peter constructs his assumption that Grace and Will already know one 
another as reasonably following from the identical wine (‘clearly you two know each 
other?’). This is phrased as a question and Will responds to it as such, ‘Sort of (.) 
we’re uh (.) we live together’. Although ‘Sort o f  seems to rather understate their 
level of knowing each other: even taken on its own this episode establishes their 
knowledge of each other in terms of common reference points, speaking in unison 
and anticipating the end of each other’s sentences. However ‘Sort o f  followed by- 
hesitation and an aborted attempt at explanation ‘We’re uh (.) we live together’ 
suggests the difficulties surrounding this speech act. Will starts a construction based 
around them (‘We’re uh’) and fails to follow through with a description of their 
relationship, choosing instead a construction based on their cohabitation (‘we live 
together’).
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Living together is immediately problematic for Grace who clarifies ‘As 
roommates’. Will adds to the non-sexual account of their friendship further by 
adding ‘In a two bedroom’. Finally Grace emphasises ‘In two beds, in separate 
rooms’ thus closing down any possibility that they might be mistaken for a 
heterosexual couple. This escalating account of legitimately asexual cohabitation is 
reminiscent of Cerys and Rob’s account of sharing a hotel room (see Chapter 4). 
However, rather than (potentially) toying with confusion and disclosure, Grace and 
Will fight to articulate their sexual uninvolvement -  thus implicitly jockeying to 
position themselves as available to Peter.
The response to this account is ‘It's ok (.) I get it. You're married’. Within the 
series there is a recurring joke about referring to Will and Grace as married. Here it 
seems to invert expectations by suggesting that marriage may lack intimacy and 
sexual passion. By problematising marriage, rather than idealising it, we might 
consider the joke quite progressive. However, as a recurring gag (even within this 
episode, as will be shown in the next extract) the notion of Will and Grace being 
married is a dominant motif throughout the series. Although playful, it hints at the 
difficulties in explaining non-heterosexual forms of cohabitation (which extends 
beyond heterosexual women and gay men). However, their female and male 
identities and the presumption of heterosexuality (unless specified otherwise) 
produce discursively difficult situations. In this instance the construction of their 
relationship in terms of not sharing bed space does not specifically articulate 
anything about their sexual identities. Furthermore certain utterances have double 
meanings, such as Peter’s comment about his new apartment being so messy that 
they ‘wouldn’t want to see the bedroom’. Grace and Will reply in unison ‘Maybe 
later’, a shared sexual reference unacknowledged by Peter.
The issue of knowledge and sexual identity is central to this final extract:
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Extract 5
Will (.) come on h e ’s perfect for me.
Except for one little problem (.) he's 
perfect for me.
I need this more than you.
Oh îplease (.) you've had plenty of dips in 
the love pool. I'm still in the cabana trying, 
out floaties. ((Will picks up phone))
Ok. (.) Give me the tphone ((Grace grabs the 
phone from Will))
Get (.) give me tthat.
No no no no no tno.
Give it to me.
Put it in my hand.
((Jack enters and observes Grace and Will on top of each
other on the sofa))
WILL: Give me a hand with it (or I'm dead).
GRACE: Ow (.) you're hurting me with fit
WILL: You're going to fbreak it
JACK: Will (.) I told you (.) you live with a hetero
long enough you're going to catch it.
WILL: Fine (.) you want him so bad (.) you can have
him. Even though he's gay.
GRACE : He is not gay.
JACK: What's this? A question of sexual orientation?
The doctor is in.
GRACE: Oh Jack.
WILL : No (.) Jack has the most finely tuned gaydar
in the tri-state area.
JACK: Do do do do do do îding.
((Jack points at Will))
WILL: He can name a gay guy in one note.
JACK: Ah (.) yes. Many have sought my counsel on
this subject. They say (.) "Jack is a wise man. 
Jack is a dangerous man. Jack is a great man." 
No (.) Jack is just a man. A man who knows men 
who like m e n . Bring to me the facts.
WILL : In his bathroom he had 3 magazines (.) and one
of them was Martha Stewart's Living.
GRACE: He also had Basketball Digest.
JACK: A : :h you both make compelling points (.) but I
believe the truth is to be found in the third 
magazine.
GRACE : [Vanity Fair]
WILL: [Vanity Fair]
JACK: Unless it's Vanity Fair.
GRACE: You're right Will. He is good.
JACK: Now (.) there is one question you can ask that
will reveal the truth. I hesitate to share this 
secret with you (.)for it has awesome power.
GRACE : What would that question be?
JACK: (.) Are (.) you (.) gay?
WILL: Thank.you(.) Homo Wan Kenobi.
Initially Grace and Will are arguing over whom Peter is more ‘perfect’ (i.e. 
romantically suitable) for. This quickly shifts from a compatibility discourse into
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
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‘need’ and fairness; with Will claiming Grace has previously had more romantic 
opportunities: ‘you've had plenty of dips in the love pool. I'm still in the cabana 
trying out floaties’. A cabana is a beach hut (i.e. on land, as opposed to ‘in the love 
pool’) and ‘floaties’ are polystyrene blocks to aid inexperienced swimmers (often 
children). This positions Grace as being further advanced romantically compared 
with Will’s apparently fewer experiences. It also resonates with the critique that the 
programme generally presents Will in rather asexual terms, having fewer romances 
than Grace and significant relationships being kept off screen (Quimby, 2005; Smith, 
2003).,
The friends begin fighting over possession of the telephone, presumably in 
order to call Peter. This leads to an argument and physical struggle that is slightly 
difficult to present textually. However, the most important element is that they 
become physically entwined on the sofa at a point when Jack enters (characters 
walking in at inopportune moments leading to misunderstanding is a stock device in 
sitcom, Mills, 2005). This is accompanied by Grace’s exclamation ‘you're hurting me 
with t i t’ a sexual double meaning that Jack playfully responds to as having 
connotations of heterosexual activity (the ‘it’ being heard as phallic). From a 
comedic perspective this heterosexual positioning is anticipated prior to Jack’s
arrival with Will yelling ‘Give it to me’ and Grace replying ‘Put it in my hand’ both
. s
of which have clear sexual suggestions. Jack reverses the pathological discourse of 
homosexuality suggesting that if ‘you live with a hetero long enough you're going to 
catch it [heterosexuality]’. It humorously parodies the idea of sexuality being 
contagious but resonates with a long history of exposure to homosexuals being 
regarded as potentially dangerous. (In the UK, a famous example would have been 
implementation of the infamous ‘Section 28’ of the 1988 Local Government Act that 
prohibited the promotion of homosexuality.). So it responds to, and inverts, the 
notion of sexuality being contagious. While the construction of catching 
heterosexuality is absurd, it seems to be parodied from a position that assumes an 
original predetermined sexuality. Bisexuality or indeed a more flexible notion of 
sexual desire shifting or not always corresponding directly with sexual identity is not 
considered. So the joke is progressive to the extent it parodies homophobic 
discourses of contagion and by connecting heterosexuality with a virus challenges its 
status. The reversal queries the basic assumption that heterosexuality is preferable
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and recalls Sedgwick’s provocatively titled ‘How to Bring Your Kids up Gay’
(1991). It suggests a step beyond liberal acceptance and directly challenges the 
preference for heterosexuality.
, Although individual instances like this suggest a radical element within Will 
& Grace that sometimes goes beyond accepting gay identity and challenges the 
presumption of (and preference for) heterosexuality, it is important to recall that 
sitcoms can be ideologically contradictory. As previously mentioned, Mills (2005) 
showed the disparity between Homer Simpson’s set piece instances of insensitivity 
towards his wife, Marge, whilst the broader narrative might be about his devotion to 
her. Will & Grace suffers a similar complication because there is an argument for 
reading Jack’s utterance as being very radical and progressive for a US sitcom. Yet 
the continued positioning of Grace and Will as pseudo-married occurs in most of the 
episodes sampled. This repetition makes it hard to entirely dismiss the motif of 
potential or un-actualised heterosexuality.
In the latter part of the extract ‘sexual orientation’ is treated as an object of 
knowledge with Jack as the expert with ‘the most finely tuned gaydar in the tri-state 
area’. The attribution of expert status is made more specific by reference to ‘the tri­
state area’ (New York, New Jersey and Connecticut) which implies Jack’s ‘gaydar’ 
has been independently verified for accuracy. Jack then mimics a radar or detector by 
making an electronic sounding series of noises that rise in pitch as he points to Will, 
‘Do do do do do do t ding’. Although playful, it constructs the identification of 
‘sexual orientation’ in (pseudo) scientific terms. Furthermore the magazines 
construct an account of the interests gay and heterosexual men should have, 
respectively ‘Martha Stewart's Living’ vs. ‘Basketball Digest’ with ‘Vanity Fair’ 
apparently not counting due to its (presumed) broad appeal. Jack continues the 
parody of his expertise by talking up the ‘awesome power’ of his ‘secret’ question 
that ‘will reveal the truth’, which turns out to be asking directly. By spelling it out 
word by word ‘(.) Are (.) you (.) gay?’ he mocks the absurdity of the convoluted 
methods of discerning sexual identity. Yet later on when he finally meets Peter he 
immediately whispers to Will, T know’ and exits, thus suggesting he is able to 
effortlessly read sexuality in ways Grace and Will cannot. When Will eventually asks 
Peter directly ‘which one of us you’re dating’, Peter replies ‘Who said anything 
about dating? I thought we were friends’. Thus the object of misunderstanding is not
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Peter’s sexuality which remains ambiguous (except to Jack) but the contested 
construction of their relationships (‘dating’ vs ‘friends’).
7.10 Conclusion
More than any other episode sampled, Yours Mine or Ours seems to 
explicitly focus on representing sexual identity, both in terms of how Grace and Will 
go about articulating their non-sexual relationship (and consequential availability to 
Peter) and the issue of Peter’s identity. Although the episode plays with ambiguity 
and Grace, Will and audience are left unknowing, it leaves little space for bisexuality 
having constructed the entire episode around a gay/hetero dichotomy. The 
construction of sexuality is also relatively static and appears to be an object of 
knowledge that can be read by Jack. The implication of the magazines seems to be 
that heterosexual and gay men have divergent interests (sports vs. household), again 
reinforcing the sexual categories as rigid. Conversely Jack teasing Will about 
catching heterosexuality can be read as parody rather than a serious suggestion, but it 
is part of an insistent positioning of Grace and Will as pseudo-married. There is 
considerable criticism of Will as a neutered gay man (Quimby, 2005; Smith, 2003) 
whose pseudo-marriage to Grace is seen to be heteronormative (Battles & Hilton- 
Morrow, 2002). However by refusing the potential for desire to exist between them 
do we buy into an immutable version of fixed sexuality?
Kaveny (2002) reads Will & Grace as a reference to St Augustine (354 - 430) 
who conceptualised human qualities and failings in terms of ‘will’ and ‘grace’. She 
argues that like Augustine, Will & Grace takes quite a dark view of sexuality and 
acknowledges that individuals might not have much control over their desires.
‘we [do not] always fall in love with Mr. Right. And Mr. Right doesn’t 
always fall in love with us. And even if we do fall in love it may not 
last forever. Or maybe he’s gay.’
(Kaveny, 2002: 10).
Kaveny concludes that it would be ‘better all around if Will could focus his 
sexual energies on Grace: it would be better all around if Grace could let go of Will 
[...]. Neither, however, is going to happen.’ (11). Consequently Kaveny thinks of 
Will & Grace as tragedy (albeit glossily masked by quick witted humour) because
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they make the error of wanting to combine their lover and best friend in one person. 
The apparent ‘mistake’ of mixing friends and lovers is of course underscored when 
Peter refuses to engage with the gay/hetero dichotomy and attends instead to the 
friend/lover distinction, a binary recognised by Burr and Butt (1992).
Battles and Hilton-Morrow (2002) argue that Will & Grace is simply a 
modem version of the delayed consummation trope. Originating from classical 
Hollywood and its reluctance to acknowledge pre-marital sex, films (and later 
sitcoms) often centred on the comedic potential of a man wanting sex and a woman 
wanting marriage. In this instance Battles and Hilton-Morrow argue that Will and 
Grace are potential lovers separated by sexual orientation and this perhaps explains 
why Will & Grace is oddly akin to a heterosexual romantic comedy. Although 
specific jokes are shown to invert norms and parody heteronormativity, the recurrent 
positioning of Grace and Will as married limits the more radical potential of the 
programme because it repeatedly suggests the normative mould for emotionally close 
women and men is heterosexuality rather than (asexual) friendship.
1 ‘KY’ or K-Y Jelly is used as a water-based sexual lubricant.
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Chapter 8
Media (Re)presentations Part Two
8.1 Sexism and Gay Men
The previous chapter made the case for public awareness of a discourse of 
friendship between heterosexual women and gay men and its widespread 
representation within the media. It argued that representations of gay men are more 
prevalent and potentially more positive than in decades gone by. However, it noted 
literature variously praising Will & Grace as ground breaking or insufficiently 
radical. Analysis of selected episodes showed a consistent effeminisation of gay 
characters and positioning of the principal characters as a pseudo heterosexual 
couple.
With the last chapter focusing on gay identity, this leaves a major unanswered 
question about how women fit into the equation. Scholarly interest in Will & Grace 
(et cetera) as gay shows has tended to focus on gay representation, rather than upon . 
women. Admittedly there is a more general body of literature about female 
representation in the media (discussed later in the chapter), but the same could be 
said for gay men with whole books being dedicated to the subject (e.g. Pullen, 2009). 
However, by focusing on whether Will & Grace is sufficiently radical in gay terms 
there seems to be a yawning gap when it comes to female representation. This 
implicitly treats the issue as unproblematic and replicates the discourse of ‘natural’ 
affiliation between heterosexual women and gay men. As outlined in Chapter Two, a 
simplistic claim that gay men are women’s political allies is a very dubious one 
(Jeffreys, 1991, 2005). Gay representation seems to be privileged, with an implicit 
assumption that what is politically expedient or transformative for men is similarly 
liberatory for women.
This chapter considers the history of female representation in the media 
(specifically television), noting both the historical absence of women from the screen 
and continued lack of visibility in some traditionally male domains (e.g. sport). It 
also considers women’s representation not merely in terms of screen presence, but 
whether they are positioned as active agents and the extent to which different media 
construct ‘female issues’. Against this troublesome history (and contemporary
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limitations on women’s representation) a detailed analysis of the positioning of 
women in Will & Grace is presented that focuses specifically on sustained analysis 
of two episodes and a range of vignettes.
8.2 The (Re)presentation of Women
One area of scholarship that necessarily precedes further analysis is a brief 
consideration of the representation of women on screen. The first thing to note is 
simply from a content point of view (defined by screen presence or speaking role) 
women have been greatly marginalised throughout the history of film and television. 
Gauntlett (2008) reviews several content analyses during the 1950-70 period and 
concludes that only 20 to 35% of speakers on television were female. (It should be 
noted these data apply to the USA, but Gauntlett suggests a similar pattern in the 
UK.) This version of events slightly conflicts with Dyer1 (1987) who notes a shift 
towards women’s issues which she attributes to the 1960s women’s movement and 
greater demand for representation on television. This resulted in more documentaries 
and discussion about infertility, cervical cancer and rape. (Whilst I do not query the 
importance of all three examples of ‘female issues’, they potentially construct a 
particularly negative and limited picture of femininity.) The growing social realism 
movement (spanning film and television) increasingly gave women not just lager 
roles, but resonated more strongly with female viewers. Although the ‘kitchen sink 
dramas’ tended to position women in domestic settings in a way that now seems 
more problematic, seen from a contemporary perspective in many cases they seemed 
to represent women in a ‘realistic’ way.
Broadcasters became increasingly aware of women as a demographic who 
were significant consumers (Lury, 1996; discussed in Chapter Five). Dyer (1987) 
connected this with a desire to take women more seriously, which was also attributed 
to the increasing numbers of women working for broadcasters (and so especially 
relevant to broadcasters like the BBC who are not funded by advertising). However, 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s there was increased focus on women as a 
specific group who advertisers and programme makers alike could target. Indeed the 
name ‘soap opera’ is well-known to derive from the washing soap companies who 
sponsored or advertised around these programmes (Hart, 1991). Dyer argues that this
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made the soap opera the first female genre, noting that the short scenes and 
overlapping narratives accommodated a viewer who was frequently distracted by 
housework or young children. However, it is also obvious that it constructed a 
domesticated female audience. This was further reinforced by women’s 
programming being predominantly daytime based, with the implicit "assumption of 
the compulsorily heterosexual married woman at home, while the husband worked 
for money.
For Dyer (1987: 6) the importance of television to feminists of the 1960s was 
that ‘of all the media, [television] seems to offer the most ‘real’ images’. By this 
point it was becoming very accessible to the general population. It also appeared live 
(and indeed often was owing to the technical limitations of the time) so had some 
degree of correspondence with ‘real time’. We might understand Dyer meant things 
like dialogue would take place at ‘real life’ speaking pace, whereas there is less 
conformity with ‘real time’ when reading. The point of this is not to suggest that 
television is more real than other formats, but the combination of accessibility (in the 
home) and the appearance of reality made it socially very powerful. ‘Pictures [...] 
are more imperative than writing, they impose meaning at one stroke without . 
analysing or diluting it’ (Barthes, 1993: 110). But of course that meaning comes from 
a series of decisions, consciously or otherwise, made during production (e.g. 
technical, expressive or artistic) (Hart, 1991). Barthes’s (1989: 141) ‘reality effect’ 
proposed that certain codes and conventions are interpreted by an audience as 
signifying everyday reality leading the audience to naturalise rather than see it as a 
construct. If we accept this idea that television is interpreted relatively uncritically, 
then the political stakes were (and are) considerable. Marginalisation of women 
ceases to be a matter of fairness at employment level and a wider concern in terms of 
the positions made available to a wider audience.
Although general equality on screen presence was not achieved, within 
certain genres of film and television women were better represented numerically (if 
not always ideologically). Gauntlett (2008) notes that sitcoms, in particular, had 
greater female representation even though women tended to occupy subordinate 
roles. My tentative explanation for the greater presence of women in this genre 
would be that sitcoms are frequently domestic (see Chapter 7) and consequently 
many of these programmes would have been about a heterosexual nuclear family -
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therefore the inclusion of women is part of that norm. However Dyer (1987) 
cautiously welcomed the more significant female roles in programmes like Cagney 
and Lacey that combined elements of women’s liberation with the sensibilities and 
conventions of a Hollywood ‘buddy movie’. This explicitly removed the protagonists 
from a purely domestic realm and positioned them as the active agents moving the 
narrative forward.
In terms of film, Gauntlett (2008) uses the Bond series as a ‘litmus test’ since 
they span over 40 years, but essentially retain the same structure. Despite being re­
cast many times, Bond himself is not seen to change much. If anything, the new 
‘harder’ (p. 53) version portrayed by Daniel Craig is tougher and more masculine 
than previous Bonds. However the agency of the female characters has shifted 
dramatically. Gauntlett notes that they become increasingly resourceful and 
physically more powerful (e.g. Grace Jones and Michelle Yeoh). The films may be 
deeply problematic in their casual violence and use of women as sex objects, but my 
reading of Gauntlett is that women become increasingly agentic and thus important 
to narrative development, rather than standing around passively or requiring constant 
rescuing.
Other critics raise questions about whether agency alone is enough to be 
transformative of women’s representation. Faludi (1991) cites Aliens and Sigourney 
Weaver’s character ‘Ripley’ as an example of a proactive female protagonist, but 
criticises her for behaving maternally towards a little girl (‘Newt’), claiming it 
reproduces normative femininity. I have reservations about this reading because film 
critics frequently suggest the films are about (quasi) rape (e.g. Kaveney, 2005), 
and a female protagonist rescuing a girl from this fate seems relatively progressive. 
However, whilst disagreeing with Faludi over this specific example, it does suggest 
that simple screen presence, or even being an active protagonist does not guarantee a 
progressive representation of women.
Generally, this brief history suggests some broadening of roles and 
representations of women on television. Female news readers are increasingly 
common (van Zoonen, 1991), although often paired with a man (Dyer, 1987) so 
implicitly connoting heteronormativity. Yet, with some notable exceptions (e.g.
Clare Balding), sports programming is still relatively closed to women especially in 
typically ‘masculine’ domains like football and game shows continue to ignore or
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degrade women. Women’s programming continues in the domestic/daytime realm 
only with a greater emphasis on ‘self improvement’ often designed to enhance 
female attractiveness (to heterosexual men). So there remains a big question mark 
about whether being told by style experts, many of them gay men (Jeffreys, 2003, 
2005), how to perform better in the domestic or sexual sphere is empowering or 
simply a re-packaging of male dominance under the guise of liberal individualism 
and self fulfilment (see Chapter 6).
Across different genres women’s representation seems highly variable both in 
terms of its quotient and tone. Reading this brief history it is perhaps tempting to 
assume a liberal progression will ‘naturally’ occur and gender roles on television will 
continue to equalise. However, a more nuanced reading of women’s representation 
suggests otherwise and feminist theorists differ in how they regard particular 
representations. What might appear liberationary to one person can appear as a ‘safe’ 
outlet for ‘fantasies of liberation’ to another (Cagan, 1978: 6, cited by Dyer, 1987).
‘One immunises the contents of the collective imagination by means of a 
small inoculation of acknowledged evil; one then protects it against the risk 
of general subversion.’
Roland Barthes (1972: 150)
8.3 ‘Will & Grace’ in the Mainstream
Mitchell (2005:1052) suggests that in pleasing ‘ a mass mainstream audience’ 
(and implicitly advertisers) Will & Grace sets up a ‘liberal façade’. Moreover, by . 
presenting an (arguably) progressive discourse on gay issues, this allows the show to 
utilise regressive representations of race and class. Clearly Mitchell’s implication is 
that without a progressive agenda in one domain, the programme might struggle to 
position itself as liberal given the problematic representations of race and class.
Firstly, keeping in ‘mind’ that liberalism has different connotations in the 
USA to the UK, we need to be careful of exactly who claims Will & Grace is liberal. 
Mitchell (2005:1052) quotes Eric McCormack (the actor playing Will) saying ‘Other 
than extremists, I don’t know how the show could offend’. Mitchell not unreasonably 
takes this as evidence of the show’s lack of political power. We might reasonably
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interpret ‘the extremists’ as being from the political right. Consequently McCormack 
is constructing an account where (implied) ‘normal’ people will not be offended.
This lack offense is taken as proof that the show is insufficiently challenging of 
problematic norms. However, reflecting upon this comment I wonder if ‘the 
extremists’ might also include critics on the radical/progressive side. After all there is 
some ambiguity about what Will & Grace is even intended to be, Mitchell cites a 
2005 claim in The Advocate from a programme executive that it focuses on a 
relationship between a man and a woman rather than gay issues. Sadly there is no 
verbatim quotation, but Mitchell’s use of the word ‘relationship’ can be read as 
connoting something more heterosexual especially when coupled with the denial of 
the programme’s gay content. More recently Sean Hayes (who plays Jack) claimed ‘I 
feel like I have contributed monumentally to the success of the gay movement in 
America’ (Karpel, 2010: %28). This apparent contradiction between those involved in 
its production (who viewers might assume should know!) could be connected with 
their identities: McCormack is heterosexual whereas Hayes, though widely presumed 
to be gay, is explaining his previous attempts to evade the question of his own 
sexuality. Having been the subject of some criticism for failing to adequately ‘come 
out’ (Karpel), laying claim to a politically progressive contribution mitigates any 
previous lack of disclosure. Perhaps Will & Grace, as a gay show, suffers a similar 
ideological dilemma to any individual ‘coming out’, namely how to construct a gay 
identity whilst simultaneously asserting one’s normalcy. This notion of normality is 
precisely what queer theorists (e.g. Warner, 1993) strenuously reject: However, as a 
programme it operates well within the mainstream and might be regarded as a 
‘Trojan Horse’, presenting an ‘acceptable’ account but sneaking in occasionally more 
radical gay issues. Furthermore the contact hypothesis predicts greater acceptance of 
gay people among heterosexuals who know at least one gay person (Herek, 1986). 
We might cautiously extrapolate this to television shows. Yet I think any analysis 
along these lines risks perpetuating the assumption that a) the audience is 
heterosexual and b) that the audience is (to a greater or lesser degree) homophobic 
and must not be directly challenged with alternative (and more progressive) 
representations. These concerns might be driven by commercial concerns about 
advertisers and the lucrative business of re-selling the programme abroad rather than
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a conscious decision about the politics of gay representation but I think it does cast 
further doubt on the market as a source of emancipation (see Chapter 5).
Mitchell’s (1995) other concern was that an allegedly progressive 
representation in one domain permits regressive representations in other areas such 
as race and class. She uses the example of Rosario, Karen’s maid from El Salvador, 
who stands out from the main four characters both racially and in terms of class. 
Even Jack, the struggling actor, is able to lead an economically comparable life to 
Will (the successful lawyer). So Rosario is constructed as the obvious ‘other’ to 
white affluence. Mitchell analyses a specific episode where Rosario is offered as a 
stake in a bet by Karen. The episode neatly sidesteps the obvious suggestion of 
dehumanisation because Karen believes Rosario is a person, but has no difficulty 
with the concept that a person can be commodified. (Although the episode plays the 
wager as farce, it echoes Hardy’s Mayor o f Casterbridge where the protagonist 
drunkenly sells his wife with typically disastrous consequences.) So this and other 
examples are used to problematise Will & Grace in ways other than what Karpel 
(2010: %15) calls the “‘Jack is too gay!” and “Will isn’t gay enough’” critique. 
Mitchell points to Raymond Williams’ (1977) notion of incorporation where 
apparent challenges to hegemonic ideologies actually reinforce problematic 
representations. This suggests that aside from whether Will & Grace has been useful 
(or not) for gay liberation there are other domains in which it might remain 
regressive. The following analysis considers Will & Grace from a more feminist 
perspective on the basis that current literature tends to overlook this angle.
8.4 Analysis
Analysis of Will & Grace has tended to focus on the use of gay characters in 
a mainstream successful sitcom. Generally this has been welcomed as a progressive 
move, with some voices of concern about the particular representations of gay 
identity (see previous chapter). What seems to have gone less noticed are the many 
stories where Will is positioned as a point of patriarchal power over Grace. Indeed 
the repeated construction of Grace as an excessively emotional and irrational woman 
seems to be a regressive move. In the following analysis two specific episodes are
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discussed in order to focus on how the narrative develops, but examples and cross 
comparisons are made with other examples.
Before examining Will & Grace I want to briefly quote from Jonathan 
Harvey’s UK sitcom Gimme, Gimme, Gimme (1999-2001). Its title is from a well- 
known Abba song (‘Gimme, gimme, gimme, a man after midnight...’), constructing 
both its campness and that despite being grotesque caricatures, Linda and Tom have 
a keen shared interest in men (which often brings them into conflict). The theme 
song is a badly sung version of the Abba song apparently performed by Tom (with 
theatrical flourishes) and Linda whose voice is pitched down low with a coarse 
gravely tone (more Johnny Cash than Frida or Agnetha). The opening helps construct 
their mutual self-delusions: Tom is a generally unemployed actor who thinks he is 
destined to be a star (but it is repeatedly suggested he is a very bad actor) and Linda 
is portrayed as physically unattractive (often wearing unflattering clothes, e.g. a skin­
tight green PVC suit) but thinking she is beautiful. These self-delusions are a stock 
comedic device in sitcoms. For example a running joke m Dad’s Army (1968-77) 
was Captain Mainwaring’s delusions of grandeur. It is similar to hubris, but rather 
than playing out tragically it exists for comedic effect (Abrams, 1993). ,
In some senses both characters are already familiar. The unemployed actor 
(of possibly dubious talent) who is convinced of their greatness can be found in black 
comedies like Withnail and I  (1986) or Joey in the relentlessly upbeat US sitcom 
Friends (1994 -  2004). The portrayal of women who are deluded about their own 
physical beauty has a long history (Snider, 1877 notes its occurrence in 
Shakespeare’s comedies). Although the joke is not strictly confined to women, 
female beauty (or lack of) is subject to more criticism than male appearance 
(Jeffreys, 2005).
Linda (played by Kathy Burke) is arguably slightly over-weight, but this is 
massively embellished by her flamboyant clothing that is consistently too small and 
portrayed as age-inappropriate. Throughout the three series she variously claims to 
be in her late teens or twenties, but her birth certificate and the arrival of her son (in 
his late twenties) keep undoing the lie. Finally, in the third series, she is apparently 
diagnosed with body dysmorphic disorder. However, through her lack of self- 
knowledge the audience is encouraged to laugh at the incongruence between Linda’s 
self-perception and ‘reality’:
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Extract 1
LINDA: I'm naturally funny. ((Audience laughter)) D'you
know (.) sometimes I walk down the street and 
people just burst out laughing ((Audience 
laughter))
She appears to misunderstand that the laughter is directed ûrfher and 
consequently she is being ridiculed. It is a far harsher and cruder sitcom than Will &  
Grace with them commonly trading homophobic and sexist insults. Linda and Tom’s 
relationship seems to be one of necessity with only occasional glimmers of affection. 
Forcing together characters who superficially hate each other is an often used 
dramatic device and there is a tradition of crude sitcoms about ill-matched pairs 
forced to cohabit (e.g. Bottom, 1991-5 -  and not so crude ones, as in The Odd 
Couple, 1968). It produces comedic situations, and rivalry that can be entertaining. 
The stylistic tone of such shows and the use of slapstick comedy reinforce the 
impression that they are not to be taken seriously or regarded as representations of 
reality. However, the programme is constructed around sexist put downs (Tom 
repeatedly refers to Linda as ‘vile’), reinforced by the construction of Linda as 
failing to conform to female norms of attractiveness: ‘I've had my best sex in the 
dark (.) Well blokes prefer it that way don't they?’ and ‘I ain't a pussy-person (.) 
when people look at me they don't think “cat” (.) they think “dog”.’
Grotesque characters can be humorous and I am not arguing that television 
should consist only of idealised people; that has its own dangers in establishing 
unattainable norms (Jeffreys, 2005). However, what Gimme, Gimme Gimme 
illustrates is an alternate account of relations between women (Linda is not quite 
exclusively heterosexual) and gay men. Rather than idealising the friendship as a 
meeting of like ‘minded’ individuals with a ‘natural’ affinity and shared interests that 
bring them closer, it punctures this myth and demonstrates that gay men (and gay 
writers, albeit in jest) are very capable of accomplishing sexism. Although Will & 
Grace presents a much more obviously functional friendship and more enviable 
characters (physically and in terms of their wealthier lifestyle) the following analysis 
will focus on sexist constructions within what is glossed as a sexually liberating and 
revolutionary programme (Smith, 2003).
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8.5 The Buying Game -  Business, Patriarchy and Tears
The Buying Game (a pun on the 1992 film The Crying Game) is an episode 
from series one where Grace sets about buying her work studio and so saving money 
on rent. Despite having identified this as a potentially wise investment Grace is 
constructed as being naive about the legal and business practices involved.
Extract 2
GRACE: He said he tried to call you, but that you didn't 
return his calls
WILL: Grace. He never called me. I was in my office all day.
GRACE: He lied to me? But that's so ( .) dishonest . .
WILL: I know. To think, in New York City, that someone could
actually try to shaft you in business. It's (.) 
shocking.
People can (.) can be such meanies.
The first indicator of naïve trust comes from her repetition of what she has 
apparently been told (‘He said he tried to call’) followed by the shifting of 
responsibility to Will (‘but you didn’t return his calls’). At this point she is 
constructed as both believing the account and being dependent upon Will. It is his 
alleged inaction in not returning the call that precipitates the problem.
This account is immediately contested by Will who addresses her by her first 
name, perhaps to emphasise his direct appeal to her or to soften the blow.
Rhetorically Will’s rebuttal of events is more powerful because it depends on his first 
hand ‘factual’ statement ‘He never called me’ as opposed to the second hand ‘He 
said he’ formation used by Grace. As a knockout blow Will adds T was in my office 
all day’ thus shifting away any possibility that he could have missed the call.
Following this two part exchange (accusation followed by rebuttal) Grace 
reluctantly accepts Will’s explanation. ‘He lied to me?’ is constructed as a question 
indicating that this possibility (of being lied to) is surprising. She struggles to 
articulate the problem with being Tied to’ with a humorous tautology ‘that’s so (.) 
dishonest’ -  note the pause as she appears to search for the right word. It is the 
presentation of her reaction that positions her as naïve. Anyone might be similarly 
misled about someone having tried to call; it is a superficially plausible claim. But
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Grace’s apparent shock at being lied to, that such a thing could even happen, permits 
a mocking response from Will.
Firstly the ‘I know’ can be read (in the light of what follows) as ironic rather 
than sympathetic. Next he parodies her shock, firstly raising the cognitive aspect of 
her thought process (T o  think’). He makes her appear ridiculous by emphasising 
‘New York City’ as though it were some utopia -  famously crime-free and populated 
by only honest people. This construction would be hearable as absurd to an 
American audience, and indeed anyone familiar with large cities. Will and Grace 
apparently live at 155 Riverside Drive in Manhattan11, a very desirable 
neighbourhood overlooking the Hudson River near to Central Park. Crime seldom 
impinges upon their lives or features in the sitcom narrative, so there is a degree of 
incongruity between Will mocking Grace for apparently assuming their world is a 
pleasant and safe place when that is precisely how the programme presents it.
The notion of being ‘shaft[ed]’ is American slang with a double meaning 
(OED, 1989) Firstly, Will connects business with ‘shafting’ people, yet in a later 
extract, both he (and then Grace) do exactly the same. Secondly, his phrase ‘shaft 
you’ has a sexual connotation as coarse slang. Thus, there is the unavoidable 
undercurrent that as Will stops Grace from being ‘shafted’ he is in some way acting 
as a chaperone. This is further enhanced when he infantilises her by saying ‘People 
can (.) can be such meanies’. The brief dramatic pause and repetition of ‘can’ creates 
a hesitation that draws more attention to the choice of ‘meanies’ rather than a 
stronger or more appropriate word. It also mocks Grace’s previous struggle to 
articulate the issue of dishonesty.
In addition to patronising Grace, Will refuses to accept her self-construction 
as a hard negotiator, preferring a sexual interpretation:
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Extract 3
GRACE: I just got my landlord to'the floor.
WILL: You slut.
GRACE: After you left, Mr Hutt came to tell me there was 
another buyer ready to put an offer on my studio.
My studio. But did I sweat? No, I leapt into action.
WILL: Wait a minute. You didn't sign anything?
GRACE: Damn right I did, after I gave him a bid. And he bit.
I got him to knock off five percent. Suck-er.
WILL: Grace five percent is not the floor. That's like the
tchotchke on the coffee table on the throw rug on the 
floor. Why didn't you call me?
Grace is presumably referring to ‘the floor’ as the price point below which 
the landlord will not go. (Indeed Will should know this is what she means since he 
explained the concept to her at the start of the programme.) It also has hints of a 
physical struggle, like her (metaphorically) wrestling the landlord to the ground and 
so seems to claim a victory for her. However this is immediately undercut by Will 
calling her a ‘slut’. Obviously this is for comic effect, and there is appreciative 
laughter from the studio audience. In some respects it is a typically short and witty 
exchange that is characteristic of the series. However, Grace does not explicitly 
reject the ‘slut’ label, but continues her triumphant story until brought to a halt by 
Will. Rather than simply suggesting a better deal might still be negotiated, he 
compares it to ‘tchotchke’, a Yiddish word for cheap toys or souvenirs. Thus having 
called her a ‘slut’ he then suggests her efforts were worthless, finishing not by 
(directly) offering help but implying she should have called him. This doubly insults 
her since a) she did not reach the ‘floor’ and b) she should have called him.
By comparison, Karen is more commonly constructed as performing sexually 
for rewards in what she constructs as a loveless marriage with the obese Stan. (N.B. 
Her relationship with Stan changes in a later series.) However when the issue arises, 
she compares experiences with her (‘closeted’ male) friend Beverly who appears to 
similarly be in a marriage of financial and material convenience.
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Extract 4
BEVERLY : Oh dear. I can't seem to set up this shot. My
big (.) new diamond ring keeps throwing off my 
balance.
KAREN : Oh good for you Bev. Ooh, that must have cost
your wife a pretty penny.
BEVERLY: You wouldn't believe the disgusting sexual
perversions I had to perform to get that.
KAREN: Oh (.) I think I would. Meet the twins.
((KAREN pulls back her hair to reveal diamond earrings))
KAREN: Ha
BEVERLY: Yes m a 'a m . Oh (.) Lord (.) the things we do for
love.
KAREN : And money (.) ha h a .
In this extract Beverly draws attention to his ‘big (.) new diamond ring’ which meets 
with Karen’s approval (‘good for you’). Then in the middle section Beverly explains 
‘the disgusting sexual perversions I had to perform’ to get the ring. This is of course 
an inversion of the more gender typical idea of men paying (or otherwise rewarding) 
women for sexual services The construction of heterosexuality as ‘disgusting’ and a 
‘perversion’ is also part of the inversion of norms taking place and fits a running joke 
within the series of what might be termed ‘heterophobia’ (best exemplified by 
Karen’s best friend Jack who articulates repulsion towards heterosexual acts). The 
joke is a standard comedic trope where something ‘normal’ is inverted for humorous 
effect. However, Karen does know about performing ‘disgusting sexual perversions’ 
(‘Oh (.) I think I would. Meet the twins.’). The twins are revealed to be a pair of 
earrings, but obviously there is some wordplay around ‘twins’ resulting from a 
sexual act. The comment about ‘the things we do for love’ is clearly ironic in the 
sense that the love being spoken of is material commodities not of persons and so 
Beverly subverts the more romantic meaning of such a statement. Karen then seems 
to explain the joke (‘And money’); perhaps she is expanding on it for any audience 
member who found Beverly’s version too subtle. Alternatively it might be intended 
to suggest she is a step behind him in the particular game.
Do Beverly's gender and the ironic treatment of ‘love’ disrupt what could 
otherwise be a sexist account of the commodification of female bodies? Instead of 
being called a ‘slut’ (like Grace) Karen gets to compare jewellery and laugh about 
what she has done. The difficulty posed by the commodification of sex in a setting 
like Will & Grace is that whilst it toys with disrupting norms, it does not speak to
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those who, through poverty, have little choice in the matter. (Like Billie Piper’s 
character ‘Belle’ in the UK series Secret Diary o f a Call Girl it connects prostitution 
with a decadent lifestyle and material goods.) Furthermore, Beverly can be read as an 
inverted character, part of the heterosexist association between (in his case, closeted) 
gay men and femininity. Consequently I do not think this fundamentally challenges 
the systemic objectification of women as someone like Sheila Jeffreys (1991) would 
see it. It reinforces sex as a commodity rather than an act of pleasure or love and it 
does that in a way associated with (ef)femininity. This also suggests a version of 
women and gay men that are obsessed with sparkly jewellery depending upon such 
goods to derive pleasure and self-worth (See Chapter Five). Karen is at times a 
comically grotesque character and as a 'screwball character' (Battles & Hilton- 
Morrow, 2002: 98), she is not taken so seriously and seems to be subject to less 
direct patriarchal influence. Battles and Hilton-Morrow’s point is not that comedy 
characters should be ignored, but rather that they often are easily dismissed. 
Consequently, whilst the representation of materialism seems problematic, any 
revolutionary potential to ‘turn the tables’ is muted.
Where Karen and Beverly depend on their partners in financial terms, Grace 
appears to require Will's intervention to fix problems in her life. He seemingly comes 
to her aid over the purchase of her studio, but in a ruse to lower the price he positions 
her as an ignorant woman.
Extract 5
HUTT
WILL
HUTT
WILL
HUTT
WILL
WILL:
WILL :
GRACE: 
WILL :
HUTT:
Mr Hutt (.) appreciate your coming. You know 
Grace? ~
I do indeed know Ms Adler.
How well?
She's been my tenant for=
=1 don't think you know Grace at all.
Pardon me?
You don't know her pal (.) because if you did (.) 
you'd know this woman knows absolutely nothing 
about business.
Mr. Truman (.) your client is a perfectly 
competent
Competent? Ha Hah (.) Did you say competent? Look 
at her. Does she look particularly business-minded 
to you? Does this hair say "I went to the Harvard 
Business School"?
Will=
=5he's a designer. Ha (.) a designer. You know 
what's up here? Pretty pillows, floor lamps, maybe
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a couple of chenille throws and th-th-that's all, 
folks. Not a whole lot of room left for numbers 
. (.) which is why she caved in at five percent (.) 
and you (.) Mr Hutt took advantage of that.
Will’s introduction is brief and he drops the word T  that would precede 
‘appreciate your coming’ before referring to Grace by her first name. The landlord, 
Hutt, responds by calling her ‘Ms Adler’, a more formal but courteous term. Whilst 
obviously Will is her friend, and friends usually address each other by first name, in 
this context it begins a process of belittling and patronising.
Hutt’s knowledge of Grace is then made the subject of debate and by doing 
this Will attempts to establish that Grace’s alleged lack of business skill is a self- 
evident fact that Hutt should be aware of, concluding with the claim that Hutt took 
advantage of her. In between is a lengthy construction (or perhaps more accurately, 
demolition) of Grace. Lack of business acumen apparently manifests itself in hair 
(‘Does this hair say “I went to Harvard Business School”?’). The issue of Grace’s 
hair being out of control is a stock joke within the series. However in this instance it 
would be more difficult to convincingly argue the incompetence of a man based on 
his appearance. Furthermore ‘Harvard Business School’ is an absurd extreme case
formulation, since people with MBAs tend not to run small interior design
.companies.
Continuing the theme of ‘minded[ness]’ Will ignores Grace’s attempt to 
interject and launches into a vivid account of what occupies Grace’ s head (‘Pretty 
pillows, floor lamps’). The triviality of such things and the literal fluffmess of 
pillows constructs a vacuous image rounded off with a stuttered ‘th-th-that’s all 
folks’, the famous sign off for Warner Bros ‘Looney Tunes’ cartoons. This implicitly 
suggests mental instability and Will suggests there is not much ‘room left for 
numbers’ suggesting Grace’s preoccupation with soft furnishings have saturated her 
mental capacities.
Although the narrative makes clear that Will’s construction is for rhetorical 
effect, his positioning of her as incapable and him stepping into protect her (by 
undermining her) is deeply patriarchal. Many of his utterances simply would not 
work if applied to another man (especially a heterosexual man). Two men arguing 
about whether a woman has been taken ‘advantage o f  whilst she sits mute seems a 
regressive step.
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To its credit, the programme does not allow Will’s tactless and excessive 
construction to go unchallenged. The first point to make here is that Will's business 
acumen and skills as a lawyer are set against the value of friendship. Clearly different 
discursive formations are required in these different domains. His construction might 
save her money and in that sense be useful, but her concern is that this reflects his 
‘real’ opinion of her. She challenges him about this and fails to get Will to explicitly 
say she is a good businesswoman. In the most general sense this indicates that speech 
acts appropriate to a professional relationship can be more troublesome among 
friends. He provides support of a patronising paternal kind that belittles her, rather 
than supporting her as an equal.
The second point about Grace’s later remark ‘I'm just surprised you didn't go 
after my big feet. I mean that would've knocked off (.) what (.) another twenty 
bucks?’ Compared to Karen (and Beverly), Grace is not prepared to be a physical 
commodity. Having already had her hair mocked, she picks another physical attribute 
and attaches a derisory sum to it (‘twenty bucks’). This implicitly raises the question 
of what Grace is worth in monetary terms, and positions Will as effectively pimping 
her out. So she is seen to respond to his control as patriarchal -  he is not simply 
being domineering but her gender and his status as a man (negotiating with another 
man) are embedded in the dispute.
Up until this point the programme presents Will’s construction of Grace as 
problematic and the writers have her challenge him directly. His failure to reassure 
her that he thinks she is a good businesswoman sets the programme off in a different 
direction where she sets out to prove him wrong. This might seem potentially 
empowering except that it seems to establish her as needing his approval in an 
asymmetric way (i.e. Will is concerned to have upset Grace, but his competency is 
not under scrutiny). One of the manifestations of patriarchy in their friendship seems 
to be the requirement that she seek his approval (a point that will be revisited later in 
this chapter). The other problem with this episode is the means by which Grace 
‘wins’ and gets the price dropped lower than Will had managed to negotiate.
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Extract 6
GRACE: I haven't had sex in five months ! And I was
in Bloomingdale's this morning waiting on line 
to buy wrinkle crème (.) and this Jennifer Love 
Michelle Sarah Felicity looking thing (.) bumps 
into me and says (.) "Excuse me (.) ma'am"
((Grace sobs))
WILL: Grace. Gracie (.) it is not worth it. Don't buy
the place if it's gonna make you feel like this.
GRACE : Do I look like a ma'am?
HUTT: Miss Adler (.) I'm so sorry (.) I had no idea.
GRACE : No (.) Mr Hutt (.) I'm sorry. I'm sorry that
you had to see me like this.
HUTT: Miss Adler (.) how about this contract?
GRACE: No (.) no (.) I (.) I can't right now. I can't. :
WILL: Grace you're making-
HUTT: =Miss Adler (.) it's not much (.) but (.)
perhaps I could lower the price a little more.
Think about it (.) all right?
((HUTT exits. GRACE immediately stops crying and sits up.))
GRACE : Now look at me and tell me I'm not a good
businesswoman.
((WILL is visibly stunned as GRACE signs the contract.))
Having apparently been upset by Will using her bad hair tactically and 
challenging him to mock her big feet too Grace uses the same technique, 
constructing herself as sexually undesirable. The string of names refers to young and 
attractive female celebrities, but by merging them into one entity she implies they are 
in some way generic or interchangeable. In this story the word ‘ma’am’ and the anti 
wrinkle crème are used to connote her aging and becoming unattractive (‘I haven’t 
had sex in five months!’). Thus regular sex, youthfulness and attractiveness are all 
conflated into one desirable bundle, the apparent lack of which makes her cry.
Will is seen to try and soothe her with a rather patronising diminutive use of 
her name ‘Gracie’. She acknowledges her emotional performance by apologising to 
Hutt that he ‘had to see [her] like this’. By turning to Hutt rather than Will there is an 
expectation that he will respond which he does with a favourable contract. In 
faltering speech Grace insists she ‘can’t [deal with it] right now’. This appears to 
push Hutt towards another offer.
The immediacy with which Grace stops crying indicates that her tearful 
performance should not be read as ‘authentic’. Her last comment (‘Now look at me 
and tell me I’m not a good businesswoman’) confirms the purpose and claims the
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outcome as her own. However her success depended upon playing the role of an 
upset and confused woman -  the very positioning she rejected from Will. Female 
tears seem to have been deployed against the landlord to beat him down on price 
allowing her to triumph over Will. Perhaps she has more entitlement to position 
her self this way and the problem lay with Will not having the right to position her as 
an emotionally unstable woman. Had Will explained his ruse in advance might she 
have accepted and the falling out not occurred? However this leaves the ethics at the 
purely personal level. Grace appears to win over the male landlord by getting a 
(presumably) good price and over Will by getting a better deal than he could. Yet 
this leaves unaddressed the implications of representing successful businesswomen 
as emotionally manipulative -  prone to using tears to get what they want. This is not 
to suggest that business should be somehow masculine and emotionless, but whilst 
this represents a win for one fictional woman it is less obvious how the 
representation is helpful to women generally. It can be seen to exemplify the tension 
between an individual attaining privilege and shifting a collective status.
At the end of the programme they talk through the events and Grace asks why 
Will plays so tough in business:
Extract 7
WILL: It is a lot harder for a gay man=
GRACE: =Because if you’re pulling out the gay card (.) -I’m 
pulling out the girl card (.) and we both know that 
the girl card trumps the gay card..
The stake raising game continues with them drawing in friends or associates 
who occupy increasingly marginalised positions: firstly the ‘gay girl card’, then the 
6 African-American, bi-curious, dyslexic’ card, and finally the ‘differently-abled 
transsexual with split ends’ which ‘beats the house’.
This dialogue takes place in a game playing context (what looks to be 
Monopoly or a similar board game). The stake raising continues with increasingly 
hyphenated identities. The potentially winning card is the ‘differently-abled 
transsexual with split ends’. Of course the humour derives from conflating identity 
politics with something as trivial as split ends. It also parodies the notion of 
hierachies of disadvantage and the entitlement associated with them111. However the
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tokenism with which other people’s identities are used in a power struggle is 
troublesome. Whilst they work up an account which attaches value to increasingly 
marginalised positions it simultaneously trivialises them because bad hair beats the 
rest. Another problem with a ‘card’ based notion of problematic identities is that it 
obscures certain privileges and takes certain norms as assumed unless stated 
otherwise. A card based system leaves his rich, white status obscured.
Will initially constructs his approach in terms of being ‘harder for a gay man’ 
and so taking up a disadvantaged position. Although, as shown, it quickly descends 
into farce, the basic premise that a gay identity permits aggressive business practices 
(that have spilled into their friendship) is challenged with the ‘girl card’. Note the use 
of ‘girl’ rather than ‘woman’ to construct a less powerful identity. It is taken as a 
previously established fact that ‘girl’ beats ‘gay’ in this game -  although outside this 
sitcom one might imagine the advantages and disadvantages to be more situationally 
specific. However in the terms of the programme, the ‘girl card’ apparently does 
trump the ‘gay card’ which further problematises Will’s patronising of Grace.
This paternal and patronising theme is not just a feature of these particular 
exchanges; it is deeply embedded in the structure of Grace and Will’s friendship. 
Sitcoms depend upon certain stock stories that are retold with slight variations as a 
way of hanging together a series of jokes and comedic set pieces (Spangler, 2003). 
The familiarity of certain running jokes and narrative structures is part of the 
audience appeal. Likewise certain positionings become routine within the context of 
the programme. In The Buying Game, Grace was initially shown to be naïve, but then 
Will stepped in ostensibly to help but uses sexist discourse to do so. There are many 
other episodes which are based around Will stepping in to help -  sometimes this is 
welcomed and sometimes it fails, but the normative formation of her consistently 
being in need and him aiding her sets up a patriarchal dynamic. Furthermore, many 
of the situations that require his help are quite childish.
8.6 Wilful Control
In an episode from the second series {Girls, Interrupted a pun on the 1989 
film Girl, Interrupted about an adolescent’s year long stay in a psychiatric hospital -  
so already hints of mental instability abound), Grace suspects an acquaintance, Val,
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with whom she has a tempestuous love/hate friendship of taking a music box given 
to Grace at her Batmitzvah. She comments to Will on how strange its disappearance 
is given that she only just showed it to Val. This is the verbal cue for Will to 
tentatively raise the faltering question:
Extract 8
You don't think she (.) um (.)
What?
Stole it? I mean, she has tried battery on you.
Why not theft?
The accusation is a difficult speech act to make and requires encouragement 
from Grace for him to fully articulate the accusation. Although an accusation it is 
framed as a question (thus making it deniable) and also put in terms of ‘you [Grace] 
don’t think’ rather than what Will himself might speculate. However, this is followed 
up with the more extreme point that Val has previously attacked Grace, thus can be 
constructed as morally suspect.
In this instance Will is the active agent in formulating the accusation and 
supporting it with previous bad behaviour (thus making his claim seem more 
plausible). There is a cut to the next scene which Grace immediately establishes as 
the following day:
Extract 9
Well (.) I hope you're happy. Thanks to you I 
didn't sleep all night. Well I've got news for 
you (.) mister. Val did not steal my music box.
She is my friend, and I trust her.
Ok.
Which is why we are breaking into her apartment 
so I can prove to you that it is not there.
The humour is based on the incongruence between Grace’s defence of Val 
and her proposal of breaking in to Val’s apartment to ‘prove’ it. She is clearly 
constructed as proposing something illogical -  taking the risk of breaking in to prove 
something she claims not to believe. It is also an astonishing reaction in that it would 
undermine any moral authority Grace might have in the matter. Instead it appears to 
be a childish tit-for-tat positioning. The claim she ‘didn’t sleep all night’ (an extreme
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL : 
GRACE 
WILL :
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case formulation) constructs Will as the active agent in her suffering (rather than 
Val). ‘I hope you’re happy’ positions him as responsible for her distress, with the 
implication this was something he intended to accomplish. Thus it constructs her as 
emotionally moody, verbally lashing out at the wrong person and proposing an 
absurd course of action.
In contrast Will is frequently the voice of reason, taking on a paternalist role. 
In an episode from series three, My Uncle The Car, the issue of a car inherited by 
Grace from her dead uncle becomes relevant when the cost of storing it is increased:
Extract 10
GRACE: Oh man they're raising the rent on my storage
space again? (.) Don't start.
WILL: I don't get it. Throwing away good money to
store a car you never even use.
GRACE: It's my Uncle Jerry's car.
WILL: Uncle Jerry is dead (.) for four years now (.)
Uncle Jerry has been dead.
GRACE : And that car is the only thing I have to
remember him by. It has sentimental value.
WILL: It's a Chevy Citation (.) with no A.C. and old
man stink.
The problem (of cost) is initially introduced by Grace who articulates not 
only that it is increasing but that it is happening ‘again’. This clearly indicates it has 
happened before and that the cost is escalating. She also implies that this issue has 
been the object of previous discussion by saying ‘Don’t start’ to Will, whom she has 
presumably disagreed with in the past and anticipates his negative response.
Despite the request not to ‘start’ criticising Will immediately indicates a lack 
of understanding (‘I don’t get it’). Rather than simply articulating his puzzlement he 
then develops this into criticism. ‘Throwing away good money’ connotes a casual 
disregard for financial prudence. It suggests no possible benefits to her expenditure 
on ‘a car you [Grace] never even use’ whilst constructing the thrown away money as 
‘good’, i.e. it has potential to be helpful or useful in some unspecified alternative 
way. Rather than offering this as advice, it is coded as something he doesn’t ‘get’ or 
understand.
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The reference to it as ‘my Uncle Jerry’s car’ is knocked down on the basis 
that ‘Uncle Jerry is dead’, thus logically he cannot own it or have use for it. This is a 
purely utilitarian perspective and Grace reconstructs it as ‘sentimental’ saying it is 
the ‘only thing’ she has to remember Uncle Jerry by. Note the singularity here which 
adds value since it is from Grace’s perspective unique and irreplaceable.
The clash of pragmatism versus sentimentalism continues with Will drawing 
attention to its apparent deficits as a car, lack of air conditioning (common in New 
York because of the high humidity in the summer) and ‘old man stink’. The first part 
of this construction is a more practical comment and continuation of the argument 
about the usefulness of the car. However ‘old man stink’ is a reference to Uncle Jerry 
that fails to respond to Grace’s emotional attachment. The exchange constructs an 
emotional account which is attached to Grace and contrasted with an unsentimental 
practical argument that ultimately results in Grace being persuaded to sell the car 
against her wishes and it then proves difficult to reacquire. Rather than questioning 
Will’s judgement in pushing Grace to act against her wishes, the episode’s comedy 
stems from Grace appearing ridiculous in her attempts to get the car back (kissing 
part of the car that turns out to have been defecated upon by a bird).
As is common Will then steps in and fixes the problem. This takes place off 
screen and although he makes it clear he did not pay the full $3000 price he 
nevertheless presents Grace with the car keys. The absurd comic pay off is that they 
have to help the intermediate owner deliver cheesecakes to a zoo. However Will both 
precipitates and resolves the car problem by influencing the original sale and then 
stepping in to save the situation when Grace on her own cannot reacquire the car.
The question is whether we read his actions as a friend acting in her best interests, 
having a good point about the car being expensive and useless but underestimating 
her attachment and then acting kindly by getting it back. This narrative structure 
where Grace is constructed as overly emotional or somehow irrational and Will 
ultimately helps her out seems to consistently position him in a paternalistic role. He 
can influence her behaviour, even when this causes her upset, and he has the power 
to restore or fix things where she cannot. His role in causing her to act against her 
wishes, his insensitivity towards her goes largely unexamined whereas her emotional 
reactions are scrutinised and rendered absurd.
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Will is arguably at his most patriarchal when it comes to Grace's romantic 
relationships. In the very first episode, which sets up aspects of their back history and 
results in them living together, she announces her engagement:
Extract 11
WILL :
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE :
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL:
GRACE:
WILL :
GRACE :
WILL:
not
GRACE
I'm happy for you.
Lying. Lying man talking.
Grace, stop it. I am happy for you. I want you 
two to have a great life together.
You do? Oh thank God. I was so worried coming 
over here. So I have your blessing then?
Yes.
I love you. '
Love you.
Ok, I've got to go tell my family.
Uh, Grace, don't.
I have to. Will. They're paying.
No. I mean, don't marry Danny.
What?
Honey, I got to be honest. This guy's not enough 
for you. I mean (.) your passion (.) and you're 
(.) you're creative and beautiful and perfect (.) 
and this guy (.) I mean (.) you should be with 
someone more (.) somebody else. I mean (.) he's
funny, he doesn't know what your favourite flower 
is, he's passive-aggressive, he man high-fives you 
after sex (.) Grace. You're so afraid you're never 
going to get married (.) you can't even see how 
wrong he is for you. I mean (.) think about it. If 
you really believed he was the one (.) would you 
be asking me for my blessing?
Go to hell, Will.
In this extract Will responds to her engagement with what seem like the 
appropriate words, but Grace immediately accuses him of lying. The importance of 
this is to underscore their bond -  she knows him well enough to read his utterance as 
inauthentic. However he counters by telling her to ‘stop i f  (disbelieving him) and 
emphasising his happiness for her. He embellishes his original response and expands 
it from merely being happy to wishing them ‘a great life together’ thus apparently 
adequately responding to marriage as a (hopefully) permanent and happy 
arrangement.
■ Grace articulates relief having been ‘so worried coming over here [Will’s 
apartment]’. This is the second indicator that underscores their bond -  she takes his
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approval seriously and constructs it as both important and a matter of concern.
Whilst many friends might discuss marriage intentions with close friends what 
switches their interaction into something more patriarchal is her question ‘So I have 
your blessing then?’ This positions Will in a fatherly role that he initially takes up by 
responding ‘yes’. After he withdraws his approval the matter of his blessing is 
reconstructed not as demonstrating their friendship, but instead as proof that she must 
(unconsciously) doubt her decision. Although she tells him to ‘Go to hell’ this is 
short-lived (they reconcile quite quickly) and with reference to his criticism of her 
relationship and her motivation for wanting to be married (insecurity). His 
suggestion that she would not ask his permission if she were certain is met with her 
curse, but she does not explicitly challenge the issue of his right to approve or 
disapprove.
At this point the scene ends and later Will tries to find Grace at her office. 
Grace arrives having apparently just walked away from her wedding. Although upset 
and angry with him for not being her ‘best friend’ (‘the part you’re supposed to 
play’) she nevertheless has taken his advice. She rationalises his motives as wanting 
her ‘to be alone (.) like you’ suggesting either bitterness on his part and perhaps the 
attribution that he prefers her to be single for his own selfish reasons. Indeed this 
resonates with the discourse of ‘fag hags’ as single women and the suggestion that 
friendships can be destabilised by one party becoming romantically involved 
elsewhere (Moon, 1995).
In the following scene Grace apologises to Will and she rapidly constructs an 
account in which she had an epiphany on the way to the service and it didn’t feel 
‘right’. Now reconciled Will and Grace go to a bar (with her still in the wedding 
dress) and the episode ends with Will and Grace (incorrectly) being congratulated on 
their marriage, but playing along. Whilst this constructs them as being able to make 
fun of what might be considered a very upsetting event (cancelling a wedding) it 
establishes from the very start of the series that Will is very powerful within their 
relationship. The chain of events causing the marriage not to occur is retold in a 
slightly fragmented way so it is not clear whether Will’s earlier comments caused 
Grace to change her ‘mind’ or whether his superior insight meant that he anticipated 
problems. Either way Will seems to be the dominant party, whether it is in being 
asked for his blessing or affecting the outcome / being proved right.
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8.7 Conclusion
The repeated construction of Will as the dominant actor, being able to 
accomplish things Grace cannot indicates a vein of sexism within Will & Grace.
Even when he is insensitive towards her, his lack of empathy is not problematised 
whereas her emotions are the subject of humour, thus apparently privileging male 
rationalism over female emotions.
When Grace is permitted to win against Will, such as in the negotiations for 
buying her office, it is a regressive representation of femininity (using tears to 
manipulate) that succeeds. So although she is presented as triumphing over him (and 
the male landlord) it is not a narrative conclusion that seems particularly feminist in 
terms of the possibilities it presents its (female) audience.
Critical commentary predominantly focuses upon the gay characters and their 
sexuality, tending to leave female characters (especially Grace) in the shade (e.g. 
Smith 2003). In part this must be attributed to the rarity with which sitcoms lead with 
gay characters, whereas female characters are far more common. However, Grace is 
positioned as desiring Will and this is can be seen as problematic:
'The underlying message is that Will is the ideal man for Grace and no one 
else will ever quite match up to his astonishingly high, female-friendly 
standards.'
Watson (2001:1?)
There is some ambiguity about in whose eyes no other man matches up, since 
it is not only that Will appears ideal for Grace, but that he is commonly critical of her 
partners and this chapter has shown one such instance. Even if we assume Will gave 
Grace good advice, by articulating his reservations prior to her abandoning the 
wedding he is not only implicated in that act, but his anticipation positions him as 
more knowledgeable and powerful. From a feminist standpoint the issue is one of 
Will being consistently represented as being ‘right’ and Grace in regular need of 
assistance. This is not to suggest that friends should not offer advice, or that male 
assistance is inevitably patriarchal. However, there is a consistent asymmetry of
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power and agency in their relationship that was not so readily evident in the Study 
One interviews.
8.8 Study Two -  Conclusions
One of the most distinct features of Will & Grace is that whereas interview 
participants co-constructed accounts of friendship that were seldom contested, within 
the sitcom tensions and disagreements are more evident. The demands of an 
interview, requiring a coherent account of friendship, are entirely different to 
episodes of a sitcom where disagreements fuel the narrative. Whilst it is important to 
acknowledge this difference it also provides a space in which alternative discourses 
about friendship can exist. For example, in the previous chapter the characters Will 
and Grace compete for the sexual or romantic interest of the same man. The level of 
hostility involved (albeit for comedic effect) goes far beyond anything that would 
occur in an interview, so it is within the media representation that shared sexual 
interest in a man is developed into a crisis that threatens friendship. (This is not to 
say that such things never occur in ‘reality’ but rather that they may not be 
articulated by interviewees.)
Shared interests are commonly taken to be an important element of friendship 
and this is evidenced in both studies. However, it is in chapter 7 that desire for the 
same man produces a situation for Will and Grace where their overlapping interests 
are incompatible. Unlike sharing a sense of humour, this is constructed as a zero-sum 
game where for one person to ‘win’ the other must ‘lose’. Ultimately neither of them 
wins Peter, the object of their interest. Although much of the episode was concerned 
with Peter’s sexual identity as the apparent key to who could legitimately attempt a 
relationship, it emerged Peter was interested in them as friends. Whilst disclosure of 
their interests apparently ended all involvement with Peter, it also served to restore 
their friendship since they were no longer competing over the same man.
This storyline explores a potential threat to friendship that went unaddressed 
by interviewees. Social psychological literature constructs sexual interest as a threat 
from within cross-sex friends as part of a discourse of assumed heterosexuality posed 
against asexual friendship. However, in this instance the sexual interest that threatens 
is an unwitting third-party. Within the narrative of the story Peter is not considered as
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a potential friend. For both Will and Grace their initial encounters with him are 
interpreted as potentially sexual or romantic. Even when the confusion about Peter’s 
interest emerges, the terms of the debate are focused on his sexual identity and which 
one of them he must inevitably desire. The narrative structure works to allow a series 
of comedic misunderstandings so a more nuanced approach would be potentially less 
humorous. However we are still left with an account of two people relating to a new 
acquaintance in entirely sexual or romantic terms. Clearly this speaks to an issue of 
how interactions are managed to avoid misunderstandings. However this illustrates a 
more fundamental issue about the hierarchical structuring of relationships that can 
present friendship (as opposed to romance) as an inferior alternative or even a 
personal rejection. Furthermore Peter’s interest in friendship appears to be derailed 
by Will and Grace sexually desiring him. The misunderstanding is presented as so 
colossal that it apparently stops Peter further interacting with them. This constructs a 
gap between friendship and romance or sexual involvement that seems unbridgeable.
The wider context of the entire series reveals that Will and Grace were 
formerly in a romantic relationship that apparently took place many years previously, 
prior to Will ‘coming out’, and although occasionally referred to is generally kept at 
arms length from the friendship portrayed in most episodes. With Will firmly 
established as gay they can be positioned within a discourse of asexual friendship. 
The construction of gay sexual identity has a powerful effect in terms of how their 
relationship is read. In this context characters can be relatively intimate without 
complicating the asexual understanding of friendship.
A major concern of this analysis has been the representation of gay men’s 
sexist discourse and how this positions female friends (or women generally). I have 
argued that Will occupies a patriarchal role and exerts considerable power in policing 
Grace’s love-life and being patronising about her profession (see my analysis of 
Extract 5 in this chapter). Lack of sexual interest in women is no guarantee of a 
consistently pro-feminist stance. However gay identity seemingly permits sexist 
utterances to pass that might appear more obviously problematic were they uttered 
by a heterosexual man. Aside from sexual identity, the discourse of friendship is 
constructed around mutual liking which may provide an important interpretative 
context. While discourse analysts may be epistemologically wary of intentionality, 
within friendship a potentially insulting utterance might be interpreted as humour and
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thus relatively benign. In the context of Will & Grace there appears to be a threshold 
that Will oversteps when constructing Grace as a poor businesswoman who has been 
unfairly taken advantage of (see Extract 5 in this chapter). When this offensive 
construction is challenged it appears to be more on the basis that friends should not 
humiliate each other rather than an overt issue of sexism. A construction of 
friendship that emphasises mutual support and respect cannot easily accommodate 
this degree of ridicule and so it poses a crisis in their friendship. Although the 
apparent goal was to help Grace, Will’s method challenged the expected norms of 
friendship. Even though the superordinate goal should benefit Grace, Will’s actions 
are not easily reconciled within a discourse of friendship. Whilst friendship might 
include assisting the other, this instance suggests that help given disrespectfully 
challenges the terms of friendship.
I Note this is Gill Dyer, not/Richard Dyer who is cited elsewhere. The distinction is important because 
Richard Dyer is more associated with gay representation in the media whereas Gill Dyer adopted a 
specifically feminist approach in Boxed In: Women and Television.
II 155 Riverside Drive, Manhattan was where Robert Oppenheimer, developer o f the atomic bomb, 
grew up (Broad, 2007). Whether this was known or relevant to the creators of Will & Grace is not 
clear.
III Terry Eagleton’s (2001) memoir The Gatekeeper notes o f academic and political conferences that 
‘there is always a man or woman who claims the title o f Most Alienated Person in the Conference’.
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Chapter 9
9.1 Discussion
This thesis set about questioning the discourse of affinity between 
heterosexual women and gay men on the basis that uncritical accounts rely on an 
inversion model of gay men being inherently feminine, thus sharing interests 
with heterosexual women. Aside from the politically dubious construction of gay 
identity, it is part of a discourse of friendship that emphasises similarity. If 
friendship is constructed in strongly gender normative terms, then presumed 
differences in interactional style are various the basis of incompatibility or an 
opportunity for a broader range of friendship styles (Reeder, 2000). Whilst some 
interviewees co-constructed accounts around shared experiences, others drew 
upon discourses of mutual non-normativity that crossed ethnic, sexual and 
gender identities. This suggests that whilst similarity (in the sense of shared 
Otherness) might be important, accounts were rather more nuanced than women 
positioning gay men as Tike’ them in some categorical sense. Indeed some 
specifically attended to the benefits of having a male ‘point of view’, although 
this reifies masculinity and there was some ambiguity about gay men’s 
‘maleness’.
In common with the interviewees’ accounts of similarity and shared 
interests, analysis of Will & Grace focused in an instance where shared sexual or 
romantic interest in the same man produced a conflict of interest that threatened 
their friendship. Whilst constructing their similarity (e.g. both giving their ‘date’ 
identical bottles of wine) as a central aspect of friendship, there appear to be 
circumstances where shared interests produce conflict.
Interviewees attended to the discourse of compulsory heterosexuality 
(Rich, 1980) in different ways. The presumption that sexual desire complicates 
friendship (especially when not reciprocated) is seen to threaten (heterosexual) 
cross-gender friendship. The title of Bleske and Buss’s (2000) paper ‘Can men 
and women be just friends?’ exemplifies the ‘problem’ from an evolutionary 
standpoint. Some interviewees articulated relief at the lack of sexual 
complication between them, although this does locate sexual desire within men 
rather than women (Hollway, 1984). It was not the intention of the interviews to
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‘uncover’ previously hidden or unconscious sexual desire between friends. Such 
a line of questioning would be very awkward for many people and potentially 
disruptive to the interviews (and possibly the friendships). The matter was 
approached more in terms of how the dyads thought others perceived them. The 
(potential) ‘misreading’ of their friendship as heterosexual romance was 
generally a source of humour and something they played with in ways potentially 
quite challenging to heteronormativity. However, they were fairly consistent in 
their refusal that anything sexual could ever occur between them. Note this was 
not in response to a question posed in the interviews, but seemed instead to form 
a necessary part of constructing their friendships as legitimately asexual. Where 
such possibilities were hypothetically discussed they were framed in the negative 
(as something that would never occur) and situated in the context of 
drunkenness, thus further distancing them from such an event.
Others toyed with presumed heterosexuality by discussing ways in which 
they had (or could have) disrupted the assumption that emotionally close women 
and men must (or should) be romantically or sexually involved. There was 
resistance to the requirement they account for their relationship, but also scope 
for fun in producing confusion in others. Similarly a feature of Will & Grace is a 
strand of humour that plays with the possibility of heterosexual romance. As with 
the participants, Will’s sexual identity has a powerful effect in disclaiming any 
such possibility. Thus the potential for sexual desire to threaten the platonic 
construction of friendship is minimal. However this reinforces the dichotomy 
between friendship and romantic or sexual relations.
Many aspects of interviewees (and media accounts like Will & Grace) 
were read in terms of parodie potential. Analysis showed parody being used to 
combat homophobia, yet leaving open questions about how it might be read by 
others. It is, for the purposes of this thesis, unknowable what onlookers thought 
of Dave and Katie’s kiss. And although they co-constructed it as triumphing over 
prejudice, Dave’s account does so in a way that draws upon implicitly sexist 
discourse which went unchallenged within the interview. Similarly within Will & 
Grace heterosexual norms are often inverted for comedic effect (often by Jack) 
which suggests potentially progressive representation. However, within the same 
episode regressive sexual norms are shown to be imposed upon Grace and Will.
198
>This is understood in terms of sitcom structure where the overarching narrative 
might pull in one ideological direction, while individual jokes, gags and set piece 
scenes perform something quite different. .
The discourse of excess consumption was used to provide accounts of 
fun. It is of course unknowable whether the precise details of the cocktails and 
alcohol drunk correspond with ‘reality’ (although a less relativist reading might 
cause a health psychologist concern!). Also the association of alcohol 
consumption with youth is not necessarily specific to these friendships. However, 
we might see sexual (and to a less extent, gender) identity being performed 
through the accounts of colourful cocktails (e.g. blue curaçao). Clearly it is an 
account that resonates with me as the interviewer when, having already 
established my gay identity, I exclaimed ‘You’re the only other people I know 
who drink that stuff (Chapter 5, Extract 2) thus implicitly responding to a shared 
position. Despite, as I recall, quite rarely drinking blue curaçao (and usually 
regretting the choice) I articulated apparent enthusiasm that seems to respond to a 
shared knowledge attached to identity rather than representing ‘authentic’ 
enjoyment of the drink. Given the gendering of drinks (e.g. a pint of beer vs a 
glass of rosé) it seems possible there is a sexuality of drinks. Holt and Griffin 
(2005: 418) note the focus on ‘boutique drinks’ in gay bars and clubs 
(coincidentally, like Katie and Dave, also in Birmingham) and the way people 
are encouraged to express their ‘true’ selves through consumption of food, drink 
and of course clothing.
Dave and Katie construct his gay identity through claimed ownership of 
twenty-six fur coats (Extract 7) and when Emily had Mike come to stay; his 
clothes took over her room (Extract 6). Through the account of Dave’s drag 
performance, which he insisted must be made public; there is a challenging of 
norms that is constructed boldly through the potential dangers of physical attack. 
However, it is also an account that leaves Katie in the shade. Although also 
dressed up, her gender conformity makes Katie his accessory. This gives a hint 
of the tension between feminist and queer politics. Whilst some accounts 
construct the interviewees as (potentially) playing with others’ perceptions in a 
mutual way, challenges to heteronormativity do not seem inherently feminist and 
sometimes appear to act against the interests of women.
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>The interview data has an obvious limitation in that participants were co- 
constructing an account of friendship for a stranger and so there was little 
evidence of disagreement. In contrast Will & Grace uses arguments, 
misunderstandings and tension to produce dramatic or comedic effects. The 
analysis in chapter 8 focuses on an episode where Will helps Grace with a 
problem but does so in a way that appears humiliating and sexist. The 
programme constructs a discourse of friendship that encompasses helpfulness, 
but struggles to reconcile a series of disrespectful speech acts with friendship. 
Although Will’s ridiculing of Grace is apparently part of a strategy to help her, 
these utterances are at odds with normative friendship posing a brief crisis where 
the authenticity of their friendship is queried. This suggests a cultural 
representation of friendship that asserts the importance of mutual respect.
The interviewees’ focus on media representations resonated with 
colleagues and people at academic conferences who, when presented the 
interview data, frequently responded by talking about television programmes like 
Will & Grace. My own growing file of newspaper and magazine clippings 
suggested the topic was being treated as a ‘phenomenon’ albeit not entirely 
seriously. (Perhaps this was through associations with sitcoms, or maybe as the 
result of a wider failure to take friendship seriously, both inside and outside of 
academia, c.f. Rose, 2000.) Certainly Chapter 6 indicates accounts for friendship 
focusing on the personalApersonality’ rather than attending to more political 
concerns. Unlike familial relationships, friendships are voluntary (Griffin, 2002) 
and interviewees’ articulated the process of friendship formation in terms of 
compatibility of individual personalities. This perhaps suggests that discourses of 
friendship itself are richer in the inter-personal domain rather than the political.
Groups consulted on internet forums were apparently able to construct 
lists of representations of these friendships with relative ease. That the 
representation was seemingly something they could identify and agree upon (no 
answers were challenged or deemed ‘wrong’) suggested that it had some cultural 
currency. It is important to emphasise that it was not a survey so frequency of 
response was not particularly meaningful, especially when you consider that not 
all representations are equivalent (e.g. one episode of a serial drama vs. 194 
episodes of Will & Grace). However, when the dates of each representation were
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tconsidered it became clear that most fell within the preceding ten years. 
Chronologically this corresponds with the literature on gay representation 
becoming both more overt and evaluated in more liberal terms (Pullen, 2009). In 
other words, whilst gay men were either invisible or pathologised, their 
friendships would go largely unrepresented. So this may indicate the emergence 
of a new discourse.
The sitcom format itself can be seen as a framework on which to hang a 
series of set piece scenes and jokes (Mills, 2005). Consequently the overarching 
narrative might have one ideological orientation, whereas individual jokes and 
utterances might be doing something quite different. From this perspective the 
analysis in Chapter 7 looks at how individual jokes may invert heterosexuality, 
thus challenging sexual norms whilst recurrent motifs (e.g. Grace and Will being 
‘married’) reassert them. Consequently Will & Grace is simultaneously 
progressive and regressive. Despite claims that ‘greater [gay] visibility equals 
greater social acceptance’ (Battles & Hilton-Morrow, 2002: 89) one thing does 
not always follow from the other, anymore than ‘the success of The Coshy Show 
in the 1980s signalled the end of racism’ (Dow, 2001).
The other problem for representations of these friendships is that, 
although women have been underrepresented in many media forms or positioned 
in ways feminists have found problematic, it is gay representation that is more 
novel. Numerically there are fewer gay men than heterosexual women and gay 
representation (in terms of visibility) has lagged behind that of women. 
Consequently the focal point of Will & Grace is gay rather than female. Mitchell 
(2005: 1052) raised the prospect of a ‘liberal façade’, the progressive gay politics 
concealing problematic issues of race and class. Will’s patriarchal positioning 
suggests the same problem for feminists and is reminiscent of the use of sexist 
language to challenge homophobia (Chapter 4, Extract 4). Whilst Richardson 
(1996) and interviewees like Amitis suggest a more progressive outlook with 
some kind of alliance based on mutual non-normativity, there are disturbing 
suggestions that one form of oppression is being traded off against another. 
Furthermore, is it morally worse for gay men to use sexist discourse, when they 
should have more knowledge of sexual politics? Or can gay men ‘get away with’ 
sexist utterances that would be challenged if they came from a heterosexual man?
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»Data gathered in a previous project suggest there may be circumstances where 
gay men are permitted access to heterosexual women in ways that other men are 
not (Shepperd, Coyle, Hegarty & Lyons, 2003). Perhaps gay identity inoculates 
against claims of sexism or makes some utterances hearable as ironic rather than 
‘authentic’ sexism.
Jeffreys’ (1991, 2003, 2005) extensive critiquing of gay men and their 
relationship with (lesbian) feminism suggests that despite queer theory’s 
suggestion of post-identity politics men still have too much invested in 
masculinity to give it up easily. Furthermore, she sees the gender inversion 
discourse of gay men as signalling their subordinate position and thus hatred of 
femininity. She cites Eric Rotes’ (1998: 46) discussion of the ‘ick factor’ and 
‘tuna jokes’ in relation to women’s genitals and specifically lesbian sex. 
Although Rotes articulates guilt about his reaction and lays claim to pro-feminist 
credentials, Jeffreys is consistently doubtful of gay men as allies. I think she has 
good reason to be suspicious given the history of attempted alliances and the 
analyses presented here. Furthermore, accounts of heterosexual women and gay 
men parodying heterosexual norms in a way Butler (1990, 1993) might approve 
of, are not clearly identifiable as transformative or recapitulation. The co­
constructions given by the interviewees are fuzzier and more nuanced than the 
theoretical categories of parody vs. recapitulation some queer theorists or 
feminists’ suggest.
9.2 Further Research
The focus on pairs of friends was entirely acceptable to some 
interviewees who clearly positioned the friendship between the two of them as 
particularly significant (e.g. close, enduring). However for other participants it 
was apparent from their continual references to other friends that they were part 
of a wider social group. Consequently the focus on dyads was not always 
appropriate and potentially missed a richer and more systemic account. Some 
artificial limitation on the number of people who took part in a larger interview 
or focus group would be inevitable in terms of how many people could be 
involved from a practical point of view.
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It is possible that a more ethnographic approach where a network of 
friends could be explored and interviewed over time would be fruitful. 
Potentially it could lead back to some of the original ethical concerns about 
interviewees being aware that they might have been spoken about behind their 
back. However, over a longer period of contact time and with a shifting of 
participants to something more akin to co-researchers the necessary trust might 
be established.
Throughout the proj ect people have expressed interest in the research, 
sometimes offering themselves as participants only to find they did not meet the 
inclusion criteria. However it was clear that many people other than heterosexual 
women and gay men (e.g. bisexuals, lesbians and some heterosexual men) were 
interested in how sexual identity intersected with friendship. The research area 
was originally conceived as an undergraduate dissertation (at Aston University) 
and to some degree reflected my experience as a gay man with many 
heterosexual female friends. In recent years I have come to have more 
heterosexual male friends. What discourses might I use to account for such a 
change (e.g. changes of circumstances, location, and new shared interests)? 
Would I construct my identity in a slightly different way?
Some magazines have covered close friendships between people like 
Matt Lucas (a gay man) and David Walliams (a heterosexual man) as a new 
‘phenomenon’. It seems doubtful that it is ‘new’ in the sense of these friendships 
previously not existing, but the prominence perhaps suggests something about 
gay friends being less threatening to heterosexual masculinity. David Beckham’s 
very public friendship with Elton John hints at versions of heterosexual 
masculinities that courts gay attention (not least through his modelling work). 
There is even a term to describe heterosexual men who have gay male friends 
(Tag stag') and an increasing number of heterosexually identified who men are 
publicly arguing for gay rights (e.g. Matt Damon).
Whilst some research possibilities reflect progressive political changes, 
others attend to more problematic issues. The interviews took place and the 
discourses of excess and consumerism identified prior to the economic recession. 
However in the light of this, and questions about environmental sustainability, 
there is a potential problem with yoking gay identity and discourses of fun with
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1consumption. How would some of these gay identities be reconstructed in the 
absence of certain material goods (e.g. blue cocktails and fur coats)? Indeed one 
need not even be pessimistic about the environmental or economic future to 
consider the many people (even within the UK) whose income could not service 
such a lifestyle. If as D’Emilio (1983) suggests, modem gay identity emerged 
from a particular set of material circumstances, economic, historical and 
increased urbanisation, what will happen if (or when) these circumstances 
change. How would gay identity operate in a world of dwindling resources? I 
don’t think this is something that can reasonably be predicted (and certainly not 
on the basis of this thesis) but it is important to reflect that improved rights and 
liberties are not assured and sexual identities have been shown to shift in the 
past, so nothing means they are now fixed.
Much of this project has been predicated on the assumption that gay 
men's sexual identity makes sex with a woman an unlikely event (and it was 
certainly constructed as an impossibility by interviewees). However, a different 
kind of study interviewing individuals (perhaps including other genders and 
sexual identities) who had been sexually intimate with a friend would be a 
fascinating area of study. One prospective participant excluded himself from 
Study One by initiating a romantic relationship with his best female friend and 
they are now married. Although potentially sensitive and raising numerous 
ethical and methodological concerns, such an avenue might add to the growing - 
body of literature questioning the binary friend/lover dichotomy (e.g. Nardi, 
1999).
9.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, participants emphasised the mutual support and pleasure 
derived from their friendships (albeit in an interview situation requiring a co­
constructed mutually satisfying account). The absence of sexual desire in 
interviews and the analysis of Will & Grace suggests adherence to a discourse of 
asexual friendship that has to manage heteronormative expectations about 
emotionally close men and women. There may be potential advantages of cross­
sex friendship stripped of the ‘threat’ of heterosexual male desire. The clarity this 
apparently provides suggests the dichotomy of friendship versus sexual or
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romantic involvement is an important dimension in the construction of 
interpersonal relations. Part of this discourse emphasises uncomplicated cross­
sex friendship which may be valuable to those involved, but conforms to broader 
norms of interaction. Interviewees and examples from Will & Grace suggest 
instances where the heterosexual romantic norm is parodied. The effects are 
often humorous but also draw attention to implicit cultural norms.
The scope of these friendships to resist heteropatriarchy may be limited 
by the separation of interpersonal alliances from the broader domain of ‘public’ 
political action. Accounts of apparent challenges to heteronormativity operate 
within a discourse of fun or support for a friend at a personal level. The 
construction of friendship accommodates pleasure more easily than politics. It 
may be that the (inter)personal basis of friendship is undermined by political 
discourses that may not sufficiently value the individual. By returning to the 
feminist idea that the personal is political, and challenging the view that romantic 
or sexual relationships should be organised hierarchically above (asexual) 
friendship, there may be better ways of constructing the sexual politics of 
friendship.
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Appendix 1 -  Recruitment Material (Flyer)
Gay Men
Straight Women
My name is Dan Shepperd and I'm a researcher at the 
University of Surrey. I'd like to interview, in pairs, gay 
men and straight women who are friends with each 
other. You could either be best friends or part of a 
larger group. You may have known each other for 
years or only a few  months. I'm interesting in 
speaking with people of many different ages+ and 
backgrounds.
If you agree to take part in my research you would 
need to give up just over an hour of your time (this is 
slightly flexible depending on how much you talk!). 
Although the interview will be recorded and later 
transcribed, it is designed to be quite light-hearted 
and enjoyable. I'm based in Guildford but will happily 
travel to other parts of the south-east (e .g . to 
London) to m eet with you at a mutually-convenient 
place (many people find it easiest to do this at their 
own home). You and your friend would both need to 
be available at the sam e time but w e can arrange a 
time to suit you.
If you think you might be interested in taking part or 
have any questions email me 
(d.shepperd@surrey.ac.uk) or call me on 01483  
682880 (shared office so ask for me by name) or 
07711 338 339 (my mobile).
T Must be at least 18 years old
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Appendix 2 -  Recruitment Material - ‘Frequently Asked Questions’
Gay Men
&
Straight Women
frequently
asked
questions
Who can take part in the study?
First you need to be an adult (18 years or over) 
however there  is no upper age limit You should 
either be a straight woman or a gay man.
What if I'm not a gay man or a straight 
woman, but am still interested?
In a few m onths time I will be interviewing other 
groups of people. If you think you would like to 
know more, contact me and we can discuss any 
contribution you might wish to  make.
Do we have to be close friends?
You should know each other quite well but don't 
need to  be "best friends". You can have known
each other for years or for a much shorter time. 
It's really up to  you.
What will it involve?
I will interview you with your friend and the  three 
of us will discuss th e  topic of friendship. You might 
well wish to  talk about the things you do together 
as part of th e  interview.
Do I get paid for participating?
I'm afraid not, but I'm happy to  provide 
refreshments.
How long will it take?
Really it's up to  you. It all depends on how long 
you talk. Many friends spend quite a while 
reminiscing and a re  surprised how fast time goes 
by. You should allow a t least an hour, but I am 
happy to  talk for longer if the  both of you so wish.
What sort of questions will I be asked?
There will be a few biographical ones to start with 
(e.g. age, occupation...). Then I'll ask questions 
about what you g e t up to, how you first m et and 
so on.
What exactly is an interview?
These interviews will be a three-way recorded 
conversation in which I will ask questions and 
raise points for discussion. There are  no right or 
wrong answers - ju st your own thoughts, 
memories and ideas. You will have a lot of latitude 
to talk about things that interest you and obviously 
you won't be obliged to answer any questions that 
you don 't want to answer!
What's the tape recording for?
With your permission III tape-record the  
discussion so th a t I can later transcribe what 
we've all said.
What about my privacy?
Although I'm not setting out to  ask personal 
questions I do respect your right to  privacy. The 
tapes will be stored safely and ultimately 
destroyed. The transcription will not have your real 
names on it and I'll remove any details th a t might 
identify you to  other people.
What is this research for?
This research forms part of my PhD, however it 
will also be submitted for publication in a social 
science journal.
Where would we do the interview?
Interviews can either be a t th e  University of Surrey 
or, if you live in the  south-east or west-midlands I 
can come to  you. Pubs, bars and cafes tend  not to 
be ideal places for interviews but living rooms are 
just fine.
When can we do the interview?
Contact me to discuss times. W eekdays, evenings 
and weekends are all feasible.
How can I take part?
Contact m e, Dan Shepperd, by emailing 
d.shepperd@ surrey.ac.uk or by calling my mobile 
(07711 338 339).
[N.B. Rescaled from A4 landscape]
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Appendix 3 -  Participant Consent Form 
Participant's Consent Form
The interview is not intended to make you feel uncomfortable and should 
hopefully be an enjoyable and interesting discussion. In the event that I do ask 
you something that makes you feel less comfortable please remember than you 
aren't obliged to answer and are free to withdraw at any time.
A tape recording will be made during the interview. This will be used on ly  for 
the purposes of transcription. Tapes will be kept securely and ultimately 
destroyed. When transcribing the tape I will replace your real names with 
pseudonyms and where necessary delete sections that might identify you to 
ensure that your privacy is respected.
I f  you would like a copy of the transcript please let me know and I will make 
one available to you. Along with other similar transcripts it will be analysed in 
terms of themes and use of language as part of the research for my PhD.
I hope very much that you will enjoy this discussion. However should you have 
any questions or concerns please let me know.
I understand and agree to the terms
outlined above and consent to participate in the research.
Signature
Date
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Appendix 4 -  Participant Debriefing Information 
Friendship Interview
Thank you for your involvement in this research. You may wish to keep this 
sheet as it contains my contact details. Should you have any questions or 
concerns that arise after the interview please do not hesitate to contact me.
0  Dan Shepperd E7 d.shepperd@surrey.ac.uk
Department of Psychology ( 07711 338 339
University of Surrey 01483 682880
Guildford 
GU2 7XH
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Appendix 5 -  Interview Materials -  Biographical Information (completed by 
participants)
[Over leaf]
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Friendship Interview -  Biographical Questionnaire
Please complete the following questionnaire. All questions are optional so only 
answer if you feel comfortable doing so. Should you have any questions please 
direct them to the interviewer.
In order that participants are not publicly identifiable a pseudonym will be 
allocated to you and your real name will not be used in any reports.
Name
Age Gender
Occupation
Ethnicity
Please choose the most appropriate section (a to e) and then indicate your cultural 
background with a tick.
(a) White
British
Irish
Other (please specify)
(b) Mixed
White and Black Caribbean
White and Black African
White and Asian
Other mixed background (please specify)
fc) Asian or Asian British
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Other Asian background (please specify)
fd) Black or Black British
Caribbean
African
Other (please specify)
(e) Chinese or Other Ethnic Group
Chinese
Other (please specify)
Qualifications
What is your highest qualification? (please tick)
None ■
GCSE(s)/0 level(s)/CSE(s)
A level(s)
Diploma
Degree
Postgraduate degree
Please turn over...
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Sexuality
Which of the following best describes your sexual feelings? (Please tick)
Exclusively homosexual
Mainly homosexual with a small degree of heterosexuality
Mainly homosexual with a substantial degree of heterosexuality
Equally homosexual and heterosexual
Mainly heterosexual with a substantial degree of homosexuality
Mainly heterosexual with a small degree of homosexuality
Exclusively heterosexual
Other (please specify)
Relationship Status
What is your current relationship status? (please tick)
No partner i
Casual partner !
Regular partner ;
Cohabiting 1
Married I
Other (please specify) 1
Living Arrangements
Do your share your home with any of the following? (please tick all that apply)
Partner 1
Spouse 1
Friends
Children
Other (please specify)
None
For Official Use Only 
Participant ID 
Date
Pair ID 
Location
Appendix 6 -  Interview Material -  Time Line (for participants to complete)
Friendship Interview  - Friendship Time-line
First
Meeting Today
[N.B. Rescaled from A4 landscape]
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Appendix 7 -  Interview Schedule
Introduction
Introduce myself (may include name, university, phd student). Thank them for 
letting me be there. Before going further explain that I don’t intend to ask 
particular personal questions and certainly don’t mean to ask anything offensive 
but if they would prefer not to answer certain things that is okay. Give them 
consent forms which detail ethic issues more closely and just draw their attention 
to the privacy issues (i.e. that pseudonyms will be allocated) and the tape- 
recording/transcription issue [Remember to start the tape!]. Explain that the tape 
is "to make sure I have a full and accurate account of your friendship in 
your words”. Check if there are any questions.
Having been all formal it should be said that hopefully they will enjoy the 
interview and should see it as more of a conversation in which they should feel 
free to talk about stuff they’ve done, anecdotes and suchlike.
Say that I’m talking to pairs of friends about how they came to be friends, what 
they do together, how other people view them etc... The idea that “some people 
believe that gay men and straight women can be particularly close friends.” 
Also that all of this is a hot media topic at the moment.
“Before we go further, do you have any concerns or questions you’d like us 
to address before we really get started?”.
Demographic Information
Hand out self-completion questionnaires. “To start with, I’d just like to know a 
few basic details about you. Could I ask you to complete the details on these 
questionnaires?” If appropriate ask for examples, especially on issues like 
living arrangements.
How the Friendship Started
“Perhaps now we could move on to talking about your friendship. How was 
it that you first met?” [Prompts: When was that? Where were you at the time? 
What were you doing then? Was it through other people? To other interviewee: 
Was that how you remember it? What else do you remember about that?]
“What did you think of each other when you first met?” [Prompts: What was 
your first impression? Did that first impression change over time? If yes, how did 
it change?]
“I’m interested in how things developed from that first meeting until the time 
when you started to think of yourselves as friends”
“When was the first time you thought of each other as friends?” [Prompts:
When did you first think o f  as a friend  rather than an acquaintance!
What do you think led you to start thinking o f  as a friend? To other
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interviewee: How about you? Was it the same time? What do you think 
happened? If there is a difference in reported timing, invite them to explain this]
"OK, so I’ve got a sense of the early part of your friendship. Now I’d like to 
look at what happened since then. I’d like you to think of this line as 
covering the history of your friendship [Show them the time line on a separate 
sheet]. Over here on the far left is the time that you first met and here is the 
time when you started to think of yourselves as friends. Over here on the far 
right is where you are now today. I’d like you to mark on this line those 
things that you consider to be milestones in the development of your 
friendship. Just mark when they occurred and write something to identify 
each milestone. Then I’ll ask you about those milestones.”
If there are lots of milestones ask them to highlight three or four important ones.
OK, let’s look at the first of these milestones. Could you tell me about it?
[Prompts: Could you tell me a bit more about that? How did you feel about that? 
What happened to your friendship after that?]
Friendship -  Present
“Thank you for that. I’d like to come right into the present and first of all to 
look at how you see each other now”
“If you both imagine for a moment that the other person is going to move 
into a flat or a house with some existing tenants and that they want a 
character reference from someone who knows them well. What sorts of 
things might you write in a reference for each other?” [Prompts: Are there
things that you think would make a good person to live with? What if they
wanted to know more about the person as an individual?]
Now I want to look at your friendship in the present. At the moment, how 
often do you meet up?” [Prompts: Do you meet as often as you’d like? What 
stops you meeting? When you meet, do you see each other for long?]
“What do you mostly do when you meet up?” [Prompts: Where do you meet? 
Do you do other things as well? What other interests do you have? Do you go out 
as part of a group? Is that something you do with other people?]
“How do you decide what you want to do together, how to spend your 
time?” [Do you go to gay venues together? Straight venues? “Neutral”? What 
sort of proportion of time spent in each?]
“What sorts of things do you most frequently talk about?” [Prompts: Are 
there things you talk about particularly with each other? Do you have a favourite 
topic of conversation?]
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"Are there things you talk about that you wouldn’t discuss with other 
people?” [Prompts: What do you discuss more with each other than with other 
friends? Are there things you only talk about with each other?]
Memories
“Has there been a time when you have particularly valued your friendship
with each other?” (Prompts: Has there been a time when______ was
particularly helpful/kind?]
“Not all friendships run smoothly all the time. Have you ever hit any 
difficult patches or nearly lost touch for some reason?” [Prompts: Was there 
ever a point where you felt a bit more distant? Are there things you argue or 
disagree on? How do/did you deal with that sort of thing?]
“How did you resolve it/things?”
Talk about the way that people often look back at photos of friends and reminisce 
about fond memories. “Perhaps I could ask you to imagine for a moment that 
you could go back in time and get a snapshot of the two of you doing 
something -  a photo that might say something about your friendship. What 
would it be?” [Prompt: What would you be doing? Where would you be?]
“How would you feel about trying to sketch the photo or image if I gave you 
a pen and paper?” If they are unsure about drawing abilities: “It can be very 
basic, stick people if you like.” If they are comfortable then give them a pen and 
paper otherwise move on. If they draw something ask to borrow it to photocopy.
“Maybe you could tell me a bit more about what’s in the photo” [Prompts: Is 
this something you do regularly? Is this something you’d like to do [more often]? 
Were you with other people? Is there anything you’d like to add?
“Why did you choose this photo? What do you think it says about your 
friendship?”
Gay /  Straight
Where the interview includes an openly gay man: “Did you know was
gay when you first starting becoming friends?” [Prompts: Did you “come out”
to ______ ? Did this change your friendship in any way? Are there things that you
(can) do (now that you know/because) is gay? How did you feel about that
at the time?]
“Have there ever been times when, from your perspective, being friends as a gay 
man and a straight woman has created difficulties?”
“Do you know other straight men and straight women who are friends?”
[Prompts: Do they do the same things as you? What might they do differently/not
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do? Are there things they can’t do? Could you make comparisons with pairs of 
straight men and straight women that you know?]
Third Parties
[If partnered] “What do(es) your partner(s) make of your friendship?”
“Do your families ever comment on your friendship?” [Prompt: What do they 
make of it?]
“Do you have mutual friends?” [Prompts: Are they people you see together? 
Could you tell me a bit about them?]
“How do you think they might describe your friendship?” [Prompts: What 
aspects of your friendship do you think they most admire? What might they least 
admire?]
“Do people ever assume that you are a couple in the romantic sense?”
[Prompts: Why do you think that might be? What stops them from thinking that? 
What do you do when it happens? How do you feel when it happens?]
Close
Briefly reflect back on what they have said to invite comment.
“If you had the power, what would you want other people to know about a) 
your friendship [pause and let them answer!] and b) friendships between 
straight women and gay men in general?”
Ask if there is anything they would like to add or anything they would like to 
clarify. Have there been positive things about this interview or more difficult 
things? Is there anything they would like to ask of me? Thank the participants. 
Hand out debriefing sheet. Explain that they can contact me about any aspect of 
the research and to contact me within two months if they want a copy of the 
transcript.
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Appendix 8 -  Sample Interview Transcript
Interview 1 -  2 2 /0 2 /0 4
Sarah is a 39 year old graphic designer and her friend, John, is also 39 years old, 
and works as an account manager. Both interviewees describe themselves as 
White British.
The Interview was conducted at John’s home on the South Coast by Dan 
Shepperd with Adrian Coyle.
[Transcript begins over leaf]
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1 John : I ' l l  p u t  t h e  c a t  o u t  a c t u a l l y ,  s h e ' l l  g e t  ■ [ ( ) ■ •
2 A d r ia n :  [ N o  s h e ' s  o k a y .
3 Dan : Anyway [ .
4 J: [ Have ( . ) we s t a r t e d ?
5 D: T h a t ' s  s e t  up ( . )  we s h o u l d  b e  r u n n in g  now.
6 J: I ' l l  h a v e  t o  c h e c k  my t o m a t o e s  i n  t e n  m i n u t e s .
7 D: Y eah, [ s u r e .
8 J: [ I s  t h a t  a l r i g h t  t h e n ?  ( . )  and make a cup  o f  t e a .
9 A: No ( . )  y e s .  You c a n  s t o p  and s t a r t  w h e n e v e r .
10 D: Yeah ( . )  a l s o  I ' v e  g o t  a s u p p l y  o f  b o t t l e s  o f  m i n e r a l  w a t e r .
11 J: Ahh
12 S arah Ahh
13 D: In  c a s e  you  g e t  t h i r s t y .
14 J: I ' d  l i k e  a p i n a  c o l a d a  i f  y o u ' v e  g o t  o n e  o f  t h o s e .
15 D: I 'm  a f r a i d  i t  d o e s n ' t  s t r e t c h  [ t h a t  f a r .
16 J: [ Okay.
17 D: I ' v e  g o t  F a n ta  som ew h ere .
18 A: And I ' v e  g o t  some s c o n e s  i f  you  want ( ) .
19 (( l a u g h t e r ) )
20 D: Okay ( . ) b u t  ( . )  b e f o r e  we go any  f u r t h e r  w i t h  t h i s  (. ) a r e  you
21 happy  w i t h  (. ) t h e s e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  h e r e ?
22 S : Y e s .
23 J: Y eah.
24 D: B a s i c a l l y  I was gonna  (.) t a l k  w i t h  you  t o d a y  a b o u t  y o u r
25 f r i e n d s h i p  and (.) I w o n d ered  i f  we c o u l d  (. ) i f  we c o u l d  s t a r t
26 a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  b y  l o o k i n g  a t  how you  f i r s t  (. ) m et?
27 J: Oh, i t  was j u s t  l o v e  a t  f i r s t  s i g h t .  No, n o ,  i t  was a [ work (
28 )
29 S : [ NO, i t
30 was (.) you w ere  w o r k in g  w i t h  a f r i e n d  who was l o d g i n g  w i t h  me.
31 J: T h a t ' s  c o r r e c t .
32 S : And t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  I saw [ John he  came ro u n d  o n e  e v e n i n g
33 J: [ S s s s
34 S: t o  go  o u t  w i t h  S a ra h . [ and I m et him i n  t h e  h a l l w a y .
35 J: [ Y e s ,  t h a t ' s  r i g h t . Was t h a t  when t h e
36 dog  was i l l ?
37 S: No, i t  was a t  my f l a t  [ i n  B r i g h t o n .
38 J: [ Ah g o o d .  I h ad  m e m o r ie s  t h a t  i t  was (
39 ) , oh y e s  i t  w a s .
40 S: And he l o o k e d  a l l  e a g e r  and ( . )  j o l l y .
236
41 J: Yeah ( . )  t h a t ' s  n i c e . And we m et i n  a pub d i d n ' t  we? In
42 Shoreham?
43 Si I c a n ' t  ( . )  [ I  c a n ' t  rem em b er .
44 J: [ Yeah ( . ) ,  s o  i t  was [ t h r o u g h  f r i e n d s .
45 S: [ t h r o u g h  o t h e r  p e o p l e .
46 A: B u t ,  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  was when you  came round?
47 J: Y e s .
4 8 S: When h e  came ro u n d  t o  c o l l e c t  S a r a h . S o , t h a t ' s  p r o b a b l y  a b o u t
49 t w e l v e  o r  t h i r t e e n  [ y e a r s  ago  now.
50 J: [ .h h h  ( . )  y e a h ,  s h i t .
51 D: , And ( . )  you  remember t h a t  a s  b e i n g  ( . )  a b o u t  t h e  same t im e
52 t w e l v e  o r  t h i r t e e n  y e a r s  ago  do you?
53 J: Y e a h .
54 S: Y eah.
55 D: And (. ) what d i d  you  t h i n k  o f  e a c h  o t h e r .w h e n  you  f i r s t  m et?
56 J: I ' d  ( s l a p )  h e r  !
57 ( ( l a u g h t e r ) )
58 S: No (. ) what d i d  you  t h i n k  o f  me?
59 ( ( l a u g h t e r ) )
60 D: D id  you  know a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  e a c h  o t h e r  (. ) i n  a d v a n c e ?
61 S: No =
62 J: = No.
63 S: A l l  I knew i s  t h a t  h e  w orked  w i t h  (. ) my f r i e n d  was t e m p in g  a t
64 t h e  same p l a c e  a s  John w orked  a t .  And I j u s t  h e a r d  t h a t  h e  was
65 a l a u g h .
66 J: Ah, t h a t ' s  n i c e .
67 S: I d i d n ' t  a g r e e  w i t h  h e r . '
68 J: I ' l l  s t i c k  w i t h  my f i r s t  s t a t e m e n t .
69 ( ( l a u g h t e r ) )
70 Now (.) w h a t ' s  t h e  q u e s t i o n ?
71 S: D id  we know a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  e a c h  o t h e r .
72 D: And (. ) [
73 J: [ A  l i t t l e  b i t ,  y e a h .  I m et h e r  t h r o u g h  ( ) S a r a h .
74 A: And w hat had you  h e a r d ?
75 J: (.) I d o n ' t  know. I c a n ' t  (.) you know (.) I d o n ' t  r e m em b er .
76 A: W e ll  y e a h  [ ( ) i t  i s  a l o n g  t im e  a g o .
77 J: [ ( ) (. ) e x a c t l y .
78 S: I j u s t  remember (.) b e i n g  t o l d  t h a t  h e  was (.) a lw a y s  m ak in g
79 (.) p r a c t i c a l  j o k e s  (.) and t h a t  h e  was g o o d  fu n  t o  work w i t h
80 J: = Ah. T h a t ' s  t h a t ' s  (.) v e r y  t r u e .
81 D: So t h a t  (.) t h a t ' s  what you  h e a r d  i n  a d v a n c e ?
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82 S: My f i r s t  i m p r e s s i o n  [ was t h a t  he  seem ed  e a g e r  t o  b e  f r i e n d l y
83 J: [ Oh god
84 S: and ( . )  [ and  ( . )  c h a t
85 J: [ D id  I?  R e a l l y ?  Oh god. ( ( l a u g h s ))  Yeah w e l l  I
86 remember t h a t  you  w ere  f r i e n d l y  th o u g h  a s  w e l l . You d i d  ( . )  you
87 know j o k e s . S a ra h  was fu n n y  ( . )  you  know ( . )  I  p i c k e d  up on
88 t h a t .
89 D: So [ you
90 J: [ N ot j u s t  fu n n y  l o o k i n g .
91 ( ( l a u g h t e r ) )
92 D: So ( . ) '  w ere  y o u r  f i r s t  i m p r e s s i o n s  a n y t h i n g  l i k e  w hat you  had
93 b e e n  l e d  t o  b e l i e v e ?
94 J: Y e s .
95 S: Y es .
96 D: Any d i f f e r e n t ?
97 J: No ( . )  i t s  l i k e  when you  bu y  a h o u s e  you  know i n  e l e v e n  s e c o n d s
98 w h e t h e r  you  l i k e  i t .
99 ( ( l a u g h t e r ) )
100 D: I was i n t e r e s t e d  ( . )  a s  w e l l ,  i n  how i t  was t h a t  you  a c t u a l l y
101 came t o  b e  f r i e n d s  ( . ) and t h e  f i r s t  p o i n t  t h a t  you  a c t u a l l y
102 s t a r t e d  t o  t h i n k  o f  e a c h  o t h e r  a s  f r i e n d s .
103 J: Wur (.) w e l l  t h a t  was t h r o u g h  work w a s n ' t  i t ?
104 S: E v e n t u a l l y  I (.) w e l l  S a ra h  was t e m p in g  t h e r e  w a s n ' t  s h e  [ (.)
105 J: [
106 Yeah
107 S: and s h e  ( l e f t ) t o  A u s t r a l i a .
108 J: Yeah (.) and I saw y o u r  c . v .  on t h e  t a b l e .
109 S: I h o u s e  s a t  f o r  my p a r e n t s  on h o l i d a y  w i t h  h e r  b e c a u s e  o u r  dog
110 was v e r y  i l l  (.) and (.) and S a ra h  came o v e r  [, and John  came
111 ( . ) and
112 J: [ t h a t ' s  r i g h t
113 S: and came ro u n d  t h e r e  t o  go o u t  w i t h  h e r  a g a i n  o r  s o m e t h i n g .
114 J: Y e s ,  y e s ,  I c a n ' t  remember (.) i t  was l a t e .
115 S: And I was (.) I d o n ' t  t h i n k  I was i n  =
116 J: = no you  w e r e n ' t .
117 S: I ' d  b e e n  a p p l y i n g  f o r  a j o b  and I ' d  l e f t  my c . v .  on t h e  d i n i n g
118 room t a b l e .
119 J: ’Hmm (.) A l l d a y s  w ere  f u l l  up a t  t h a t  t i m e .
120 S: And John (.) r e a d  i t .  And t h o u g h t  t h a t  [ t h e y  c o u l d  (.)
121 J: [ c o s  we w ere  j u s t
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122 S: cos I'm a graphie designer and (.) they use maps and he thought
123 I could start up (.) might be interested to start up that side
124 of the business.
125 D: Right.
126 J: I read it in somebody else's house.
127 S: I noticed twenty quid was gone.
128 ((laughter))
129 Yeah so eventually I actually ended up working with John. They
130 took me on to set up this map department. So my first (.) then
131 I got to know John just through [ (.) work.
132 J: [ I felt you know (.) initially
133 obviously that the contact was through me so I did you know
134 feel responsible for (.) you know that it was what you wanted
135 (.) that it was good.
136 D: Yeah, yeah =
137 S: = So my early impressions of him were just (.) making jokes and
138 =
139 J: = terrible (.) I do have [ a sensitive side.
140 S : [ I remember him being in that small
141 room with the not very powerful Mac [ and I'd taken some
142 muffins in
143 J: [ I remember
144 S : for breakfast in the plastic (.) wrapper (.) in those little
145 plastic trays (.) and when I went to eat them they weren't any
146 in there and there was just screwed up paper in the same shape.
147 ((laughter))
148 J: Ah yeah
149 S : So I just (.) so I suppose my early recollections of him were
150 just humour.
151 J: And nothing else.
152 D: How about you? What are your (.) recollections of the first.
153 point you started to [ think of Sarah as a friend rather than
154 (.) rather than just a sort of
155 S : [Oh, I think we got on really well (.)
156 really well didn't we. And she's a very clever girl. And.funny.
157 And (.) you know (.) you just meet someone and (.) you just (.)
158 if you get on with each other then that's a relief.
159 D: Okay, well [I've
160 A: [ I'm wondering whether (.) whether there was a time
161 when you were able to think of each other as friends as opposed
162 to (.) just someone you hung around with or =
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163 J: = No I don't think about things like that (.) do you? Cos (.)
164 you know they just (.) I think if you like someone then that's
165 that, you know. I don't tend to think (.) too hard about that
166 sort of stuff (.) personally (.) do you?
167 S: I can't remember when I first came to your house (.) or
168 anything (.) OH, you had a flat in Westbourn.
169 J: Okay (.) I don't know (.) I don't know. You see I can't (.)
170 time scales I'm not good with. I don't remember (.) but I glo
171 remember being psyched to know Sarah.
172 S: But because he knew my friend anyway I guess he was sort of (.)
173 it was like going out and meeting up with John and his [
174 friends.
175 J: [ That's
176 right.
177 S: The work people and that kinda thing. So maybe we sort of
178 slipped in to [ being (.) er uh.
179 J: [ Yeah. (.) I don't remember that.
180 ((laughter))
181 D: Okay (.) I think we've started to get a (.) kind of a sense of
182 the earlier part of your friendship. I was wondering as well
183 about things that have (.) sort of happened since then? If ( .)
184 we were to (.) take a line sort of like this ((hands John and
185 Sarah the line-line)) and to think of like (.) that end as
186 being the time you first met and over here as being (.) today,
187 some of the milestones a n d .(.) or events that you might put
188 along it. Some of the things that have happened in your
189 friendship. If I actually gave you a pen I don't know whether
190 you could (.) actually begin to agree on some of the things [
191 that might have happened along the way.
192 J: [ Yeah
193 D: And perhaps we could then (.) talk about some of them.
194 J: Oh alright. You do the pens.
195 S: We'll have to split it up into twelve or thirteen sections
196 won't we.
197 D: There's a slightly thicker one there if you prefer =
198 J: • Sorry ! ' .
199 S: There's a big one about this time last year.
2 0 0 J: (.) Yes (.) there was. But let's (.) yes.
201 S: ( ) How long did I start working with you?
2 0 2 J: Work was (.) I think we bonded at work. There was problems with
203 the = ■
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204 S: We fall out (.) well we don't fall out badly. We spar [ (.) we
2 0 5 J: [ Yes we
2 0 6 do
2 0 7 S: come to blows.
2 0 8 J: I've still got some bruises.
2 0 9 S: Some what? [ Some bruises?
210 J: [ Some bruises. ■
211 ((laughter))
2 1 2 D: What sort of things do you spar about?
2 1 3 J: Well we're [ both different
214 S: [ ( ) (signs). We both like to speak at the same
2 1 5 time.
2 1 6 J: Yeah, so we're like quite (.) neither of us are wrong. We are
217 quite strong willed.
2 1 8 S: Independent.
2 1 9 J: When one of us is wrong (.) ((laughs)). Yeah (.) so I think
2 2 0 that we respect each other for our views.
221 S: Right so what about =
2 2 2 ' J: = Oh I don't know (.) I mean (.) I think that when we were at (
22 3 ) and there was (.) when you started (.) obviously technology
2 2 4 was going that way and you were (.) you had problems with the
2 2 5 repro guys because of the new technologies (.) and you know (.)
2 2 6 I think that (.) well personally I remember (.) you know (.)
2 2 7 recognising your integrity on it. And (.) trying to support you
2 2 8 through that as opposed to taking the easy option which would
2 2 9 be not to get involved. You know (.) its like you say its
2 3 0 S: . ( (laughs))
231 J: No I don't (.) I can't (.) no (.) it's [ just
2 3 2 S: [ You were quite a rock
23 3 when I was (.) I had a relationship (.) I was toing and froing
2 3 4 to Greece for seven years.
2 3 5 J: Yes (.) do seven years (.) that will take up seven years.
2 3 6 S: I suppose about five years into knowing you [ (.) oh god.
2 3 7 J: [ Yes ( .) I find
2 3 8 these quite self conscious these questions. Don't you?
2 3 9 S: Its like oh god (.) how long have I known him. The major big
240 one (.) was last year.
241 D: A-ha.
2 4 2 S : Wasn't it?
24 3 J: Yeah (.) oh yes.
244 A: Maybe it would be easier to start from the most recent [ ones?
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2 4 5 S; . [ Yeah.
2 4 6 Like [ ( )
247 J: [ .hhhhhh
2 4 8 S: I found out that John was, well I had already known, but found
2 4 9 out from John's mouth that he was actually gay. So (.) that's
2 5 0 the biggest one.
251 J:. Yeah (.) so next question then.
2 5 2 S : ((laughs)) I'd known from the [ d a y  I'd met you that he had
25 3 quite
2 5 4 J: [ I know I know I know
25 5 S: a big wall around him. And I was unable (.) his humour and been
2 5 6 (.) you know his strength [ and his hiding (.) shelter isn't
2 5 7 it?
2 5 8 J: [ Yes (.)
2 5 9 S: And he'd made such a good job of protecting himself [ that even
2 6 0 J: [ Yes
261 S: though I knew him really really well (.) I was probably the
2 6 2 only one that could penetrate the ( .)
263 ((laughter))
2 6 4 wrong choice of word. He
26 5 wouldn't
2 6 6 (.) let me through.
2 6 7 J: Are my ears red? ((laughs))
2 6 8 S: (.) Yeah.
2 6 9 J: Yeah (.) there you go. That's probably another research
2 7 0 question isn't it?
271 S: That's an [ eight hour session.
2 7 2 A: [We, we will come back to that =
2 7 3 S: = Yeah
2 7 4 J: Good, I look forward to it.
27 5 S: So that was, so that is a year ago, so shall I put there John
2 7 6 (•)
2 7 7 J: Gaylord.
2 7 8 A: Describe it in whatever way makes sense to you.
2 7 9 S: John (.) tells (.) me (.) he (.) is (.) gay. AT LAST =
2 8 0 J: = Here it comes ( (laughs))
281 S: (.) A n : :d (.) probably even more recently =
2 8 2 J: = I, yes (.) I don't look at things like this though. You know,
2 8 3 I don't sort of =
2 8 4 S: = But that's been a major thing for us though.
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28 5 J: (.) Yea : h but its not like (.) yeah but its like (.) I wouldn't
2 8 6 put like labels on things and [ ( )
2 8 7 S: [ But its not (.) its like (.) it
2 8 8 is a pretty major thing isn't it?
2 8 9 J: Yea :h .
2 9 0 S: That you (en)trust me with that information.
291 J: No (.) its not like I didn't trust you with it or any[thing
2 9 2 S: [ No,
29 3 Entrust me with it at last.
2 9 4 J: Trust you? Entrust. I see.
29 5 S: And another (.) well there's (.) more recently (.j Marilyn?
2 9 6 J: Yeah.
2 9 7 S: Cos I went to Marilyn =
2 9 8 J: = Yeah, that's good. I'll go and check the tomatoes and you
2 9 9 tell them about that.
3 0 0 S: Okay (.) Yeah after my split up with my Greek relationship I
301 (.) I'm quite level headed and I can see through my problems
3 0 2 (.)
303 D: Mmm
3 0 4 S: But I got (.) I'd been (.) going so long with this relationship
305 that I went to see a ( ) therapist.
3 0 6 A: Mmm
3 0 7 S: Only for about four sessions, four hours, and (.) its about a
30 8 year and a half later and I said to John you might find ( )
3 0 9 but you have to be ready to go yourself. So eventually he said,
3 1 0 oh what's her number (.) so he's been going since oh I don't
311 know (.) September. Once a week.
3 1 2 D: Yeah
313 S: So we have (.) I think she's been a real help for both of us,
314 hasn't she?
315 J: Yes (.) she's been very good. We'll be handing otit her card at
3 1 6 the end of the session.
317 ((laughter) )
31 8 A: In terms of events, experiences, moments that you think added
3 1 9 something (.) there was something that happened that caused
3 2 0 your friendship to develop in a new way (.) or added a depth to
321 it or (.) or a (.) new depth =
3 2 2 S : = I should think my relationship with Makis toing and froing to
323 Greece a lot [ even though I was with someone in my head, even
3 2 4 J: [ Yes, perhaps that.
325 S: though I wasn't physically with them all the time (.)
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>3 2 6 D: Sure.
3 2 7 S: When I was here we could still have a friendly relationship.
32 8 J: Yeah.
3 2 9 S: Without like, another partner like (.) [ w e  sort of like
3 3 0 J: [ Yes, but
331 S: devoted to each other friendship-wise without being pulled
3 3 2 away.
333 J: ((laughs))
3 3 4 S:- And' he was a big support.
3 3 5 J: Oh, thank you.
3 3 6 S: Although he did get a little bit like what the bloody hell are
3 3 7 you [ going on about (.) go there or don't go there.
3 3 8 J: [ going on about !
3 3 9 S: Like it was quite clear cut =
3 4 0 J: = I know .
341 S : but it wasn't.
3 4 2 J: That's another eight hours there ((laughs))
343 S : What else (.) I suppose (.) mostly our friendships based on (.)
344 humour and liking to laugh at the same things.
345 J: And [ also having
3 4 6 S : [ and that's just years and years of that building up.
3 4 7 J: We can support each other where, if (.) one of us is down we
34 8 don't=
3 4 9 S: = You can make it worse.
3 5 0 ((laughter))
351 J: Exactly (.) and we recognise traits in each other that are (.)
3 5 2 similar.
353 D: Yeah.
3 5 4 S: So we have peaks and troughs.
355 J: Pizzas and =
3 5 6 S: = Peaks and troughs.
3 5 7 J: As everyone does (.) and its nice to know that (.) oh well (.)
35 8 everyone (.) oh well this isn't relevant to the question is it?
3 5 9 D: No no no (.) carry [on.
36 0 J: [ Oh well. Its nice to know that you know
361 have a friend that you don't have to =
3 6 2 S: = shag
363 J: Shag.
3 6 4 ((laughter))
365 That is a relief. ((laughs))
366 S: I think myself being like (.) we are both thirty-nine now =
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3 6 7 J: = Are you? ((laughs))
36 8 S: and (.) all through my twenties I was going out lots (.) had
3 6 9 boyfri[ends of (.) different lengths of time or not =
3 7 0 J: [ yeah = yes
371 S: And then like group (of) friends I had from school (.) male and
3 7 2 female (.) there was a big amount of us and as you hit your
373 thirties they start marrying off and (.) having their own
374 children (.) so your pool of male (.) and of female friends
375 diminishes =
3 7 6 J: = yes
3 7 7 . S: So now I find that I- haven't got that many male only friends
37 8 left because they've got wives or your relationships change.
3 7 9 D: Yes
3 8 0 S: Whereas because neither of us have ever =
381 J: = are dysfunctional in relationships
3 8 2 S: Yeah, because we can't hold relationships down we
383 ( (laughter))
3 8 4 No, we are still friends [ because no one else has taken the
385 other
3 8 6 J: [ yeah
3 8 7 S: one away = _
388 J: = I think that's true (.) definitely (.) I (.) you know (.)
3 8 9 (it's just that) yeah hhhh
3 9 0 A: These sound more like processes (.) things that unfold over [
391 time
3 9 2 J: [ I
393 can't think I don't you know not sorta like =
3 9 4 A: = That's that's that's fine =
39 5 J: = you know (.) dramatic sort of airy fairy (.) you know (.) see
3 9 6 what I mean?
3 9 7 S: Because, like none of the like (.) if we were both straight
39 8 then maybe like I'd secretly always fancied you but [ couldn't
3 9 9 (help )
400 J: [ I  wish you did
401 (.) that's gotta be natural.
4 0 2 ((laughter))
403 S: It might sound (perverse) but there's never that tension there.
404 J: Yeah =
405 S: = It's a friendship for one but the other one wants it to be
406 more because it isn't =
407 J: = Yes [ which (would be)
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>4 0 8 S: [ so [ disappointing
409 D: [ Sure, sure
410 S: No sexual tension there =
411 J: = No (.) despite Sarah looking like an attractive man.
412 ((laughter))
413 A: What what use is (.) I mean what use is this, does this
414 correspond to your understanding (.) of the, of the
415 relationship [ I just
416 J: [ yes
417 A: meant as you've been doing a lot of the talking =
418
419 J: . = yes (.) I don't do talking about myself.
4 2 0 S: Yeah, he doesn't =
421 A: = Is there a (.) is there anything about any particular events
4 2 2 (.) any particular processes that (.) other than those Sarah
42 3 has talked about that (.) describe the relationship or are (.)
424 important in your understanding of the relationship?
425 S: Right (.) =
4 2 6 J: = We don't demand much of each other. (.) Which is very good.
4 2 7 (.) We are not demanding or clingy or anything like that (.)
4 2 8 and (.) I've very much appreciated that (.)
4 2 9 A: Okay (.)
4 3 0 S: I feel (we are as) similar as we are different =
431 J: = Yeah, we are very [ different.
4 3 2 S: [ but we are also very similar. ((laughs))
43 3 J: Yes, yes (.) that's true.
434 A: Okay, so what do we have.to work on then Dan? We've got some
43 5 events and some processes. .
4 3 6 D: (.) Well we could (.) we could look at (.) well we can go down
4 3 7 one of two avenues (.) we could either look at (.) we could
4 3 8 either leave the events to later and look at processes now and
4 3 9 the things you actually value in the friendship (.) or do it
440 round the other way. Does anyone [ have a
441 A: [ I would (.) person[ally
4 4 2 S: [ What [ would be more fun
443 J: [ Don't do it just
444 to ( )
445 A: ( ) in terms of ease (.) I would suggest you start with the
446 events
447 D: Yes.
448 A: and then get on to processes.
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4 4 9 D: Okay =
450 A: ■= they will be easier to talk about because they are more
451 specific.
4 5 2 D: Okay, yes. Well before we move on (.) are there any events
4 5 3 you'd wish to highlight even if (.) I mean you've spoken
454 earlier about humour and things like that (.) it doesn't
4 5 5 necessarily need to be though of as being a big heavy event.
456 S : In our time line?
457 D: Yeah
4 5 8 A: Yeah
4 5 9 J: Sarah's very good at pulling =
460 S: = (no) I'm not
461 J: Yes you are ((laughs)) I was just going to say about (.) its
4 6 2 nice to sort of (.) we understand each other on those levels
463 (.) so its kind of (.) you don't =
4 6 4 S : = its probably why it seems to eventless.
4 6 5 J: Yeah (.) yeah, probably. Its not eventless but there are some
4 6 6 (.) but I don't know.
4 6 7 A: Let's go back to the most recent milestone that you (.) that
4 6 8 you talked about. The, the time when you found out that John
4 6 9 was gay for definite.
470 S: Yep
471 A: Could you tell us (.) a bit more about that?
4 7 2 J: Well I can.
473 A: Okay
474 J: Well I'll just say that (.) it (.) became (.) obvious that its
475 very (.) unfair of me to (.) not be honest on that [ level.
4 7 6 A: [ Aha
477 J: But I didn't (.) you know (.) particularly (.) feel a great
4 7 8 need to sort of (.) I manage things my way. You know (.) and
4 7 9 I'm kinda happy with that. A : :nd (.) I'm still embarrassed in
4 8 0 this (.) to this ( .) you know ( .) in a funny sorta way ( .) but
481 it (.) you know (.) the bottom line is that (.) it is hurtful
4 8 2 to Sarah not to be honest, I think. And I don't want to do
483 that. You know (.) so when I realised I was very apologetic,
4 8 4 sorry.
48 5 S : No you don't have to be sorry.
4 8 6 J: No but you know (.) it (.) its like (.) yeah. But I did (.)
4 8 7 realise that (.) it wasn't (.) you know (.) fair.
4 8 8 A: That's, that's =
4 8 9 J: = cos Sarahs very honest (.)
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490 A: It's quite a long way into the relationship (.) what I'm
491 wondering is what factors led to that realisation you say that
4 9 2 you realised that [ it wasn't honest
4 9 3 J: • [ She found my Kylie CD.
494 S: No, I'd met, I'd known John [ for a (.) long time and (.) John
4 9 5 J: [ yeah
4 9 6 S: is a bit like the Neighbourhood Watch around all our friends.
497 he knows everything about everybody. He's like the lynchpin =
4 9 8 J: = But that's not me being nosey, [ people talk to me.
4 9 9 S: [No, its just like that.
5 0 0 A: Right.
501 S: Then I thought, he knows a: absolutely e :verything about me and
5 0 2 I don't know anything about him.
503 J: On that level.
504 S: And I just (.) thought (.) yeah
50 5 J: Cos you don't define me by that ( )
5 0 6 S: My first impression of him when I met him was (.) I felt (,) oh
507 he's (.) gay.
50 8 J: Yes.
5 0 9 S: Except eight years into our friendship I didn't know for sure
510 and I thought either he's (.) I couldn't think that he's shy
511 and (.) if he did like women (.) there's no way (.) cos he did
512 have like teeny [ little episodes in the distant past around
513 Tim's wedding
514 J: [ yes
515 S: time =
51 6 J: = yes, snogged lots of girls =
517 S: = had you? I [ didn't know that.
518 J: [ yeah
51 9 S: But he'd say that, I saw this girl I quite liked (.) oh-la-la-
52 0 la-la-la and (.) I remember him being flirty in the restaurant
521 once. When we were all out with the work people =
522 J: = Hmm
523 S: And some girl (.) well I thought either he's (.) straight but
524 (.) too shy to (.) act on it or its his cover because he's gay
525 but he can't [ (say).
52 6 J: [ But I don't =
52 7 A: = But you didn't press this?
528 S: Well (.) the only route in would [ b e  (.) humour wise (.) he
52 9 J: [ I wouldn't (allow)
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5 3 0 S: wouldn't allow it [ he had like a Berlin Wall (.) thickness
531 around
5 3 2 A: [ yeah
533 S: him = ,
5 3 4 J: = Yes, I'm very proud its in the back garden at the moment.
53 5 S: Where we could (.) I could (.) approach humour on any level =
5 3 6 J: = yeah.
5 3 7 S: BUT (.) it was this unsaid thing that (.) I mean that I can
53 8 talk to anybody and be open and [ honest about myself but (.)
5 3 9 D: [ Aha
5 4 0 S: I couldn't pierce his armour at all =
541 A: = Yeah '
5 4 2 J: Hmm
543  - S: And sometimes I would get quite wound up about it [ ( )
5 4 4 J: [ Yeah you
54 5 did (just) get angry.
5 4 6 S: Not angry
5 4 7 J: Not angry, just frustrated.
54 8 S: Frustrated [ mostly for him, because I thought you are, you
5 4 9 know
5 5 0 J: [ Annoyed
551 S: in your later thirties now =
55 2 J: = thank you.
553 S: Have you got a sex life going on or (.) relationships with
554 people?
555 J: ( (laughs))
5 5 6 S: I thought maybe he was stagnated in (the) late teens or
5 5 7 something.
558 A: Yeah
5 5 9 S: Stuck in his late teens and never gonna be able to move on from
5 6 0 i t .
561 J: ' Yes (.) you were worried for me.
5 6 2 S: So I was really (.) worried (.) yeah.
563 A: But it was hard to (.) to (.) express this (.j to him (.) [ was
56 4 it
565 S: [
56 6 Yeah
56 7 A: the Berlin Wall?
568 S: We've got (.) we know several couples around (.) here,
56 9 Worthing. All quite different from each other but (.) we all
570 get on really, really well (.) and none of us could (.) I was
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571 probably the only one who could (.) might be able to permeate
5 7 2 the armour. But (.) couldn't. I remember the first (.) I would
573 notice (.) I was working up in London (.) because John works in
574 print and sometimes they'd have print jobs that (.) I'd have to
575 drop a CD round or something (.) and I could tell sometimes (.)
5 7 6 that (.) maybe I'd call and then (he) wouldn't answer the phone
5 7 7 and (.)
57 8 J: ((laughs))
5 7 9 S: . he'd call me back and go, ah you just caught me in the shower.
5 8 0 I was in the bathroom [ and I could ( ) a pattern, that he
581 was
5 8 2 J: [ I  was just (doing someone)
583 S': seeing someone and was trying to avoid them.
5 8 4 A: Yeah.
585 S: So, it was a bit of phone evasion.
5 8 6 A: Okay =
5 8 7 S: = Or another time I might have a CD to drop round and he'd go.
58 8 oh I'm not in [ tonight.
5 8 9 J: [ Hmm
59 0 S: But I had to drop this thing around and the lights were on and
591 the car was there. But obviously there was something [ like
59 2 J: [ (gay
593 going on)
5 9 4 S: but I didn't know what. So I just like (.) presumed he's gay.
595 Well I just (.) I just knew he was so.
5 9 6 A: It (.) it sounds like there were lots of unanswered questions
5 9 7 around this and there was [ (no) way of getting in there to (.)
598 get answers.
5 9 9 S: [ Yeah (.) I can remember once going
6 0 0 on that walk to (.) with (.) Jane ( ) John had a
601 little bit of a (.) a little bit of a mark on his neck showing.
602 And I thought I can either ignore it like you want me to =
603 J: = Yes.
604 S: But he's also teased a little bit by actually realising that it
605 might show anyway. Although he had been wearing lots of jumpers
60 6 before in his kitchen on hot nights.
60 7 J: Hmm. Yes.
608 S: So as we were coming back from this walk, and he was changing
60 9 his boots to get back in the car I was just [ like well
610 J: [ like a Rottweiler
611 (.) on a poor little kitten =
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6 1 2 S: = No, no, I was [ ( ) humour was the way in.
613 J: [ no, no, yeah, yeah.
614 S: But he got so upset, upset and angry in the car that he was
615 like "if you say anything again.I '11 pull over and you can walk
616 back" ((laughs)).
617 D: I was going to ask about the (.) sort of attempts to get
61 8 through your (.) "Berlin Wall".
6 1 9 J: Deflect them off, you remember that tennis game you used to get
6 2 0 in the seventies? When you just try and reflect them.
621 A: What what, what was going on for you in terms of the dynamics
6 2 2 of this relationship? You've already told us that you were
623 aware of (.) you were aware there wasn't an honesty there.
6 2 4 J: Yeah, well no (.) its not honesty. I would never compromise, I
625 get very uncomfortable if I have to lie and so I would try not
6 2 6 to lie. I would just be evasive and (.) you know =
6 2 7 S: '= I think [ I felt like
628 J: [ I'm not very good at lying.
6 2 9 S: The smallest (.) part of all this is that I felt (.) short­
6 3 0 changed by the relationship, but that's the smaller part. My
631 bigger worry was that, he wasn't living the l i f e ,he should be
6 3 2 [ living. And
633 J: [ And standards.
6 3 4
635 S: that a lot of good friends of around here who just liked John
63 6 for who he was and gay or straight, and it really didn't bother
6 3 7 us. None of us were gonna have an issue. And I was just (.)
63 8 worried that he wasn't living the life he should have been
6 3 9 living.
6 4 0 J: Ye : :s .
641 S: Openly.
64 2 J: I was! ( (laughs)) But no.
643 S: But you weren't though =
644 J: - I know.
645 S:' And I also felt like, you know (.), if he did meet a guy that
646 you wanted to be with (.) would he of (.) let that relationship
647 go because he couldn't bear to [ open up.
648 J: [ Yeah.
64 9 S: That was my big fear.
650 J: I mean it was very true and its good that Sarah =
651 S: = So how many possibles has he (.) deflected? Cos I didn't
65 2 know.
2 5 1
*653 A: Yeah.
6 5 4 J: They're under the patio at the moment.
65 5 ((laughter))
6 5 6 A: What happened (.) could you tell us a bit more about the actual
6 5 7 disclosure =
65 8 J: = No ! ((laughs))
6 5 9 S: That was great !
6 6 0 J: I don't (.) I don't remember.
661 S: You do !
6 6 2 J: Surely you don't.
663 S : Another mutual friend that used to work within print. Tom is my
6 6 4 neighbour (.) and (.) they were, this couple were good friends
665 down the road (with a) gay couple who (.)
6 6 6 J: Oh right.
6 6 7 S: Why, did you think I was going to say something else?
66 8 J: No, no! I was just (.) squirming at the memory.
6 6 9 S : And a few times they would have barbecues next door. And they'd
6 7 0 say "Oh, come round, Johns coming, blah blah blah, we're asking
671 Roger and Paul from down the road" and then I'd hear via Tom,
6 7 2 John saying, "If they're coming, then I'm not".
673 J: Yeah. I didn't much like them.
67 4 S: I think, I think he didn't want to be (.) sucked =
675 J: = caught out
6 7 6 S: caught out or sucked into (.) I think it was being caught out
6 7 7 really wasn't it? So basically =
678 J: = I didn't much like them though.
6 7 9 S: But you didn't know them did you?
6 8 0 J: I didn't, I was being judgmental. And purely (.) you know. I
681 like them very much now.
6 8 2 S: So eventually they came round for a meal for a meal one evening
683 (.) I don't know (.) did you know they were coming?
68 4 J: No [ (.) I was angry.
685 S: • [ And we had a great night, and he just didn't stop talking
68 6 to them. And we got to know them a lot better. And sometimes
6 8 7 we'd have curries with them =
688 J: = Hmm.
6 8 9 S: And one particular evening (.) we went (.) John and I went down
6 9 0 to their house, had a take-away. And we all had quite a lot of
691 red wine to drink and they were all psychoanalysing me cos they
69 2 are social workers and that. Paul does psychology, counselling.
693 J: Homeless things and whatnot.
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6 9 4 S: Yeah.
69 5 A: You don't want to get tangled up in those people at all =
6 9 6 J: = Especially when they get starry and get their own TV show.
6 9 7 ( (laughter))
69 8 S: We had quite a lot of red wine, they were psychoanalysing me,
6 9 9 cos I'd split up with my long-term relationship and they were
700 saying how I was so much like a gay man.
701 J: ((laughs))
7 0 2 A: What did they mean by this?
7 0 3 J: Well (.) that's an interesting thing. Well because she's not
704 -prissy. And (.) you're a bit like a (.) I say a bit like a
705 bloke in (.) you don't you know (.) fall into a role of an
7 0 6 attractive woman. No that's a joke. No (.) like (.) she can
707 talk about sexual things and (.) I can't think of the words (.)
7 0 8 and you know (.) you're not fluffy and (.) coquettish and you
7 0 9 don't sort of sit coyly by anyone. You're not that type.
710 S : Whenever we got together with Roger and Paul our chats would be
711 (.)
712 J: They would be funny.
713 S: Equal on both sides. They'd talk about their conquests and
714 whatever [ ( ) .
715 J: [ And (.) and (if we had until) the early hours, we'd
716 talk about Sarah's! ((laughs)) Yeah, but no you do, cos when
717 you're in your clubbing days and that, sexually you were a gay
718 man. (.) Sorry to say that (.) out loud, to let these guys
719 know !
7 2 0 S: So after picking on me for hours at this curry, (and) we'd had
721 quite a lot of red wine, then I (.) wanted to ask (.) John was
7 2 2 (.) was instigating it. So I asked "How about you then?". He
723 was a little bit drunk. Are we running out of time?
7 2 4 A: No
725 D: No, no
7 2 6 J: Plenty of time to spend on this subject.
7 2 7 S: And (.) he (.) so I tried to turn the tables and ask John, cos
728 I thought this might be my routine with two gay men who we now
7 2 9 trust. And (.) he made (.) little like inroads further than he
7 3 0 ever had before. And he (.) didn't want me to ask him. And he
731 was (.) fending it off and the two guys were going "No, no,
7 3 2 you've had your turn asking Sarah, its only fair". And then he
733 said, "Yes, I'm gay".
734 J: Did I?
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73 5 S: Yes, and I got all the streamers and party poppers out.
7 3 6 A: That's Sarah's account of what happened then, what's your =
7 3 7 J: = My main memories are of feeling uncomfortable! Mainly (.),
73 8 but I was very relieved because (.) it stopped any dishonesty
7 3 9 and I (.) it was getting to a stage where (.) I' couldn't
7 4 0 deflect things the whole time, it was exhausting. You know.
741 D: Hmm =
742 A: + So were you open to that possibility then? I mean had you
743 reached a stage where you though this deflection was
744 exhausting? Was it just =
745 J: = Yes. I had. But I was prepared to carry it on, cos I didn't
7 4 6 have an option (.) that I felt comfortable with.
747 A: So, what what was it about that moment that [ ( )
7 4 8 J: [ The guys (.)
7 4 9 Roger and Paul. Them being, not cliché gay guys.
750 S: They wouldn't let you off would they? r
751 J: No, I wouldn't mind (.) I don't (.) I don't judge. I was
7 5 2 prejudice to them as a gay couple, because when I first met
753 them I found them a bit (.) possibly insipid. And (.) yeah (.)
754 I was wrong, that was wrong. You know.
755 S: But you don't like overly camp men do you?
7 5 6 J: No (.) I don't feel that comfortable with that. I don't want to
757 be defined by it you see. So (.) but when we got to know them,
7 5 8 they were so funny and interesting that (.) not, you know (.) I
7 5 9 didn't think "Oh god, I don't want to be..." I have a fear of
7 6 0 being judged. You know, cos I (.) ((laughs)). Yeah (.) so there
761 you go. Cos they were (.) I didn't mind being part of (.) you
7 6 2 know. I can't think of the word, sorry.
763 . S: Well, they were just ordinary guys getting on with their lives.
764 J: And so (.) yeah (.) that makes that more comfortable.
765 D: Were =
7 6 6 A: = If we, we take it from, sorry Dan, if we take it from there
7 6 7 in terms of this milestone event (.) and how it effected the
7 6 8 relationship between the pair of you?
7 6 9 J: Sarah would ask me who I was shagging, that's all! ((laughs))
770 S: No!
771 J: No, not at all.
7 7 2 S: ■ No (.) then for a few days afterwards, then (he) kind of
773 recoiled a little b i t . And it was like the thing that no one
774 could really mention. But after a few days, then I mentioned it
2 5 4
775 again and like he'd be cooking in the kitchen and go "we'll
7 7 6 talk about this another time" =
7 7 7 J: = Deflect, deflect, deflect ! Yes (.) that's true.
77 8 S: Like I had asked him to kill somebody. (It's been about a year
7 7 9 and [ )
7 8 0 J: [ ( )/
781 A: Could you follow that through, because I think we are
7 8 2 interested in the effect that had on [ (.) your relationship?
783 S: [ our relationship.
7 8 4 J: (.) Well obviously not having to deflect stuff is (.) good. But
78 5 I don't think its changed anything else, (.) do you?
7 8 6 S: Well I feel much more comfortable and open about everything.
7 8 7 J: Well okay (.) yes, well I do (.) obviously.
78 8 S: And I don't worry about for you so much.
7 8 9 J: So yes, positive effect all round. But, it was the right time
7 9 0 for me. It wouldn't have been the right time to do it earlier.
791 S: Okay
7 9 2 J: Cos it was the right time for me. And whether that's
793 unfashionable or whatever, I don't (.) otherwise it would have
79 4 happened earlier.
79 5 S: Hmm.
7 9 6 J: Yeah?
7 9 7 S: Yeah. I must admit a good two years before I could have asked
7 9 8 him at any point [ (but I couldn't).
7 9 9 J: [ And I wouldn't have wanted you to. It's just
8 0 0 (.) I'm a slow learner.
801 S: Humour was the only way i n . John was terrified that I might try
80 2 and out him.
803 J: Yes, I was scared of that. Because I though Sarah's a kind of
804 no-nonsense kinda straight forward and say "Don't be a wanker".
805 And there's no justification, none of my friends would run a
80 6 mile anyway.
80 7 S: I remember you backing down the hallway with Emily and I once.
808 J: Yes, I was terrified.
8 0 9 S: He was washing his car 'round at our friend's house [ and we
810 were
811 J: [ I  drove
812 it (
813 )
814 S: having a cup of tea. And I (.) think this ( ) he might have
815 had this little mark on his neck. And we all noticed it and
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81 6 they all felt just like me about him and so two of us were
817 trying =
00 oo J: = I don't want to [ be bullied.
81 9 S: [ And he was just backing away.
82 0 J: I'd got nothing to say. I'd say to you "I don't know what to
821 say". I'm not doing anything different. I just (.) I'm not, you
8 2 2 know.
823 S: Its just it was good that it came up at that time with those
8 2 4 guys wasn't it?
825 J: (.) Yeah.
8 2 6 A: So, Sarah has talked about it as having to (.) having an
8 2 7 increased openness. Is that your understanding as well?
828 J: On that: level (.) on those issues, yes.
8 2 9 A: Just on those issues?
830 J: Yeah. I don't feel any different. Just on those issues. I mean
831 (.) you know (.) we're (not) dysfunctional in any other way. I
8 3 2 don't think. But its better. Obviously. But then (.) you know
833 (.) I'm still working through it. You know. And I don't want
8 3 4 someone I care about to think of me in a way that I haven't
835 quite (.) you know (.) I don't want her (.) or you know anyone
8 3 6 to pigeonhole me. You know, I don't just mean that sexually,
8 3 7 you know. I just (.) its just a fear I have, we all have "Oh, I
838 don't want to be racist", don't we? Don't we? (.) Don't we?
8 3 9 S: Yes -
8 4 0 ( (laughter))
841 J: And its like I don't feel (.) its just, you do the best you
8 4 2 can, at any point. Yeah? Good, that's me off the hook.
843 D: So what about the things you actually do together =
8 4 4 J: = sexually
845 D: No (.) just activities that you might do together, have they
8 4 6 changed at all, since (.) er (.)
84 7 J: Well we've been out with a gay friend of mine haven't we?
84 8 S: Yeah, that's very true.
8 4 9 J: And Sarah was in on the pull. (.)
8 5 0 D: What, what happened there?
851 J: Well I suppose that was the first time (.) we'd been out with
85 2 someone I know who (.) my other friends don't know.
853 S: We'd both been doing the online dating (.) thing.
85 4 J: Yeah, but the results were so dreadful ((laughs)) that I (.) er
855 =
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8 5 6 “ S: = No, no, no, I thought for John the best thing that could come
8 5 7 from the people there(.) is to get friendships out of it, and
858 to have ( ) gay friends, that might lead to something. And
8 5 9 (.) its been pretty unsuccessful for me -
8 6 0 J: = What, having gay friends?
861 S: No! ((laughs)) So now we show each other people that we may
862 have met [ online.
863 J: [ And point and laugh. (.) No.
8 6 4 S: So that's a big thing.
865 J: . That's nice.
866 S: I show him (.) show him (.) my (.) er (.) favourites ( )
867 J: And I =
868 S: And see who he's been (.) er (.) chatting too.
86 9 J: That's (.) that's nice (.) cos you know (.) its not on a sorta
87 0 (.) heavy level we just have a laugh about it and =
871 D: = Yeah.
87 2 J: Its nice to say 'Ooh (.) what do you think about this' and (.)
873 er (.) you know (.) that's kinda good.
87 4 D: . Yeah.
875 A: It's it's (.) it sounds like it has opened up a different area
8 7 6 in the friend[ship
8 7 7 J: [ Yes
878 S: Mmm
87 9 A: (But) it doesn't sound something major (.) it doesn't sound
88 0 like its been a revolutionary change?
oooo J: No
8 8 2 S: No its just like its opened a door on (.) somethink that could
883 have been opened (.) I don't know (.)
884 J: Definitely (.) yeah. And you know (.) that's good. But I'm not
885 sorta you know (.) I don't (.) personally (.) I'm not a
886 revelation sort of person. I don't (.) I just (.) what's the
887 word (.) er (.) not (type) (.) you know I work things out for
888 myself all the time (.) I don't have opinions of things I don't
889 know about.
890 S: I think both of us =
891 J: = Apart from knitwear ( (laughs))
892 S: We ((laughs)) (.) Personality-wise we're both quite socially
893 confident =
8 9 4 J: = yes
895 S: But underneath we [ got (.) I got (.) working class barrier to
89 6 J: . [ Mmm
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♦8 9 7 S: break down (.) I don't know (.) growing up my parents (.)
898 aren't particularly educated (.) and so I felt like I was (.)
89 9 going to a polytechnic (and everything) I was going (into)
9 0 0 areas I had not emotional backup on because they (.) and then
901 John's difficulties he blames his Catholicism on a lot of the
9 0 2 (.) ((S slaps her leg sharply twice))
903 J: Yeah (.) and my council-house upbringing (.) you know (.) chips
9 0 4 on my shoulder (.)
90 5 S: So we both got our (.) [ weights
9 0 6 J: [ I  know ((laughs)) pathetic!
9 0 7 S: But true! You know.
90 8 J: There you go (.) what can you do? But yeah (.) that's nice (.)
9 0 9 you know (.) so you can see sort of areas with each other where
910 you don't (.) you know (.) obviously doesn't need to feel
911 unconfident about these things but (.) she does.
9 1 2 A: Yep (.) yep.
913 J: And vice-a-versa.
914 A: Okay.
915 J: You know.
916 A: Are you done with that (.) with that milestone (.) or is there
917 other stuff [ (you want to )?
918 D: [ Yeah (.) I think that (.) that's good.
919 A: Okay. Good.
9 2 0 J: Tea?
921 A: Maybe if (.) if we (.) we finished the milestones bit (.) and
9 2 2 the (processes) because the other milestone that Sarah talked
923 about was (.) the therapy [ that (.) and the ( )
9 2 4 J: [ ((laughs))
92 5 A: (.) who introduced John to a therapist. If you could just tell
9 2 6 us a little more about that?
9 2 7 J: There's nothing to say (.) to say particularly except that I
92 8 took S (.) Sarah's recommendation and (.) urn
9 2 9 S: Well I wouldn't have gone to one [ usually anyway
9 3 0 J: [ No no (.) and I trust her
931 (.) you know (.) that she'd have sussed out whether it was a
9 3 2 good thing (.) or a good person (.) and urn (.) its not a
933 revelation 9.) but its (.) what's nice is that (.) it sorta
9 3 4 kick-starts you (.) you know to (.) it's a positive thing (.)
935 and its nice to see friends doing a positive thing and (.j or
9 3 6 having a positive result. Really? Isn't it? I mean we don't [
9 3 7 sorta talk
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9 3 8 S: [ I  think you can
9 3 9 only go to someone like that when you are ready to go to them
940 yourself =
941 J: = maybe.
9 4 2 S: Yeah (.) no its also to do with our age (if you) are in your
943 mid to late thirties [ you can (.) see how you've been (formed)
944 and
9 4 5 D: [ Mmm
9 4 6 S: that your parents were learning on the job because (.) both (.)
9 4 7 our parents were in their early twenties (.) you can't blame
9 4 8 . them for (.) not knowing [ the things that you might have
9 4 9 wanted to
9 5 0 J: [ N o
951 S: change about how you turned out (.) is not their fault.
9 5 2 J: No
953 S: (.) And you can also ( ) at a point in my life where I
9 5 4 can change and mould my future (.) whereas I might have thought
9 5 5 that I couldn't have. I only saw the woman four times as part
9 5 6 of my broken relationship thing (.) and she really ironed out
9 5 7 loads of things (.) cos she talked about my upbringing and =
95 8 J: = yeah _
9 5 9 S: Yeah ((laughs)) So (.) yeah (.) when John was ready to go I, was
9 6 0 just like really pleased for him [ because I thought she could
961 J: [ yeah
9 6 2 S: iron out [ so many things.
963 J: [ yeah (.) not that there was much (.) obviously to
9 6 4 iron out ! No (.) [ there was quite a b i t .
965 S: [ I t  (builds/boosts) your confidence doesn't
9 6 6 it?
9 6 7 J: Well (.) er (.) er (.) yes (.) very useful. It's like (.) its
96 8 like (.) a er (.) dishwasher that (.) you know (.) its just a
9 6 9 really good end result (.) you know.
9 7 0 A: has that had any kind of effect on the friendship (.) do you
971 think?
9 7 2 J: No (.) don't think so =
973 S: = You seem a lot more confident about (.)
974 J: Yeah (.) that's yeah (.) yeah and there has been =
975 S: = and letting yourself off the hook (.)
9 7 6 J: Yes (.) yes. Yeah definitely (.) it has had a beneficial effect
9 7 7 on me (.) definitely (.) you know (.) and its (.) yeah (.) but
97 8 we're quite ( ) of each other (.) I (.) you know (.) said
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*979 today that she should go back (.) and things like that so its
980 nice [ to have
981 D: [ Mmm
982 J: a positive you can't argue with. (.) Hmm '
983 A: Okay
984 J: [ Tea?
985 D: [ Shall we move on to (.)
986 A: Alright (.) John seems quite keen to [
987 J: [ Its fine !
988 S: ((laughs))
oo J: Does anyone want a cup of tea?
990 D: ( (laughs))
991 S: I'11 have tea.
992 A: That would be grand. No (.) it er (.) does seem like a natural
993 break there.
994 D: Yep (.) okay (.) I'll just put that on hold
995 J: (Alright (.) good) turn that off now.
996
997 [Tape is stopped]
998
999 A: Okay = .
1000 D: = So (.) can you tell me a little bit about how you came (.) to
1001 the decision to do this interview (.) first of all? Cos [ that
1002 J: [ I
1003 thought probably (.) Aiden (.) said (.) 'Do it (.) fat boy' (.)
1004 were his exact words.
1005 D: ((laughs))
1006 J:" No (.) urn
1007 D: . Did you?
1008 A: ( (laughs)) No
1009 J: No
1010 S: He said there'd be organic scones.
1011 J: Yeah (.) urn (.) er (.) well because I know Aiden did research
1012 on (.) and that interested me cos (.) er (.) I'm interested in
1013 (.) what (.) I like statistics and things like that (.) I like
1014 forms (.) that end up you know with (.) I just find that
1015 interesting you know (.) the end result research I find it
1016 interesting.
1017 A: You (.) you've been on at me for ages (.) urn (.) about taking
1018 part in research [ studies.
1019 J: [ Mmm
260
1020 S: Have you?
1021 J: Mm (.) because (.) in his job (.) he does research on ( )
1022 (.) sexuality interests me (.) period (.) that's why its
1023 interesting to me. (.) You know (.) I thought (.) and I don't
1024 know (.) the subject matter I thought (.) was quite
1025 interesting.
102 6 S: John mentioned it a couple of weeks ago (.)
1027 J: Mm
1028 S: and urn (.) probably over 'Will & Grace' (.) and said 'Shall we
1029 do it?' and I thought (.) that's (.) that's also quite a
1030 landmark to be able to (.) to have the confidence to want to
1031 (.) open up (.)
1032 J : Yes.
1033 S: You're the second gay friend I've m e t .
1034 J: [ M m
1035 A: [ Okay ( ) ((laughs))
1036 . S: So you know its like (.) talking about us (.) and himself and
1037 being open to whatever might come out [ (.) meeting another
1038 friend
1039 J: [ M-hm (.) I'm still
1040 nervous of it.
1041 S: I think maybe going to Marilyn and year on from (.)
1042 J: Yeah (.) maybe.
1043 S: That's probably =
1044 J: = What its like to (.) you know (.) yeah I didn't realise that
1045 (.) I did (.) comp (.) decomp (.) decompmentalise my life (.)
1046 departmentalise (.) I suppose.
1047 A: Could you say some more about what (.) what you mean by that?
1048 J: Well you know (.) I just keep (.) urn (.) its what I've always
1049 done (.) you know (.)
1050 S: Straight friends on that side, gay ones over [ there.
1051 J: [ Maybe (.) but I
105 2 didn't know that many gay people. (.)
1053 D: So (.) urn (.) how was it that it was first raised then (.)
1054 doing this [ one?
1055 J: [ This one?
1056 D: Mm ( . )
1057 J: Urn (.) Well Aiden set it up (.) He'll (.) I think*he suggested
1058 (.) that you were starting to do this
1059 D: Yes
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41060 J: and that it might be (.) you know (.) ( ) I'd said I'd be
1061 interested in doing this.
1062 D: A-ha. (.) And then as the next [ step?
1063 J: [ Which I am (.) you know.
1064 D: Yes. So as the next step (.) how did you raise it with Sarah?
1065 J: I forgot to mention it to you actually. And then I (.) said (.)
1066 'Oh!' and then I remembered in a flurry and I (.) just said
1067 'Oh, Aiden (.) that Irish (.) geezer I've met (.) is you know
1068 (.) does this stuff and then one of his guys had [ (just
1069 started)
1070 S: [ You were quite
1071 excited.
1072 J: Yeah (.) I was (.) you know (.) I'm less so now !
1073 S: ( (laughs))
1074 J: I think its like (.) more like when you think of multiple
1075 choice (.) type questions.
1076 A: ( )’
1077 S: And then he did say 'Be kind to me and don't (.) you know'
1078 J: Did I?
1079 S: Something like that. ((laughs))
1080 A: There was a (.) fear of what might come out?
1081 J: Yeah (.) because (.) no (.) not fear (.) but [ you know (.)
1082 S : [ ( )
1083 J: Sarah could have a laugh at my expense I'm sure (.) If the
1084 roles were reversed (.) I would at hers ((laughs)) Have a jaffa
1085 cake.
1086 D: Thank you. (.) How did you feel about it (.) when it was first
1087 raised (.) what was your sort of (.) reaction to it all?
1088 S: Yeah (.) I just thought "yeah let's do it".
1089 D: And what about the fact that he brought it up as an idea (.)
1090 that you might do?
1091 S: Well I was totally open to it. I thought it would probably help
1092 us.
1093 J: Yeah (.) you said that.
1094 A: In what way?
1095 S : Well (.) building on from the er (.) our therapy [ ( )
1096 J: [ Yeah !
1097 S: and er (.) so (.) progression.
1098 J: Mmm. You're very black and white on things (.) you don't sorta
1099 skirt (.) skirt away from issues (.) you (.) you (.) if
1100 something comes up you just sort of look it head on.
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1101 S: Do I ?
1102 J : Yes you do (.) very much so. And I don't (.) I take it away and
1103 erm (.) try and think about it (.) and then twenty years later
1104 (.) I might work something out. You know so its sorta like a
1105 (.) yeah (.) just that really.
1106 A: You're bringing it up into a (.) you're talking there about (.)
1107 the kind of people that you are (.) which I think leads to the
1108 next question (.) which I think Dan's going to =
1109 J: = Which is how would you like to be
1110 A: Which is going to bring you right up to the present.
1111 D: Okay (.) We had some (.) you mentioned some of the processes
1112 that went on (.) urn (.) between you (.) obviously you've also
1113 mentioned the humour. I wonder if you'd tell me a little bit
1114 about the sorts of things you joke about?
1115 J: (How to meet online) ((laughs)) (.) Everything. I can't think
1116 of anything in particular.
1117 S: There's quite a lot [ of (wordplay)
1118 J: [ Its always deficiencies [ (and if we
1119 could)
1120 S: [ He laughs at my
1121 hair, my clothes =
1122 J: = Arg! Your shoes.
1123 S: My shoes
1124 J: ■ Your feet =
1125 S: = ((laughs)) Everything about me.
1126 A: Whereas you laugh at?
1127 S: ( ) when we used to work together (.) Ah! He used to do
1128 some incredible practical jokes on (.)
1129 D: What sort of thing?
1130 S: I remember [ once (.) they had this (.) erm (.) image-setter
1131 J: [ All sorts.
1132 S: . for producing film for print (.)
1133 D: M-hm
1134 S: and there was a technical fault on it (.) and the guy the I
1135 used to call on the hotline =
1136 J: = Rick (.) Rick
1137 S: sounded really nice (.) and I quite liked the sound of him (.)
1138 cos he sounded (.) like nice too. So I made the mistake of
1139 saying to John (.) "Oh this Rick sounded really nice". The next
1140 time things went down (.) Rick turns up and [ I go down to let
1141 him in and when
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1142 J: ;[ ((laughs))
1143 S: I come back (.) the guy is walking into the computer room
1144 behind me and (.) John has typed onto my screen (.) the twenty
1145 inch computer screen "I love you Rick".
1146 ( (laughter))
1147 S: And then this machine that had broken down (.) the guy had it
1148 in pieces and (.) realigned the laser and everything and then
1149 later on I saw him and he put the thing back together and
1150 everything (.) he's filling out his clipboard report of (.) the
1151 repair he'd made and I said (.) "Oh (.) what's (.) what's wrong
1152 with it this time?" and he said "This might have something to
1153 do with it" and he pulled out a long length of hair which
1154 looked like mine (.) I didn't realise (.) I used to do frui (•)
1155 a catalogue for a wig company. And then the following ( )
1156 seen a wig that was just like my hair. So John (.) anything to
1157 humiliate me (.)
1158 J: I love it because it gives Sarah an opportunity to think on her
1159 feet (.) which is always nice to see.
1160 S: (But if you) take it too far on him he doesn't like it =
1161 J: = No (.) I don't (.) and there's a (.) er (.) issue of work (.)
1162 everyone always accuses of me of (.) you know (.) "you love to
1163 give it out but you don't like it back".
1164 S: Mmm (.) Which I know more (now that he does) ((laughs))
1165 J: A h h ! I like practical jokes like that (.) they're not (.)
1166 they're spontaneous ones you know?
1167 D: A-ha. Yeah (.) yeah.
1168 S: A lot of our humour is word play as well isn't it?
1169 J: Yeah (.) definitely.
1170 D: Do (.) do you ever:play practical jokes on him?
1171 J: Yes ! Sarah's horrid to me!
1172 S: Yeah (.) I used to fill his [ ( ) with paper and
1173 stuff
1174 J: [ On my thirtieth birthday
1175 S: (.) and staple his sleeves together.
1176 J: Big grown-up stuff. We still =
1177 S: = This was things when we first met.
1178 J: Yeah. Yeah (.) Sarah is horrible to me and we =
1179 S: = (I'll never forget) his age (.) when he was thirty he was
1180 saying he was twenty-nine. He almost had us all (.) and then a
1181 fax came through from his brother's girlfriend saying
1182 "Thirtieth".
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1183 J: And I (.) er (.) we were going out for dinner that night and
1184 there was loads of people and all the placemats we "What's the
1185 difference between John and (.) Joan Collins? (.) They both lie
1186 about their age". They were all placemats and stuff in the
1187 restaurant.
1188 S: Put (pictures) up before we got there.
1189 J: Terrible (.) yeah cos (.) I hate to be (.) you know (.) caught
1190 out (.) humiliated. Terrible. (.) Yeah (.) but no (.) humour is
1191 very important (.) I think.
1192 D: What do you think it brings to your friendship then?
1193 J: [ Laughter
1194 S: [ Evil
1195 ((laughter))
1196 J: : Humour is important =
1197 S: = Well its escapism isn't it?
1198 J: Yeah definitely (.) and er (.) also cos you might not be using
1199 your brain during the day in a way that's vocational (.) its
1200 nice to exorcise it with word-play and joking (.)
1201 D: Yeah (.) yeah
1202 J: Its an outlet.
1203 D: What do you think about it? (.) do you =
1204 S : The same
1205 D: Yeah?
1206 J: Its very important because otherwise (.) you know = ■
1207 S: = There's so many humorous people around.
1208 J: Yeah (.) (let it happen (.) let it) (.) I don't know (.) what
1209 can you say about humour (.) it's a personal thing isn't it?
1210 D: Do you mean (.) different styles of humour or =
1211 J: = Yeah (.) obviously (.) yeah just (.) cos things (.) its nice
1212 to laugh (.) you know. So if you can find people you can laugh
1213 with that's the bonus ball isn't it? (.) I [ think
1214 D: [ Sure
1215 S: So [ (like when (.) also ) one of our current
1216 J: [ And also (.)
1217 S: favourites.
1218 J: Yes (.) er yes (.) also its just (.) you know it takes away the
1219 (.) er (.) y y y you know takes away the sort of seriousness of
1220 (.) things (.) which is good. Because it can make you relax and
1221 look at things not so (.) if you're (.) you know worried about
1222 something [ and (.) navel gazing about something (.) like you
1223 know
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41224 D: [ M m
1225 J: navel gazing [ about something then (.) you know (.) humour can
1226 er
1227 S : [ ((laughs))
1228 J: (.) make you think (.) can (defuse/diffuse) the problem for
1229 yourself (.) you know.
1230 •D: Yeah (.) yeah
1231 J: Totally. (.) Its like whatever really cos (.) as you get older
1232 (.) you (.) you do (.) you're not so worried about what other
1233 people think (.) because people aren't looking at you (.) when
1234 you are your age when you go out and that (.) you are probably
1235 very aware of how you look and (.) everything's a bit you know
1236 (.) but when you are our age its not like (.) [ not like people
1237 are looking so
1238 S: [ You you you (.) hurr
1239 J: much you know! (.) You can (.) be easier on yourself.. Its like
1240 that thing of (.) "youth is wasted on the young" or whatever
1241 one of those off the pat things (.) you know.
1242 D: Mm
1243 J: Its like (.) erm (.) you're kinder to yourself I think as you
1244 get older. And I think (.) you can laugh more (.) agreed? (As
1245 an) older gentleman?
1246 A: I didn't say anything. Not what [ you (.) you ( ) think
1247 J: [ ((laughs))
1248 A: And I'm younger than you =
1249 S: = By one month.
1250 A: And I can't say anything either
1251 J: Hm (.) can you not? You're a grown up you can say what you
1252 . like!
1253 A: (Not)' in an interview [ (though!) ((laughs))
1254 S: [ h e  (.) ((laughs))
1255 D: . ( (laughs))
1256 J: Oh right ! ((laughs)) Sorry.
1257 S: Stop holding up those cards Aiden!
1258 J: Yeah [ (.) I know, ((laughs))
1259 S: [ (Have you ever) done that?
1260 J: You've said things before in the interview?
1261 S: [ Not (.)
1262 A: [ Not (.) not expressing personal opinions.
1263 J: Mmmmm-ha! So its alright for you not to but we have to?
1264 S: Its what we're here to do.
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1265 A: You've been asking =
1266 J: What do you think about that Dan?
1267 S: ( (laughs))
1268 A: Oh!
1269 D: ((laughs))
1270 S: He's quite good at manipulating.
1271 J: Oh I wouldn't say that ! Okay (.) keep it =
1272 D : = So (.) changing tack for a minute (.) if you imagine yourself
1273 in a hypothetical situation (.) not that sort [John has pulled
1274 a face] ((laughs)) (.) where one of you needs a (.) well is
1275 going to move into a (.) a urn (.) shared house or something
1276 like that
1277 J: . Yeah ■
1278 D: And needs some sort of reference from a close friend (.) for
1279 the existing tenants (.) so they [ know a bit about
1280 S: [ I have got other friends you
1281 know!
1282 ((laughter))
1283 D: What sort of things do you think you might write?
1284 S: Don't go near him in the kitchen!
1285 ( (laughter))
1286 J: Urn ( . )
1287 S: I can't see John sharing a house with anyone!
1288 J: I have shared houses before.
1289 S: Yeah [ but not
1290 J: [ Urn (.) I'm more relaxed now.
1291 S: He's had Jane living here for a while.
1292 J: That's =
1293 S: = You were quite glad when she went weren't you?
1294 J: Well yeah because its (.) you know [ ( )
1295 S: [ I  think so
1296 J: Yeah (.) you know (.) Ah-ff (.) Well they'd be very lucky
1297 wouldn't they? I'd just say nice things.
1298 S: What would we say about each other? What reference would we =
1299 A: = Yeah (.) Say something more.
1300 S: I (.) naw-er (.) I can't think (.) your (.) urn (.. ) er ( . ) so
1301 you just want a list of good qualities?
1302 D: If you were just writing out a character [ (.) reference
1303 S: [ assassination
1304 ( (laughs))
267
1305 D: (.) the sorts of things that you might put on that (.) you know
130 6 the kinds of things you might bring to mind.
1307 S: Warm, humorous, friendly (.)
1308 J: Thank you (.) generous (.) °good looking"
1309 S: Generous and good looking (.) he made me say that.
1310 D: ((laughs))
1311 J: Yes (.) and Sarah is very bright (.) and funny and (.) kind-
1312 hearted and generous. And late (.) for everything.
1313 D: Are there any things you have in mind that would make her a
1314 particularly good person to live with?
1315 J: (.) Nothing.
1316 . D: ((laughs))
1317 J: I dunno (.) Hmm (.) erm (.)
1318 S: John's quite a home lover (.) he's very homey.
1319 J: ' That sounds very rock 'n' roll (.) sexy. Yeah.
1320 S: But you'd rather be here than come 'round mine.
1321 J: Well yeah =
1322 S: = cos mine's just DIY SOS
1323 J: Yeah (.) and also cos =
1324 S: = When he comes home from work you'd rather just be here
1325 wouldn't you (.) than anywhere else.
1326 J: Yeah (.) definitely.
1327 S: With your pussy.
1328 J: In a gay kinda way. (.) But yeah (.) then you're not homely but
1329 you are (.) your home's lovely (.) decorated and that. Tasteful
1330 and nice. You're quite (.) you know (.) you are very (.) aware
1331 of your possessions (.) you know and you don't want them
1332 marked, scratched, spilt-on (.) you know.
1333 S: I never had ( ) them.
1334 J: Exactly. You know (.) its like (.) but I'm quite =
1335 S: Well you're quite stroppy in that sense aren't you.
1336 J: I am very stroppy. And er- (.) you know if well I think the sofa
1337 gets fucked it gets fucked. Whatever (.) you know. But then
1338 that's like (.) you get that thing (.) you get it from your
1339 parents (.) that sort of [ v e r y  strong (.) mm she's not
1340 wasteful at all.
1341 S: [ M m
1342 J: So things are hoarded and kept and re-used (.) and urn
1343 ((laughs)) her boys ( (laughs))
1344 S: ((laughs)) Oh no
1345 J: And I'm the opposite I'm very (.) you know [ (.) sloppy
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1346 S: [ Yeah John gets
1347 really er (.) if you want to like live with him (.) don't let
1348 him use your video, your kettle, your iron =
1349 J: - It will break.
1350 S:' He gets through electrical appliances like =
1351 J: = yeah (.) they blow up (.) yeah er (.) like bizarre (.)
1352 telephone machines and (.) just every (.) videos (.) I dunno I
1353 had one a year probably from (Argos) (.) (Twice) every five or
1354 six years.
1355 S: Just [ like your personality really
1356 J: [ But er (.) the Playstation's been [ good though.
1357 S: [ ( )
1358 A: [ M m
1359 "D: ( (laughs))
1360 J: Erm (.)
1361 S: I dunno (.) I can't (imagine) us going to live with anyone.
1362 J: No
1363 S: So (.) mm (.) perhaps I'd say (.) I'd say don't do it!
1364 ( (laughter))
1365 S: Yeah (.) I can't think of anything urn (.)
1366 D: Okay =
1367 J: = Perhaps its (.) you know (.) the wrong age group to answer
1368 that question maybe now.
1369 A: Okay well we'll (.) we'll =
1370 S: = Maybe the wrong way of putting it =
1371 J: - Yeah =
1372 A: = The question was to =
1373 J: = Maybe it would be better to (.) if you m o w  someone (.) how
1374 would you describe them?
1375 D: Mm
1376 J: Or if you were describing a blind-date
1377 D: Mm
1378 J: That would be a good one.
1379 D: Yeah (.) okay (.) I'll =
1380 A: = We should have several ways of =
1381 D : = Yeah
1382 J: Mm (.) depending on the age-group of your clientele (.)
1383 D: The other thing I was going to ask about (.) was thinking about
1384 your friendship at the moment erm (.) -
1385 J: = Whether it will last the day
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i1386 D: ((laughs)) Erm (.) how often you actually meet up (.) and what
1387 you do.
1388 J: Okay (.) a couple of times a week (.) three [ times a yeah?
1389 S : [ Yeah ( ) times a
1390 week.
1391 D: And that's pretty regular is it?
1392 J: Yeah (.) and its nice cos like (.) we are both like not
1393 partnered up and live alone (.) if you know (.) if you just
1394 fancy a curry and flopping out in front of the telly (.) and
1395 its nice (to have) that sort of companionship.
1396 D: Mm
1397 J: You know.
1398 S: You don't have to say anything particularly do we?
1399 . J: No. And Sarah doesn't know how a kettle works.
1400 S: I do. [ You don't like the colour of my tea (that's all). Still
1401 J: [ You
1402 S: are happy enough to drink it. ( . )
1403 D: So do you kind of arrange things in advance or is it
1404 spontaneous?
1405 J: Spontaneous
1406 S: [ Spontaneous
1407 J: Definitely (.) just after I start cooking I get a text saying
1408 "do you want a curry" and er (.) yeah ((laughs))
1409 D: ((laughs)) And what do you =
1410 J: = Yes of course I fucking do! (.) you know (.) (How could I not
1411 fancy curry).
1412 . S: Yeah (.) we probably meet up a couple of times a week don't we?
1413 J: Yeah. Yeah we do try and go out as well (.) you know (.)
1414 S: Yeah we go to gigs sometimes.
1415 J: Yes (.) and er (.) might go shopping together and er (.) walk
1416 on the downs [ o n  the beach (.)
1417 S: [ Haven't done that for ages.
1418 J: Well no. We haven't actually (.) no.
1419 S: We have spontaneous meets probably about (.) two or three
1420 times a week.
1421 D: Yeah (.) yeah. So you're saying you go shopping, you go for
1422 walks =
1423 J: = Mm-hm
1424 D: you go for a curry, things like that (. )
1425 J: Yeah
270
1426 D: Is that a fair sort of representation [ (of the sorts of
1427 things)
1428 S : [ Yeah. Definitely.
1429 A: Is (.) is this stuff you do by yourselves or (.) or with (.)
1430 with a group as well? \
1431 J: Well we (.) recently (.) recently I mean (.) I'd say (.) that
1432 (.) less so with groups [ (it used) to be more so.
1433 S : [ Last couple of =
1434 J: = yeah
1435 S: We would probably have been the odd couple [ of lots of our
1436 J: [ Yeah
1437 S : married friends.
1438 J: Yeah (.) and (.) er (.) and ( ) weekly (.) yeah.
1439 S: Take aways (.) maybe at the weekend too. I was coming out of
1440 this relationship and =
1441 J: = yeah
1442 D: Yeah (.) yeah
1443 S: And John (.) I don't know (.) what he was up to (.) but
1444 Saturdays was often like freedom (.) we might go for a curry
1445 together (at) someone's house (.)
1446 J: Mm
1447 S: Whereas now (.) I'm back on the market
1448 J: ( (laughs))
1449 S: And I don't want to waste my weekends with people who are
1450 paired up =
1451 J: = I'm the same (.) my married friends I find boring at the
1452 moment (.) in general. You know (.) er =
1453 D: = Okay (.) yeah (.) yeah
1454 J: Definitely. You know (.) lovely people (.) lovely warm kind
1455 people and all that (.) but er (.) its just
1456 S: Not getting us anywhere (.) the clocks ticking =
1457 J: = Well yeah (.) yeah (.) sometimes (a stab) of cocaine =
1458 S: = (Fuck) [ you! ((laughs))
1459 J : [ No (.) only joking.
1460 A: ((laughs))
1461 J: But urn
1462 D: ((laughs))
1463 A: Only j oking.
1464 J: ( ) But (.) but it is that (.) it is nice to have
1465 someone who understand that [ and ( ) the situation (.)
1466 yeah
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41467 S: [ I  think probably its because of
1468 our age (too).
1469 J: Yeah (.) you know (.) where our friends are like (.) as bored
1470 of their Saturday nights in front of Pop Idol as we are if we'd
1471 spoken with them. Perhaps (.) you know.
1472 A: Yes . 1
1473 S : We'd often find that if go round to (.) some of our straight
1474 friends (.) for a curry (.) or whatever (.) and we were their
1475 entertainment for the night = ■
1476 J: - Yes (.) definitely.
1477 S: (People) who just stay in all the time anyway [ or they've got
1478 J: [ Yes (.)
1479 definitely.
1480 S: kids.
1481 A: What do you mean by saying that you were their entertainment?
1482 J: Well we're entertaining.
1483 S: We're like a double act (.) they always know that we wouldn't
1484 stop talking =
1485 J: = And also that (.) it would be a more interesting evening for
i486 them.
1487 S: Because we (.) we're (.) like our non-domestic input.
1488 J: Exactly (.) cos like (.) their (.) experience [ is more based
1489 A: [ Yeah (.) yeah
1490 J: upon (.) you know they don't go out so much (.) so perhaps (.)
1491 you know (.) whatever.
1492 A: You (.) you [ (sound) like you are enthralled (.) with (.) with
1493 J: [ Ooh !
1494 A: this setup where you are the [ entertainment.
1495 J: [ They all (.) also give you
1496 strength (.) you know (.) like the (Monahans) (.) and that you
1497 know (.) if you go out with them on your own then you know (.)
1498 its because you are a bit sparky and that (.) that would (.)
1499 like make (.) as you say several times you don't feel like (.)
1500 entertaining them.
1501 S: Yeah —
1502 J: = And I had that with friends as well you know. Definitely (.)
1503 I definitely fall into that (.) that role of er (.) with that
1504 group of friends if I am on my own at the same you know (.) you
1505 just (.) you (spark/start) conversations and make things
1506 interesting and edit the conversations with people you know and
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>1507 um (.) to change the subject (.) and Sarah's [ the same (.) you
1508 know cos otherwise
1509 S: [ I ( )
1510 J: you'd get bored yourself (.) you know
1511 A: Yeah
1512 J: So you control the er (.) (way things are going a bit).
1513 A: Okay [ what about the er
1514 S: [ Well they kind of expect us to don't they?
1515 J: (.) Yeah (.) they (.) yeah definitely. Its like (.) social
1516 gatherings won't happen if we weren't there I wouldn't have
1517 thought (.) you know.
1518 A: I'm (.) I'm wondering if .(.) we are hearing here something
1519 about the (.) nature of the relationship (.) that with (.) with
1520 other friends you're the ones who entertain [ but with each
1521 other you
1522 J: [ Yeah
1523 A: can entertain each other [ i n  different ways.
1524 S: [ Yeah
1525 J: [ Yes (.) definitely. I mean I
1526 wouldn't want it (.) you know (.) if Sarah was not going to er
1527 (.) a couply thing I would think (.) I er (.) wish she was
1528 going (.) cos (.) at least we can do (jokes).
1529 D: So when you are trying to work out what you wanna (.) do (.)
1530 how do you actually go about arranging it? Cos you said [ it
1531 was
1532 J: [ ( )
1533 yeah
1534 D: fairly spontaneous =
1535 S: = What (.) our weekly meetings?
1536 D: Yeah (.) how do you decide what it is that you want to do?
1537 S: Text
1538 J: Texts (.) and its its just like mm (.) if you (.) I'm sure with
1539 your own friends you just can (.) identify a feeling (.) like
1540 sometimes I can call Sarah and just say (.) I'm watching telly
1541 (.) do you fancy that (.) without you know [ without feeling
1542 D: [ M m
1543 J: (.) And if she says no (.) its fine (.) you know (.) its never
1544 loaded which is lovely. WE've always managed that (.) haven't
1545 we?
1546 S: Yeah.
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I1547 J: Which is really important (.) you know. Not (.) not relying on
1548 each other. But appreciate each other. That's quite grown-up I
1549 think isn't it?
1550 S: Mm (.) I'd really miss him if he wasn't about !
1551 J: Ah! "thank you° Ah.
1552 S': One of my fears I suppose when I was thinking about (.) trying
1553 to get him to admit that he was gay and to open up =
1554 J: = sorry
1555 S: But er (.) in a er (.) little selfish ways I think "what if he
1556 (finally) open up and then meet someone and then they end up
1557 living with (them)?" (.) then I er (.) (our) whole relationship
1558 would break [ down.
1559 J: [ Mm (.) But it =
1560 S: = Just like Will and Grace ( (laughs))
1561 J: ((laughs)) That's not gonna happen though (.) is it (.) don't
1562 you know (.) it =
1563 S: = Yeah (but I hope) I'd love to meet somebody
1564 J: Totally..
1565 S: I think my whole relationship would change [ but ( ) about
1566 what
1567 J: [ I wouldn't
1568 S: the other person [ thinks (.)
1569 J: [ I think either of us are (.) you know =
1570 S: - You were quite good friends with Sarah ( )
1571 J: Yeah (.) yeah
1572 S: for quite a while (.) but as soon as her boyfriends come on the
1573 scene =
1574 J: = Yeah (.) but if you were (.) yeah (.) if you behaved like
1575 that then (.) I wouldn't expect you to be my [ (friend)
1576 S: [ I  never drop my
1577 friends =
1578 J: = You never have (.) amidst all your relationships you've
1579 always kept your friends. You know you've got your =
1580 S: = There haven't been that many.
1581 J: You've got a wide circle of friends (.) you know. Erm (.) and
1582 I'd hope to be the same. (.) You know its very important not to
1583 erm (.) And also its very =
1584 A: = What what (.) what would respective partners make of your
1585 relationship?
1586 S: They'd [ better (put) up with it hadn't they !
1587 J: [ ( ) (.) yeah.
2 7 4
>1588 S: ( ) he's had no =
1589 J: = ’No none at (.) because um (.) I would get on with your
1590 partner and vice-a-versa [ I don't see
1591 S: [ As long as you don't get off with 'em that's
1592 alright !
1593 - ( (laughter))
1594 J-: No that's true (.) I think that erm (.) probably =
1595 S: = I wouldn't have liked someone who didn't like John =
1596 J: = And vice-a-versa (.) exactly (.) I don't think there is any
1597 danger of that. (.) And honestly its not like either of us
1598 would be doormats and (.) er (.) sort of like fall at the feet
1599 of someone and (.) do exactly as they wished (.) you know (.)
1600 at all. So its not like (.) you know (.) whatever (.) they're
1601 just (.) I would never analyse all of that (.) that sort of
1602 thing because its what happens isn't it (.) you can't (.)
1603 contrive how things are gonna be that haven't happened. That
1604 would be foolish. Wouldn't it? (.) Yes.
1605 S : ( (laughs)) (.) They didn't nod.
1606 J: Mm
1607 ((laughter))
1608 D: So are there ways in which you could (.) bearing in mind what
1609 you have just said (.) are there ways though that you could
1610 ever conceive of future partners finding your friendship in
1611 anyway • =
1612 S: = If we find a gorgeous bisexual man then that would be [
1613 perfect !
1614 J: [ Yeah !
1615 (Split him) in half (.) there you go.
1616 S: Erm
1617 J: I just wouldn't even (.) be (subject) to something that
1618 happens.
1619 D: Mm
1620 J: (I've) nothing to say on that (.) have you?
1621 S: What (.) did he say?
1622 J: That we'd worry about what a prospective partner would make of
1623 our relationship.
1624 S: No not at all =
1625 J: = Not at all. Honestly.
1626 S: (.) I wouldn't (.) er go for anyone that had fixed ideas about
1627 er sexuality anyway =
1628 J: Mm (.) that's [ good.
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1629 D: [ Mm (.) The other thing (.) thinking back to erm
1630 (.) your (.) your sort of friendship now erm (.) was I was
1631 wondering about the things you most frequently talked about (.)
1632 you discussed humour quite a lot already (-) but I wonder
1633 whether there were particular =
1634 J: = Apart from Craig Doyle? (.) Erm (.)
1635 S: He talks about cars quite a lot.
1636 J: Cars (.) I like cars.
1637 S: Cars, music (.) -
1638 D: Mm
1639 S: Clothes (.) more so recently.
1640 J: Yeah.
1641 S: ( ) with pleated skirts.
1642 J: ( (laughs))
1643 S: John is really crap at making his mind up.
1644 J: Yes.
1645 S: So if he's been (.) um-ing and ar-ing about whether to sell his
1646 house.
1647 J: The sold sign is in the front yard. But [ I'm still here.
1648 S: [ (I'm not surprised)
1649 J: Yes (.) er (.) that's why I went to Marilyn because I couldn't
1650 make a decision (.) about anything. (.) Tea or coffee. Who
1651 knows.
1652 S: And he always wants your endorsement that you like whatever it
1653 is that he's done, said, bought, thinking of buying =
1654 J: - Yes.
1655 S: Eaten ((laughs))
1656 J: Possibly going to eat.
1657 D: What sorts of things do you enjoy discussing then, John?
1658 J: Cars, CDs (.)
1659 S: yeah (.) I think John has bought (.) my ( ) (.) he's
1660 always bought loads of CDs and music.
1661 D: Mm
1662 S: And I always was and I went though a flat period of (.) not
1663 having much money because (.) I was going backwards and
1664 forwards to Greece so I became a bit like a nun didn't I?
1665 J: Mm
1666 S: I mean lifestyle (.) I only use my money for absolute
1667 essentials.
1668 D: Yeah.
1669 S: And then music went out of my life for quite a while (.)
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1670 D: Yeah.
1671 S: And now (.) I'm buying more, music =
1672 J: = yes =
1673 S: We (.) we (.) °we don't cut each other CDs0
1674 J: Yes (.) no (.) obviously not. We wouldn't do that, ((laughs))
1675 Because [ that would be [ illegal
1676 D: [ ( (laughs))
1677 S: [ And go to gigs.
1678 J: Yeah (.) And it's a shame Sarah doesn't read books (.) that's a
1679 shame. -
1680 S: I do read ! I'm reading (Kate Aidie's) thing at the moment.
1681 J: ((laughs)) Sarah Monahan in drag! (.) Yeah (.) cos I I I  like
1682 books and I =
1683 S: = I like books but I can't (.) er (.) oh (.) read [ all day
1684 J: [ books
1685 S: everyday cos I spend all day long reading.
1686 J: That's true. Well that's er (.) all sorts of things (.) there's
1687 no limit (.) you know history and er (.)
1688 S: Walking
1689 J: Yeah [ countryside things.
1690 S: [ ( ) shops.
1691 J: Picking up guys.
1692 D: ((laughs)) I I I was wondering if there were specifically
1693 things that you talked about in your friendship that you er (.)
1694 don't really discuss so much with other people?
1695 J: Picking up guys.
1696 S: ( (laughs))
1697 J: No just those things.
1698 D: Yeah
1699 J: I can't think of anything (.) can you?
1700 S: No (.)
1701 J: I can't think of anything (.) you know. Its not like.an
1702 exclusive little relationship (.) is it? [ You know (.) Its
1703 whatever
1704 S: [ N o
1705 J: I think we'd feel claustrophobic if we were (.) you know
1706 D: Yeah (.) yeah.
1707 J: You know if you (.) we're not (.) bitchy are we really either
1708 (.) or [ (.) or only on the telly (.) things on the telly (.)
1709 maybe =
1710 S: [ N o
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1711 S: = Only Miss World and Eurovision ((laughs))
1712 J: Yeah
1713 D: ((laughs))
1714 A: ((laughs))
1715 J: Don't [ ask him about that !
1716 S: [ ( ) don't they?
1717 J: Yeah (.) I mean I (didn't have a telly for years). Sorry !
1718 D: Shall we move to the sketch thing =
1719 A: = Yes I think we should move to the (.) on
1720 J: To the Will and Grace sketch thing?
1721 A: Before he goes off about the Eurovision again !
1722 J: I was hopeful (.) oh (.) there's a pad coming out.
1723 D: Its okay (.) don't worry ! I was wondering if you could indulge
1724 me by thinking about a time (.) in your friendship that you
1725 wish could have a photo of? So if you had a photo which sort of
1726 summed up = -
1727 S: - I've got one.
1728 J: Hang on (.) let me think (.) don't tell me.
1729 S: It happened twice (.) it happened to you and Lucy and then it
1730 happened to me later in the year. I was round here and John had
1731 been in the shower (.) and his phone rang.
1732 J: Stop it!
1733 S: And he said "will you get it".
1734 J: ( (laughs))
1735 S: And I think it might have been Glen or someone (.) so I'm
1736 halfway up the stairs chatting away to this mutual friend.
1737 D: Mm
1738 -S: And John is doing a towel dance (.) on the landing =
1739 J: = As you do.
1740 S: Naked (.) with a towel in front of him (.) not realising that I
1741 could see him in the mirror! ((laughs))
1742 J: It was cold that day. 1
1743 ( (laughter))
1744 J: (It was her) not a shower.
1745 D: So (.) would this be your choice or? (.)
1746 J: Erm (.) er (.) I've got such a poor memory (.) I genuinely do
1747 don't I? About (.)
1748 S: A photograph of something that [ ( )
1749 J: [ I  can't remember what I did
1750 last :
1751 D: [ So if you
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V1752 J: week =
1753 S : = What like a bondy moment thing?
1754 . D: Well (.) yeah it could be anything. If you could (.) I mean (.
1755 think about it as if you could go back in time (.) you know (.
1756 to one of those Kodak moments (.) only you didn't have the
1757 camera there.
1758 S : Yeah
1759 J: Mm
1760 S: Oh god. What (.) er (.)
1761 D: If you prefer it can be something that never happened at all
1762 (.) if you were to kind of compose a photo (.)
1763 J: I see what you are saying (.) you know
1764 S : A (double) wedding !
1765 ( (laughter))
1766 J: That'd be good (.) a double wedding (.) yeah. No er
1767 S: John driving a Volkswagen.
1768 J: Stop it! ( ) Sarah at a jewellery party with all the
1769 girls (.) that would be fun. Right (.) a make-up party.
1770 S: Are we supposed to be serious?
1771 D: (.) Not unduly.
1772 J: Er (.)
1773 D: You sound like you've got quite a few ideas there (.) I was
1774 wondering if I could persuade you to draw me one of them
1775 between you?
1776 J: Sarah can draw.
1777 S: We'll have to have a picture of John with me (.) leaving John
1778 (.) and a future partners house that they have built (.) got
1779 together.
1780 J: No (.) insipid.
1781 S: No I'd like to see you (.) actually live with someone for a
1782 while.
1783 J: I don't think that would be nice for them (.) do you?
1784 S: Don't be so hard on yourself.
1785 J: "Okay" (.) Mmm (.) (That's so) nice but ergh! Mm (.) well I'd
1786 equally like to see that with you. Yeah maybe a block of flats
1787 and we can get it all in one.
1788 S: Me pushing John along the seafront in his bath-chair.
1789 J: That'd be nice.
1790 ( (laughter))
1791 J: Yes (.) with a Jack Russell.
1792 D: We're onto more hypothetical versions [ of the photo now!
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1793 S: [ Yeah.
1794 J: ( )
1795 S: Erm
1796 D: Cos you have thrown up a lot of different possibilities. Is
1797 there something that maybe (.) involving the two of you (.) if
1798 you could actually [ go back in time.
1799 S: [ Going ( ) together.
1800 J: Being on a plane together (.) that would be good. Yes. Isn't
1801 it?
1802 S: Yeah with you doing your Airplane "we're gonna crash" scene.
1803 J: Mm
1804 A: This is a photo that might actually say something about your
1805 friendship.
1806 J: Oh I don't like it. Its
1807 S: Erm
1808 A: Don't like?
1809 J: Oh its [ (just sort of)
1810 S: [ Me being John's bridesmaid
1811 ( (laughter))
1812 J: Sarah as a kitten [ ( ' ) ' .
1813 S: [ Oh no I hate cats.
1814 A: It doesn't have to be an event (.) it could be something that
1815 just (.)a pose between the pair of you that will say something
1816 about your friendship.
1817 J: ( ) Sorry. I just (.) you know (.) its just a bit (.
1818 it feels (.) insipid.
1819 S: We've got a commitment problem as you can see !
1820 D: ((laughs))
1821 J: I er (.) no (.) I can't come to = -
1822 S: = Probably out dancing somewhere
1823 J: Yeah
1824 S: Yeah and being =
1825 J: = That's good = .
1826 S: Yes us on a dancefloor.
1827 J: That's good. I'm happy with that.
1828 D: The two of. you on a dancefloor =
1829 J: = y [eah
1830 S: [ ( ) we drove back and had a crash in the (.) in his
1831 Alfa =
1832 J: = yeah
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1833 S: And the last picture of us was (.) boogying on down (.) to some
1834 thumping [ dance music. (Plenty of us on the dancefloor)
1835 J: [ That's good. (.) You're happy? (.) Good. Phew!
1836 D: Could I =
1837 S: = Oh we've got to draw it haven't we!
1838 J: Oh!
1839 D: Would you feel okay with that or =
1840 S: I I can draw it =
1841 J: = Sarah can draw it (.) I can have a fag !
1842 A: No (.) no (.) you will have to provide (.) guidance.
1843 J: Okay.
1844 D: Do you want to be draw-er
1845 S: What shirt do you want to be wearing?
1846 J: Well it would be ( ) wouldn't it? Don't (forget your
1847 ) style !
1848 S : Have you got any A2 paper?
1849 D: I've got card.
1850 J: I don't like this bit (.) at all.
1851 A: What is it (.) what is it about it that you don't like?
1852 J: It's just =
1853 S : = Too sentimental
1854 J: Argh! Its just like (.) urgh (.) too (.. ) I just (.) argh. Yeah
1855 (.) too sentimental.
1856 A: Could you be more specific [ than that !
1857 S: [ I got a photo that I do like of
1858 u s . •
1859 J: Go on
1860 S: Do you remember at ( ) wedding?
1861 J: Yes that was good (.) I had quite a shiny face though.
1862 S: Yeah you had quite a shiny polished look though.
1863 J: Just come back from holiday (.) hm.
1864 S: Looked like a =
1865 J: = I looked like a Da (.) what's his name? (.) Dicky (.) does
1866 the antiques? The orange guy?
1867 A: Dav (.) David Dickinson.
1868 J: David Dickinson (.) yeah. ( )
1869 S: You know (.) got a nice picture of us lined up with (.) some
1870 people that we both worked with (.) well he works for them and
1871 I (.) worked with them and we were (.) at a wedding do ( ..)
1872 there were about six of us in a line and just as the camera
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1873 went off he (.) squeezed me or something so (.) we were both
1874 laughing lots or (.) - -
1875 ( (laughter))
1876 S: Oh dear
1877 D: That sounds like a good one.
1878 A: I guess something like that would capture what you have been
1879 talking about. (.) About the humour aspect
1880 S: Yeah (.) yeah.
1881 A: of the relationship (.) okay (.) you've got a pallet of pens =
1882 D: = There's a thinner pen there (.) if you (.)
1883 S: ' You don't have any 2Bs do you?
1884 D: That's a bit thinner (.per
1885 . S: God (.) I should get into this really.
1886 D: (.) It's alright I turned it over when we had (.)
1887 J: It's very good (.) thank you I like how I look.
1888 S: Its stubble not spots.
1889 J: ((laughs)) And what, about me?
1890 D: ((laughs)) And that's the pair of you dancing?
1891 S: Those are hands (.) not bananas.
1892 ( (laughs))
1893 J: Ah (.) you can put that (right) one behind if you wish. There's
1894 a
1895 D: Is it something you do often?
1896 J: Not as often as we'd like.
1897 S: Mm
1898 J : We both enjoy it (.) but er (.) you know (.) but perhaps wanna
1899 go to different clubs.
1900 D: Yeah, yeah.
1901 S: And dance with different people.
1902 J: No (.) dance with the same people ((laughs))
1903 D: What sorts of places would you ideally go to?
1904 J: MFI ((laughs)) (.) What me personally?
1905 D: Yeah (.) yeah
1906 J: A mixed club would be great (.) but (.) you know =
1907 S: We've been to the ( ) before.
1908 J: Yeah (.) yeah (.) there's not much dancing going on there.
1909 S: That was so funny recently when =
1910 J: = I fell off stage didn't I? That was horrible. I was
1911 mortified.
1912 S: ( (laughs))
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1913 J: (You did and ) And we sat (.) and the tickets were front-
1914 row and it was a cabaret type (.) thing and this woman (.) this
1915 Faith Honey =
1916 S: = She picked on me
1917 J: Yeah
1918 S: Verbally (.) and then she wanted us all to get up.
1919 J: So she was like ''Oh go on!" and (.)
1920 S: ( )s up on stage holding stomachs in!
1921 J: I couldn't bear it. To be under the spotlight is my idea of
1922 hell. Yeah (.) [ its absolutely horrible.
1923 S: [ (And there was these ) he knew from chatting to
1924 her online (.) he recognised them!
1925 J: What a find!
1926 S : And they all saw him!
1927 A: ((laughs))
1928 J: Look at the glee with which she tells that !
1929 S: I'm getting him back for all the horrible things he does to me.
1930 J: Yeah (.) true (.) are you cold now? (.) It's a bit chilly isn't
1931 it? .
1932 S : It is a bit chilly. (.) Er (.) (but a funny one we saw)
1933 recently we went to see ( ) with car (.) there were
1934 about six of us =
1935 J: Yeah
1936 S: • And the guy that was warming up between acts (.) he came out
1937 like a [ sort of oh (.) gay (guy's mother)
1938 J: [ It was horrible !
1939 S: And he was saying (.) picking [ it was a gay guy's mother
1940 picking
1941 J: [ Ohohohohoho!
1942 S: out people (.) going "are you gay?" And you know they go yes or
1943 no or whatever. John is sitting behind me and goes [ (hide me)
1944 A: [ Oh no (.)
1945 When you do go out to venues (.) does it tend to be mixed
1946 venues or gay venues or?
1947 J: Bit of each.
1948 S: Er (.) What have we done lately (.) there's a place called the
1949 Camellia in Brighton (.) that's quite ( ) so there's
1950 the option of mixed audiences.
1951 D: Yeah (.) yeah. (.) When you go out and do that do you usually
1952 with other people or just tend to be the pair of you?
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1953 S: Er (..) We often go to gigs just together. Sometimes when we go
1954 to comedy things there might be about six of us. (.) Or I might
1955 be going into Brighton to meet one of my (.) girlfriends and
1956 then (.) John comes too and =
1957 J: = Yeah.
1958 S: A bit of .a mix really.
1959 A: And anything else about the picture?
1960 D: (.) No (.) I think we've probably (.j I suppose before we move
1961 on I really ought to ask if there' anything you want to add
1962 about the picture (.) I mean you've spoken about a few other
1963 possibilities as well.
1964 S: To add about it?
1965 D: Yeah.
1966 A: What (.) what it says about your friendship.
1967 S: Er (.) that we're quite close (.)
1968 A: M-hm
1969 D: Yes.
1970 S: We like music, laughter and dancing really.
1971 J: Get off the subject (.) boring
1972 S: ( (laughs))
1973 J: Sorry.
1974 S: We're not (.) we're not tactile with each other are we? We're
1975 not touchy (.) are we?
1976 J: No (.) I'm not (.) I'm not a cuddly person.
1977 S: But if were on the dancefloor where we lark about and (.j
1978 probably [ ( ).
1979 J: [ Very good picture !
1980 S: We might end up like that though.
1981 . J: Your breasts are lower in real life. '
1982 S: ((laughs)) Your ( ) is a bit wide there.
1983 A: So its an idealised representation.
1984 J: Yes
1985 (.)
1986 D: Shall we move on?
1987 A: Yes
1988 J: Yes
1989 D: We're on different (.) cos they're printed differently (.)
1990 you're here aren't you?
1991 J: Its like they are working together (.) but they're not !
1992 D: What I was wondering about as well (.) if we are moving on (.)
1993 was whether there have been times (.) from your perspective (.)
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1994 where being friends as a straight woman and a gay man has (.)
1995 ever created difficulties?
1996 J: Nothings springs to mind.
1997 S: What you mean outside perceptions (.) and stuff?
1998 D: Yeah (.) you could include that if you like.
1999 S: I don't think it has at all.
2000 J: No
2001 S: Except for not (marrying someone).
2002 J: Sorry
2003 ((laughter))
2004 A: You (.) you talk about outside perspectives (.) what do other
2005 people think of your friendship or your relationship?
2006 J: Er (.) [ (I don't know) you better ask them.
2007 S: [ I  think they are (puzzled) about it.
2008 J: Yeah perhaps.
2009 S: Well all the ones that are paired up
2010 J: Yeah (.) you always have a funny guy and a (.) ° straight guy6.
2011 A: ( (laughs))
2012 J: I don't.really (.) its not something I (.) worry about [ at all
2013 S: [ No I
2014 don't.
2015 D: Do people ever assume that you are a couple in a romantic
2016 sense?
2017 J: Only when I've got (.) no I don't do jokes. E r m -(.) [ well
2018 maybe
2019 S: [ Maybe
2020 yeah
2021 J: people who don't know us (.) but yeah.
2022 D: But but (.) you don't really feel its arisen? It hasn' t been a
2023 problem?
2024 J: Er (.)
2025 S: I expect people probably have though we were a item [ haven't
2026 they?
2027 J: [ Perhaps
2028 they've thought (.) "he could do better than her".
2029 S: ( (laughs))
2030 A: But (.) you've never been in that situation where you' ve
2031 thought "well hang on, they're interpreting this in (. ) a" =
2032 J: = No we wouldn't allow that to happen I don't think.
2033 S: I think people probably have thought it but (.) erm
2034 J: They might think it in TK Maxx.
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2035 S: Mm
2036 D: Is it something that would bother you? If someone (.) did think
2037 that?
2038 S: No I'd (like you) I'd go =
2039 J: = Mwah! (.) erm (.) oh (.) lalala! (.) What can you say (.) you
2040 know.
2041 S: In your previous life (but not ) now (.) was I ever (.)
2042 did you (.) was I ever useful as a decoy?
2043 ((laughter))
2044 J: Like the one you put out for sharks?
2045 S: Er (.) I don't know (.) I suppose to a degree its easier if you
2046 (.) aren't out as such (.) as you were to go out to a social
2047 event that you don't have to worry.
2048 D: Mm
2049 J: Like if you go to the pictures to see a sloppy movie or
2050 something (.) maybe you know (.) but er (.) I suppose so (.)
2051 it's easier (.) but you know (.) I wouldn't sort of you know
2052 (•)
2053 A: But there was never a case where you (.) when you were using
2054 (.) when Sarah was acting as cover to enable you to pass as =
2055 J: No (.) I don't think so do you (.) I mean she wouldn't.
2056 S: Well I wouldn't have known would I?
2057 A: Yeah.
2058 S: I remember one occasion years ago (.)when you (.) when your
2059 mum's brother was down or something (.) so said "oh did I want
2060 to go round with you (.) to" (.) and you think (.) mm (.) I
2061 wonder if he thinks he wants me to be =
2062 J: = Mm no (.) wouldn't have been her brother I don't think.
2063 S: (.) Someone (.) it might have been her brother (.) I think. (.)
2064 And I refused (.) well I said "no (.) I don't want to". Cos I
2065 get on well with his mum (.)
2066 ' J: I don't (.) I don't know (.) mm (.) erm (.) I certainly
2067 wouldn't try and contrive it. It would [ be disrespectful
2068 S: [ I think we probably fit
2069 together (.) even just being a single woman on your own =
2070 D: = Mm ■
2071 S: Lots of (.) are married or coupled up (.) have been for years
2072 (. ) it is (.) you do feel like you are (.) a bit of an odd limb
2073 (.) you are there on your own [ and ( ) couples
2074 J: [ Yes (.) agreed
2075 S: So there are [ situations where (.) you go and =
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2076 J: [ Agreed
2077 J: Yeah (.) yeah (.) then yes (.) that's a good point. A nice
2078 point of view (.) saved.
2079 S: Well its just another (bat) isn't it? Bal (.) balance I mean =
2080 D: ■ Yeah
2081 J: Yeah totally (.) and I mean (.) couples if you are with couples
2082 ,I mean they talk in "we"s which is so obvious (.) and they're
2083 like (.) you know (.) we like to go to Sainsburys (.) or you
2084 know (.) and its just a hideous thing and er (.) and not that
2085 you'd want to er (.) We don't speak in "we"s do we?
2086 S: "We"s? No
2087 J: Like you know (.) you prefer [ (fruit) (.) I hate shit like
2088 that.
2089 S: [ Well what about (.) the straight
2090 couples who have often got the (.) one of them does the talking
2091 for this sort of stuff [ and one of them does these things
2092 J: [ Yeah
2093 S: but because we are both independent and individual [ we both
2094 A: [ Yeah
2095 S: cover both things ourselves.
2096 J: Yeah
2097 D: Yeah (.) I understand.
2098 A: You talked about that you get on with John's family (.) or (.)
2099 or his mother (.) to what extent do families (.) or are they
2100 familiar with your relationship?
2101 S: Yeah (.) my mum and dad know about John (.) my sister (.)
2102 J: Also vice versa.
2103 S: My dad did that great joke that time you pulled up in that car.
2104 J : What did he do?
2105 S: He test drove some car =
2106 J: - Some sports car =
2107 S: = Round the corner from my parents house (.) and he pulled up
2108 there. .
2109 J: I did. What did he say?
2110 S: Oh when (.) when you pulled the window down (.) my dad was in ■
2111 the front garden and he goes past and he said "what do you
2112 think of it?" and I said "its silver (.) it matches your hair!"
2113 ( (laughs))
2114 J: Excellent joke (.) very funny.
2115 A: What (.) what's the history of your families have made of
2116
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2117
2118 [Tape is turned over]
2119
2120 [Start of 2nd tape]
2121
2122 A: Go on! You were going to say something.
2123 J: I was just gonna say I could see where you were leading with
2124 that, and (.) what can I say (.) without sorta deflecting an'
2125 that. As I would like to I (.) I (.) I'm not aware (.) or I
2126 can't speak for other people (.) and I wouldn't want to (.)
2127 (comment) on how they see things.
2128 A: Do you (.) what's [your
2129 J: [ (can) I make that simpler [ for you?
2130 A: [ What's your (.)
2131 what's your perception of what they might =
2132 J: = I'm not interested.
2133 S : (Well I think) my mum and dad (.) if they think I've been upset
2134 or whatever [ they might say couldn't (.) oh-oh (.)
2135 D: [ Yeah
2136 S: where's John [ or something they find that we are support for
2137 each
2138 J: [ Ann !
2139 S: other [ (cos no one else does)! ((laughs))
2140 A: [ Mmm
2141 D: [ Yeah / '
2142 S: They all see (.j they all see John as a friend and support.
2143 J: Yes (.) that's nice. (.) And vice-a-versa.
2144 D: Right (.) okay (.) well I think we are now probably moving more
2145 towards the end aren't we =
2146 A: = I think so
2147 D: What I did want to do was kinda open up the floor a bit more
2148 and (.) just really ask you (.) if you had the power (.j is
2149 there one thing that you'd like other people to know about your
2150 friendship? (.) Or about"friendships between straight women and
2151 gay men in general?
2152 J: Yeah (.)
2153 S: I don't think (.) They can see what our friendship is (.) can't
2154 they =
2155. J: = Yeah (.) Are you looking for [
2156 S: [ That we might change society?
2157 J: No we really don't (.) its like (.)
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2158 S: Most of my female friends that are single have got their best
2159 gay friend.
2160 J: Yes (.) yeah (.) you know (.) its something that happens with
2161 all of (you too).
2162 S: Did you know I've got another [ ( )
2163 J: [ Of course I know !
2164 S : Cos you've got your girlfrie (.) best girlfriends?
2165 A: No
2166 S: No?
2167. J: Okay.
2168 A: I've got (.) I've got a number of straight female friends (.)
2169 But not one [ that...
2170 S: [ Yes
2171 D: Okay
2172 J: Would you like one?
2173 ( (laughter))
2174 S : Mmm (.) I bet its cos we live where we come from. Its not like
2175 we've moved to the other end of the country.
2176 J: Yeah.
2177 S: Met some (.) Mmm
2178 J: I think (.) you know (.) we all need (.) if you think about it
2179 especially at out age (.) you know, most people are coupled up
2180 (.) all traditional couples you know (.) and the (comfort) of
2181 that relationship is having someone they can you know chill out
2182 (.) don't have to dress up with (.) you know (.) just (.) be
2183 without having to [ talk. And so that is nice to (.) have that
2184 [ with
2185 A: [ Yeah . [ Mmm
2186 J: someone. (.) When you are younger (.) you have it with guys (.)
2187 you know. Or I did (.) perhaps. I always had a best friend =
2188 A: = In a peer-group kind of sense?
2189 J: Yep. Of course (.) because its socially (.) you know (.) its
2190 fine but its not perhaps (.)
2191 S: I don't think (about John as my) (.) I mean I don't say I've
2192 got a best friend =
2193 J: = No I don't [ either.
2194 S: [ I haven't got a best [ friend. Cos I haven't got
2195 a
2196 J: [ No I don't either. I
2197 would shy away from that as well. Because I don't...
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2198 S: best friend. (.) Lot's of friends for different parts of my
2199 person[ality, (times) and [ places.
2200 J: [ Exactly right. [ Yeah. (.) Definitely.
2201 S: I wouldn't go around calling someone my best friend and I only
2202 want [ (them).
2203 J: [ Yeah. And I (.) you know (.) yeah.
2204 A: [ Mmm
2205 S: I don't think that at the time of our lives and where we are
2206 (.) that (.) we fit in (.) with each other (.) quite well.
2207 J: Absolutely right. I mean (.) yeah. That's it, [ that's it.
2208 S: ' [ I  don't think
2209 that we feel we don't want to move on, if I found someone that
2210 I want to [ be with
2211 J: [ I wouldn't (.) but I wouldn't (.) its like (.) yeah (.)
2212 things' (.) you know (.) as I (.) I think its very important
2213 that we (.) I'm sure are both aware that its good to encourage
2214 each other to move on.
2215 A: It brings to mind that time-line we started off with =
2216 S: = Mmm
2217 A: If we were to continue that on (.) into the future (.) can you
2218 imagine how this is going to (.) unfold?
2219 S: I can see us ending up (in an old people's home together)
2220 ((laughs))
2221 J: No. I can't imagine (.) and I don't. I don't (.) you know (.)
2222 you don't (.) I don't imagine (.) do you? I can just imagine
2223 (.). I hope that the friends I do have (.) that I will have (.)
2224 you know.
2225 S: Yeah (.) I think that we would be friends.
2226 J: Yeah. (.) Yes, totally (.) absolutely.
2227 S: But it depends on [ (other people)
2228 J: [ I can't think of any off-pat answers to
2229 this sort of end question.
2230 D: That's fine.
2231 S: ( ) it would totally change. If I was with someone (.) and
2232 if I.had a child (.) which I don't know that I can, can't,
2233 will, won't [ or whatever (.) but if I did have a child (.) you
2234 wouldn't
2235 J: [ or indeed if its gonna be possible.
2236 S: be =
2237 J: = I wouldn't be interest[ed. .(.) I do like them (.) but for
2238 short
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#2239 S: [ interested. He can't bear (them)
2240 J: periods. And if I had another kitty [ (.) no one compares to my
2241 S: [ I  wouldn't be interested.
2242 . J: princess. ((laughs)) She loves that kitten doesn't she?
2243 S: We'd have to put it outside. ((laughs))
2244 J: ■ In the rain. ((laughs))
2245 A: There was (.) one (.) thing that Sarah mentioned (.) that we
2246 haven't asked about at all and we ought to (.) think about
2247 including in that's where a particular friendship comes in
2248 terms of the hierarchy of friends. I don't quite know how you
2249 missed that out =
2250 D: = Mmm
2251 A: But you mentioned that when you talked about bestest friend and
2252 not being best friends.
2253 D: Emm.
2254 A: Not wanting to describe it like that.
2255 D: (.) You sound (.) you sound like you've got something in mind?
2256 A: No (.) I (.) think we are done but what we'd like to do (.) to
2257 ask you about is the interview (.) because as you know this is
2258 the first one we have done.
2259 J: I thought it was really crap !
2260 S: We could have done with more scones.
2261 A: Thank you !
2262 J: I think (.) its not what I thought (.) at all. And I thought
2263 (.) I wonder why (.) why you are asking these questions. Cos
2264 they are personal (.) and I don't see how they (.) are of
2265 interest. You know its [ like a
2266 S: [ Yeah, but our dynamic (.) might not be another gay
2267 (.) straight couple.
2268 J: So it would be nice to talk about (.) you know (.) the
2269 attraction (.) why gay guys have girlfriends. Its frustrating
2270 not to.
2271 D: Okay =
2272 A: = I was explaining to John about how (.) psychological science
2273 worked in terms of (.) we have to work from specifics. It
2274 wouldn't be enough for you to talk about other people. We have
2275 to hear about you (.) and then we go and interview other people
2276 and add. That way we build up a generalised picture of how (.)
2277 gay men and straight women (.) are (.) how they talk about
2278 their relationships.
2279 J : Speak for yourself mate!
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2280 A: So it has to come from the specifics rather than what you know
2281 in general terms.
2282 J: Okay. (.) So what do you think?
2283 D: About how the interview went (.) or about gay men and =
2284 J: What use was (.) is that still on?
2285 A: Yep. Cos =
2286 J: = This is all useful !
2287 D: I'm really (.) well a lot of the things like the picture (.)
2288 and the timeline are sort of techniques which aren't so
2289 standard in interviews so we are kinda trying out things and
2290 seeing how people are with these things. You've both been
2291 really useful because I can see some things worked and others
2292 were (.) more difficult or slightly inappropriate.
2293 J: Hmm
2294 D: I (.) I certainly felt your (.) your (.) slight discomfort a
2295 couple of times.
2296 S: Well we feel =
2297 J: = well the picture and the (.) well its probably just a
2298 personal thing [ its probably just a personal thing (.) I was
2299 going to say
2300 S: [ its you (.) its you I think.
2301 J: I think other people would enjoy the picture.
2302 S: If you were Christopher Biggins he'd be out drawing portraits.
2303 J: Exactly.
2304 D: But obviously (.) you know (.) in an interview I need to be
2305 aware (.) of =
2306 J: = I think that people pick up that questions are not always
2307 that well received. Its good perhaps just to go (.) "Oh, try
2308 something else."
2309 S: But then I think (.) you've gotta keep that (.) you've gotta do
2310 that to everybody to gauge whether (.) he's odd that he didn't
2311 =
2312 A: = I (.) I (.) think it would be (.) what I'd suggest is that
2313 Dan uses everything for another couple of interviews and to
2314 interview people with whom there is a (.) prior relationship
2315 there (.) so that (.) we =
2316 S: = I might just (dislike) pencils ((laughs))
2317 A: Yeah. ((laughs)) So we just need to get a sense of (.) of
2318 whether (.) the timeline works across a number of interviews.
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2319 J: Its kinda like I was thinking (.) its like an insipid movie
2320 with Madonna and that guy (.) Rupert Everett (.) you [ know (.)
2321 and I
2322 . D: [ Yeah
2323 J: just had these ( ) felt insipid to me.
2324 S: Yeah, but you are the type that doesn't [ g o  to (them).
2325 J: [ Yeah I know. So (.)
2326 its personal (.) you know.
2327 S: The timeline (felt) difficult because we had (.) years of our
2328 relationship (.) just getting to know each other more and more.
2329 But for (ages) it didn't change at all and you feel that that's
2330 not what other people might (.) probably (knew) at the outset
2331 that he's gay and I'm [ straight and no a lesbian ! ((laughs))
2332 J: [ You don't want confrontational relationships
2333 do you? (.) So you don't want (.) you know (.) if your
2334 relationship takes (.) a Jerry Springer approach its gonna be
2335 tiresome. So they are probably less (.) She's [John's cat]
2336 adorable (.) let's plug it [the microphone, which the cat is
2337 trying to play with] into the mains ((laughs)). No (.) she'll
2338 bite it won't she?
2339 D: ((laughs))
2340 J: (.) Yes
2341 A: But its also (.) but its interesting to have this guy as part
2342 of the interviewing team here (.) because (.) you were
2343 deflecting and not wanting to talk about personal stuff all the
2344 way through = ,
2345 J: = Yeah =
2346 S: = Really?
2347 A: Yeah. The pattern was so obvious from an early point of view.
2348 The deflections were quite interesting and strategic (.) and so
2349 it might not (.) in that sorta situation ( [cat
2350 bites microphone] )
2351 J: Leave it. Its much easier to comment and judge on other
2352 ■ people's (.) lifes than your own (.) you know.
2353 S: I judge more on your than you do on mine.
2354 J: I can judge yours (.) I would do (.) your obsession with
2355 (smoothness).
2356 S: (Smoothness?)
2357 J: You know (.) plaster.
2358 S: Yeah.
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2359 J: But you know (.) Or your inability to get a heating engineer
2360 'round. I can think (.) its those sorta (.) I wouldn't put a
2361 weight on that (.) but its just that you can see how things
2362 could be better for me (.) and so it (.) and vice-a-versa.
2363 S: I think that maybe I (.) I could put it more (.) than a gay
2364 straight, [ a male female relationship that I made more of a
2365 thing
2366 J: [ But that's a big issue.
2367 ■ S: about his gayness and coming out than it being equal (.) don't
2368 you think?
2369 J: Hmm
2370 S: Cos he wasn't openly gay from the outset [ its not like we had
2371
:
2372 A: [ Yeah
2373 S: equal playing field.
2374 J: Yeah (.) but that's just like (.) Yeah (.j true.
2375 .D: But I mean these things are important. I wouldn't want to go
2376 around assuming that everyone was in this position of (.) of
2377 (.) making (.) embarking on friendships where (.) where (.)
2378 people were (.) sort of gay from the start =
2379 A: = Mmm
2380 D: I think it is important =
2381 J: = Well yeah (.) definitely. It is an individual thing isn't it.
2382 So what's your hopes for the end result (.) of the research?
2383 Understanding or something?
2384 D: Yeah, it is an area that hasn't been (.) researched. And there
2385 are a lot of assumptions that are to do with (.) friendships
2386 and how they may or may not be different to (.) romantic
2387 relationships. I kind of wanted to unpick some of that a little
2388 bit.
2389 J: Platonic relationships between two women would be something I'd
2390 think would be =
2391 S: = Well
2392 J: Or even between two guys. (.) How do we differ? Except that we
2393 might watch Will & Grace?
2394 S: Cos you've got a male perception of things and I've got a
2395 female perception of things.
2396 J: Okay.
2397 S: You're often two women who were good friends before (.) and
2398 maybe they'll go off on holiday and fancy the same person (.)
2399 and you're bitchy and nasty.
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2400 J: So what's different?
2401 S: ((laughs))
2 4 0 2 D: That's the heart of it.
2 4 0 3 ( (laughter))
2404 A: That's what we are trying to unpick.
2 4 0 5 J: But it is interesting I mean (.) it is interesting that (.) its
2 4 0 6 not (.) its only in Rupert Everett type movies that it is
2407 . portrayed and everyone knows (.) you know (.) about that
2 4 0 8 relationship. But I've never read anything interesting on it.
2 4 0 9 Have you?
2410 S: Well someone must have though it was important enough to (base)
2411 Will & Grace oh it.
2 4 1 2 J: Well look at the success of that [ I suppose (.) and it (.) its
2 4 1 3 D: [ Yeah
2414 J: like its (.) and ideal friendship (.) because there is sexual
2415 tension (.) but its not with each other (.) you know. Which is
2 4 1 6 good. Two women together would maybe feel competitive. And two
2417 guys together would feel (.) I'm just wondering if male
2418 friendship is (.) there is a lot of pride around (.) you know
2419 (.) in (.) in male friendship. So those two things take away
2 4 2 0 from the (.) from the gay man (.) straight female.
2421 D: That's a very interesting idea actually.
2 4 2 2 S: Are you going to try to get hold of some people who are (.)
2 4 2 3 probably have been friends for a long time and then the guy is
2 4 2 4 with someone and the girl is with someone (.) and I wonder
2 4 2 5 whether it is still = '
2 4 2 6 A: Yep. [ Quite how outside involvement (.) and outside
2 4 2 7 relationships
2 4 2 8 - J: [ That would be
2 4 2 9 A: impact upon the (.) relationship is something that would be
2 4 3 0 very interesting =
2431 D: = Yes, it would (.) certainly. -
2 4 3 2 A: So this is like (.) the way it will unfold is that over time we
2 4 3 3 will look at w h o .we have got and what circumstances they are
2 4 3 4 talking about (.) and looking then and deciding'who is missing.
2 4 3 5 Who do we need (.) what viewpoint isn't represented here and we
2 4 3 6 can go out there and seek after people who fall into that (.)
2 4 3 7 category.
2 4 3 8 S: I can think of one that would be really (.) interesting but (.)
2 4 3 9 I don't see (.) I don't see Pauline any more. When I was at
2440 college (.) one of my tutors she was five years older than me.
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2441 She'd been out with a guy Tony for ten years and moved down
2442 from London as a couple together [ and after a couple of years
2443 here (.) he left her
2444 A: [ M m  -
2445 S: and came out that he is gay. But their relationship has like
2446 lasted (.) well I haven't like seen them for a long time (.)
2447 but their relationship lasted (sufficient) time for them to get
2448 married and have two children. I dunno how they are now but (.)
2449 it's a big thing to have a ten year relationship [ with someone
2450 A: [ Really?
2451 D: [ Gosh
2452 S: and then the shock of =
2453 A: It would be interesting to hear the process [ (.) How (.) how
2454 they
2455 S: [ Yes
2456 A: did that. (.) What? You look =
2457 J: Yeah (.) no (.) I was just saying (.) you know that (.) I'm
2458 sure there's more pertinent things you could be asking (.) you
2459 know =
2460 A: = Such as?
2461 J: Well a little bit less fluffy and a bit more direct. You know
2462 (.) things that you would want to know.
2463 A: It's hard to be (.) you can't be direct in interviews because
2464 (.) if you are direct (.) if you overly direct (.) then you are
2465 accused of leading. So therefore [ the questions have to be
2466 open .
2467 J : [ Well
2468 A: They should have been (.) quite therapeutic like [ very open
2469 (.)
2470 S: [ You just
2471 talk them out.
2472 A: invitation-like. That (.) that's what it is [ (.) yeah.
2473 S: [ I suppose if you
2474 are too specific [ people clam up. Wouldn't they?
2475 J: [ But if then if they are open to (.)
2476 A: Or you can be accused of (.) you can be accused of (.) pushing
2477 down this particular route. It might be frustrating but that's
2478 the nature of (.) of the game that we [ have to be (.)
2479 J: [ D o  you think (.) have you
2480 (.) collected anything that's of use?
2481 D: Oh, [ certainly, yes.
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t2482 A: [ Yes !
2483 D: Absolutely =
2484 J: = Really?
2485 A: Yes. =
2486 S: = (That he) is awful ((laughs))
2487 J: Well, that's good.
2488 D: Definitely (.) yeah.
2489 A: From my point of view (.) I [ was (.) saying to (.)
2490 S: [ ( ) you've met him not that
2491 many times before.
2492 J: Yeah (.) he's got like loads [ up on m e .
2493 S: [ That's why I'm quite surprised
2494 you agreed to do it. Because of what he =
2495 A: = But I needed someone I could trust to (.) be (.) be on the
2496 side of the =
2497 S: = But he obviously really trusts you. Your relationship has
2498 been sort of online and meeting [up. But you've not ( )
2499 as a
2500 A: [ Yep.
2501 S: friendship thing =
2502 A: = Yep, [ yeah.
2503 J: [ Mmm
2504 S: But that's quite a trusting thing for you to do to bring me in
2505 (.) for him to hear it all.
2506 J: Yes (.) I trust (.) yes that's true (.) yes I trusted you
2507 (two/too) =
2508 A: = You fool
2509 J: Yeah (.) [ never-mind ((laughs)). (.) That's interesting isn't
2510 it?
2511 A: [ I shall use ( ) online as ammunition. I shall
2512 (.) just (.) just save bits of it.
2513 J: I think its an interesting subject like I (.) said. It would be
2514 nice for there to be an accessibility for other people to
2515 understand it (.) in a not clichéd [ way. So if you could
2516 attain
2517 A: [ Mmm (.) yeah
2518 J: that that would be good [ (.) but its not (.) friendships are
2519 (.)
2520 D: [ Yeah
2521 J: not what you can (.) well you (.) want something from
2522 friendship. You know (.) its like a (.) tennis game isn't it?
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2523 Yeah (.) and I don't think you [ should (show everyone that)
2524 (.) pictures like
2525 A: [ But we got that.
2526 J: that.
2527 A: But we got that in terms of what you might want (.) you might
2528 want out of it and (.) what function the friendship might be
2529 fulfilling for you (.) we talked about that.
2530 J: Did we?
2531 A: Yeah
2532 S: Yes
2533 A: You don't remember? There was lots of stuff about you talking
2534 about what was (.) the thing that struck me most of all was (.)
2535 and I said this to John in the Kitchen. We were talking about
2536 how he (.) he tends to do (.) how he built this wall around him
2537 and (.) would deflect things. Throughout the interview you've
2538 got that pattern (.) again and again.
2539 J: Well that's a personal thing. But (.) but (.) that does not •
2540 help your research because that's my problem [ its nothing to
2541 do with
2542 A: [ No, no (.) its about
2543 the description of (.) its almost like it gives credibility to
2544 your description of (.) of (.) the communication pattern
2545 because we can see it in the friendship (.) we can see (.) well
2546 (.) it here in the interview. That there is added support its
2547 not just that you are (.) [ you know
2548 J: [ But its of no interest to your (.) ultimate research
2549 . because it's a personal detail (.) it's the way I am =
2550 S: = But its statistics (.) if they do ten interviews [ and find
2551 . that
2552 J: [ Unless you
2553 find that there is like definite roles and (.) you know.
2554 A: Part of what (.) part of what we are looking at is about how
2555 gay men and straight women talk about their friendships. So
2556 what (.) so the analysis of this will be very (.) very
2557 detailed. And you may be surprised by some of the stuff that we
2558 [ (manage to) pull
2559 J: [ make up
2560 ( (laughs))
2561 A: out of this. [ ( )
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2562 J: [ Okay. It would be interesting (.) you know it
2563 would be (.) useful if (.) we could (.) you know (.) it would
2564 be useful to have any reference that isn't clichéd [ and
2565 S : [ ( ) at the end of
2566 his online profile he can put as seen on... ((laughs))
2567 J: Too true.
2568 D: I'm not gonna take away this picture and use it to (.) put out
2569 the view [ that (.) that its just like that the whole time.
2570 J: [ (Here's) a gay man (dancing to music) and that is proof!
2571 ((laughs))
2572 D: Everything you are saying now about this picture (.j is sort of
2573 part of what we can (.) look at. .What you are saying about it
2574 is that in many ways you think it is very twee =
2575 J: = Yes
2576 D: And that forms part of our =
2577 . J: = But it may form part of how I am or part of Sarah is not (.)
2578 you can't (.) well maybe you [ can.
2579 A: [ You can't speak on behalf of all
2580 straight women who are (.) and gay men who are involved with (
2581 ) so therefore that's why we have to look at you as a
2582 friendship (.) as a twosome (.) to begin with and then [ keep
2583 J: [ Okay,
2584 I understand that.
2585 A: adding to that.
2586 J: But you'd think that you would know that (.) without having to
2587 do that.
2588 D: No
2589 J: Why?
2590 A: Because you don't have (.) you don't have the research base to
2591 make that conclusion. When (.) you (.) when [ you (.) when you
2592 S: [ (You can't) make
2593 it up can you.
2594 A: say psychological research [ is often accused of (.) stating
2595 the
2596 J: [ But you know it!
2597 A: obvious. And sometimes it does seem like it is stating the (.)
2598 obvious, but the difference is that what we (.) assume to be
2599 obvious is (.) there often isn't a real [ research evidence
2600 base
2601 S: [ You've gotta have
2602 people state it.
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2603 A: for it. And I don't think that what we'll be saying will be
2604 obvious at all.
2605 J: That's good then. Now I (.) yeah (.) you know (.) yeah.
2606 D: A lot of the reason that I embarked upon this originally was
2607 that I found very difficult what was being published in certain
2608 magazines (.) what was being said were some of the clichés were
2609 what you were [ talking about earlier. And (.) like Adrian says
2610 J: [ Yeah
2611 D: (.) there isn't always that evidence there to support it.
2612 . J: I think the most fascinating thing is (.) yeah (.) the most
2613 fascinating thing is there is a female population that is like
2614 a gay male population ten years ago. There's lots of single
2615 women (.) you [ know and they are cheating, dating (.) through
2616 internet
2617 D: [ Mmm
2618 J: dating and (.) speed dating (.) you know. Its not (.) you know
2619 (.) they might meet up and have a shag and that. They don't
2620 need the boyfriend (.) the traditional role (.) cos its (.) you
2621 know incompatible with how they are. You know so maybe the
2622 female members (.) of the relationship are (.) it's what (.)
2623 it's an interesting angle =
2624 D: = It's a fascinating angle.
2625 J: I mean because the thing is (.) is because traditional roles of
2626 marriage and especially early marriage (.) are going out the
2627 window (.) you know (.) cos marriage gets later (.) and because
2628 (.) women these days don't need a man and don't have roles. You
2629 know (.) like a lot of single women friends of your age group
2630 (.) are very independent career-minded (.) bright women (.) and
2631 they're scary to guys. And guys don't (.) you know (.) they
2632 just (.) you know (.) find them too scary, tough and ( )
2633 because they don't know how to behave with them because their
2634 roles are taken away.by these women who are above them (.) and
2635 are assertive. And so how do you react if you are a guy? You
2636 know?
2637 D: Hm
2638 J: There best thing is (.) you know (.) a gay guy (.) will be more
2639 culturally aware and and will be of more interest to the women
2640 perhaps. Whatever.
2641 D : You raise a very interesting issue actually.
2642 J: I think so.
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2643 S: I think (.) its just our relationship it can go on for years
2644 (.) like a marriage or something might do (.) without the
2645 tension of the sex (.) feeling [ y o u  know
2646 J: [ Without sentiment. You care for each
2647 other but you're not possessive with each other. Yeah, there's
2648 not a role which is good.
2649 A: Okay (.) but you say without (.) sentiment? What do you mean by
2650 sentiment?
2651 J: Mm [ Well
2652 S: [ H e  means getting upset about relationship breakdown.
2653 J: Yeah (.) if like Sarah didn't call me for two days I wouldn't
2654 (.) you know be (.) [ you know like (.)
2655 S: [ Sad ((laughs))
2656 J: That sort of thing (.) like being honest (.) you know (.)
2657 things are changing in society aren't they =
2658 S: = Probably a lot of [ marriages are (.)
2659 J: [ Your age group especially. You don't get
2660 it anymore.
2661 S: Its always about that women and men have to (.) have sex to
2662 have pregnancies (.) to have children (.) otherwise they
2663 wouldn't get together at all would they? Why (.) what's the =
2664 J: = The very interesting thing I think is (.) sorry (.) this is
2665 absolutely true (.) it brings me on to this thing of envy of
2666 single people (.) mates are getting envious. Of independent
2667 single people. Because they have their cake and eat it. So it
2668 is perceived. And that's like (.) fascinating. And there's no
2669 question that's why all these instant shag sites (.) what's
2670 that straight one that's been in the newspaper (.) all the time
2671 recently (.) where you know (.) oh god its been so heavily
2672 covered.
2673 A: I know the one you mean though.
2674 J: Its just swamped with like (.) married people (.) you know (.)
2675 and just (.) go for a shag one afternoon (.) just a bit of
2676 excitement. Because the thing is they are now watching telly
2677 (.) and seeing that you know (.) the whole single life out
2678 there is accessible to them. And they are stuck at home with
2679 seven or eight year old kids, bored of their relationship.
2680 S: But (.) I think a lot of people don't make much effort in their
2681 relationships do they? I mean they don't (.) rejuvenate it.
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2682 J: So there is definiately (.) you know (.) why would you (.) you
2683 know want to be in a relationship with children (.) in
2684 suburbia? What is appealing about it?
2685 S: Cos that's just [what
2686 J: [ The only thing that was appealing about it
2687 was (.) that it was what you did. But now you don't have to do
2688 it .
2689 A: Hmm (.) that sounds a very pessimistic and negative view.
2690 J: It's [ positive (.)
2691 A: [ What might be something that might be appealing about
2692 that?
2693 J: Well of course there is (.) and (.) you know (.) of course
2694 that's just slopping around and being comfortable within your
2695 own front door (.) closing the door (.j I don't take that away.
2696 But then twenty years ago, thirty years [ ago (.) You see you
2697 don't have
2698 A: [ Mmm
2699 J: to have (.) your [ own (.) your own (.) roles [ now.
2700 A: [ Yes
2701 S: [ You forget
2702 though we are both (.j financially we can afford to do (.) you
2703 know (.) (neither) of us are well of (.) but financially we can
2704 afford to do what we want, [ we've got our own homes (.) a lot
2705 of people
2706 J: [ Mmm
2707 S: struggle financially when they've got fam[ily.
2708 J: [ Yes (.) true.
2709 S: And the strains of all that. So we're (.) not normal like that
2710 (.) are we? =
2711 J: = Yeah (.) forget what I said. I hadn't thought it through I
2712 was just of the top of my (.) it just came into my [ head.
2713 A: [ Okay =
2714 D: = It's very interesting.
2715 J: That's why it is important (.) things are interconnected I'm
2716 sure of it. (.) Yeah (.) previously gay men would have liked to
2717 have a female friend so they can be (.) girlish. Cos they have
2718 no other area to be girlish (.) do they? Can't be with their
2719 mates, can't be with their work colleagues. It's just with
2720 another girl (.) you know (.) and because (.) gay men didn't
2721 have gay friends =
2722 A: = Mmm
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2723 J: And now of course they do. But like it's a need isn't it? And
2724 also for a lot of women (.) it (.) they like the attention of
2725 the gay men (.) in the traditional cliched sense will give
2726 them. They take notice of things, tell them they are gorgeous
2727 (.) it might be the only person who does tell them that.
2728 S: You've never said that ((laughs)) (Do you) have other female
2729 friends?
2730 J: • Sorry.
2731 A: The more I think about it, the more I think it would do no harm
2732 to (.) include more questions of the nature of what John was
2733 suggesting there =
2734 D: -• Mmm
2735 A: Because then we could ask people to talk in general terms and
2736 then make [ connections between their experience and this.
2737 J: [ Give them more (.) mm (.) benefit of the doubt ■ (.) that
2738 they can handle (.) you know (.) bit more grown up stuff than
2739 (.) timelines and things.
2740 S : Maybe you should make it between straight men and gay men? And
2741 their friendships =
2742 J: = That would be fascinating.
2743 A: You don't get (.) well (.) it would be hard to winkle out.
2744 J: Yeah (.) very hard (.) I bet they would be. Because its loaded
2745 so much isn't it? Yeah (.) that would be [ tough.
2746 A: [ But we were (.) Dan is
2747 (.) (attendant) and if there [ is (.) ( )
2748 D: [ Yeah (.) the idea is kind of later
2749 on to involve other people though (.) rather [ than just (.)
2750 you know
2751 S: [ Yeah
2752 D: (.) other people who might have [ opinions on this and =
2753 J: . [ Yeah
2754 S: = Do [ you know
2755 J: [ Its just a really time (.) to be doing this sorta
2756 research I'm sure (.j because =
2757 S: = It's a bit of a shame Will & Grace has happened because (.) [
2758 we
2759 J: [
2760 It's quite interesting.
2761 S: (.) we were like them before they came on the telly (.) in the
2762 sense of our humour [ and stuff (.) but then [ the norm is Will
2763 . &
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2764 A: [ Hmm
2765 D: [ Mmm
2766 S Grace -
2767 J: • Exactly (.) and you [ know
2768 S : [ S o  you're . [ not
2769 A: [ (So, that's) (.) so that's
2770 the benchmark that everyone [ uses?
2771 J: . [ I  (.) I (.) the only (.) I mean the
2772 redeeming [ (feature of that)
2773 S : [ (Maybe) people have turned into them =
2774 J: = Exactly right (.) and I have seen people .(.) you know (.) in
2775 the gay community (.) ape (.) you know (.) things from Will &
2776 Grace (.) I (.) the redeeming thing about it is that it is
2777 funny. Thank God (-.) but you know =
2778 S: = (For us) I thought it was quite nice to see it because it
2779 validates you doesn't it? =
2780 A: Yeah (.) sure.
2781 J: No (.) because they are good, positive (.) they're not like
2782 saccharin models (.) you know what I mean (.) they are quite
2783 (.) they are quite flawed =
2784 A: = Yeah.
2785 J: Which is good. Better than having them all perfect. It would be
2786 boring (.) I'm not saying that just to you.
2787 A: I've been rumbled ! ((laughs)) I knew it was bound to happen one
2788 of these days. Right shall we hit the road?
[Tape is stopped]
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Tm gay and .99% of my Mends are straight wemen. You may study me, if you wish!
Jas btice; Jun 20GS 
PuMs'5,a5
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BGFW I’m gay and funnily enough I would say I have an equal number of relationships with
straight women, straight men and gay men! rm not the camp stereotype of a gay 
fuses: n/a man so I suppose straight men feel more comfortable around me than they would
other ga y men. Some of my dosest: ftlomdshilps are with straight men!
In respsnse to toe OP, sorry I can't Stink of any gay man-straight woman frtendsWps
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My Best Friend's Wedding - Juia Roberts and Ftupert BvereB.
It probably Erst came to my attention In the mid-BOs with Madonna, either oiling  
herself or being called, a Tag hag', as she was Mends with lots of gay fellas,
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rm  ^ralght and I  had a Gay friend In High School.
We don't talk much now because we are on opposite sides: of Texas going to Uni now 
hut I can tell you things about him athough rm  not sure If he'd be considered Gay 
because he was a Transexual or Tea engendered person, whatever you call it.
f ie  dressed like s  Girt and saw himself as a Girl even though technically he was a Soy
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and ZVe heard that many Transexuals don't consider themselves Gay became B ey  
believe they are really straight trapped m toe opposite sex's bosy and many times 
they have surgery to change that.
*12
Can I throw something In here? Without wanting to rock the boat too mueh, isn't 
o ?  just wanting FM's here to do the groundwork of research for him? Bit cheeky for s  
first past ki my Rook. bAthatfs just the way I perceive Bis.
' *13
P u i o G  a id Cilia bladteseem gtite dose
Ju^th hai i e  : and juRmn G ary w e e  pretty (Awe th ey  w ent on  HoNday together
*14
##K:____________  ;_______________ _
Otiginally Posted by Em erkain M o l
I'm s&ra^M and /  had a Gay friend in fffgA 5CA0O&
w e  d o n t t a *  maçü mm  bem use we a /e  oa sides &  Texas oo «7 is
wtsweiiirmedce 
coasidlenKf<5yOecBM5eAewasaTi^ oseiW<y7^ o%encknedper30i^
whatever yüu o i ï  It,
Hs ûressed # e  ,3 GM and saw hlmseîf as a Gif! a van tmough tacnnkahy ha 
mm a Soy and iV e heard that many Ttansax usfc don't consider toemse/ves 
Gay temtEre tâey CeiJeve they are reaAy straigh t trapped in the opposite 
sex's Posy and many times they have surgery to change that
ManypeopiAh veofflodtyurdeirsta«&nghuw gay and straight applies to
transsexual p* pie and usually get it wrong n am'v because they have equal 
dtmcuity unoe stand mg what transsexuar actuauy nrean^.
tf your friend Zs a transsexual woman (which see ms to fee what fsti'm âesarôtog) and 
is attracted ts men. she Is straight.
If she Is attracted to other women, she Is gay (lesbian).
$ 0, * o m  your a _ o  pt you dPdm'f have a gay M end m Wgk M AwLwW ryi
. Ggga
*13
Thanks everyone for toe suggestions sa far. Seems like quite a few films deal with tois 
topic - some of them I’ve seen, others I need to track down. I’ll have to analyse them 
all regardless, Rut are any of them particularly good In your opinion?
Sassen, thedonmelster and nation*ide232 - you all mentioned real life celebrity 
exam ples. I hadn't thought of that angle before. Although S m o n  Amstell on B uzzco#*
make a joke about Cilia and Dale W into A the other day so I'm sure you're onto
something! Are there any other examples that come to mind?
Thanks once again
#16
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I've lurked on and off for about a year. I’ve got a fair idea what media sources to look 
at, but K k  alw ays worth casting the net wider and people's replies have been really Intereamg.
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gay men are l&e this ^
Dan,
Maybe my mind’s  gone blank, but I cant think of any prominent gay male Ammeter# . 
en TVI
The only gay man I can think of was Leon from Roseame, and mat's go*mg keck IQ
years.
*2D
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Priflnally  P asted  by G ra n d  D izzy  
Am,
'kybe my mmds gone kamk, but J caAt (AWt of an}' prominent gay male
characters o.t TV'
TAeorSygaymanfcamfAWtOfwes Leon ^ -om and mat's gelrK?hack IQ yearn.
what about Sean in corrte
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Gay me# ik e  women as ttieir Mends It gives them power, 
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I pefsanally think a tat of A a fg h t w om en Eke to he around gay m en because th e /r e  
unthreatenfng - they know that they're not gofng to com e onto them  or anything, but
they can still have a mate Mend they can talk to sate in the knowledge that it's net 
going to develop Into something tmcomhxtab#e_. t a t  a  thought.
* 2 4
Quote:________________
Qfieinaliy teted h y-eteE a
f  psœsmîfy tstiak a lot otsbaighl women M e to 6e amuixSgaY man because 
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atocjgA t.
I agree with that elena.
My sister w as beaut;IW -  stunning, s h e  em ployed a gay mam and a  very dd ery  
gentlem an. Both w ere ku ely  to her They were (he only males her husband did not 
object to her talking to nutte* that he was.
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The relationship betw een Jo and 
Geoffrey in the piay "A Taste Of 
Honey" - m ade into a him in 1961  
with Rita Tnshmgham, Dora 
Bryan and Murray Melvin, Also 
the film "Get Real" {1998) has the 
friendship betw een the main gay 
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"Queer as Folk" UK series had the 
friendship betw een Nathan and 
D onna....there are loads o f  
exam ples!
-
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Q  03-12-2006, 19:40
sarum
Forum Member
Join D ate: Jul 2004 
Location: W iltshire UK 
Posts: 2,233
Quote :
Originally Posted by S h in ea  ligh t
Srg Brother had a few examples
Brian and Narinda - Big Brother 2  
Marco S  Michelle/Em ma -  Big Brother 5
IMG A better exam ple from BBS would be Dan and Nadia. Their relationship w as quite 
touching, and I believe it's still continuing.
[ j  03-12-2006, 20:41
D'Ohnut 
Forum Member
Join D ate: Apr 2005 
Location: Edinburgh 
Services; Sfcy-f 16QGb, TW
 erne, Blue yonder lOmh
Posts; 716
Gimme Gimme Gimme (with kathy burke and James drey fus)
310
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kitïcmie 
Fomm Member
lo in  Date: May 2006  
Services: Jam es Sutton's 
CheeHeader 
7,100
Jack and Jen in Dawson's Creek is a relationship well worth studying. An excellent 
script as well. Series 2 onwards.
§103-12-2006, 22:59
cuttlefishspike 
Forum i
Join Date: 3d  2.004 
Location: h ttp ://tw :sto ri,com 
/  #i J o v e
Services: http://tvriston.com
/#5_hate 
Posts: 3,397
Quote:
Original:!1/  Posted by C onstructio n m an
Gay men like women as tfietr friends it gives them power,
knowing you cant have m e Love but you would Love zo.
Cm, hope you are joking, (hence the i 
boosheet.
î ). If not, then you are talking myaagimstic
True frienships are built on a wide variety o f foundations, not wholly on sexuality and 
‘power struggles'.
18 04-12-2006, 09:19
dan_s 
F<
Join Date: Nov 
Posts: 6
ê
Thank you so  much for all your suggestions. It’s  interesting to se e  the range: 
celebrities, reality TV and scripted drama. I wonder too about print media. I've got an 
article from Elle magazine back in about 2003, but are you aware of ever having read 
anything about gay men and straight women?
I was really interested to read Midiboy's post about A Taste of Honey back in 1951. 
With so many contemporary exam ples fits interesting to hear about something from a 
few years ago!
El 04-12-2006, 13:52
r?cky77 
Fomm Member
Join Date: Jun 2006 
Location: Eating, W est London 
Services: Zen in ternet 
Posts: 933
funny that gay m en/straight women get along, but lesbians/ straight m en tend not to!
104-12-2006, 14:03
KB8J
Forum Member
Join D ate: Jan 2006 
Location: Bleeding Herts 
P osts: 4,947
Q uote:
Originally Posted by d a n _ s
Thank you so much for all your suggestions. It's interesting to see  the range; 
celebrities, reaiity TV and scripted drama. I  w o n d er to o  ab o u t p rin t 
m edia .  I ’ve got an article from Elle magazine back in about 2003, but are 
you aware of ever having read anything about gay men and straight women?
Fictional rather than factual, but wasn't there a gay chap who was part o f Bridget: 
Jones's "urban family"? Think he w as called Tom. Bridge, Shazzer and Jude were al 
straight women, iirc. Helen Fielding wrote it.
Q  04-12-2006, 14:24
iarrysrabbit 
Banned User
Join Date: Mar 2005 
Locati on: Hi ding! II!! 
Posts: 4,657
Quote:
Originally Posted by C onstruction m an
Gay men like women as their friends it gives them power,
knowing you cant have me Love but you would Love to, &
1 disagree. You may know people like that but my gay friends are my friends because 
they like me and I like them. Mind gam es don’t interest m e.
105-12-2006, 16:39
311
dan_s
Forum Member
Join Date; Nov 2006 
P a s ts :€
Quote;
Originally Posted by KBBJ | 
Fictional ra ther than factual, but wasn't there a gay chap who was part of I 
Bridget Jones’s  ’’urban family”? Think he was called Tom. Bridge, Shazzer and j 
Jude were all straight women, iirc. Helen Fielding wrote it.
Oh yes, I remember him. He was the former pep star or something.
@ 05-12-2006, 16:42 # 3 8
KB S3 Quote: " •
Join Date: Jan 2006 
Location; Bleeding Herts
Originally Posted by d a n _ s 1 
Qh yes, I remember him. He was the former pop star or something, 1
Posts: 4,947
That’s the one. If you're after more literary examples (Tm sure you’ll find som e in 
chick-lit), you could try the books forum.
1
H  05-12-2006,16*49
gandatron 
Foram Member
Join Date: Nov 2006 
Location: Oxford, Khartoum, 
Athens
Services: Broadband, m atrass 
turning, green flavoured cakes, 
classical studies 
Posts: 2,391
Q uo te :
Originally Pasted by a lla sjo n es
Just remembered bbe film 'As Gaod As I t Gets’
Bloody good film.
Q  05-12-2006,16:59
-beckee- 
Forum Member
Join Date: Nov 2006 
Location; Bolton 
Posts: 145
Q uote:
Originally Posted by C onstructionm an
Gay men like women as their friends it gives them power,
knowing you cant have me Love but you would Love to, #
Women like gay men as their friends too dunno why, I think it might be cos 
women won't judge them as much as ether men.
jH 85-12-2906, 17:10 #3
titanfiux I'm only going from personaii experience but straight women tell m e that gay men
Forum Member make great friends because they don't have any other adgenda than pure friendship.
Join Date: Mar 2005 ., ' » , ,  . , „ ,  , ’ , , , ,
Location: Manchester<.UK T heir o th e r  rem a le  fn e n d s  can  b eco m e je a lo u s  an d  cau se  p ro b lem s due  to  fe m a le s
Services; sky Digital, BT Bmeg, competing a g a in s t each  o th e r ,  ev en  on a  subconrious level,
SonyEriccson K7.5Gi A friend  once to ld  m e, th a t  e v e n  though  sh e  h ad  a  fe m a le  b e s t  friend , sh e  w ould
Posts: 875 a lw ays c o m p a re  h e rse lf to  h e r.
@ 05-12-2006, 17:12
gandatron 
Forum Member
Join Date: Nov 2006 
Location: Oxford, Khartoum, 
Athens
Services; Broadband, m atrass 
turning, green flavoured cakes, 
classical studies 
Posts: 2,391
I am straight {and male) but have significantly more female friends than male friends. 
I think it depends on the type of person you are. I'm not feminine or camp, but just 
feel like I can talk to women more easily than men.
L ast e d ite d  b y  gandatron : O S-i2 -ZOOS a t  1 7 :1 5 .  ■
0  05-12-2006,17:21
titanfiux 
Forum Member
Join Date: Mar 2005 
Location; M anchester UK 
Services: Sky Digital, BT Bmeg, 
SonyEriccson K750Î
Q uo te :
Originally Posted by gandatron
I  am straight {and male) but have significantsy more female friends than 
male friends. I think it depends on the type of person you are. I’m no t 
feminine or camp, but just fee! like I can talk to women more easily than
# 4 1
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tg  05-12-2Q0G, 17:29
titanfiux 
Forum Member
Join Date: Mar 2005 
Location: M anchester UK 
Services: Sky Digita:!, ST 
SonyEriccson K750: 
Posts; 875
Thats great but it can have complications when you settle into a relationship with a 
woman. You partner may feel slightly threatened by you having d ose friendships with 
other wom en, because there is always the possibility that the friendship "may" 
develop into something more physical.
It's not all plain sailing though We all get an attack of the green eyed monster at 
times.
One of my friends in Newcastle had huge problems with her husband, as we used to 
go out three times a week training for the g rat north run. She kept telling him I was 
gay but he eonldnt get it into his head why i wasn’t girl y and camp. He even got his 
bed: friend to come along with us to make sure w e weren't upto anything naughty. 
She found this hilarious, a t first but it soon became a problem, so I stopped training 
with her. -
& 0  2006, 17:41
-beckee- 
Fcrum
Join Date : Nov 2005 
Location: Bolton 
Posts: 145
Quote:
Originally Posted by titan fiux
I'm onîy going from persona f experience hut straight women te/f me that gay 
men make great friends because they don't have any other adgenda than 
pare friendship.
Their other female friends "can" become jeahus and cause prcbfems due to 
females competing against each other, even on a subconclaus leveL 
A friend once told m e, that even though she had a female best friend, she 
v/ouid always compare herself to her.
I agree totally ^
Q  05-12-2006, 17:54 
tribade
Join Date; Jun 2004 
Location: Edinburgh ' 
Services: $
Posts: 4,773
Quote:
Originally Posted by ricky77
funny that gay men/straight women get along, but lesbians/ straight men 
tend not to!
Generalisation, & imo, not true.
0  05 12 2006, 17:57 
CM
Jam Date: May 2005 
Posts: 23,552
Quote:
Originally Posted by cu ttle fish sp ik e
Cm, hope you are. joking, (hence the | | |  ). I f  not, then you are talking 
mysogmistic boosheet
True frienships are built on a ¥/ide variety of foundations, not whoiiy on 
sexuality and 'power struggles'.
H wasn’t  joking actually,
and who's talking about relationships,??
tor some reason or other gay men like lots of women friends i dont 
only have my theory, ig l
why i can
B  05-12-2006, 18:00
tribade 
Forum Member
Join Date; Jun 2004
Quote:
Originally Posted by -b e c k e e -
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Location; Edinburgh $ 
Services: $
Posts: 4,773
1 agree to i >
I don’t. If you don't trust your partner being friends with others (regardless of 
sexuality/gender) then there’s  bound to be problems.
□  05-12-3006, 18:07
pinker
Banned U ser
Join Date; Jun 2005 
Posts: 441
Quot e :
Originally Posted by ricky77
funny that gay men/straight women ge t along, but leshmnsf straight men 
tend not to!
I have found this to be very true, with som e gay women feeling the need to make 
sure men know they won’t  take any shit
Which is kinda of out of place when your being friendly like you would to  anyone
Ü  05-12-2006, 13:07 
titanfiux
Join Data; Mar 2005 
Location; M anchester UK 
Services: Sky Digital, BT 
SonyEriccson K750Ï 
Posts: 875
Quote:
Originally Posted by tribade
I donJb If you don’t trust your partner being friends with others (regardless 
of sexuality/gender} then there’s  bound to be problems.
Would you feel ok with the thought of your partner sleeping over at his friends house, 
if his friend was a pretty straight woman?
Jealousy plays a natural part in relationship building. I trust my partner 100%, but I 
still feel jealous when he gets unwanted male attention when w e are out together, 
and he feels the sam e when I do.
Also the point I was making was only to do with female to female friendships and not 
about partners.
its the sam e for gay guys having gay guy friends. Easier to have a female friend IMO
Last edited by iitsnfiux : 05-12-20GS at 18:15.
p  0 5 -1 2 -2 0 0 6 , 1 8 :1 7
tribade
Join Date; Jun 2004 
Location: Etânburgh $ 
Services: ÿ 
Posts: 4,773
Quote:
Originally Posted by titan fiux
Would you feel ok with the thought of your partner sleeping over at his 
friends house, if his friend was a pretty st'aight woman?
Yes. I’m a dyke. Any boo as you say jealousy is natural, that I agree with, however, 
you have to trust, that to me is very important.
Cl 06 12-2006, 00:56
Hullboy
Forum 3
Join Date; Jul 2005 
Location; Hull 
Posts: 2,365
Cilia Black and erm just about everybody
Dale Winion 
Biggins 
Paul O Grady
Frankie Howard (though not now I hasten to add)
2 of 3 < 1 2 3 >
3 1 4
B  06-12-200S, 12:40
ricky77 
Forum Member
Join D ate: Jun 2006 
Location: Ealing, W est London 
Services: Zen internet 
Posts: 933
Quote:
3 Of 3 < 1 2  3%?
Thread T ools V  
# 5 1
Originally Posted by tr ib a d e
Genemllsationf Btimo, m b  true.
I d isagree.. .obviously it doesn’t  apply to anyone, but from what I ’v e  seen , many 
m ore straight fem ales have gay m ale friends than gay fem ales have straight m ale 
friends.
A lot of gay male spaces (not just nightclubs) tend to have a fair few straight wom en  
hanging around, but this is not the case with gay fem ale spaces and straight m en.
Not saying it’s  good or bad, just saying thats what I’ve noticed:!
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C  07 12-2006, 21:56
Helorown '
Forum M ember
Join D ate: Nov 200:5 
P osts : 2,720
I’ve always had lots o f gay male friends, and had d o se  (often flirtatious) friendships 
with them , where no discussion w as off limits.
One ex-work colleague of mine is a good friend who I have been to  gigs with. He w as 
known for getting drunk at office parties and snogging women after a few drinks. He is 
d e fin ite ly  gay and not bi. %
One Christmas he w as necking the Office Totty, and a row of middle aged m anagers 
w ere standing in a line watching them.... all extrem ely jealous.
1 m ust admit to being on the receiving end at the end of a drunken works outing, and 
it w as the best kiss I’ve ever  had. I think because it w as so unexpected and slightly 
naughty. There is no way that I could be described as Office Totty, but I do think he is
315
*a Breast Man, | | | | § i
I've seen him since, and he brought up the subject 
would do if he wanted to resume where he left off.
but I don't know what I
Last e d ite d  b y  Hélbmwr, : 07-12-2006 a t  2 1 :5 8 .
ü  10-12-2006, 02*49
RadiorobFM 
Forum Member '
Join Date; Juf 2001 
Location; Manchester 
Services; AQL broadband. 
Virgin Media, Freewew, DAB 
Posts: 4,317
My take on this question is this, basing it on personal experience and observation.
I tend to see lots of women in the city I Ivie in tag long with young gay men and it 
seem s to be for several reasons. One is becuase these young men are a fashoo . 
statement, second: that these women use them to attract men (and to avoid 
heterosexual men too). Third th ese  women get sexually turned on by these people. 
Four because they find them entertaining (laugh at rather than laugh with), five 
because and five because they can get into so-called gay bars and have a go at the 
gay men there. 1 say the latter because the amount of homophobic abuse I have had 
from heterosexual females in gay bars is numerous. What saddens m e is these guys 
have no idea that these women have no interest in them  and are just using them.
Having never had any form of acceptance from a heterosexual ever  in my life my 
viewpoint might sound rather cy nical but it is my opinion that heterosexuals and 
homosexuals can never live in harmony because heterosexuals a s a group disrespect 
homosexuals and treat them as inferior, deny homosexuals the. most basic freedoms, 
invade and disrespect and straighten out our venues (this has happened twice in 
Leeds) and generally see  homosexuals as something to laugh at and attack. If 
saddens m e but sadly if  s  true.
I am lucky that I now have a group of excellent friends but I try to avoid 
heterosexuals as mudi as possible, .
Q  10-12-2006, 03:04 
julesT
Forum Member
Join Date; Oct 200S 
Posts: 1,209
No offence RadioRob but if som eone said the sam e thing visa versa they'd soon be 
shot down as a homophobe and banned from the site.
I understand you may have had problems in the past and not been accepted but not 
all straight people treat homosexuals as inferior.
I'm male but i've always been led to believe that many girls have close gay friends as 
they feel safe and comfortable around them and enjoy their company, not that they're 
out: to use them.
B  10-12-2006, 03:41
RadiorobFM
Join Date: I d  2001 
Location: Manchester 
Services; AQL broadband. 
Virgin Media, Freewew, DAB 
Posts: 4,317
I'm not saying that "all straight people treat homosexuals as inferior” but as a group 
of society we are denied the basic rights and equality that heterosexuals have because 
heterosexuals rdo not allow us that basic freedom and equality , hence me making 
that general observation. I'm ju st making an observation on what I have experienced 
and how homosexuals are treated and from society in general. -  examples include not 
being able to hold our partner's hand in the street and being denied the most basic 
social ceremony that exists -  marriage.
I think toe fact they feel safe around them is a good point to make because they know 
they aren't going to get hit upon. It’s  something the person asking the initial question 
should consdier along with the repurtisstcns of this, that heterosexual men have 
worked this out and appear in such places, (such as the gay bars where these fag-hags 
go to, as they are known in homosexual tardes) and that place no longer becomes 
safe for us to go because of the hassle we get. It's happened to two separate bars in
I f  10-12-2806, 05:33 
iipstlkesugar
Join Date: Dec 2006 
Location: Sug 
Posts: 2,633
Quote:
Originally Posted by d a n _ s
Hi, I'm a PhD student a t the University of Surrey and I’m researching 
friendships between gay men and straight women. I'm currently trying to 
find out where .people have seen these friendships represented in the media 
{magazines, films, TV, radio shows, etc,.,). So ft could be anything you have 
seen, heard or read over the last few years.
Over the next few months 111 be following up as many of these sources as 
possible and analysing them. So if you can think of something, please be as 
specific as possible because it will help me to track it down.
If you want any more in formation or are just interested in what I'm doing 
drop me a line here or email/  PM roe.
316
1u  0 12-2006, 08:27
Em zi 
Posts: n /a
All thoughts or suggestions gratsfusly received' 
Den
The American television show "Will and Grace",
Quote:
Originally Posted by S h in ea lig h t .
Big Brother had a fern examples: -
Brian and Narinda - Big Brother 2  
Marco & Michaffs/Emma -  Big Brother 5
Also Richard's friendship with Susie, Lea.
Reading Radiorobfm’s comments...I'm  afraid have peen evidence o f that. Som e 
straight women, especially career wom en, do tend to se e  gay men as an accessory, 
no different from toy dogs or oversized bags. Young gay men are som etim es labelled 
"Fag hags handbags" because they are there just to hang off your arm looking 
attractive. They’re pets, basically. Som e men must get something out of it - no-one 
forces anyone to :be friends with straight women!
B  10-12-2006,14:21
RadiorobFM 
Forum Member
3oin Date: Jul 2001 
Location: Manchester 
Services: AOL broadband. 
Virgin Media, Freeview, DAB 
Posts: 4,317
Q  04-01-2007, 10:13 
dan_s
Join D ate: Nov 2006 
Posts: 6
jH 05-01-2007, 11:00
la bra doodle ..
Forum Member
Join Date: Jan 2007 
Posts: 32
Not heard the phrase "fag hag handbags" but it's a good one,
I think these young gay men are nieve and don't see through these women. They 
think they are their friends but actually these men are their accessory.
Thanks to everyone who has contributed. Your comments are really helpful.
Quota:
Originally Posted by tltan flux
fm  only going from personal experience but straight women tell m e that gay 
men make great friends because they don't have any other adgenda than 
pure friendship.
Their other female friends "can" become jealous and cause problems due to 
females competing against each otherf even on a subconcious level.
A friend ones told me, that even though she had a female best friend, she 
%4/ould always compare herself to her.
I agree with this. I have a lot of girlfriends, [im a straight girl) but gay friends will 
often be more objective. Also, I feel I can be more open and honest with my gay 
friends, as they are less prone to feeling upset and taking what I say personally. I do 
not understand also how a woman can fall in love with a gay man. As soon as I know 
their bread is buttered on the other side, they immediately become brother-like in my 
mind!! Although Will Young is nice to look at ^
317
1Appendix 10 -  Internet Data -  Out Everywhere 
FORUMS
S T R A I G H T  W O M E N  IN T H E  M E D I A
Forums > Film, TV & Radio: Miscellaneous > Gay men and straight women in the media
Gay m en and. straight wom en in the m edia 
from AidanC (caoimhghin) 0 ^ on  Sun 10/12/0618:22
One of my PhD students is researching friendships between gay men and heterosexual women and he’s currently trying to find 
out where people have seen these relationships represented in the media (that is, in magazines, films, TV programmes, radio 
shows, etc.). We'd be really grateful if you could help out by telling us where you've seen relationships between gay men and 
heterosexual women represented in the media over the last few years. We know that there are some obvious answers that are 
bound to come up. However, we need to get a clear sense of (a) the most frequently-identified locations and (b) the range of 
locations, so all replies will be gratefully received, even if they're just restating what someone has said earlier.
Over the next few months, this PhD student will be following up as many of these sources as he can and will be analysing them 
to see how these relationships are represented. So do be as specific as possible so that he can track down whatever sources you 
identify.
If you'd like any further information about the researcli, do message me privately.
Many thanks Aidan
Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in the media
from Cheeky- Geordie - Thats Who (fruitcake) ||J gjj on Sun 10/12/0618:38
OK from what i know.. a gay man loves to dance, although he will dance alone you could find the ugliest straight woman will 
also want to dance.
I this is not a problem as the gay man will dance with almost anybody and it makes the straight woman feel special because she 
: can dance with somebody who will have no interest in her
My 1st b/f always seemed to attract the ugliest straight women to dance with... they loved him
it always confused me as to why it happened., till i caught the end on a TV program ... that explained it all
Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in the media
from Now W ith Poorlvness So Give Me Meds (morphine_attack) j§[ gj] on Sun 10/12/0618:39
rupert everett and madonna
jack and karen from will and grace
they are two obvious ones that spring to mind.
: Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in the media
i from Phil And John In The Onantocks (philjohn) m  [g Q on Sun 10/12/0618:40
" There was that series (Bob and Rose) witii Alan Davies. Didn't she turn him straight?
"
Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in the media
from Now W ith Poorlvness So Give Me Meds (morphine_attack) [|j |§ on Sun 10/12/0618:42
i don't think it's just ugly straight women that dance with gay blokes, i’ve seen many a barbie-esque straight girl dancing and 
be-friending a gay guy. '
i think it for many it is about enjoying the company of the opposite sex without sex getting in the way.
Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in the media 
from NickW  (saxifraga_umbros) 0  gg on Sun 10/12/0618:49
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>The Archers (Adam & Ian with Lillian)
Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in the m edia
from Acidicallv Alkaline (Uove.dancemmsic) |gj|jg on Sun 10/12/0618:57
OKfrom what i know .. a gay man loves to dance, although he will dance alone you could find the ugliest straight woman 
will also want to dance.
My 1st b /f  always seemed to attract the ugliest straight women to dance w ith ... they loved him
What awful comments. How they look doesn't comeinto it, you're almost making out that they should somehow he grateful for 
being danced with. Sad.
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in the m edia  
from SebT  (gorecki) ggijon Sun 10/12/0619:04
The two main people in 'Gimme Gimme'.
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia
from Look At Mah Face! (radiophonie) JU1] Q on Sun 10/12/06 20:37
; Why did God invent gay men?
; In order that fat girls could have someone to go out with
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia
from I Invented Post Its (sagebrush) QHjQ011 Sun 10/12/06 20:46
There's Sean and Violet in Corrie.
Paul Burrell and Diana...oops no, he's married isn’t he.
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in the m edia
from Footprints In The Butter.......(londondykegirl) | |  üJ pi on Mon 11/12/0617:10
Ian and Mandy Maguire in a few episodes of Shameless
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in the media
from Footprints In The Butter..... (londondykegirl) | | g 3 g§on Mon 11/12/0617:11
Carrie Bradshaw and Stanford in Sex in the City
Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in  the media
from Footprints In The Batter (londondykegirl) EH 11 on Mon 11/12/0617:11
Charlotte York and Anthony in Sex and the City
Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in  the m edia  
from London Cliterati (curve) Ü  0  on Mon 11/12/0617:12
Pauline Fowler and Derek!
I Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in the m edia  
I from London Cliterati (curve) §  El 0  on Mon 11/12/0617:12
Pauline Fowler and Derek!
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fRe: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia
from Footprints In The Butter..... (londondykegirl) | |  EU 11 on Mon 11/12/0617:13
David Guest and Liza Minnelli? Oops no they got married.
; Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia
■ from Footprints In The Butter (londondykegirl) ||[ | |  [§ on Mon 11/12/0617:15
Posh Spice and Elton John?
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia
from Footprints In The Butter.......(londondykegirl) | |  EUH on Mon 11/12/0617:23
Julianne and George in My Best Friends Wedding
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in the m edia
from Footprints In The Butter.......(londondykegirl) §  0  g  on Mon 11/12/0617:25
Nathana and his female school friend in Queer as Folk
I Re: Gay m en and straight wom en in  the m edia  
I from Neil B (actionos) ||]  H on Mon 11/12/0617:31
George Michael and Geri Halliwell
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia
from Footprints In The Butter..... (londondykegirl) IS on Mon 11/12/0617:41
And although i cant think of any at the moment, doesn't Big Brother ususally have a gay man and a straight woman who are 
best friends after 24 hours?
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in the m edia  
from London Cliterati (curve) ^  p i ü  on Mon 11/12/0617:44
hahhaha Brian Dowling and Naurindar Kauri  ^ - ^
B22..................................................................................................... ...
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in tlie  m edia  
from John T fitse27) 1^ 1  on Mon 11/12/0617:44
Thingy and thingy from Pretty in Pink (sorry but I am sure you can work it out - she was famous for a year or two, Mollie 
someone? and he disappeared without trace)
There has been a young girl and gay in Hollyoaks in the City
Princess Margaret and numerous "walkers"
Cilia Black and - well, how long have you got
Ob, and I saw Joan Collins with Christopher Biggins, but was told off on anther thread for questioning the suitabilty of that 
pairing!!
Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia  
from Neil B (actionos) 0 1 0  on Mon 11/12/0617:46
Richard and Nikki from this year's BB! That was an odd friendship because he used to chastise her and tell her off like she was 
his little daughter - because she was so immature.
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Re: Gay m en and straight w om en in  the m edia  
from J o h n T  Q'teeay) on Mon 11/ 12/ 0 6 1 8 :0 4
Elton John and 
Liz Hurley 
Gerri Halliwell 
Cilia
Princess Di
